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Introduction: Situating Power in Dynamics of Securitization
Andreas Langenohl and Regina Kreide
Contextualization and outline of the volume
Today, ‘security’ has advanced to a conception that is equally prominent
in social and political discourses and practices, and in academe. Contem-
porary diagnoses as well as historical reconstructions of security dynamics
point out that ‘security’ has evolved as a vernacular conception whose ref-
erence dimension is constantly widening, up to a point where it appears
without qualifier, but as a value in itself. For instance, it has been argued
that security, once the prerogative of the modern state and its raison
d’état, is meanwhile framed as a concern that transcends the interests, but
also the boundaries and capacities, of the state. Developments like the ex-
pansion of ‘security’, as a normative demand, to the realm of society and
to individuals’ safety, as in the conception of ‘human security’, tend to
posit state-political interests in security in contradistinction to the wellbe-
ing of social groups and societal systems of reproduction as well as to the
safety of individuals irrespective of their political belonging.1 In such con-
stellation, the conception of ‘security’ loses its seemingly self-explicatory
quality, instead becoming a key vehicle for negotiations and fights over
political prerogatives, social demands, and claims at cultural identities.
Frédéric Gros has reconstructed some aspects of this generalization of ‘se-
curity’, arguing that while ‘security’ has a quite diverse and complicated
genealogy in Western European history, it has meanwhile become a global
currency whose prominence resides precisely in the conspicuous absence
of any qualifier of what ‘security’ is concretely supposed to mean, and for
whom.2 In particular, the notion of ‘human security’, according to Gros,
serves as a vehicle for a bio-political conception of individuals as carriers
of life functions that replaces the idea of individuals as holders of human
rights.3 These accounts highlight the ubiquity, and at the same time vague-
1 Daase 2011, 2012; Junk 2011.
2 Gros 2015; see also Browning/McDonald 2011.
3 Gros 2015, pp. 185-255.
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ness, of ‘security’ as the base of the power of that conception. ‘Security’
seems to have lost all substantial qualifiers to the advantage of a negativis-
tic conception, namely, as the absence of threat. In some languages, this
negativistic definition of security even materializes on the word-morpho-
logical level, like in the Russian bezopasnost’, which literally means ‘the
absence of danger/threat’.
Accordingly, security-related research has focused for some time now
on those processes that boost the categorization of social and political con-
stellations as relevant to security – that is, as harboring potential threats to
a community or a polity. Thereby, it has been, in particular, International
Relations and Strategic Studies which have become a platform for such
conceptualizations of security. Since the 1980s, ‘Securitization Studies’
has emerged, and internally differentiated, as the “largest body of sec-
ondary literature in security studies”.4 It rejects the realism inherent in
classical understandings of IR, in particular the stipulation that states have
‘natural’ security prerogatives that organize their behavior within an anar-
chic international system in which each shift in power can only end up in a
zero-sum game. Instead, scholars maintain that security issues are politi-
cally and socially constructed. In this context, the term of ‘securitization’
has emerged as a key concept for the reconstruction of those processes
that frame given policy issues and social constellations as relevant for a
polity’s survival.5 Since then, ‘securitization’ has been conceptualized in
various ways.6 Starting from the speech act-theoretical model of the
‘Copenhagen School’ and being amended by more practice-theoretical ap-
proaches7, it meanwhile transcends the focus on polities, instead posing
questions concerning the securitization of social groups, transnational net-
works (for instance, such as terrorism), or economic developments.8
This volume contributes to this debate through a rigorous focus on the
power dimension of securitization. Thereby, it follows a dual strategy. On
the one hand, it discusses recent developments in securitization studies
from the angle of how notions of power figure in these debates. In this re-
spect, the volume’s contribution consists both in a systematization of the
debate and in the suggestions of conceptual and theoretical approaches
4 Christou et al. 2010: 348.
5 Wæver 1995; 1996; cf. Vuori 2011.
6 See Wæver 2004 and 2015, Buzan 2016.
7 Bigo 2002, 2006; 2014; Balzacq 2005, 2011; Balzacq et al. 2016; Leander 2010.
8 See, for a summary of recent research trends, Balzacq et al. 2016.
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that might benefit the debate, given the circumstance that a broad effort to
conceptually come to terms with the power in securitization processes is
absent so far. On the other hand, the volume aims at a more historical and
interdisciplinary contextualization of conceptions of power in securitiza-
tion studies through exemplarily focusing on scenes of securitization, tak-
ing up the thread in the 18th century. The contributions thus span the range
not only of political science, sociology and anthropology from which
prominent conceptual contributions to securitization studies have
emerged, but also of law, arts history, contemporary history, and social
history.
By dint of its historical and conceptual approach, the volume aims also
at questioning certain core assumptions in securitization studies as they
present themselves today. Securitization studies started out by questioning
the ontological dignity of the category of ‘security’ as used in realist Inter-
national Relations and Strategic Studies,9 thereby also conveying critiques
of the potentially detrimental uses of security as a vehicle of political
dramatization.10 However, securitization studies found it less easy to leave
behind other core characteristics of IR. This pertains, in particular, to two
of its aspects which are crucial to the realist understanding of state power
in the international system: the state and the international system. Securiti-
zation, while having broadened its horizon to scales of securitization dif-
ferent from the state (for instance, ‘macro-securitizations’),11 many of its
scholars still prefer to direct their attention to the securitization of the state
vis-à-vis threats to that state as they are being constructed within the hori-
zon of the international system (see Andreas Langenohl’s paper in this
volume).
The most powerful critique of such state-centrism has, arguably, come
from anthropology, which has recently fostered an approach that views
processes of securitization as a basic mode of the reproduction of any col-
lectivity in the sense of its production and stabilization over time.12 Ac-
cording to this approach, the invocation of security is a powerful lever in
the symbolic, social, and political constitution of collectivities; as such,
collectivities can never be regarded as ‘given’. Moreover, securitization
constructs communities and entities not only through framing them as be-
9 See for an historical overview Wæver 2015.
10 See for a discussion Browning/McDonald 2011.
11 Cf. Buzan/Wæver 2009.
12 Holbraad/Pedersen 2013; cf. critically Rollason 2017.
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ing under threat, but also through asserting that other communities and en-
tities are potentially threatening (see Regina Kreide’s and Carola Wester-
meier and Hannah Broecker’s articles). Finally, the ‘international system’
purports an understanding of principal symmetry and zero-sum logics be-
tween the units that comprise it, thus tending to turn a blind eye to struc-
turally caused asymmetries within that system, for instance, in (post-)colo-
nial dynamics (see Maria Ketzmerick’s contribution).
While this volume, therefore, presents anthropological, sociological and
political-theoretical critiques of views on securitization that still seem to
take the state and the international system for granted, it also includes
studies that question the saliency of the state and the international system
from an historical point of view. While studies on security and securing
have been common in historiography, for instance, in military and diplo-
matic history, the historical perspectivation of securitization studies is still
in a very early, but promising phase.13 Thereby, the historical reconstruc-
tions of securitization dynamics assembled in this volume aim not so
much at an outright rejection of the ‘modernism’ inherent in IR and also in
some strands of securitization studies, but rather at the productive engage-
ment with dynamics of securitization, and the power dimensions inherent
in them, through focusing on such dynamics that escape the logic of the
state as contained within an ‘anarchic’ international system. Examples
range from securitization discourses and practices in early modern munici-
palities and cities in the 19th and 20th centuries to the role of international
public law as a securitizing force that was set up to challenge the interna-
tional system’s ‘anarchy’, to securitization dynamics within asymmetrical
transnational constellations, like in the context of decolonization move-
ments.
This way, the volume dedicates itself to opening up a discussion over
possibilities to conceptualize power dynamics in securitization processes
beyond the state and the international system. In the following, we will
briefly introduce the volume’s contributions along the lines of conceptual
arguments that crosscut them. The articles are organized into two book
sections. While the first represents conceptual attempts to deepen our un-
derstanding of the power dimension of securitization processes, the second
one comprises articles which, in conceptualizing that power dimension, in-
13 Buzan/Wæver 2009; Buzan 2016; Conze 2012.
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troduce views on securitization that bypass and challenge the nexus of
state and international system.
Part I – Conceptualizing the power dimensions of securitization
Arguably, any discussion of power in securitization processes is inextrica-
bly linked with questions of how power is conceptualized in general, and
which kind of power securitization represents. The Copenhagen School
has given some impulse to debating that question. For instance, the CS has
been read as being based on a Schmittian conception of power, so that the
‘securitizing move’ embodies the sovereign declaration of a state of ex-
ception.14 Other critics have seen the CS as rather shuttling between a
Schmittian and a Habermasian aspect of securitization: As the ‘securitiz-
ing move’, it was argued, needs to be validated by relevant ‘audiences’,
there is in principle (at least, within democratic and pluralist political or-
ders) the chance to confront the securitizing move with questioning and
resistance.15 Other contributions reframed the CS argument as relating to a
rather discursive mode of power: The “grammar of security”16 invoked by
the securitizing actors, according to this view, represents a discursive
mode of power that responds to the reflexive contingency of modern soci-
eties, in that it processes that contingency through a violent transformation
into a juxtaposition of self and other.17 The discursive model of power, in
turn, has been supplemented by the question of how actors maneuver
strategically within discourse.18 Approaches delineating themselves from
the CS, like the Paris School, have conceptualized power as residing rather
in social relations structuring the dynamics between securitizing actors
and their audiences: “The practical force of discourse falls, therefore, be-
tween logical consistency and the dynamics of social power”.19 So far,
however, the debate has not resulted in a clear positing of alternatives re-
garding how to conceptualize power in securitization. In particular, the re-
lationship that securitization studies maintains with resource-theoretical
14 Munster 2005.
15 Williams 2003.
16 Buzan et al. 1998, p. 33.
17 Huysmans 1998.
18 Stritzel 2012.
19 Balzacq 2011, p. 26.
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and instrumental conceptions of power – a power that is possessed by an
actor strategically pursuing his or her interests – is still unresolved (see
Langenohl in this volume).
The contributions in the first section of this volume maintain that re-
source-theoretical and instrumental conceptions of power in securitization
are comparatively weak. As securitization is first of all a process of rela-
ting – that is, a process shaping, instigating and creating relations between
and among actors, discourses, artefacts, and social and political figurations
– resource-theoretical approaches find themselves at odds with this rela-
tional dynamic because they tend to isolate actors and their power bases.
Pursuing this argument further, any relational notion of power cannot but
establish a connection between political, social, symbolic and material
processes.20 Processes of securitization may thus be perspectivized as dy-
namics that stabilize or destabilize such relations through a primary orga-
nizing principle, which is security and its respective understandings, shut-
tling between the invocation of a threatened entity and that of potential
threat. Power, accordingly, resides in the capacity to streamline connectiv-
ities and collectivities according to the respectively pertaining logic of se-
curity and thus to produce or stabilize such connectivities and collectivi-
ties across the realms of the political, the social, the symbolic and the ma-
terial.
Andreas Langenohl’s paper dissects the securitization debate with a
view to the different conceptions of power inherent in its contributions and
strands, arguing that the question of how a notion of power can inform se-
curitization studies cannot be decoupled from understandings of the politi-
cal implicit in these currents. Within this horizon, the paper makes two
main points. First, the Copenhagen School – especially Ole Wæver’s work
– is given credit for disentangling the notion of political power from the
notion of securitization altogether. As the CS tends to diagnose the effects
of securitization as the entering into potentially fatal dynamics such as
declaring exceptional states, demanding extraordinary measures, and be-
ing bound to these states and decisions, securitization tends to strip securi-
tizing actors of any capability to engage in political coordination, especial-
ly with those adversaries that are made to represent a threat to the polity.
Thus, the CS invites the conceptualization of power not so much on the
model of securitization, but rather on that of desecuritization, in the sense
20 Cf. Balzacq et al. 2016.
Andreas Langenohl and Regina Kreide
12
of a restoration of the capability to engage in more open-ended relation-
ships, among antagonists and among allies. Second, and taking this argu-
ment further, the paper proposes a sociological variant of relational social
theory – namely, Norbert Elias’s sociology of figurations – in order to con-
ceptualize the power dynamics in securitization. Most importantly, an ana-
lytical difference is introduced between the power to securitize – that is,
the manifestation of a relational structure that encourages, enables, or de-
mands securitization – and the power of securitization, in other words, the
effects, often unintended, that securitization has on the conduct of political
and social affairs.
In Chapter 3, Regina Kreide continues this discussion and engages in a
philosophical debate about the power of border politics and its securitiza-
tion effects. She demonstrates that the ‘grammar of security’ diagnosed by
the CS is underpinned by the philosophical argumentation that aims at jus-
tifying ‘security’ as a legitimate concern in today’s societies. Yet, upon
closer inspection, these arguments are more instrumental in justifying po-
litical and social exclusion. She uses Andreas Langenohl’s (in this vol-
ume) useful distinction between the “power to securitize” and the “power
of securitization” to argue that if collectives of states mobilize their
sovereignty to close borders and, thus, “appropriate” a right to exclude,
they problematically transform our societies into securitized societies. In
conversation with scholars of critical security studies, Kreide proposes
considering the relationship between the power to securitize and that of se-
curitization as a dialectical one, which – vis-à-vis arguments in favor of a
right to exclude – reveals how the materialization of closing borders inher-
ently negatively affects those who should be protected through rendering
them, including the Roma, “irregular” and “illegal”, and, thus, through
fundamentally denying the guaranteeing of their fundamental citizenship
rights.
Hannah Broecker’s and Carola Westermeier’s joint contribution propos-
es a hegemony-theoretical understanding of the power in securitization,
viewing the invocation of ‘security’ and the constitution of asymmetrical
relations between subject positions as flip sides of the same coin. Accord-
ing to this proposition, leaning toward the work of Ernesto Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe, securitization effects connectivities and collectivities
through the empty signifier of security, which effaces differences between
the elements of the collectivity constituted as threatened as well as drama-
tizing distinctions between that collectivity and that which is supposed to
be threatening it. Taking this theoretical stance further, the paper argues
Introduction: Situating Power in Dynamics of Securitization
13
with a view to the dealing with the most recent financial crisis in the Euro-
pean Union that the securitization of ‘financial stability’ by political actors
eventually gave way to a discursive deflation of the financial economy as
primary root of the crisis as a result of a delegation of the financial prob-
lematics to expert commissions. The paper thus makes a case for an under-
standing of power in securitization that does not stop short at an analysis
of the securitizing move, but investigates how that move enters into dis-
cursive dynamics that, rather inconspicuously, turn the tables on the secu-
ritizing actors. In the case under discussion, the empty signifier of ‘finan-
cial stability’ was relocated from a discourse that securitized financial
markets as a threat to the polity (the European Union) into a discourse that
construed financial markets as the referent object of securitization.21
Carola Dietze, in her chapter, discusses the relevance of considerations
of political (de-)legitimation in a broad sense for processes of securitiza-
tion. Interestingly, critical security studies have so far discussed the legiti-
macy of political orders as such only tangentially, instead narrowing the
focus on the legitimation of securitizing actors and security professionals.
Dietze takes issue with this view on the example of debates around politi-
cal (de-)legitimation triggered by terrorism as a new tactic of political vio-
lence. In particular, she analyzes claims to responsibility and other sources
issued by some of the 19th century’s first terrorists. Security concerns and
the viability of modern states, Dietze thus shows, are intrinsically linked to
each other. She concludes her chapter with a suggestion to include the cat-
egory of political legitimacy in a more comprehensive way into securitiza-
tion studies.
Part II – Historical and contemporary manifestations of the power
dynamics in securitization
The articles in this section demonstrate that the power in securitization,
from a historical perspective, cannot be reduced to the securitization of the
polity as a given entirety – a stipulation inherent in some strands of securi-
tization theory that presuppose the state and its structures of authorization
in order to model securitization as an actualization of the ‘grammar of se-
21 Cf. Wæver 1995.
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curity’ in the first place.22 The ‘entirety’ of the polity, or of any other enti-
ty that is made into the referent object of securitization, is not given but
needs to be symbolically, politically and socially manifested. Seen from
this angle, the recent diagnosis of an enlargement of the horizon of securi-
tization from state to society and to the individual23 merits historical re-
consideration, because it was never the state or the polity per se that be-
came objects of securitization – rather, state and polity are referent objects
of securitization that require symbolic work for their constitution.
The sheer institutional existence of states, as well as the focus of securi-
tization studies on democratic political orders (cf. Dietze’s contribution),
has often tended to camouflage the construction work necessary to consti-
tute the referent objects of securitization. It is, hence, smaller-scale enti-
ties, like cities and social groups, within them which are beneath the state
and polity level that can become the object of security concerns, both in
the form of constructed referent objects and as constructed threats (see the
contributions by Krüger and Lenger, Haus, and Ivasiuc). Here, the sym-
bolic-political, but also material, work of securitization becomes aptly ob-
servable because the nexus between those groups, often tiny in number,
and the overall security concerns of the community, society and polity is
based on symbolic inflation, dramatization, and material stakes. Also,
these articles show that the local dynamics of securitization lend them-
selves to being scrutinized through Foucauldian categories of power, such
as pastoral, disciplinary or governmental power, which enter into complex
synchronicities.
Historical study also demonstrates that the international ramifications of
power dimensions in securitization require a much more cautious recon-
struction than the all-out instrumentalist approach of realist IR, which still
seems to infiltrate securitization studies inasmuch they cling to an instru-
mentalist notion of power and the general heuristics of the international
system (see Langenohl in this volume). The ‘international’ cannot be re-
duced to an anarchic inter-state system producing zero-sum struggles for
hegemony, but fashions complications. For instance, considerations of
how international law intervened in processes of securitization opens a
view to the construction of security agendas beyond the nation-state level
(see Thilo Marauhn’s article). Conversely, securitization processes in post-
22 See Balzacq’s 2005 critique.
23 Daase 2011, 2012.
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colonial transitions highlight the structurally unequal relationship between
(former) metropolises and (former) colonies (see Maria Ketzmerick’s con-
tribution).
Lastly, a historical perspective is also able to establish that the power
dimension of securitization does not necessarily reside in strictly time-
bound speech acts or practices, but may intrude into the symbolic invento-
ry of society. Images and imaginations of peace and order may be, in fact,
undergirded by a securitizing appeal to the porousness and preliminarity
of such peace and order (see Katharina Krause’s contribution). The con-
ceptual consequence is that the line between ‘ordinary politics’ and the
‘securitizing move’ might be harder to establish than envisaged by the
Copenhagen School. In other words, the ‘grammar of security’ might be
rooted in, and handed over by, symbolical representations and material
artefacts that reference not squarely threat but rather the desirability of ‘or-
dinary’ order against the horizon of its imagined sophistication that equals
its imagined fragility.
Sebastian Haus’ paper deals with the ways that drug users in public
spaces in Frankfurt am Main became the object of governance by the city
administration from the 1970s to the 1990s. He argues that the city’s anti-
drug politics – which at times involved massive securitizing moves and
measures, such as demands to hospitalize drug users and to ban them from
public spaces – war repeatedly rearranged in connection, first, with public
discourses about the threats that public drug use pose to ‘public order’,
and second, with the emergence and spread of HIV and AIDS since the
1980s. Thus, the administration’s take on drug policies was seldom un-
equivocal. The 1970s and 1980s were characterized by competing dis-
courses framing drug use either as a security threat or, in a ‘pastoral’ sense
sensu Foucault, as a threat to the users’ wellbeing. With the advent of HIV
and AIDS, this dual discourse gained complexity, as emerging self-help
organizations of HIV-positive people, in close connection with the city’s
gay community, were able to reframe HIV and AIDS not as a matter of
security or pastoral care, but as a matter of self-organized empowerment
campaigns that highlighted the autonomy and agency of groups held to be
at risk. The cooperation between these initiatives and the city administra-
tion was double-edged with respect to the balance of power: while gay
men effectively resisted their securitization, and included heroin users in
their cooperation with the city in the fight against HIV, ‘liberal’ modes of
governing heroin users modelled after Foucault’s notion of governmentali-
ty gained ground. The limits to this liberal governmentality came to the
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fore, however, with the effective dissolution of the public heroin scene in
the city on the basis of renewed securitizing moves by the city administra-
tion at the beginning of the 1990s – a turn that the author interprets as
pointing to the limits of governmental power, even in a place like Frank-
furt which had ‘reinvented’ itself in a distinctively neoliberal style since
the 1980s.
The article of Thilo Marauhn and Marie-Christin Stenzel argues that
power, security, and public international law are closely interrelated. Jurid-
ification plays an important role in this relationship. The authors reveal an
interesting interface between juridification and securitization, as juridifica-
tion can be seen as an instrument that is adopted in order to address a situ-
ation of perceived insecurity. International law, like the climate summit or
conventions against committing war are discussed examples. However, ju-
ridification does not allow for more security but may lead to a process of
de-securitization. The authors define de-securitization as re-transferring is-
sues back into the regular political processes. Public international law
could then be perceived not only as a means of securitization but also as
an instrument of de-securitizing. Putting this way, this legal approach of-
fers a much broader conception of securitization than has been proposed
by the Copenhagen School.24 The Copenhagen approach then appears to
be too narrow for a comprehensive analysis of international negotiating
processes. Looking at public international law through the lens of securiti-
zation helps to better understand, the authors argue, the interface between
situational hermeneutics and instruments adopted in response to a situation
defined as relevant in terms of security.
The joint paper by Christine Krüger and Friedrich Lenger engages in a
social history of the securitization of dock workers’ strikes and protests in
the cities of London and Hamburg in the late 19th century. The compara-
tive view fleshes out the different stakeholders’ interests as well as politi-
cal and discursive strategies of the parties involved in those conflicts.
Through the reconstruction of those dynamics, the Copenhagen School’s
model of securitization is complicated through a sociological analysis of
the dynamics of bargaining and persuasive power. While in Hamburg, the
strikes and protests faced a massive securitization through the discursive
invocation of class struggle as a threat to the social order, with the state
being called upon as the guarantor of security of last resort, in London a
24 Cf. Wæver 1995.
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tendency prevailed that interpreted the strikes as the symptom of a social
order in need of reform. On the conceptual level, the authors conclude that
their comparison reveals two different articulations of security in the two
cities. While the Hamburg scene lends itself to a CS-style analysis of secu-
ritization processes through dramatizing speech acts that are capable of in-
flating a class conflict into a security concern for the polity and for society
(which, as a side effect, may result in path dependencies that restrict op-
tions of arbitration), the conflicts in London rather merit an analysis in
terms of Foucault’s notion of governmentality: The protests were taken up
by the owners of the means of production and the local government as a
call for social reform, equaling a de-securitization which has a govern-
mental power dimension inasmuch as it is based on a vision of social
forces regulating themselves, and that channels potential threats to the se-
curity of the societal system into organized negotiations. Security, in other
terms, was not to be effected by a ‘securitizing move’ that would wield the
powers of the sovereign state, but rather through a rearrangement of the
potentially self-regulatory forces of social dynamics.
Katharina Krause’s paper approaches the power dimension in securiti-
zation processes from the perspective of arts history. It poses the question
how prints and image series in Nuremberg from the 16th to the 18th cen-
turies portrayed the contemporary political and social order – and hence
political legitimacy – through conveying a sense of threat that was, how-
ever, held in latency. In the images under investigation, this shows, for in-
stance, through the portrayal of town fortifications which never move to
the foreground but instead frame representations of a quiet and orderly life
in the city and its vicinity. According to the author’s interpretation, this
ambivalently signals both a demonstration of political and administrative
power and a reminiscence of earlier battles and wars, portraying the
peaceful everyday as both orderly and exposed to a latent threat. And it is
through this ambivalence and the durability conveyed to it by the visual
representation that the images exert a distinct ‘power of securitization’ (cf.
Langenohl’s contribution), that is, a power that short-circuits the represen-
tation of political legitimacy and social order with the lasting allusion to a
potential threat. Thus, the article contributes to deepening our understand-
ing both of the constitution of the modern ‘grammar of security’ in the
long term, and the share that visual representations – which are character-
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ized, according to Lene Hansen,25 by perceptual “immediacy”, “circulabil-
ity” across different contexts of perception and, as Krause’s article clearly
demonstrates, “ambiguity” – have in it.
Maria Ketzmerick’s contribution is dedicated to an analysis of power
dynamics of securitization in a period of decolonization, using the exam-
ple of Cameroun in the 1950s. She looks at the power relations between
the anti-colonial resistance movement, U.P.C., and the French administra-
tion in Cameroun under the umbrella of the UN trusteeship council, evolv-
ing and transforming in the course of a conflict in which various securitiz-
ing moves were taken by all parties involved. Moreover, securitization dy-
namics switched between different scales, from local to state and to supra-
state levels, such as that of international organizations like the UN, which
proved to be an effective projection screen and modulator of securitizing
moves. Like in other recent contributions,26 the study shows that, from a
historical perspective, the effects and the ‘success’ of securitizing moves
cannot be understood without taking into account different audience struc-
tures on different scales and their interdependencies. The study also
demonstrates the aptness of a notion of ‘balance of power’ as in Norbert
Elias for the analysis of securitization processes, as it reconstructs how the
different actors on different scales negotiated their positionalities and al-
liances.
Ana Ivasiuc suggests a framework for the analysis of power dimensions
in securitization modelled after Actant Network Theory. According to her
argument, which empirically relates to processes of securitization of social
groups labelled ‘nomadic’ observed in the city of Rome, the still prevalent
divide between the Paris School and the Copenhagen School has to be
seen in the context of an overall epistemological impasse, critiqued by La-
tour, which results from the epistemological separation of symbolic mean-
ing and material presence. Processes of securitization will thus only ever
be partly understood in their complexity. In order to arrive at an alternative
epistemology, the author conducts an exemplary reconstruction of the se-
curitization of Roma groups in Rome in which material objects and their
(dis)placement, like surveillance cameras and fences around state-autho-
rized Roma camps, merge which symbolic constructions of the Roma as
dangerous. In this perspective, power is conceptualized as being the prod-
25 Hansen 2011, pp. 55-58.
26 See Buzan/Wæver 2009.
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Arguably, this volume falls short of suggesting the ‘one’ conceptualization
of power in dynamics of securitization. Rather, its objective is to probe the
grounds for elaborating on alternatives to the, still often encountered, im-
plicit resource-theoretical notion of power in securitization studies – a
power that enables strategic actors to securitize, be it through dramatic
speech-acts or through less dramatic, but no less effective, professional
practices. Developing alternatives to such simplistic view entails con-
fronting the available versions of securitization studies both with concep-
tual reconstructions – with an ‘immanent critique’,27 as it were – and with
historical reconstructions of processes of securitization that point to the
limits of current securitization studies’ understanding of power.
Finally, the results presented in this volume invite an engagement in re-
search along the following general lines: the relationalities of securitiza-
tion between different actors, across different discourses and between dif-
ferent scales of power figurations, from local to global; the materialities of
the power of securitization, not only with respect to the role of material
artefacts and processes in security routines, but also with respect to the
materiality of the ‘securitizing move’ as it crystallizes in different material
and medial formats; and the long-term formation of ‘grammars of securi-
ty’ (whereby ‘grammar’ might be too narrow a term, invoking language
practices while glossing over other symbolic registers) and their organiza-
tion into what might be preliminarily called an archive of security. Future
archivists of security and securitization, in reconstructing the records,
might be better equipped to challenge the ubiquity of ‘security’ as an al-
legedly universal concern.
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This chapter presents a theoretical and conceptual reconstruction of under-
standings of power in current securitization studies. In the first part (sec-
tions 1 and 2), it argues that these understandings have to be approached
against the background of all three major ‘schools’ in post-realist securiti-
zation studies that maintain a critical relation to realist International Rela-
tions (IR), and that conceptions of power crucially revolve around the
question of how to conceptually situate the political in processes of securi-
tization. In particular, this chapter will argue that the Copenhagen School’s
theorization of securitization provides the richest basis for this endeavor
because it is based on the conception –– perhaps implicit –– that rescues
power as a particular mode of the political for analysis.
This argument then provides the platform for the paper’s second part
(sections 3 and 4), which suggests a relational model of the power of secu-
ritization. Drawing on works in relational sociology, especially such by
Norbert Elias, it proposes a distinction between the conditions that enable
actors to engage in securitization (the power to securitize), and the differ-
ent effects that these practices may have, including those that come as un-
intended consequences of securitization (the power of securitization).
While acknowledging that these two parts of the paper may be read as
forming different projects that both merit chapters of their own, I want to
show that a discussion of current securitization studies’ engagement with
the question of power (and the absence thereof) actually invites a relation-
al modelling of power dynamics in securitization.
Current Securitization Studies: Three schools and their disputes
This section introduces current securitization studies by way of what can
be identified as their common genealogy, namely a critical questioning of
1
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assumptions regarding security in realist understandings of International
Relations (IR). The three schools of securitization – “Copenhagen, Paris,
Aberystwyth” as identified by Ole Wæver1 – regard themselves as critical
interventions into realist and neo-realist theories of international relations,
claiming the core of IR – that is, security – for alternative readings of se-
curity. In this, they also challenge the realist conception of power in IR as
rational and utilitarian agency on the side of states and their elites, respec-
tively.2 From the perspective of securitization, ‘security’ is not the natural
prerogative and concern of states within an anarchic international system,
but is rather claimed by political elites and other actors for the legitimation
of political agency and supremacy.
At the same time, the three schools differ with respect to how exactly
they reconstruct the logic of securitization. This section traces the major
disputes in securitization studies, in particular the debates around the
speech-act theoretical model of the Copenhagen School, the role of audi-
ences in supporting or denying ‘securitizing moves,’ and attempts to in-
clude the dimension of routines and practices into the conceptualization of
securitization. At stake in these discussions is, on the one hand, the effec-
tiveness of securitization practices and, on the other hand, the ways that
securitization is imbricated with strategies of implicit or explicit authoriza-
tion and legitimation. With effectiveness and authorization/legitimation
being two conceptual core components of political power as commonly
understood, it is surprising that the debates in securitization studies have
so far mostly refrained from dedicating conceptual attention to ‘power’ as
a major component in the theoretical genealogy of securitization studies.
This prepares for the discussion in Part II, which is dedicated to a theoreti-
cal and conceptual reconstruction of understandings of power in current
securitization studies.
“Copenhagen, Paris, Aberystwyth”: Three interventions into realist
International Relations
The field of current security studies is characterized by a multitude of ap-
proaches that multiplied with the advent of non-realist security studies in
1.1
1 Wæver 2004, 2015, pp. 92–93.
2 Cf. Lipschutz 1995, Der Derian 1995.
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the 1980s.3 Starting with the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CS),
since the end of the systems confrontation between liberal-capitalist West
and state-socialist East, a number of approaches have formed whose aim it
is to articulate alternatives to the dominant realism in International Rela-
tions (IR). While realism has meanwhile differentiated itself into compet-
ing sub-approaches such as ‘neorealism’ or ‘neoliberalism’,4 it is still,
broadly put, characterized by the conviction that polities (that is, states)
have ‘natural’ security interests (often named raison d’état), that these in-
terests tend to conflict with each other, and that such conflicts take place
within a normatively largely unregulated, in fact ‘anarchic’ interstate sys-
tem. By way of contrast, critical interventions into realist approaches pro-
ceed from the assumption that security interests are neither given nor natu-
rally coupled to a polity’s condition of existence or existential threats, but
that they are politically, socially and culturally constituted. In other words,
security is the outcome of processes termed securitization. Not least, this
approach promises to yield more historical context to security studies,
highlighting the historical conditions under which particular policy fields
or societal, economic and cultural concerns become subject to securitiza-
tion.5
The inner differentiation of this branch of security studies – which one
might call constitutive-theoretical securitization studies as they are all in-
terested in the ways that security concerns become constituted through ac-
tors, discourses and practices – has been quite complex since the early
1990s. Two ‘schools’ of securitization studies – the CS and the ‘Aberyst-
wyth’ or ‘Welsh School’ (WS) – emerged virtually simultaneously, at that
time not entertaining many interconnections. Later, the so-called Paris
School (PS) emerged, partly in critical appreciation of major conceptual
elements of the CS. These debates have been shot through with broader
theoretical referentialities, and have been characterized differently by the
protagonists in the debate. For instance, Balzacq opposes two broad cur-
rents in securitization studies, namely ‘philosophical’ and ‘sociological’
approaches, whereby he attributes the philosophical register to the CS (be-
cause of their alleged clinging to a universalist speech-act theoretical mod-
el of securitization) and reserves the sociological register for the PS,
stressing social and political conditions that determine the effectiveness of
3 Wæver 2004.
4 Cf. Jahn 2012, pp. 20–23.
5 Buzan & Wæver 2009; Buzan 2016.
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securitizing practices.6 Buzan names feminism, constructivism, poststruc-
turalism and postcolonial theory as major distinctions in current securitiza-
tion studies that differentially rely on theoretical resources that combine
an emphasis on the constitution of security with aspects of hierarchization
and marginalization of subject positions.7
Here I want to briefly characterize the three schools, for introductory
purposes. The CS, as already mentioned, fashions a speech-act theoretical
model of securitization, according to which political actors label certain
political, social, cultural or economic problems as existential threats to the
existence and survival of the polity.8 The underlying speech-act theory is
borrowed from Austin,9 and thus can be categorized as a linguistic-prag-
matic theory. According to this theory, securitizing speech acts invoke a
semantic repertoire, the so-called “grammar of security”,10 that declares a
problem as exceptional. Thus, its handling is made the prerogative of a
centralized authority (usually the government) which is thus legitimized to
suspend the normal checks and balances of political conduct. The PS, dis-
tancing itself from the CS’s preoccupation with the speech-act, has been
more interested in practices of securitization that change the conduct of
social, political, economic and military affairs with the aim to fight
threats. These practices usually operate beyond the level of publicity asso-
ciated with political speech-acts, and are typically engaged in by experts
who often make use of a professionalist, as opposed to political, type of
legitimation.11 Finally, the WS, which has had some repercussions in femi-
nist and postcolonial securitization theory, is based on a normative refuta-
tion of the state’s claim to the security prerogative, arguing that security
ought to relate to individuals, social groups and populations, whereas the
state ought to be relegated to a purely instrumental role with respect to
achieving such security.12 Security is thus associated with the emancipa-
6 Balzacq 2011.
7 Buzan 2016, pp. 128–129.
8 Wæver 1995, 1996; Buzan et al. 1998.
9 Austin 1976.
10 Buzan et al. 1998, p. 33.
11 Balzacq 2005, 2011; Bigo 2006; Leander 2010.
12 This redefinition of security concerns as related to social processes and conditions
of participation is also reflected in more recent studies on changing ‘cultures of se-
curity’, like the extension of classically state-centered security concerns to the
realm of so-called ‘human security’ (cf. Daase 2011, 2012), however, without the
normative ambition that is characteristic of the WS.
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tion of individuals and peoples from oppressive state apparatuses. It is the
express aim of the WS to refute realist IR, which is denounced to be ob-
sessed with questions of the distribution of power among states, and to
work toward a normative paradigm shift, that is, toward a notion of securi-
ty informed by moral philosophy.13
In the following subsections, I will discuss some crucial issues regard-
ing the interrelationship of these three schools as well as view them com-
paratively in greater detail, in order to prepare the later discussion of the
implications of securitization processes regarding power dynamics in se-
curitization. It is thereby useful to start out with a debate that has charac-
terized in particular the interrelation between the CS and the PS, while the
WS, which has been less present in the mainstream debates, will be given
less attention.
The ‘audience’ disputes
The Copenhagen School’s speech-act theoretical model of securitization
implies audience conceptually in the performativity of the speech-act, and
thus does not have to address the presence or absence of concrete audi-
ences. According to Vuori, this limitation of the securitization move to its
nucleus, the speech-act, is a strength of the CS because it is unambiguous-
ly constructivist: “Thus, the core of securitization theory is the intersubjec-
tive establishment of a security status for an issue. This core is not con-
cerned with threat perceptions, or whether something is really a threat, nor
is it concerned with security measures”.14 The CS approach thus opts for a
constitutive-theoretical variant of securitization theory that depicts the ul-
timate process of securitization in a speech act that conjures up a “gram-
mar of security”,15 whereby the notion of ‘grammar’ is deliberately used
in the speech-act theoretical sense, namely as forming the ‘felicity condi-
tions’ of a performative speech-act of securitization. Thus, Vuori’s argu-
ment is that through the speech-act theoretical architecture of the “securi-
tising move”,16 the departure from realist or substantialist notions of secu-
rity can be accomplished most radically and decisively.
1.2
13 Booth 1991.
14 Vuori 2011, p. 136.
15 Buzan et al. 1998, p. 33.
16 Id., p. 25.
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From this perspective, the CS embeds itself within the much grander
horizon of the linguistic turn (cf. Bachmann-Medick 2010), setting out to
challenge any understanding that security refers to something ontological-
ly given. Accordingly, it has been categorized as a theory dedicated to the
analysis of security as a “self-referential practice” by Thierry Balzacq, its
most ardent critic.17 However, the CS is not the only theoretical strand of
securitization studies which opposes any substantialist understanding of
security with an emphasis on the self-referentiality of security. Sharing the
interest in the symbolic constitution of ‘security’, but rejecting the route
via speech-act theory, Jef Huysmans holds that “[s]ecuritisation is not a
speech act but a multidimensional process in which skills, expert knowl-
edge, institutional routines as well as discourses of danger modulate the
relation between security and freedom”.18 In earlier works, Huysmans had
suggested a discursive understanding of securitization, according to which
the ‘content’ of security consists in “an ensemble or rules that is immanent
to a security practice and that defines the practice in its specificity (Fou-
cault, 1969: 63): I will use the Foucaultian concept ‘discursive formation’
to refer to this ordering logic which the signifier articulates.”19 Like the
CS, Huysmans proceeds from a self-referential model of the practice of
securitization, and also from the (historical) preexistence of a semantic
structure to which securitizing acts make reference (called ‘grammar’ in
the CS and ‘discursive formation’ by Huysmans). Yet unlike the CS, he
does not see this self-referentiality grounded in the performativity of a
speech-act but in the reproduction of a discourse through the practices it
organizes.
As mentioned, Thierry Balzacq proved to be the strongest critic of the
self-referential model of securitization. In 2005, he presented a detailed
critique of the CS, arguing that it had appropriated Austinian speech-act
theory in a one-sided manner. According to this critique, the CS collapses
Austin’s complex theoretical edifice of the performativity of speech-acts
into only one of its aspects, namely that of ‘illocution’, that is, the capacity
of certain speech acts to bring about a new status of social affairs by dint
of their very utterance (which presupposes that the securitizing actor is so-
cially authorized to perform the act). This comes at the expense of the as-
pect of ‘perlocution’, which regards reactions of addressees of that speech-
17 Balzacq 2005, p. 177.
18 Huysmans 2006a, p. 153, as quoted in Vuori 2011, p. 159.
19 Huysmans 1998, pp. 232-233.
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act as crucial conditions of its performativity, or empirical effectiveness.20
From this point of view, the response of ‘audiences’ to the securitizing
move is thus of utmost importance for the empirical reconstruction of the
speech-act’s effectiveness. At the same time, Balzacq retained the impor-
tance given by both the CS and Huysmans to the “semantic repertoire of
security [as] a combination of textual meaning – knowledge of the concept
acquired through language (written or spoken) – and cultural meaning –
knowledge historically gained through previous interactions and situa-
tions. Taken together, these two kinds of meanings form a frame of refer-
ence through which security utterances can be understood”.21 This “se-
mantic repertoire” figured under the term of “context”. In later works,
Balzacq, while retaining the focus on the significance of audience respons-
es to securitizing moves, enlarged his context model by non-discursive di-
mensions, in particular, “the dispositif, that is, a constellation of practices
and tools”.22
Since Balzacq’s interventions, the notions of ‘audience’ and ‘context’
have been subjected to much differentiation against the background of
manifold empirical studies, that is, they are used in order to differentiate
empirical accounts of successful, or on the contrary failing, practices of
securitization.23 The three texts mentioned in parenthesis are indicative of
how the audience postulate has been taken up and differentiated into very
different directions and in conversation with different strands in Interna-
tional Relations, the social sciences and the study of culture more broadly.
For instance, Mark B. Salter conducts a “dramaturgical” analysis of air
transport security in Canada which conceptually relates to Goffman’s the-
atrical model of social encounters, underscoring the argument that the au-
dience must cooperate in any actor’s securitizing move for it to be persua-
sive and hence effective.24 Holger Stritzel presents an “intertextual” analy-
sis of the securitization of organized crime in the U.S., where “discourse”
is seen as an aspect of the social and securitizing acts are reconstructed
with respect to how they situate themselves within a discursive structure
encompassing more than just security-related discourses.25 This approach,
20 Balzacq 2005, pp. 174–178.
21 Id., p. 183.
22 Balzacq 2011, p. 3.
23 Salter 2008; Stritzel 2012; Senn 2016.
24 Salter 2008, p. 321.
25 Stritzel 2012, p. 549.
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although insisting on the audience’s function in authorizing securitizing
actors, itself relates to audience responses proper only indirectly, instead
depicting the persuasive strength of securitizing moves in their ability to
involve various discourses. Even more radically, Martin Senn’s “rhetori-
cal” analysis of post-Cold War nuclear arms securitization,26 relating to
Mieke Bal’s narratological categories,27 implies that the persuasive de-
vices in securitizing moves are located on the level of the text (or, here,
the film) itself, and can be reconstructed without taking into account the
audience’s response empirically. The last two examples thus locate the ef-
fectiveness of securitizing moves theoretically in audience and context,
yet refrain from making empirical audience responses the starting point of
the analysis.
Thus, the ‘audience disputes’ have not led to a clear valorization of au-
dience as a methodologically unavoidable instance in the analysis of secu-
ritizations. Rather, securitization studies have found ways to circumvent
such methodological rigor while, on a theoretical level, accounting for the
saliency of the category of audience. Thereby it has been mainly theoreti-
cal registers stemming from the humanities, such as intertextuality or
rhetorical analysis, which, through arguing for the empirical implication of
audience in securitizing moves, avoid the figure of self-referentiality as
found in the CS and in poststructuralism together with the necessity to
turn to an analysis of empirical audience responses. This rather unexpect-
ed, if not ironical, preliminary outcome of the ‘audience disputes’ raises
the question of whether it was really the juxtaposition between “sociologi-
cal” and “philosophical” theories of securitization (in Balzacq’s terms)28
that formed the basis for the quarrel. In the next subsection, I will try to
read the ‘audience disputes’ from another perspective, namely with a view
to how the relationship between the authorization, or legitimation, of secu-
ritizations and their effectiveness was negotiated in these disputes.
Securitization: Authorization/legitimation and effectiveness
The three schools of securitization, sharing a constitutive-theoretical inter-




28 Cf. Balzacq 2011.
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differ in the ways that they interrelate two aspects of securitization: the au-
thorization, or legitimation, aspect on the one hand, and the aspect of ef-
fectiveness on the other hand. As the glimpse into the debates around the
role of ‘audiences’ in securitizing speech-acts has revealed, the dispute, al-
though represented by Balzacq as one between ‘philosophical’ and ‘socio-
logical’ approaches to securitization,29 in actuality revolved around the
separability of the two aspects. The CS, in particular as reconstructed by
Vuori,30 merges authorization and effectiveness of a securitizing speech-
act. If the ‘securitizing move’ is conceptualized in analogy to performative
speech-acts such as wedding couples or naming ships,31 then the securitiz-
ing actor’s ‘move’ can be considered effective, assuming that he or she is
authorized to perform that particular speech-act. The presence of a con-
crete audience is superfluous for this effectiveness to materialize, because
the speech-act itself indicates the presence of a political legitimation of an
actor to securitize policy issues.32 A securitizing move will thus be regard-
ed as effective if its ‘felicity conditions’ (in Austin’s sense) are met, that
is, if the ‘grammar of security’ is conjured up by an authorized person. By
way of contrast, Balzacq differentiates between the authorization and the
effectiveness of securitizing practices. While the CS implies that securitiz-
ing actors must have some kind of authorization or legitimation in advance
in order to reach out to a “target group” in the first place,33 this does not
guarantee the effectiveness of their communication, in particular not with
respect to audiences like parliaments or security councils on whose “for-
mal support” (ibid.) securitizing actors depend, and which may express di-
vergent views or outright reject the securitizing move.34
29 Balzacq 2005.
30 Vuori 2011.
31 Buzan et al. 1998.
32 Langenohl 2017.
33 Balzacq 2005, p. 185.
34 Cf. Williams 2003. – The general audience, or the public, is however regarded by
Balzacq (2005, p. 190) as uninformed, passive, and dependent upon strategic ac-
tors. Lene Hansen (2012: 532) also sees the audience as “a dynamic space where
actors seek to justify their policies and destabilise those of their opponents”, thus
refuting a notion of audience as ‘public’ in Habermas’s sense, that is, equipped
with the potential to intervene into securitization. This weakens the conceptual ar-
gument that securitizing moves should be seen as perlocutionary, as opposed to il-
locutionary, statements.
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These observations invite to pose the more general question of how au-
thorization/legitimation and effectiveness of securitizing practices are
more broadly interrelated in the field of securitization theory. This
question is undoubtedly key for the aims of the present article, as autho-
rization/legitimation and effectiveness are both key components of under-
standings of political power, especially so as Balzacq’s critique points to
the conceptual non-coincidence of those two components. The following
table, relating important contributions to the debate, fans out a spectrum of
conceptualizations of the nexus of authorization/legitimation and effec-
tiveness (see Figure 1).
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Authorization/legitimation and effectiveness are conceptual-
ly independent: securitizing actors must have some authori-
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Authorization/legitimation emerge from attributions of pro-
fessional status in professional fields, while effectiveness re-






Both authorization/legitimation and effectiveness emerge
from constellations formed by different referent objects, dif-
ferent actors and different audience structures of securitiza-
tion
Fused model
Figure 1: Conceptualizations of the nexus of authorization/legitimation
and effectiveness
As this brief, and most likely incomplete, sketch of different conceptual-
izations of the nexus between authorization/legitimation and effectiveness
of securitization implies, securitization studies is strongly imbricated with
the understanding that securitization and power are closely interrelated.
Thereby, recent contributions tend to propose what I call a ‘fused model’
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of the nexus of authorization/legitimation and effectiveness, which priori-
tizes the reconstruction of the complex constellations of securitization,
with referent objects, actors and audiences forming integral parts of secu-
ritization. This model seems to emerge as new mainstream in securitiza-
tion studies, all remaining differences between the different approaches
notwithstanding. Thus it is all the more surprising that so far there is no
systematic treatment of the question of exactly how this interrelation be-
tween securitization and power ought to be conceptualized. Instead, we
find notions of power figuring at very different conceptual points within
the respective models and the debates unfolding between them.
First, securitization studies claims for itself a critical stance toward real-
ist understandings of power in the interstate system. Most drastically, this
is articulated by Booth,35 who proposes to build security studies anew on a
notion of emancipation of the individual as opposed to power politics at-
tributed to the state. Yet, it also has repercussions in very recent contribu-
tions, such as in Buzan,36 who attributes to realism in IR an unreflected
“state-centric, power-political understanding containing an assumption of
conflict as a permanent condition of world politics”. This points to a foun-
dational scene of securitization studies insofar as they seem to depend in
their coherence on a permanent delimitation from realist IR, including a
tendency to relegate the notion of power to a traditionalist understanding
of politics within an anarchic international system. This makes it compara-
tively difficult to conceptualize power in alternative ways.
Second, a constitutive-theoretical notion of power strongly leaning to-
ward Foucault is entertained by poststructuralist contributions such as
those by Huysmans.37 Here, power conceptually figures as a structuring
force that creates scenarios within which securitization reigns unques-
tioned, so that securitization “does not refer to an external, objective reali-
ty but establishes a security situation by itself”.38 This Foucauldian con-
ceptualization of securitization power, unsurprisingly, shares with Fou-
cault’s notion of power the dilemma that either it has no room for resis-
tance against securitization or, on the contrary, it sees the potential to re-
sistance rather indiscriminately everywhere.39
35 Booth 1991, 2007, pp. 95-148.
36 Buzan 2016, p. 128.
37 Huysmans 1998, cf. also Bröckling 2012.
38 Huysmans 1998, p. 232.
39 Cf. id, pp. 245–248.
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Third, Thierry Balzacq has worked to form a complex understanding of
power in securitization practices which, however, sticks to a resource-the-
oretical approach. He proceeds from a Bourdieuian analysis that conceptu-
alized the seat of power in relations among actors informed by different
kinds and amounts of “political or symbolic capital”.40 Also, the relation
between securitizing actors and audiences is revealed as being a power re-
lation characterized by mutuality: “The ‘power to’ secure the compliance
of the audience helps the securitizing actor ‘fuse his/her horizon’ with the
audience’s which, in turn, has the ‘power to’ acknowledge or ratify the
claims put forward by the speaker”.41 The inverted commas in Balzacq’s
argument seem to testify to a certain unease with a pure resource-theoreti-
cal understanding of power in securitization; accordingly, Balzacq indi-
cates, through the notions of ‘context’ and ‘dispositif’, the position that
both the legitimation and the effectiveness of securitization depend upon
conditions that escape a resource-theoretical reconstruction. However, this
distinction between securitizing practices and their frame conditions en-
ables Balzacq to stick to a resource-theoretical notion of power all the
same or, rather, to relegate the concept of power to instrumental action
among securitizing actors and between them and their audiences.
This section has demonstrated that securitization studies, as it wishes to
challenge the dominant realist paradigm in IR, strongly implies under-
standings of power in securitization acts and practices. It engages the
question of how exactly two key components of understandings of power
– namely that of authorization, or legitimation, and that of effectiveness –
ought to be conceptually interrelated. The disputes around the significance
of ‘audience’ for the securitizing move to succeed are emblematic of these
debates. Yet, so far there is little rigorous conceptualization of the notion
of power in securitization studies.
This, as former as well as current contributions demonstrate, might
have to do with the unease that securitization studies experience with re-
spect to a classically realist understanding of inter-state power politics,
from which they consistently tried to delineate themselves. Therefore, a
closer look at the ways in which the realist IR background still informs,
maybe even haunts, securitization studies might be a promising entry point
into the attempt to reconstruct a notion of power from the different under-
40 Balzacq 2011, p. 26; cf. also Balzacq 2005, pp. 187–191.
41 Balzacq 2011, p. 26.
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standings of the political that securitization studies maintain, which will be
accomplished in the next section.
Conceptions of the political in securitization studies: The legacies of
realist IR
This section confronts the ambition of current securitization studies to crit-
ically intervene into (neo-)realist IR with the argument that much of secu-
ritization theory is still to a great degree informed by a realist IR legacy.
First, this pertains to the interest mainly in inter-state or inter-polity rela-
tions shared by protagonists of the Copenhagen School and ‘poststruc-
turalist’ contributions like that by Jef Huysmans. Second, the realist lega-
cy of IR can be depicted in more recent contributions that shift securitiza-
tion theory onto the terrain of a sociological field theory (Balzacq and Bi-
go, for instance), while retaining a notion of agency that is strongly in-
formed by utilitarianism and strategic action. This sustained link to funda-
mental categories and paradigms of IR, while pointing to the often over-
looked difficulties to apply securitization theory outside of IR,42 also har-
bors insights concerning the ways that notions of power in securitization
studies are coupled with understandings of the political. As will be argued,
the main bifurcation characterizing the field of securitization studies is
that between a resource-theoretical notion of the power to securitize (the
question of who ‘has’ power, and under what conditions) on the one hand,
and a more complex understanding of power as relating to the ability of
actors to cooperatively control the securitization dynamics in which they
are imbricated on the other. Here, it will be argued that it is mainly the
Copenhagen School that offers a way out of utilitarian and resource-theo-
retical notions of power in that it conceptually prioritizes not securitization
but rather desecuritization in the sense of a valorization of cooperative po-
litical agency.
2
42 Cf. Bigo 2014.
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The preoccupation with relations between polities
Securitization studies formed in a historical context that was characterized
by the falling apart of a supranational, bipolar order that organized most
states in the northern hemisphere into two blocs, and many states in the
southern hemisphere too, which often served as sites for proxy wars. The
demise of this particular case of a ‘macro-securitization constellation,’ as
it was later called by Buzan and Wæver,43 was responded to in IR by an
interest in newly emerging structures organizing international conflicts,
the most famous probably being the ‘clash of civilizations’ theorem of
Samuel Huntington.44 Yet, although securitization studies kept returning to
the question of supranational cleavages and more generally structures of
cooperation and conflict, the CS stuck to a classical IR perspective insofar
as they were interested mainly in relations among polities, or between
polities and those collectivities that claimed politicity (for instance, re-
gions claiming political autonomy) for themselves.45 Ole Wæver’s work
provides insight in how securitization studies did not leave behind the IR
interest in the relations between more or less clearly demarcated polities or
groups seeking political self-constitution, although they transferred it into
a constructivist argumentation. For instance, Wæver explicated that the se-
curitizing move implies a definition of the collectivity and a valorization
of its political boundaries and spatial cohesion. This way, ‘societal’ securi-
tization does not relate to security issues penetrating all fields of society,
like in surveillance studies or governmentality studies, but rather refers to
the invocation of the political collective and its ‘identity’ as the reference
object of securitization.46
Moreover, those social fields which lack an entity that can be related to
the survival interests of the polity, like the economy, do not qualify for
genuine securitization, although economic issues may by transposed onto
‘political’ or ‘societal’ terrain, that is, made a subcase of the securitization
of the state or its constitutive collectivity.47 Third, the adoption of the CS
2.1
43 Buzan and Wæver 2009.
44 Huntington 1994.
45 Cf. Hansen/Nissenbaum 2009.
46 Wæver 1996, pp. 109, 123. See for a re-actualization of this conception Abulof’s




approach by discourse-theoretical contributions (as in Huysmans)48 main-
tained, and even dramatized, the constitution of polities in modernity (that
is, states) through relations to other polities, like in the argument that the
ultimate discursive anchoring point of the ‘grammar of security’ is a dou-
ble ‘fear’ characterizing modernity, namely fear of the other and fear of
uncertainty. Through the invocation of a threatening other, which helps
banning the specter of uncertainty, polities gain self-affirmation: “Security
policies open a space within which a political community can represent
and affirm itself. The policies thus create the condition of possibility for
the political community“.49 Thus, although Huysmans developed his argu-
ment concerning the transformation of uncertainty into an ‘other’ that
must (and can) be made subject to security politics on the example of mi-
grants and not of other states,50 he kept returning to the question of how
such securitizations impact on international relations, thus retaining secu-
ritization studies’ overall orientation toward the paradigmatic question of
IR.51
Finally, in more recent contributions, CS scholars have endeavored to
frame international relations within a context of other types of inter-polity
relations more thoroughly than before. While Wæver’s article on securiti-
zation dynamics in the European Union should be read as a stocktaking of
how the supranational EU framework catalyzed and rearticulated tensions
among polities in Europe, between them and groups seeking political self-
constitution, and between states and Brussels that made no strong claim to
conceptual rigor,52 newer works conceptually highlight the ways that inter-
state relations are embedded within both geographically grander and the-
matically more heterogeneous relations. Regarding supra-IR securitiza-
tion, in their article on ‘macro-securitizations’, Buzan and Wæver argue
that between the inter-state level and the global, or world-system, level,
there exists an intermediary level of securitization which consists of ‘con-
stellations’ of other securitizations.53 The possible effect is that state secu-
ritizations may be clustered and condensed into supra-state securitization
constellations, one of the most prominent examples being the Cold War:
48 Huysmans 1998.
49 Id., p. 238.
50 Id., pp. 238–244.
51 Cf. Huysmans 2006.
52 Wæver 1996.
53 Buzan/Wæver 2009.
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“[t]he key difference [from other securitizations] is that they are on a larg-
er scale than the mainstream collectivities at the middle level (states, na-
tions) and seek to package together securitisations from that level into a
‘higher’ and larger order”.54 With respect to the thematic spectrum of pos-
sible securitization, Buzan highlights the contingency of borders and pos-
sibly conflicting securitization rationalities that result from the multiplica-
tion of possible referent objects of securitization that do not always sit eas-
ily with a polity’s survival rationalities like, for instance, human rights is-
sues or, more generally, human security.55 Yet, even here, the predominant
analytical focus remains on the effects that this plurality of securitizations
has for international relations and for the constitution of territorial borders
and political collectivities.
The focus on inter-polity relations is mainly characteristic of the CS,
not so much of the PS, which was from the outset strongly oriented toward
a ‘sociological’ understanding of securitization, and was thus informed by
theoretical resources that did not take international relations as their point
of departure (for instance, Pierre Bourdieu or Michel Foucault).56 How-
ever, as will become clear in the next subsection, the PS featured and pro-
longed another characteristic of realist IR, namely a focus on strategic
agency.
The preoccupation with strategic agency
While, as demonstrated in the last subsection, the CS represents the main
locale for securitization theory’s continuation of IR’s interest in inter-poli-
ty relations, the PS presents itself as a stronghold of IR’s emphasis on stra-
tegic agency as the common denominator of international relations. This
emphasis on instrumental action is based on genuinely sociological contri-
butions that have no direct connection to IR, such as the works of Pierre
Bourdieu or Michel Foucault. For instance, Thierry Balzacq’s self-pro-
claimed ‘sociological’ theory of securitization emphasizes the strategic re-
2.2
54 Id., p. 257.
55 Buzan 2016. On human security cf. Daase 2011, 2012.
56 Although the CS fashions a notion of ‘social structure’ too, it mainly denotes the
effect of core components of a given societal order, or hierarchy, on the ways that
polities interrelate with each other, thus referring to an ‘international social struc-
ture’ (see Buzan 2016, pp. 132–134).
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lationship that securitizing actors maintain toward their audience. With a
particular view to their relation to a mass-mediatized public, securitizing
actors appear as strategic actors whose pledges for public support are
based on a power differential between them and that audience, thus ren-
dering the audience more or less passive.57 At the same time, and referring
to the works by Didier Bigo58 and Pierre Bourdieu,59 Balzacq promotes a
capital-theoretical approach that localizes the action resources of securitiz-
ing actors in a ‘habitus’ composed of different sorts of ‘capital’ that en-
dow these actors with the capacity to maneuver and pursue their strategies
within differentiated ‘fields’ of security.60 This strategic, or instrumental-
ist, approach to securitizing agency is ameliorated by considerations of
‘context,’ which forms the frame for strategic action. In some sense,
Balzacq’s suggestion reminds of neoclassical economic models of utilitari-
an action in which (securitizing) actors pursue utility maximization under
‘constraints’ (rendered as ‘context’ by Balzacq),61 were it not that the
‘context’ is viewed by Balzacq as an enabling, as opposed to restraining,
condition for securitizing moves. What, however, is common to Balzacq’s
suggestions, neoclassical agency models, and realist IR is the axiomatic
role of strategic and instrumental action. This orientation is also clearly
present in more recent contributions that take into account the discursive
substrate of the context of securitization as, for instance, in Stritzel’s call
to consider not only the power of discourse, but also the power of strategic
actors in discourse.62
It is interesting to compare the emphasis on strategic action in the PS
with the ways that strategic action figures in the CS. Here, the picture is
somewhat more differentiated. On the one hand, the ‘securitizing move’,
which stands at the conceptual center of the CS notion of securitization,
has been perceived as alluding to a decisionist understanding of politics
57 Balzacq 2005, p. 190.
58 Bigo 2000; cf. Bigo 2006.
59 Bourdieu 1990.
60 Balzacq 2011, p. 26.
61 Cf. Kirchgässner 2008.
62 Stritzel 2012, pp. 550–552. This focus on strategic action was challenged from a
variety of approaches, like poststructuralism (for instance, Huysmans 1998), but
also feminist interventions (to which Booth, representative of the Welsh school, re-
ferred already in 1991), postcolonial and Marxist theory, that all shared an interest
rather in the structural conditions of inequality entrenched in the international sys-
tem than in the agency of securitizing actors (Buzan 2016, p. 128–129).
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borrowed from Carl Schmitt,63 where politics ultimately boils down to the
act of announcing the state of exception as the fundamental move through
which political sovereignty is constituted. Rens van Munster, for instance,
claims that Schmitt and the CS share a conceptualization of securitization
that is in the last instance derived from the scene of war: “[f]or them [CS],
too, the exceptional logic of securitisation is captured most adequately by
the logic of war”.64 According to this interpretation, the ‘securitizing
move’ appears as the ultimate strategic and instrumental act. However,
Michael C. Williams has pointed out that, although there is a clear concep-
tual affinity between the gesture of the securitizing move and that of
declaring the state of exception,65 the CS conception necessarily drifts
over into the conceptual register of communicative action sensu Haber-
mas:66
“As speech-acts, securitizations are in principle forced to enter the realm of
discursive legitimation. Speech-act theory entails the possibility of argument,
of dialogue, and thereby holds out the potential for the transformation of se-
curity perceptions both within and between states. […] It is via this commit-
ment to communicative action and discursive ethics, I would like to suggest,
that the Copenhagen School seeks to avoid the radical realpolitik that might
otherwise seem necessarily to follow from the Schmittian elements of the the-
ory of securitization. […] This element of the Copenhagen School is clearly
illustrated in the concepts of ‘desecuritization’ and ‘asecurity’ which form in-
tegral aspects of securitization theory.”67
This argument, yet, eclipses the strictness of the Austinian speech-act-the-
oretical architecture of the CS, about which it has been argued that the au-
dience response, to which Williams refers, has no empirical but a concep-
tual significance for the CS (see above), so that the theoretical point about
the securitizing move is precisely its ability to bracket empirical audi-
ences, and thus also “the possibility of argument, of dialogue”.68 In other
words, while Williams argues that securitizing moves, like any speech act,
are in principle open to response and deliberation, the key argument in the
CS is that the ‘performativity’ of the speech act and its legitimacy are ulti-
mately grounded in a ‘grammar of security’ which, as it were, outmaneu-
63 Schmitt 1934.
64 Munster 2005, p. 5.
65 Williams 2003, pp. 515–521.
66 Cf. Habermas 1987.
67 Id., p. 523; cf. also Hansen 2012, pp. 529–531.
68 Williams 2003, p. 523.
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vers any attempt to question the securitizing speech act from the very start.
However, Williams also points to the fact that, in order to understand the
ways that the CS views securitizing speech acts, one has to take into ac-
count not only the notion of securitization but also that of desecuritization.
In the next subsection, I will argue that, if viewed from the perspective of
desecuritization, the tense relationship between an Austinian and a Haber-
masian notion of speech act can be resolved, and at the same time a view
can be gained on the deep structures of the notion of the political that the
CS entertains.
Notions of the political
In this subsection, I will trace the argument that the CS in fact refutes an
understanding of securitization as stemming from strategic and instrumen-
tal action. My point of departure is Stefano Guzzini’s interpretation of the
CS and especially of Wæver’s works.69 According to his interpretation,
the core concept of the CS is not securitization, but desecuritization.
Against the historical background of successful diplomatic efforts to shift
political deadlocks between the superpowers back onto diplomatic terrain
(notably the ostpolitik of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr), Guzzini argues
that Wæver’s interest lay first and foremost with those processes that con-
quered the security dilemmas of the Cold War.70 Within the grips of such
security dilemmas, ‘strategic action’ appears as a mere mirage, as they co-
erced political actors into executing a logic of securitization that, as long
as the ‘strategic’ view held, paradoxically left them without any control
over the situation. Put differently, under conditions of security dilemmas,
strategic action can never be autonomous. According to Guzzini’s recon-
struction of Wæver’s approach, autonomous and cooperative agency can
only be regained if actors agree to reengage in a communicative relation-
ship that, among other things, is also open to the reformulation of ‘strate-
2.3
69 Guzzini’s 2015.
70 See also Hansen 2012, pp. 537–538.
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gic’ interests.71 As securitization is opposed to diplomacy,72 strategic
agency is opposed to autonomous agency which can only succeed in an in-
terrelation with other actors. Such desecuritizing agency has a power di-
mension, too, diminishing the opposing party’s chances to securitize in
their turn as securitization as a legitimate means of power becomes dis-
credited.73
Seen from this angle, the notion of the political entertained by the CS
shuttles between a Schmittian74 and an Arendtian75 – not, as Williams has
it, a Habermasian – understanding of the political, that is, between one
which sees the core of the political in the exceptional act that constitutes
sovereignty, and one that views the political as an arena of cooperation
even among adversaries.76 According to Guzzini’s reading, the difference
between these two understandings has been for the CS ultimately a norma-
tive question, with Wæver being interested predominantly in the ways se-
curitization can be turned around into desecuritization, with mutually re-
sponsive agency ensuing.77 In other words, empirical (de-)securitizations
– this is how I understand Guzzini’s argument – necessitated a conceptual
notion of (de-)securitization, which was normatively split into the affirma-
tion of desecuritization and the criticism of securitization. Thereby, the no-
tion of desecuritization may not only be read as following and correcting
securitizing moves, but also, and more fundamentally, as highlighting the
71 Lene Hansen (2012, pp. 534–535) has argued that Wæver insists on the political
responsibility that both securitization and desecuritization have to confront each
other, as, according to the CS, neither move can consistently claim any objective
state of affairs in order to legitimize (de)securitization. This interpretation invokes
Wæver’s critique of poststructuralist positions which, according to him, tend to ig-
nore the question of actors’ responsibility for securitization and desecuritization
alike. However, here I would point out that, even if that responsibility is present
from the standpoint of a normative understanding of (de-)securitization, it is still
worthwhile to embrace Guzzini’s argument that the possibility of a redemption of
responsibility is more aligned with desecuritization because securitization struc-
turally diminishes the opportunities for responsible agency.
72 See also Huysmans 2006.
73 Guzzini (2015) cites the example of the demise of state socialism when power
holders, for instance in the GDR, lost their legitimation to securitize the confronta-
tion with the west.
74 Cf. Schmitt 1934.
75 Cf. Arendt 2006.
76 Therefore, desecuritization does not necessarily announce the resolution of a con-
flict but only its ‘tending’ (Dubiel 1999; cf. Hansen 2012, pp. 536–538).
77 See Wæver 2000.
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constituted nature of ‘politics as usual’, just as securitization is conceptu-
alized as constituting a departure from ‘politics as usual.’ Therefore, al-
though ‘desecuritization’ seems to indicate a sequentially later stage than
securitization, in conceptual terms it equals securitization in bringing
about a certain state of the political – namely, the grounding of politics in
the political, which in turn is seen in the possibility to engage in coopera-
tive action even with adversaries.78 Thereby, it is through the normative
argument that desecuritization rescues the political as field of cooperative
agency that desecuritization is rendered as conceptually prior to securiti-
zation, even as securitization always empirically challenges the logics of
desecuritization.
Compared to this very complex notion of the political as found in the
CS, the Welsh and the Paris schools are more clear-cut in their premises.
According to the Welsh School, emancipation and security are identical
both theoretically and empirically.79 The political thus appears as an all-
encompassing sphere of human interactions where actors discover their in-
terdependencies. In this, there is a certain affinity to the notion of the po-
litical as heralded by desecuritization in the CS; however, the challenges
that securitization puts to that notion of the political are less clearly expli-
cated, but rather rejected in a wholesale way. In turn, the PS has no theo-
retically refined notion of the political, but insists that the political is im-
bricated with the societal or the social. The focus on practices of securiti-
zation, in clear demarcation from the CS, is meant to drive home the point
that securitization is characterized less by political speech acts or discours-
es but rather by practices that operate below the radar of politics.
With respect to the interrelated questions of how securitization studies
refer to IR and how this reference figures in the notion of the political en-
tertained by the three schools, the Welsh School and the Paris School seem
to herald a radical questioning of IR. The Welsh School identifies the po-
litical with multilateral cooperation for the sake of the wellbeing of indi-
viduals and societies, not states, whereas the PS, focusing on practices of
securitization, subverts any notion that official politics as such – for in-
stance, international relations – is of much significance for understanding
the logic of securitization. In contrast to such clarity, the CS appears to be
78 Bonacker and Bernhardt (2003, p. 228) thus rightly point out that for the CS the
condition of peace (understood in terms of a ‘security community’ in the sense of
Karl Deutsch (1970) is first of all conditioned by the absence of securitization.
79 Booth 1991, 2007; Wyn Jones 2005.
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more ambivalent, shuttling between a Schmittian and an Arendtian notion
of the political, affirming the latter while at the same time seeing it ex-
posed by the logic of the former. However, this is not the whole picture. In
the next subsection, which eventually turns to the question of how power
is conceptualized in the three schools respectively, I will argue that the
CS’s normative opting for a notion of the political as aligned with desecu-
ritization, not securitization, is the major feature by dint of which the CS,
among all schools of securitization studies, performs the most radical
questioning of IR perspectives in the study of securitization, and can thus
be regarded as the most fruitful perspective to conceptualize the power dy-
namics of securitization in a more general framework.
Conceptions of power
The PS, as has already been pointed out, maintains a ‘sociological’ under-
standing of securitization. Accordingly, its notion of power is derived
from sociological theory, in particular Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social
fields, although references to Foucault’s notion of dispositif add a certain
dose of discourse theory. Still, the focus on instrumental action, made pos-
sible by the distribution of different forms of capital among securitizing
actors, implies a strong resource-theoretical notion of power: power is had
by securitizing elites due to their ability to accumulate social, cultural and
symbolic capital within the context of restricting and enabling structures
termed ‘context’ or ‘dispositifs’. The WS, at first glance, holds a diametri-
cally different notion of power, rejecting the very concept of power as the
source of oppression in the name of security. ‘Power’ as a concept has to
be eliminated from security thinking, giving way to ‘emancipation’. The
project is thus, as it was often before in moral philosophy to which Booth
adheres,80 to deconstruct the seemingly self-evident centrality of power in
the understanding of inter-human relations. Yet ironically, the very refuta-
tion of power as a legitimate concept in security thinking reproduces its
architecture as a notion strongly featuring a resource-theoretically backed
utilitarianism which aligns closely with the notion of power in the PS,
even if that concept is viewed in a less moralizing way by the latter.





nuanced understandings of the power in securitization that might help to
lead the debate out of the realms of IR proper.81
Vuori argues that the CS’s argumentative kernel is illocution, not per-
locution,82 the consequence being that interests and purposes of securitiz-
ing actors, and indeed the empirical effects of securitization, have to be
eliminated from the conceptual picture in order to fully grasp the radically
semantic constitution of securitization. While Balzacq,83 as outlined
above, has reproached the CS of reducing the performativity of securitiz-
ing moves to illocution at the expense of perlocution, a deeper rationality
of this conceptual architecture might be found in an, perhaps implicit, at-
tempt by the CS to fully abandon a power model of strategic actors who
wish to effect particular states of affairs. Seen from this angle, the CS not
only theoretically deconstructs ‘security’ as relating to objectively existing
conditions of threat, but also, methodologically, any understanding that se-
curitization has anything to do with strategic agency. According to this
(implicit) argument, securitizing actors conduct securitizing procedures in
the sense of ‘naming a ship’, as Buzan et al. explain in line with the notion
of illocution,84 that is, they follow role scripts derived from the ‘grammar
of security’ and located beyond the instrumental reach of actors. From this
perspective, it would be hard to tell from particular empirical speech acts
whether they are performed as ‘strategic action’ or as a slavish execution
of the ‘grammar of security’, because this distinction would be preor-
dained on the methodological level. To put it more drastically, from the
perspective of the securitizing move as an illocutionary speech act, it is
impossible to distinguish securitizing actors from securitization muppets,
who declare what their experts (or whoever else) told them to declare.
In light of these considerations, I propose to depict the radicalism with
which the CS articulates a rejection of core assumptions of IR not in their
turning away from questions of how polities relate to each other (in fact,
they are much more interested in that question than the WS or the PS), but
in their insistence that strategic action is not at the core of securitization.
On the contrary, securitization operates according to a logic which leaves
absolutely no room for strategic action but instead performs a speech act
that is adamantly determined by a role script generated by the ‘grammar of
81 Cf. Bigo 2014.
82 Vuori 2011, pp. 154–155.
83 Balzacq 2005.
84 Buzan et al. 1998.
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security’. The ‘securitizing move’ is the mere execution of that role script,
and the securitizing actor is the empirical incarnation of a homo sociologi-
cus in Ralf Dahrendorf’s sense,85 that is, of a sociological actor model that
views action solely as the blind execution of others’ expectations. The se-
curitizing actor is, to put it even more bluntly, a slave to securitization.
This is a most radical deconstruction of any claim that power resides with
the securitizing move if understood as strategic action, and thus a most ef-
fective refutation of utilitarianism as the core component of ‘realist’ IR.
Instead, power can only materialize as a consequence of desecuritization
in Wæver’s sense,86 that is, under conditions in which the factual interde-
pendency between actors (for instance, but not confined to, state actors) is
made subject to coordinated action.
The power to securitize and the power of securitization: Towards a
relational model of power in securitization
In the last section, it was argued that the CS, in comparison with the PS
and the WS, gains a much greater distance from the IR legacy in securiti-
zation studies because it casts radical doubt on any understanding that the
securitizing move is grounded in the sovereign execution of power based
on power resources. This can be linked to Stefano Guzzini’s conviction
that the historical background for the emergence of the CS was an interest
in processes that led to the dismemberment of constellations of securitiza-
tion.87 In such constellations, all involved actors – like the governments of
the Soviet Union and of the NATO states – found themselves locked up in
a spiral of mutual securitizations that left ever less space for mutually co-
ordinated action in international relations. Agency, in the sense of coordi-
nated action, thus, lies not in securitizing, but in desecuritizing moves, as
it is only the latter that can re-establish coordination beyond the execution
of the ‘grammar of security’. It is the aim of this section to generalize this
historically circumscribed scenario, according to which only desecuritiza-
tion can be associated with agency as opposed to conduct in conformity,
into a more encompassing, and conceptually deeper grounded, model. The







power is not in the securitizing move because it is not instrumental action
but role-conforming action, and that it resides instead in desecuritization,
that is, the capability to cooperatively steer interdependencies apart from
role scripts – must be transferred into an analytical model.
A first starting point for such a theoretical generalization is the argu-
ment made above that, according to the CS, power, in an Arendtian sense,
emanates from interdependencies. For Wæver, power is identical with the
power to desecuritize because it is only in desecuritization that policy is-
sues can be shifted back onto a terrain where mutual political coordination
between opposing camps becomes possible. A second important vantage
point is the argument that securitizing moves – for Wæver, rather express-
ing actors’ powerlessness than power, in the sense that they are deprived
of the capacity to coordinated political agency even with adversaries –
may have consequences that cannot be fully controlled by securitizing ac-
tors because their capability to engage in mutual action coordination is
severely limited by securitization. In other words, securitization may exert
a power over securitizing actors – and, as in the case of a political con-
frontation like the Cold War, virtually everyone else.
This way, the power of securitization can be conceptually delineated
from the power to desecuritize. This presents us with a first rough relatio-
nal power model that distinguishes between the agency in desecuritization
and the effects of securitization. However, contrary to the normative
grounding of these two modes of the operation of power in (de)securitiza-
tion as is characteristic of the CS, for the present purposes it is unneces-
sary to exclusively align securitization with the power of effects and dese-
curitization with the power of agency. For the major conceptual dividing
line is not that between securitization and desecuritization, but that be-
tween coordinated agency (which may aim at both securitization and dese-
curitization) and uncontrollable, or unaccounted for, consequences (which
may stem from both securitization and desecuritization). While the CS has
given us ample ground for distinguishing the power dimension of securiti-
zation into the two modes of ‘power of’ and ‘power to’, it is now time to
anchor this distinction in a conceptual ground that leaves the CS’s norma-
tive framework behind, thus arriving at a more rigorously theorized, rela-
tional model of power in securitization and desecuritization. This will be
done through introducing Norbert Elias’s relational paradigm of power.
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Norbert Elias’s relational model of power
According to Norbert Elias, the subject area of sociology is a stocktaking
and a resulting typologization of “networks of interdependencies” (Inter-
dependenzgeflechte) between actors.88 Together with Gabriel Tarde and
Georg Simmel,89 he thus can count as a representative of an ‘interaction-
ist’ (or maybe rather ‘associationist’) sociology. He has common ground
with Tarde and Simmel also by dint of the equal analytical valuation of
psychic-affective and social processes, as is evident from his famous theo-
rem regarding the “process of civilization” in Europe since the Middle
Ages. According to this theorem, the process of civilization refers to an in-
creasing tendency to self-discipline through anticipation of possible inter-
pretations of one’s behavior by others. It was conditioned by a change of
social figurations which affected first the noble elite and then trickled
down into the bourgeoisie, thus disseminating through society. This figu-
rational change was the result, most notably, of changing power structures
in late-feudal society. While the ‘high’ Middle Ages where characterized
by outspokenly decentralized power structures, which in the absence of an
overarching authority had enabled feudal lords to unleash the force of their
affects upon their subjects, the increasing centralization of political power
– for instance, in the French royal court – resulted in the emergence of a
social milieu of courtiers in which the rise and fall in the king’s grace be-
came strongly dependent on the attributions by other courtiers. Elias ar-
gues that this process, on the psychic level, effected routines of affect con-
trol, and on the intrapersonal level, the emergence of a social etiquette.90
For the purposes of this chapter, Elias’s considerations are less impor-
tant with a view to their historical statement, which has been met with crit-
icism among historians (cf. Duindam 1998), but rather because they exem-
plify a conceptually relational model of power. In his later works, Elias
often uses the notion of ‘balance of power’ (Machtbalance)91 in order to
ground power in his relational reasoning. A balance of power is a more or
less stabilized relationship structure between individuals belonging to dif-
ferent groups constituted by attribution. Within this relationship structure,
members of the different involved groups have different possibilities to
3.1
88 Cf. Elias 1969, p. 172.
89 Cf. Tarde 1894 and Simmel 1989.
90 Elias 1976a, 1976b.
91 Elias 2005 (1989), 2006 (1986).
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engage in agency, both with respect to themselves and to members of the
other groups. The differences between those options have, in their turn,
different origins, for instance, varying institutionalized spaces of action of
the presence or absence of social institutions not directly involved in the
relationship structure and the stakes held by its groups, such as the state
and its legal institutions.92 Elias thus proposes a figuration-theoretical con-
ception of power, addressing the interdependencies and interrelations be-
tween actors in their membership roles and stakes against the background
of more encompassing relationship networks. His conception of power is
opposed to a resource-theoretical or domination-theoretical notion of pow-
er, as that which is ‘possessed’ by actors and ‘effected’ upon other actors
and which hardly allows complex reconstructions regarding the relational,
effectual and conditional processes and structures that put power to work.
Instead, Elias’s conception invites to widen the perspective beyond securi-
tizing actors and securitized actors to wider societal, political and cultural
networks of interdependencies which are directly involved in the emer-
gence and the changing of balances of power, even if they might not di-
rectly intervene in the ‘execution’ of power.
It might be objected that Elias’s conception of balances of power in fig-
urations is not that dissimilar from the balance-of-power conception so
characteristic for realist IR, thus effectively abandoning the CS’s impor-
tant challenge to realist IR, namely to deny that securitization equals stra-
tegic and instrumental action based on power resources. There are, how-
ever, important differences between the two conceptions of balances of
power. First, Elias’s conception does not presuppose any given entity or
set of entities, such as states. This makes his model much more open-end-
ed in comparison to realist IR, which regularly proceeds from the stipula-
tion of an inter-state system as the precondition for its theorizing. In fact,
Elias’s model is capable of encompassing security-related actors from in-
dividuals, private companies, political movements, state institutions,
92 See Elias (1986) for an illustration of his notion of power balance, developed in an
analysis of gender relations in the Roman Empire where he argues that the status
of women in society was decidedly affected by legal innovations, carried out by
the state, regarding their right to property and inheritance. Elias’s theoretical argu-
ment thus exemplified is that power relations between members of different group
membership resulting from social ascriptions (here, gender ascriptions) is crucially
impacted by the structure of the overall figuration of which, on from a certain
point in historical time, the state becomes a part.
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supranational institutions, all the way up to ‘macro-securitizations’.93 Sec-
ond, Elias’s model is particularly apt in conceptualizing the intervening ef-
fects of third parties on power balances unfolding between two parties,
and thus to give very nuanced accounts of Balzacq’s ‘contexts’ of securiti-
zation.94 Third, it is also, in principle, capable of accounting for the effects
of non-human agency on processes and effects of securitization, such as
‘actants’ in the sense of Actant Network Theory,95 as it shares with other
associationist approaches in sociology the conviction that the analysis of
interrelations and interdependencies must have conceptual priority over
any statement about the ‘nature’ of the entities between which interrela-
tions and interdependencies unfold.
An analytical matrix of power in securitization
These elaborations on Elias’s conception of power can now be used as a
platform from which to embark upon a conceptualization of power in se-
curitization. In particular, Elias’s understanding of power as emerging in
(shifting) balances within figurations between actors and/or actants lends
itself to an understanding of power as unfolding structure of action options
that may enable, but also restrict, actors’ capabilities in securitization pro-
cesses. The following matrix of power in securitization is meant to pro-
vide a conceptual architecture for understanding the particular role of
power in securitization across the different ‘schools’ of securitization as
well as across two different modes of power which pertain to the process
of securitization and to its effects, respectively (see Figure 2).
The two power modes are derived from the above discussion of
Wæver’s refutation of the IR argument that securitization inevitably mate-
rializes instrumental power, analytically distinguishing between the power
to securitize as that figuration which enables securitization, and the power
of securitization as the (often unintended or unaccounted for) effects that
gain momentum as the consequence of securitization. The advantage of
this distinction is that it brings together considerations that regard both the
constitution of securitization and its effects. The two aspect structures of
securitization, in turn, take up the debate in securitization studies about the
3.2
93 Buzan/Wæver 2009.
94 Balzacq 2005, 2011.
95 Cf. Latour 1996, 2000.
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necessity to supplement a practice dimension of securitization to the
speech act dimension proposed by the CS. In other words, it makes an an-
alytical distinction between acts that aim at communicating, or represent-
ing, something as related to security96 and acts that aim at engineering se-
curity (in whatever particular sense) in a particular field of practice.
Field 1 in the matrix approaches the power to securitize in the sense of
the CS and, partly, the WS. It refers to acts of communication that aim at
representing security – that is, of framing a certain issue as pertaining to
security. The power dimension of such acts can be seen in the figurations
which enable them. For instance, according to the orthodox reading of the
CS,97 a ‘grammar of security’ must be available that lends the ‘securitiz-
ing move’ illocutionary performativity. That this grammar cannot be taken
for granted is exemplified by Huysmans,98 who argues that it is only in
modernity that such grammar develops as states tend to derive the symbol-
ic sources of their existence from a stipulation of other states as ‘enemies’.
In a similar vein, Booth’s intervention points to at least the normative pos-
sibility that that grammar might be challenged on the grounds that security
ought not to pertain to states but to people, thus delegitimating the gram-
mar of security to a certain degree.99 Another possibility to understand the
power dynamics in Field 1 is to take Balzacq’s critique of the CS serious-
ly, and thus to ask how relevant audiences can be persuaded and/or mobi-
lized to support the securitizing speech act. In any case, the securitizing
96 This formulation heralds, in methodological terms, a more encompassing under-
standing than ‘speech act’ in the CS sense.
97 Cf. Vuori 2011.
98 Huysmans 1998.
99 Booth 1991, 2007.
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Figure 2: Analytical matrix of power in securitization
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act of communication is empowered by social as well as discursive figura-
tions which cannot be taken for granted but have to be historically recon-
structed.
Field 2 addresses the question of the effects that securitizing acts of
communication may have on securitizing actors and others concerned by
the securitizing move. From a standpoint developed analogously to Elias’s
conception of power, these effects may restrain actors’ options as an effect
of securitization. For instance, as Wæver has argued, securitization during
the Cold War tended to lock political actors into a political deadlock from
which they found it very hard to escape without questioning their political
mandate that enabled them to perform securitizing moves in the first
place.100 Elias, who himself addressed the Cold War’s arms race, argued
that it forms an example of a figuration that unfolded at the expense of ac-
tors’ intentions and their capability of cooperatively steering the con-
flict.101 Further, power effects of securitizing acts of communication re-
gard the ways that individuals and groups find themselves exposed to the
logic of an ‘othering’,102 which may strongly impact their agency options
and capacities to resist the securitizing move.
Field 3 groups those practices that aim at installing or maintaining secu-
rity in particular fields of practice, such as international relations, ‘inner
security’, border controls, the fight against epidemics, etc. The power to
securitize refers here to those social, technological and discursive figura-
tions that enable securitizing action, for instance, through political autho-
rization, technical equipping, or societal legitimization. These different
figurative levels may have varying impacts on the power to securitize. For
instance, Bigo has argued that, with respect to the policing of the EU bor-
ders, ‘security experts’ have attained an influential position due to their le-
gitimization through various bodies of (partly academic) expertise, while
their political (more precisely, democratic) legitimation remains as doubt-
ful as it is unimportant for their position within the security figuration.103
Other researchers have made the point that in highly technicized security
settings, such as imaging techniques in controls at airports, technology it-
100 Cf. Guzzini 2015.
101 Elias 1983.




self has risen to a legitimacy status of self-evidence that is hardly ques-
tioned.104
Finally, Field 4 pertains to the effects of such securitizing practices.
These may be seen not only in the effects that securitization has on various
social constituencies (like migrants to the EU from Africa or airline pas-
sengers), but also in the ways that these securitizing figurations create path
dependencies that attain a self-immunizing status.105 Many studies within
the framework of the Paris School, dealing with the emergence of security
professionalism and related bodies of knowledge and practices of social
authorization, might be interpreted as reconstructions of the power of se-
curitization. In other words, while securitizing practices may more effec-
tively ‘secure’ practice fields the more elaborated and institutionalized
they are, their very institutionalization may effect blind spots through
which alternative options to tackle a perceived crisis are effaced.106
A typology of power in securitization
Having introduced the four fields in the matrix of power in securitization,
I now wish to advance to a more systematic analytical model, amounting
to a typology of power in securitization (see Figure 3).
Field 1 addresses the power to securitize, in the sense of performing se-
curitizing acts of communication. This power can be conceptualized as the
creation of a public scene in which a decision between two antagonistic
political options must be made – namely, to proceed with a given politics,
or to transpose it into the register of the ‘grammar of security’. This mode
of power thus consists in the presence of a figuration that allows effecting
a scene of radical political decision. The question is, thus, how such a fig-
uration can be brought about. It is influenced by a variety of factors within
the overall figuration, like the presence or absence of counter-securitizing




106 This regards, for instance, the securitization of global public health by the UN,
which, according to Weber-Mosdorf (2013, p. 163), suspends an interest in the
determining factors of the spread of diseases. For similar processes in the engi-
neering of security through private companies and the reformulation of national
security in terms of ‘national risk registers’ see Frevel/Schulze 2012 and Hag-
mann/Dunn Cavelty 2012.
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the legal ban on volksverhetzung), or a shift in the relation between securi-
tizing actors and their relevant audiences.
Field 2 addresses the consequences that arise from such acts of securiti-
zing communication for the figuration, encompassing both those relational
elements that helped bringing the scene of decision about as well as those
relational elements impacted by the consequences of that scene. One way
to conceive of these consequences is to render them in terms of Heinrich
Popitz’s typology of power, which will be returned to with respect to Field
4 (see below). According to Popitz, one major type of power is “authorita-
tive power”, which rests on a constant relationship between the dominant
actor and the subjected actor, in particular “on a twofold process of recog-
nition: on the recognition of the supremacy of others as those who set the
criteria, as those who are crucial, and on the striving to be recognized by
those crucial others and to receive signs of probation from them”.107 The
act of communicating securitization may unfold such power effects under
the condition that the creation of a scene of decision in which securitiza-
tion rests creates an opportunity for securitizing actors to establish them-
selves as “those who are crucial” and thus can allocate recognition.
“Authoritative power” may have more complicated consequences,
though. With respect to the securitizing actors, their figuration may be-
come more strictly differentiated with respect to actor roles. For instance,
a political actor having performed a securitizing act of communication
might find herself unable to ‘call back’ that act, as her position within the
power balance would suffer from such a move, which might seem incon-
sequential to relevant audiences. Alternatively, other actors belonging to
the securitizing figuration may profit from the securitizing move at the ex-
107 Popitz 1992, p. 29, author’s translation.
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pense of the securitizing actor, claiming for themselves more radical and
‘more securitizing’ positions. With regard to those actors and groups
against whom the securitizing act is directed, they may find themselves
under political and public pressure to recognize the securitizing actors’
supremacy; or they might, on the contrary, be empowered by the act in the
sense that they receive from it a public platform to articulate their re-
sponse.108
In a more general framework, securitizing acts of communication may
unfold a power that Popitz terms “the power to establish data” (datenset-
zende Macht).109 ‘Data‘ may be interpreted here as epistemic elements
that, for instance, concern conventions of representation enshrined in the
‘grammar of security’. The invocation of such grammar (if it is available
and uncontested, see above) may result in discursive power effects. This
dimension of effects of securitizing acts of communication can be aligned
with studies operating under Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’110
with respect to contemporary regimes of security.111 They demonstrate
how ‘dispositifs’ of security112 pre-shape and restrain political and societal
options to address security. Other works, for instance by Christopher
Daase,113 may be interpreted as commentaries on the power effects of se-
curitizing acts of communication inasmuch as they are interested in the
(partly unintended) consequences of a widening of proclamations and am-
bitions of security beyond the reach of existing political institutions, most
notably the state (as in ‘human security’). In terms of the figuration-ana-
lytical register advocated here, securitizing acts of communication are es-
tablished as a relevant semantic frame for ever-wider fields of society –
that is to say, they are legitimized. On the one hand, this leads to a re-
straining of types of relationships between groups of actors,114 while on
the other hand, certain groups of actors are accredited with newly legiti-
mate claims (for instance, NGOs) whose redemption cannot always be
108 Cf. Williams 2003.
109 Popitz 1992, pp. 23–27.
110 Cf. Foucault 2007.
111 Bröckling 2012.
112 See also Balzacq 2011.
113 Daase 2011, 2012.
114 Bröckling 2012.
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guaranteed within the existing figurational interdependencies (like, still
mostly, states in inter-state relations).115
Field 3 concerns those figurations that empower actors/actants to ‘cre-
ate’ security. The scare quotes around ‘create’ indicate that what is at stake
here is not so much the question whether security is effectively created or
not, but rather that certain practices and ‘routines’116 lock in that claim for
themselves to tackle a security problem. This involves a widening of the
view regarding actors of securitization as it is mostly not political elites
but diverse organizations, including private service providers, that are ac-
credited to identify threats and control them.117 This is evident, for in-
stance, in studies devoted to the analysis of security procedures on air-
ports,118 which argue that the agency of humans and non-humans have to
be analyzed in their interdependencies in a symmetrical manner.119 This
approach can easily be rendered in a figuration-theoretical register: Power
balances of securitization encompass not only figurations of human beings
in their different group memberships, but also interdependencies that in-
volve non-human agency, like body scanners, automatized information
technologies, and more generally infrastructures.120 The figuration-analyt-
ical question is thus: which are the factors that determine those power bal-
ances that stretch between securitizing (human and non-human) actants
and those subjected to control? This regards not only material artifacts but
also institutional questions, like that of the juridical frame conditions of
data transfer or political positions on the accreditation of private com-
panies with state responsibilities – and finally, also questions of represen-
tation, such as imaging techniques in luggage checks, radar appliances,
mapping techniques, or oracles.
What these routines and practices do, first of all, is to produce and insti-
tutionalize a pattern of identification of threats to security with the aim to
control these threats.121 Security routines aim at reconnaissance, be it the
spotting of potential aggressors across fortification walls, satellite-support-
ed surveillance of air space over state territory, or security checks at air-






121 Cf. Leander 2010; Rauer 2012.
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ports. In all these cases potential threats have to be identified (through de-
manding a word of passage, through identification of an airborne vehicle,
or through establishing a person’s identity). The question is, thus, through
which patterns of identification are security concerns translated into con-
trol practices, regardless of the question whether they deliver security.
From a figuration-analytical perspective, such reconnaissance establishes
a particular balance of power between a control routine and an actant sub-
jected to control, within a wider figuration which determines the frame
conditions of that balance (through informational processes, juridical com-
petencies, technological infrastructure, etc.).
The power to securitize through routines and practices thus amounts to
a pattern of identification which links an epistemic procedure with an epis-
temic object.122 This distinguishes the power to securitize from other kinds
of power, for instance, from such in which power materializes in the capa-
bility to produce insecurity, uncertainty or ambivalence like secret service
disinformation campaigns or military disruptive actions, or from such that
already presuppose an accomplished identification. To stick with the three
examples in the last paragraph, it is only after the identification of ‘securi-
ty threats’ that hot pitch is spilled on aggressors, that interceptor aircraft
attacks intrude on an enemy aircraft, or that a suspicious person is arrest-
ed. Although these practices undoubtedly fashion security-related aspects
and thus belong to the overall figuration of securitization which may im-
pact on the identification of threats to security, it is precisely for this rea-
son that they do not refer, strictly speaking, to the creation of a pattern of
identification as core component of the power to securitize. They are,
rather, examples for the power of the provision of security, to which we
will turn now.
Field 4 comprises the consequences of acts that aim at enhancing secu-
rity. These regard, first of all, those individuals, groups and figurations
that find themselves subjected to the identification and control practices
characteristic of the power to securitize. According to Heinrich Popitz,
they might be termed “power to act” (Aktionsmacht) and “instrumental
power”.123 “Power to act” boils down to the ability to do harm to others. It
is directly relevant for securitization through routines and practices, for in-
stance, in order to eliminate a threat from an aggressor identified as such.
122 Cf. Rheinberger 1997.
123 See Popitz 1992, pp. 23–27.
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“Instrumental power”, however, involves a decision on the side of the sub-
jected, who is confronted with the choice to comply with the dominant
person’s demands or to face negative sanctions. This aspect of the power
of securitization thus involves the cooperation, if rudimentary and poten-
tially ambivalent, of the subjected. With a view to securitization, an exam-
ple might be the urging to reveal security-related information through
threatening the subjected with torture.
However, the power of securitization manifests itself also through unin-
tended consequences for the securitizing actors/actants arising from the
pattern of identification on which the power of security is grounded. Pat-
terns of identification might develop a technological path-dependency or
institutional inertia that make it difficult to question and modify them. The
deployment of imaging technologies at airports may incentivize the devel-
opment of weapons or explosives that pass the technological check. De-
mands for cooperation between banks and security authorities regarding
money laundering for terrorist purposes may result in an over-compliance
of banks, reporting each and every transaction and thus producing data
noise instead of information.124 Implementing satellite-supported recon-
naissance devices for nuclear missile relocations may trigger camouflage
innovation and thus accelerate the arms race. In principle, it is not implau-
sible to assume that the power to securitize, in the sense of putting to work
practices of identification of potential threats, spills over into a figuration,
as discussed by Elias on the occasion of the Cold War, that tends to spiral
out of the control of the actors involved.125
Conclusion: Paradoxes of power in securitization
If viewed from the perspective of balances of power in Elias’s sense as
proposed in this chapter, the main power dynamics unfolding in acts of se-
curitization are those between the activation of securitization and its ef-
fects, that is, between the power to securitize and the power of securitiza-
tion. More specifically, it has been argued that the power to securitize of-
ten results in a situation in which the power to engage in cooperative steer-
ing of a conflict situation is taken away from securitizing actors, so that
4




the consequences of their securitization may spiral out of cooperative con-
trol. In the case of acts that aim at representing an issue as relevant for se-
curity, securitizing actors may find themselves in a condition that leaves
little maneuvering space for performing acts outside of the ‘grammar of
security’ and the role scripts that come with it – not least because, under
conditions of an effected scene of decision, the promise of more securiti-
zation may become a political asset. Consultations with those construed as
a threat to security might thus seem to be the least promising option for
staying in control, which significantly deteriorates securitizing actors’
communicative options. In the case of acts that aim at maintaining or es-
tablishing security in a given political or societal field, the institutionaliza-
tion of a pattern of identification of security threats may result in an insti-
tutional and technological path dependency which effectively silences
those subjected to controls, thus establishing a most effective cat-
egorization of actant types into which those thus categorized can hardly
intervene. Here, cooperation is reduced to compliance with the techniques
of identification, thus cutting securitizing practices effectively off from
learning potentials that might ensue from a more broadly conceived coop-
eration between those in control and those controlled.
Considering these arguments, it seems as if securitization is a zero-sum
game – not because, as realist IR would have it, power gains for one unit
cannot but result in horizontal power losses for another unit. Rather, secu-
ritization always comes at a cost, namely the cost of a significantly de-
creased capability to engage in (political) cooperation even among adver-
saries. The question whether this cost in fact fully annuls the ‘advantages’
brought about by securitization is a historical one, as it depends on the his-
torical and temporal horizon one envisages. Short-term gains in the identi-
fication of threats to security might be levelled out by long-term restric-
tions in trying to find common agendas for cooperation benefitting all
sides involved. It is, not least, this problématique that demands a historical
and trans-epochal perspective in securitization studies.126
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The Power of Border Politics: On Migration in and outside
Europe1
Regina Kreide
Migration and the movements of refugees are embedded in a broader soci-
etal context in which our world is depicted as unstable, insecure and
haunted by threats. Terrorist attacks, we learn, can occur almost every-
where and strike almost anybody; democracy is under pressure, autocratic
leaders impose arbitrary political decisions on citizens; wars nearby and at
its periphery shake Europe; the European welfare states face multiple
challenges; and, in the middle of this, migration is presented as a danger to
public order, cultural identity, and national labor-market policy. Open bor-
ders, and immigrants “pouring into Europe,” be they refugees, asylum-
seekers or immigrants, are depicted as a major security problem. The
threat becomes incarnated in the refugee and immigrant.
The question that comes up is whether there exists a right to exclude, a
right to close borders – also for states that claim to be legitimate, in the
sense that they respect human rights and are democratically organized.2
And what is the role of borders in publicly defining threats and forms of
insecurity? Borders, I argue, are a multifaceted infrastructure that not only
infringes on people’s free movement. Moreover, borders are an instrument
but also a condition for the creation of modes of securitization. As long as
borders are imposed coercively, and through this, contribute to securitiza-
tion, they are illegitimate. The reason for this, I show, is mainly because
the power of securitizing restricts people’s qualified options, structurally,
by literally blocking their way out of war zones, hunger, and economic de-
1 I am grateful to criticisms and observations by many collegues involved in the SFB
„Dynamics of Securitization“, especially Huub van Baar, Ana Ivasiuc, and Andreas
Langenohl. Special words of thanks are due to collegues of the University of Wash-
ington Seattle, among them Amos Nascimiento, Bill Talbott, and Michael Forman. I
also owe helpful insights and suggestion to Andreas Niederberger and collegues
who participated in a conference at the University of Duisburg-Essen in November
2016.
2 Wellman/Cole 2011, pp. 2.
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privation, and, interactionally, by making migrants invisible, or depicting
them as criminals, or victims. Sometimes, however, the security discourse
itself reproduces certain stereotypes and neglects the migrant’s power to
de-securitize.
First, I will define what I mean by borders in this paper (1), then I will
discuss some arguments to show that there are no good moral reasons in
favor of closing borders (2), before taking you with me on a brief journey
through the empirical world of the outer European border politics, and
European law (3), and the border politics within Europe that effect mi-
grants and also Roma minorities. Through this, I hope to offer a revealing
argument against a “right” of states to exclude. Understanding state
sovereignty as having the power to exclude allows for a transformation of
our societies into securitized societies. This goes hand in hand with a no-
tion of power that is directed to create securitization – with all kinds of
problematical aspects for politics and our daily lives (4). Moreover, I show
that these modes of securitization reveal that borders are not just walls but
an accumulation of coercive practices that, nevertheless, are not all-en-
compassing but leave room for the power to de-securitize – however
marginal it might be (5).
Borders
Borders building booming, even after the fall of the so-called Iron Curtain.
Forty walls have been built worldwide since 1989. In Europe alone, the
following walls are intended to prevent migration: the Spanish Exclave
Ceuto and Melilla in North Africa; in northern Greece at the border with
Turkey there is a wall 12,5 kilometers in length; at the ports of entry to
Russia and the Republic of Belarus (this happened through the Baltic
states); in the South east of Bulgaria at the border with Turkey (3 meters
high and with a length of 35 kilometers, and 135 further kilometers are
planned); Hungary has built a “provisionally” security installation at its
border with Serbia which will be 175 kilometers, and with Croatia as well.
Slovenia built a fence at the border with Croatia and Austria, and Macedo-
nia set up a fence on the border with Greece. Border crossings are danger-
ous and cost lives. In 2015, at least 1,015,078 people crossed the Mediter-
ranean to Europe; 3,771 had died in their attempts in 2015, even more in
2016, which was the deadliest year so far with at least 5,000 dead. Be-




every 47 arrivals. Since the year 2000, more than 23,000 people have died
on their way to the European continent.3
Borders are not just visible walls that hinder entry to a country and a
nation-state’s means to enact enforcement over its own territory. They do
not just define physical entry to a country. They also appear, second, as a
form of creating membership distinctions in a political and social commu-
nity. Third, there are different kinds of social and cultural boundaries that
deny people entry or full access to social and cultural participation in pub-
lic life, as their way of life is not taken into account and they are confront-
ed with various types of discrimination. All three forms are interconnect-
ed, an aspect that is often neglected in the philosophy debate but which
becomes prevalent when focusing on security measures taken to install
different shapes of borders. There is the case of territorial inclusion, but,
nevertheless, either political exclusion or cultural disrespect, or even both
(with regard to migrants and, for example, to the framing of immigration
as a threat). There might be political inclusion (in the form of the posses-
sion of formal citizenship rights) but, nevertheless, territorial eviction and
cultural discrimination also occur (as with European Roma, for example).
In addition, there might be the rare case of overall cultural acceptance but
territorial and political exclusion (as with Russian Germans or citizens of
the former GDR – even though it is also a bit risky to say that there is no
discrimination of “people from the East”). Borders are complex social in-
stitutions, characterized by practices of border crossing and enforcement
mechanisms of all kinds.4 The question here is whether states are entitled
to claim this triple remuneration, that is, legal, political, and cultural ex-
clusion.5 Currently, there are some predominant arguments about why
states are morally entitled to enforce their own immigration politics. Most
of them are not convincing, as I will lay out in what follows.
In favor of closed borders
One argument is that states are comparable to marriages or private clubs
that, to a certain degree, are in the privileged position to decide about their
own affairs and matters. Just like a single person has a right to decide to
2
3 Luft 2016, p. 47.
4 Mezzadro/Neilson 2013, p. 3.
5 Cassee/Goppel 2012, p. 9.
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whom – if anyone – he or she will marry, a group of co-nationals has the
right to decide whom – if anyone – it wants to invite to join the political
community.6 This neglects, however, that there are major differences be-
tween the two aspects, the state and private association. States are not
voluntary associations; we are usually born into a state and gain citizen-
ship. One can terminate one’s club membership even if there is no other
club that will take him/her, but one cannot terminate one’s citizenship so
easily if no other states offers him/her its citizenship. Moreover, private
associations are allowed to reject or “blackball” members, Kit Wellman
argues, even if they are born in the clubhouse. A state, in contradistinc-
tion, is not allowed to reject the descendants of fully-fledged citizens, and
de-naturalization violates international law. A basic idea here is self-deter-
mination, and it seems this embraces sovereignty over entry to the terri-
tory as well as over membership in a political community. Certainly, the
members of the club, like the members of a state, do have good reasons to
be interested in the admission requirements of their club or state. More-
over, new members are future decision-makers; it is part of collective self-
determination to have control over who is and who will be the “self” that
decides for itself.7
It seems that territorial exclusion and exclusion from the political com-
munity has been blurred. It is unclear why the presence of additional peo-
ple on a territory would make a difference for the political community of
members at all. It seems that the club analogy is meant to say that there is
a right not to include citizens in the political, and thus in the citizenship
community. Wellman argues that states are not allowed to deny admission
to citizenship to immigrants who made it to the territory. This, he claims,
is against the principle of ‘relational equality,’ which he considers to be
important for any liberal state.8 Since states do have a right to exclude, the
only option left for him is to link freedom of association with a territory
principle. Wellman cannot clarify how the moral principle he sees at work
when it comes to territorial restriction should be transferred to the realm of
political exclusion. What one actually needs is a theory of territory. How-
ever, I think it would also be misleading, mainly because I cannot think of
any reason why the mere entering of a territory, in the sense of a Kantian
“visitation right,” should be blocked at all.
6 Wellman 2008.
7 Cassee 2016, p. 43; Wellman 2008, p. 114.
8 Wellmann 2011, p. 75.
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This leads me to yet another objection in favor of a right to exclusion.
One needs to bear in mind, according to David Miller, that freedom of
movement is restricted even domestically. One is not allowed to go every-
where, to enter private property, and public institutions have opening
hours and hours when you cannot visit. Miller concludes that it is suffi-
cient for people to have at their disposal an adequate number of options
relating to their “generic human interests” so that they can make meaning-
ful decisions for their lives, with regard to their profession, religion, cul-
tural activities and so on.9 But this assumption is problematic as well. A
major issue I see is that freedom of movement is a very substantial free-
dom. Restricting this freedom majorly infringes on individual autonomy,
as freedom of movement is a pre-condition of many other freedoms based
upon the physical presence. This includes the freedom of career choice,
love relationships, and housing conditions. It also restricts a substantial
notion of self-determination. To move to places where the economic op-
tions seem to be better is a biblical theme; probably, it is as old as
mankind. Moving is an important strategy in order to decide over oneself
and in that sense an important right. As we, with a European passport, in
most cases, are able to travel to most of the countries in the world without
any visa restrictions, should know.
There is another important argument against international freedom of
movement. It is again David Miller who argues that there exists a link be-
tween cultural homogeneity and social trust. People need to have trust in
their political and welfare institutions which are organized according to
principles of justice, and also cultural identity is an important source of
this trust.10 The problem with this view is that it cannot explain why peo-
ple affirm their support of social institutions based upon cultural and na-
tional homogeneity. Social services and just institutions are a value in it-
self. As long as people in need profit and the institutions work, support ex-
ists and is seen as legitimate. There would need to be a justification of
trust that is independent from people’s actual behavior (that is, refrain
from support). This justification, and Miller see the problem as well, is a
precondition of the trust argument. The instrumental value of nationality
(serving as motivation for trust) depends itself on an intrinsic value: co-
nationals must be convinced that their association (the state) is valuable
9 Miller 2016, p. 51.
10 Miller 2016, p. 64.
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and worth sustaining over time.11 Obviously, the argumentation is circular.
It is assumed that people need to believe in cultural homogeneity and, if
so, then they can be convinced to the support of social institutions.
Another objection is that taking self-determination seriously means re-
thinking what democratic self-determination means. The current immigra-
tion regulation has been made by a demos that includes only those who are
domestically members of a state. If one takes the principle of democracy
seriously, meaning that any coercive submission under rules requires that
one should be the author of these rules, things look different.12 Then one
needs to include all those who are coercively prevented from being a
member, and this also includes immigrants who would like to enter the po-
litical community in question. To include everybody in creating and estab-
lishing the conditions for democratic norms aims at preventing a top-down
variation of democracy. A strong notion of democracy, in contradistinc-
tion, includes everybody effected by enforceable rules. Seyla Benhabib’s
principle of juris generativity may help here.13 This refers to the “law’s ca-
pacity to create a universe of normative meaning that can escape the prov-
idence of formal law making.” The Universal Declarations of Human
Rights (UDHR) and other international covenants and treaties have en-
abled actors such as women, linguistic, ethnic, political, sexual and reli-
gious minorities to enter the public sphere, and this praxis of inclusion has
to be expanded beyond borders. It is exactly this idea of juris generativity
that needs also be applied to refugees and immigrants.
But one could object now that not allowing people entry to a state or a
political community is not coercive, and so any expansion of the demo-
cratic demos is not required. The situation, one could argue, is comparable
with an individual who again and again wants to enter his neighbor’s
house because, for example, s/he does not like his/hers, or his/hers has no
warm water, or no water at all.14 I have a right to protect my property, but
I might have a moral obligation to help him/her with, for example, warm
water, but I am not obliged to let him/her in, just as little as I impose force
on her by not letting him/her in. Is this convincing? I do not think so, be-
cause the example is misleading. It neglects the context of the problem
and with it more complex questions, such as: Why is there no water? Who
11 Miller 2016.
12 Brunkhorst 2014; Abizadeh 2008.
13 Benhabib 2011.
14 Cassee 2016, p. 54.
Regina Kreide
72
is responsible for this? How could one deal with the problem of water sup-
ply in a way all parties are satisfied? Who has defined the rules for defin-
ing the territory? When focusing on these questions, the topic becomes
multifaceted; in fact, it may be that the neighbor has no water not because
s/he has not paid his/her bill but because water supply in this part of the
city has been of subordinated importance, and the infrastructure is not well
developed. Those circumstances were imposed on him/her and are coer-
cive insofar as the infrastructure measurements do not leave him/her quali-
fied options to live a good life. The same holds for the migration situation.
Seen from this angle, the problem can only be solved when the causes are
thematized and the existing circumstances questioned. Neither neighbor is
responsible for the situation, but an acceptable solution for all parties must
be found. It is only then that coercive rules become legitimate. For this, all
those affected in their generic interests, to use Miller’s own term, should
be included in the process of debating the effects of enforceable rules and
in the decision-making process. This would require taking into account the
interests of those waiting in camps at the outskirts of the European bor-
ders. However, borders “do” more than hinder people – if at all – to cross
national or regional boundaries, enter new territory and political commu-
nities. They are more than an instrument used to enforce rules on people.
They are coercive in themselves. This has to do with how the border is or-
ganized and exercised. Borders, I would like to show, incorporate the
power to securitize, not just by being a wall but through social practices of
securitization. To make this argument more convincing, I will now take
you on a more empirical journey through European Union (EU) docu-
ments, immigration law, and security studies, and an analysis of the rela-
tionship between European borders and the creation of threat.
Securitization of migration to Europe
Open borders, refugees, immigrants, it is said, make our societies less se-
cure; or rather, make our societies insecure. Terror attacks by alleged asy-
lum-seekers seem to underpin this view. We all know that security issues
do not necessarily reflect the objective, material circumstances of the
world. Often, security issues are the result of the efforts of the elite, media,
science, and politics to understand and shape the world. During the last 20
years or so, a series of studies has tried to understand why and how securi-
ty is created, and what effects these different policy measures have on
3
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people’s lives. I can only give a very rough overview here and will discuss
three approaches before offering a dialectical understanding of securitiza-
tion in order to understand the European border politics.
Securitization
Still influential is the so-called Copenhagen School, with scholars such as
Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan. They criticized realist and neo-realist theo-
ries of international relations and claimed that security was a power bal-
ance among nation-states with rational and utilitarian agency on the side
of states and their elites. “Security,” according to them, is not a given pre-
rogative of states, but is created through speech acts by political elites and
other actors for the legitimation of political agency and supremacy. Speech
acts perform “securitizing” with words, invoke a semantic repertoire, the
so-called “grammar of security”15 through which a social affair can be ad-
dressed as a “problem” (such as terrorism or migration), and this then al-
lows for exceptional measures through a centralized authority (usually the
government). Securitization, here, means calling something a security
problem, and through this, triggering political measures to deal with it.
This approach has been – rightly, I think – criticized as being too preoc-
cupied with the mere linguistic approach and the idea that a pragmatic
turn in security studies would cover most phenomena regarding security.
The so-called Paris School, represented by, for example, Didier Bigo and
Thierry Balzacq, doubts this. They think the speech-act approach to secu-
rity is too narrow, as it neglects the practices of securitization in a broader
sense. What is meant here are practices that go beyond publicly-uttered
speech acts, that is, ones which include weapons, walls, satellite tech-
niques, and a whole range of administrative practices such as population
profiling, risk assessment, a specific habitus of the security profession-
als,16 and, at EU level, data exchange and the activities of Frontex. More-
over, this approach does not just concentrate on states as securitizing ac-
tors but also includes non-state actors, such as companies, professionals,
experts, and individuals. It also addresses the audience of security mea-
sures. Talking about something being a threat requires a public responsive
to these ideas and images. By asking who actually accept the discourses
on security, this approach focuses on the relationship between security




measures, the agents who bring up security threats, and an audience that is
or is not responsive to this discourse.17 Securitization, put this way, means
discursive and non-discursive ways of creating knowledge about security
techniques that change the conduct of social, political, economic and mili-
tary affairs.
Plausible as this “Paris School approach” might be, it still misses two
aspects. First, it falls short of an analysis of how discursive and non-dis-
cursive practices are embedded in professional, including juridical, and
technical contexts of power. The questions here are: Who has the power to
define situations as being threatening? What are the effects of those pol-
icies? What are societal repertoires to respond? Andreas Langenohl distin-
guishes between the power to securitize and the power of securitization18
– a very helpful distinction for our scrutiny. The first distinction, the pow-
er to securitize, covers power as the power to address and frame a situa-
tion as pertaining to security. Regarding the migration issue, the more spe-
cific questions include: Who has the power to define what is a threat?
How are refugees and migrants framed as being threats to the public or-
der? The second aspect, the power of securitization, focuses on the intend-
ed and unintended effects that securitization measures have on people’s
lives. To find out about the power of securitization requires an analysis on
how borders and border instruments infiltrate people’s lives, the lives of
refugees and immigrants but also those of the rest of the population. A
third aspect of power is also very important here, namely, the power of
desecuritization and, mirroring Langenohl’s distinction, the power to dese-
curitize. Desecuritization – and this does not come as a surprise – is linked
to securitization, a link which must be defined. As a first approximation,
the following explanation may be sufficient. Whereas the power of dese-
curitization does not stem from an objective strategy to reveal securitizing
measures but rather creative political counter-narratives to securitizing po-
litics on an everyday basis, the latter, the power of desecuritization, focus-
es on political effects of counter-narratives and resistance politics. The
power of and to desecuritization play important roles in defining what bor-
ders are and how to understand their coercive character, as we will see lat-
er.
17 Balzacq 2005, 2011; Bigo 2006; Leander 2010.
18 Langenohl, this volume.
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First, let me briefly return to the second blind spot of the Paris School –
that is, how exactly security and insecurity, as a result of a securitization
policy, are linked. A plausible way of understanding securitizing measures
is the following: security is not an objective condition but is constructed.
It is constructed through intersubjective, shared interpretations within a
social context and is directly linked to processes of securitization. So far,
Paris School scholars would probably agree. However, those practices of
security create insecurity, both are intrinsically linked. These practices
come to the fore in a dialectical relationship in which the formation of se-
curity brings about its opposite, not a more secure world, but an insecure
world. This happens, for example, through measures of “normalization,”
of political exclusion, surveillance and data collection. A dialectical- and
Foucault-based approach includes not only a reflection on processes of
discursive representation and construction, but also a critical interrogation
of the techniques and forms of expertise that are involved in enacting,
maintaining, reinforcing, or challenging migration-related processes of se-
curitization.19
What does this entail for the migration and border issue? Refugees are
not just unsure of whether they will survive their dangerous trips after they
are forced to leave. Once they have made their journey with is privations
and life-threatening routes to Europe, they again have to wait stressful
months and sometimes years before getting legal acceptance as either an
“asylum seeker” or as a “refugee”, which then allows them to apply for
fully-fledge citizenship after three years, or as so-called “beneficiary of
protection” which makes them wait for seven years before being eligible
to apply for a German passport. More than this, through European policy,
refugees are framed as criminals, potential terrorists, and/or non-au-
tonomous victims that need to be helped and, as an effect, are patronized.
To offer a better picture, I take a closer look at how EU and German mi-
gration policy is deeply entrenched by securitizing power practices and
how this can only be called coercive border control.
The securitization of European borders
In the mid-1980s, immigration became politicized through the issue of
asylum. From the abolishment of border control between Schengen coun-
tries and the free movement of persons within the European Union, it fol-
19 Van Baar 2011a; van Baar 2013d.
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lowed that member states of the European Union (EU) lost decision-mak-
ing authority over entry, residence, and exit. This was the begin of the
“Fortress Europe”.20 States lost steering authority as decisions of a single
state in a space without internal frontiers naturally bears consequences for
all member states. Nevertheless, the European Union and especially the
member states did not want to give up on steering mechanisms for immi-
gration of citizens from third countries. Two measures were taken: first, a
more effective safeguarding of eternal borders; and, secondly, a Euro-
peanization of asylum law.
Safeguarding of external borders
The European Union (EU) established a politics of “integrated border
management,” through which it endeavors to ensure that it can decide who
enters and who is excluded, like a classical immigration country. Many ac-
tors are involved, such as EU institutions (European Commission, Euro-
pean Parliament, and the European Council), the Member States and Fron-
tex, the EU border agency. Central aspects are increasing use of technolo-
gy, outsourcing, privatization, and exterritorialization. Through this, the
inclusion of third countries in the EU’s border management became possi-
ble. This happened through repatriation agreements (with Morocco), and
“neighbor politics” though which the legal immigration of citizens of this
particular state are eased and, in turn, it is expected that a further wave of
refugees is blocked (Turkey). The European Court of Justice (EUGH/ECJ/
CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) made it very
clear that the norms of international refugee protection are also valid for
EU institutions and agencies, including Frontex, when acting outside the
European territory. This leads to the problem of how to deal with states
that violate the human rights of refugees, which happens every day.
Amnesty International has already accused Turkey for months of forc-
ing refugees to go back to their countries of origin, which include war-torn
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. More and more people were caught on their
way to Greece and were deported to EU-financed deportation camps in
Erzurum, in the eastern part of Turkey. Without further legal assistance or
an asylum procedure, they were deported from there to their countries of
origin. This happened even though refugees from a country of war do have
an international legal claim to a right to protection (non-refoulement).
20 Mrozek 2017, pp. 84–96.
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Turkey has pledged itself to respect the European and the Geneva Conven-
tion of Refugees. There is nothing quite like a “border” for blocking the
way within existing law. Instead, blocking the way here entails having the
option to either try to flee anew after having been deported back to the
war-torn or insecure country of origin, or become an illegal person in
Turkey. State leaders know that a mere sign on a wall would not prevent
anybody. This is why the EU border control agency, Frontex, goes further
than just controlling visible walls and fences. It has created border control
that is backed by scientific knowledge and co-operation with hi-tech com-
panies.21
Europeanization of asylum law
In the 1980s, asylum was quickly connected to illegal immigration. In the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, asylum politics was integrated into the “third
pillar” of co-operation, and this “third pillar,” next to the first that handled
economic, social and environmental policies, and the second that took care
of foreign policy and military matters, brings together co-operation in the
fight against crime. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 confirmed the “Hague
Programme” of 2004, which was then further developed in the “Stock-
holm Programme” of 2014, in which asylum law was taken away from the
sovereignty of the individual member state and was submitted to commu-
nity law. A European-wide equal protection for asylum-seekers was to ex-
ist. Stockholm, indeed, led to a close-woven regulation system. However,
the conditions under which to grant asylum, in terms of the social and
healthcare performances, were not standardized. Standards for accommo-
dation and support, for example, differ across and within member states,
and this was taken as reason to allow for a huge amount of discretion. That
21 Frontex, we should note, is not a European border police agency, even though it
has task that are police-like. It is rather a transnational administrative agency and
is subordinated to national law. It has a budget that has increased from 19,2 mil-
lion to 114 million euros between 2015 and 2016 (Luft 2016, p. 55).) Frontex is
responsible for so-called “push back” operations, which are, according to the
Geneva Refugee Convention, illegal and violate human dignity, according to EC-
tHR rulings since 2012. Nevertheless, they still exist, as previous Frontext Execu-
tive Director Ilkka Laitinen admitted recently. Frontex works, and we should keep
this in mind, with full support of the European Internal Ministry, the European
Commission and the majority of the European Parliament. Since Frontex has been
criticized by the public, the member states tend to use Frontex as a scapegoat for
human rights abuses rathen than the EU, which is the actual contracting authority.
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refugees and immigrants moved further to the North was expectable under
those conditions.
The European-wide border control system utilizes advanced technolo-
gy. Already in 1998 in an Austrian Presidency work program on Eurodac,
a database of fingerprints from asylum applicants was commented on in
the following: “The steep rise in the number of illegal immigrants and
therefore potential asylum-seekers caught has revealed the increasing need
to include their fingerprints in the system”.22 Other regulations on migra-
tion in Europe followed.23 Eurosur has been brought into life to intensify
information exchange between Schengen states and Frontex through data
from satellite control in real-time. It functions in co-operation with the
European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Europol (the EU’s law en-
forcement agency), the EU Satellite Centre and the European Maritime
Safety Agency, and all are coordinated through Frontex.24
What we can see from this admittedly rough first analysis of existing
border policies is first that it is not sufficient, when closely-looking at bor-
der policing practices to think of a border as just a wall. Border control has
become an industry in which science, technology, and politics work close-
ly together. These material and technical ways to create borders have led
to securitization. This happens, as we have seen, through discursive (as
with European legal and political regulations, and media coverage) and
non-discursive ways (collecting fingerprints, data storage systems, and
satellite control) of creating knowledge about security techniques, and
measures of “normalization” (surveillance processes in arrival camps, en-
forced distribution of refugees within an arrival country), of surveillance,
and of data collection.25
Second, the power to securitize borders lies with European institutions
that have created a network of control, surveillance, and deterrence. They
function according to political decisions on a European level, backed by
the respective national government. Behind those decisions stand real per-
sons who have discussed those measures and have signed the orders. But
as we know from systems theory, administrational institutions communi-
cate with one another across functionalistic systems through codes that al-
low access to other systemic domains, without the involvement of the sub-
22 Statewatch 1998, cited in Huysmans 2000, p. 755.
23 Kostakopoulou 2000.
24 Luft 2016, p. 58.
25 Van Baar 2011a; van Baar 2013d.
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ject at all. The power to securitize is the power of the European elite to
establish structures that then function as securitizing practices and govern-
mental control. The power of securitization, however, becomes visible
first and foremost in a “grammar of security,” as Buzan puts it, a grammar
that forms the condition of a performative speech-act of securitization.26
On the basis of this, as we have seen, the migrant is coined as a criminal,
the other, a threat, an ascription.
Securitization within Europe
Enforcing measures with regard to migration happens not only at the out-
skirt of Europe. Securitization takes place also within Europe. Borders ap-
pear not just as walls and technical borders but as social and economic
boundaries. The practices and discourses of securitization have tainted mi-
nority politics to an extent that they blur the distinctions betweens immi-
gration and asylum politics, on the one hand, and minority politics regard-
ing an “indegenious” minority, on the other.
The Roma in Europe are particularly affected by different security mea-
sures. Shortly after the fall of Communism, institutional discrimination
and violent attacks by “ordinary citizens” against the Roma occurred
throughout Central and East Europe. Human rights organizations and the
European Union started to deal with the “Romani case” and framed it as a
“human emergency”.27 The adequate protection of the Romani minorities
became one of the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, formulated in
1993. It was in these days that the Roma were defined as a European mi-
nority that needed human rights protection. From the perspective of EU
citizenship,28 there are (at least) two types of Roma citizens: those with a
European passport who moved from eastern to the western European
countries (mainly to Italy, France, and Germany), and exercised their
rights of free movement; and Romani refugees from the former Yu-
4
26 Buzan et al. 1998.
27 Van Baar 2011.
28 EU citizenship, as we are aware, is one among many regimes in Europe that con-
fers rights, and refers mainly to the legal side of citizenship. EU citizenship is
sometimes used as the broader conception that includes political, cultural, and so-
cial aspects of citizenship, as well as how citizenship regimes emerge and change
(Engin Isin/Michael Saward 2013, pos. 209).
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goslavia, who had fled the civil war and have already lived in Germany
and other European countries for almost 20 years.
It was in this context of having recognized the Roma as a European mi-
nority that the European Commission stated that the Roma have difficul-
ties in defending their basic human and citizenship rights, because of
“their nomadic way of life”.29 One needs to know that, throughout history,
and surely nowadays, no more than 3 % of Romani people were and are
voluntarily travelers. Nevertheless, citizenship policy had to be applied,
regardless of the fact that these Romani people held European passports.
Italy, for example, started with some of these policy measurements.
Around 1990, many Italian regions had already adopted laws aimed at the
“protection of nomadic cultures.” According to these laws, Roma “cul-
ture” needs to be “protected” through the construction and surveillance of
segregated camps, the so-called campi nomadi. It was paradoxically the
Italian authorities who “nomadized” the Roma by evicting them and forc-
ing them to circulate within Italy. This irregulation of the Roma social mo-
bility was used to reinforce the widespread prejudice that Roma do not be-
long to Italy, even though most of the Italy’s Roma are Italian or non-Ital-
ian EU citizens.30 What is striking here is that in this context, citizenship
and human rights are not seen as being unconditional, but require certain
societal pre-conditions such as “being settled” in which “being settled”
means “in a camp.” Rather, citizenship rights are an instrument for securi-
tizing the Roma people, in the name of emancipating them. EU citizenship
is called into question when European citizens are evicted regardless of
their European passports.
Let us briefly have a look at the siuation in Germany. The situation of
the Romanian Roma in Germany is more complicated, but nonetheless
shows also an ambivalance of the existing rights claims and the de facto
exclusion of rights in the securitization discourses. Every summer, hun-
dreds of Roma try to find informal work in the city of Berlin (and also
Frankfurt and some of the other major cities). The newspapers reporting
on this usually avoid mentioning that the people of this group of ‘day la-
borers’ are Romani. Mentioning this fact could lead either to swift dis-
crimination and is historically seen as akin to the outright discrimination
of a group that was previously persecuted under the Nazi regime. The pub-
29 European Commission 1999, p. 2, cited in van Baar 2011, p. 209; Atger 2013.
30 Van Baar 2011; Aradau et al. 2013; Ivasiuc, this volume.
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lic debate about the citizenship rights of Roma in Germany, however,
switched from stressing Roma’s right of free movement as European citi-
zens, on the one side, and the view that they were unwanted foreigners
who ‘abuse’ their right to the hospitality that German society offers to
people in real danger, on the other. And, yet again, they were depicted as a
threat to public order.31 At some point, some of the Romanian Roma in
Berlin were provided with tourist status in an emergency situation. They
were sheltered in a house for asylum-seekers, which is not a place for
tourists, and were given some financial support so that they could return
home (to Romania) after the legal established 90 days that a European citi-
zen without financial means is allowed to stay. This situation shed a glar-
ing light on German and European citizenship rights. The Roma demanded
asylum in Germany. They fulfilled most of the criteria, such as being sub-
ject of permanent and systematic discrimination in their country of origin,
being persecuted, evicted and pushed into a status of homelessness, and,
as a consequence of this, being traumatized (Caglar/Mehling 2013). They
wished to claim asylum in Germany, even though holding a European
passport exceeds the border between European and non-European citizen.
Being European citizens, Roma minorities from Romania are not eligible
to enjoy the rights that refugees from “third countries” can. But, at the
same time, they could not take advantage of the benefits of European citi-
zenship, either.
German, as well as EU, citizenship fell short of guaranteeing this mi-
nority group their rights, even though they exercised their citizenship
through their mere presence in different places. The Romanian Roma in
Berlin enacted it, after having been deported back to Romania, by coming
back to Germany a few weeks later, exercising their right to free move-
ment.32 The way in which the Roma people articulated claims to asylum
highlighted the limits of EU citizenship as well as human rights. They
were denied basic rights in Germany despite the fact that they held Euro-
pean passports. The migration of this group, even if they hold European
passports, is identified as an internal danger; with regard to the immigra-
tion of the Roma from Kosovo, which we do not have space to discuss
here, is seen as an external danger. Securitization, such as being exposed
to the techniques of control, normalization and exclusion, is a way of pro-
31 Caglar/Mehling 2013, pos. 4120.
32 Cagla/Mehling 2013, pos. 4210.
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ducing forms of non-belonging, and both citizenship and human rights are
part of these exclusion processes.
In each example, I have illustrated the operation of the securitization
discourse in forming and forging external and internal boundaries that ex-
clude “the other” from citizenship and from being a full-fledge member of
a political community. The discussion of the cases so far enables us to dif-
ferentiate three aspects of securitization. Firstly, in the case of access both
to residence and to citizenship, securitization shaped the outcomes in de-
termining the conditions of access. Secondly, the securitization discourse
contributes to marginalize, both symbolically and socio-economically, and
becomes the framework and prism for claims of equal citizenship rights.
Finally, the case of the Roma in Germany reveals the link between securi-
tization and the denial of the exercise of citizenship rights even under the
condition of being a member of the European Union. All these examples
are at the end of a series of at least three aspects of a dialectics of securiti-
zation.
First, the Italian and German situations clearly illustrate how measures
to “create security” and “stability” lead to a problematization of the Roma
– in the form of nomadism, illegality, and public and private security
threats. The supposed security measures establish insecurity for the Roma.
And this constrains substantial options for members of this minority (as
least when part of the groups effected), options that in Millers’ terms
touch generic interests such as housing, equal access to education, possi-
bilities to find an adequate job that allows a living, and so on. Second,
European regulations on minorities and migration are not designed to sup-
port inclusion and integration, nor to ground normative “correction” for
the nationally framed citizenship law. Rather, it mirrors and reinforces the
external foreclosure, the re-nationalization, and the internal border cross-
ing within Europe and even within a European countries such as Germany,
France, and Italy, to mention just three countries here that discriminate
against Roma and migrants. There are different classes of European citi-
zenship. There is citizenship for those who ‘belong,’ at least for the time
being, and for those who should be expelled upon basis of their citizen-
ship, as we have seen with the Roma. Citizenship can bring about exclu-
sion, instead of more inclusion, and effect even those who do have a Euro-
pean passport. Third, not just the outer borders of Europe but also bound-
aries within Europe are coercive. Before we have seen that the safe-guard-
ing of eternal borders leads to legal exclusion that may leave migrants
some other options (going back to war or poverty) but those are options
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that do not qualify for a decent life (or generic interests). Seen from within
Europe, legal inclusion of European citizens is also not necessarily fol-
lowed by a political, nor a cultural inclusion (that is not highly discrimi-
nating). Romani people are not just prevented from social participation.
Rather, social living conditions are imposed on them (such as living in
camps, being harassed by vigilantes, and degrading representation in the
media). The legally assured freedom of movement can easily be reversed,
into the freedom to be moved and enforced border crossing and eviction.
Roma people seem to be illegible to enjoy human rights since they are al-
legedly “nomadic” and therefore pose a security risk. These modes of se-
curitizing people, of excluding them and neglecting their rights, are part of
the pattern of denying social participating.
The power to (de-)securitize
The analyses of European border politics externally and internally have re-
vealed at least two aspects that are closely related with what I have called
the dialiectics of securitization. The following section first deals with the
ambivalence of human rights, and the second with the power to securitize
and the power of securitization.
The ambivalence of human rights
First, citizenship and human rights in the context of migration, we have
seen, work as a securitizing frameowrk, identifying migrants and also Ro-
ma as a special group of people, who do not belong to the community of
human rights bearers, who need to be first made eligible to exercise hu-
man rights. Securitization, such as being exposed to techniques of control,
normalization and exclusion, is a way of producing forms of non-belon-
ging, and human rights are part of these exclusion processes. This high-
lights a more general problem with human rights. We could also see that
human rights play an ambivalent role when it comes to securitization pro-
cesses. They are conditions of freedom and resistance as well as instru-
ments of oppression at the same time. How can this be the case? To better
understand this dual character of human rights, we briefly need to recall
the predominant notion of human rights. According to the liberal tradition,
human beings are originally seen as a historical continuity with traditional
natural law. They are a reaction to state absolutism and moralizing revolu-




day human rights in natural law, shaped by John Locke, along with
Charles de Montesquieu, are still important for the understanding of liber-
al human rights nowadays. They claim to be universally valid, they hold
for every person, and they ask for a political order that protects individual
freedom. In this reading, human rights mean that the individual has a right
to exercise life, liberty, and property in security.33 Rights are an institu-
tional guarantee of the private enjoyment of different goods and ser-
vices.34
Of course, the list of objections against this notion of human rights is
very long, and I cannot go into this here in any length.35 Yet, there is a
major pitfall of human rights that probably Karl Marx mentioned as one of
the first. That is, freedom does not mean that one has the externally se-
cured option to act as one likes according to one’s will. Rather, freedom
means the possibility of social participation. As long as freedom is under-
stood as the undisturbed private realization of one’s own will, the real so-
cial pre-conditions remain unseen. The normative individualism of the lib-
eral human rights that are directed towards protecting individual security,
be it the security of personal or economic freedom, is in tension with the
idea of being “part of a society,” or being a respected member of it. Hu-
man beings, Marx says, do not want, first and foremost, to obtain a fair
share of societal resources. Rather, they want to be part of a community, to
be people among others, being able to determine their social affairs politi-
cally. Human beings, it is supposed here, are political animals. Human
rights in its liberal interpretation do not allow for this, when they claim in-
dividual security. They deny, paradoxically, some groups inside and out-
side territorial borders of Europe, migrants and Romani people, to be part
33 Locke 1689.
34 See also Menke 2016, p. 52.
35 It is misleading, a first objection says, or at least inaccurate, to say that one has
human rights by nature in virtue of one’s humanity, as “human nature” can be
many things. Second, it is questionable whether one can, in fact, speak of continu-
ity between the natural law approach and the present-day understanding of human
rights, because the use of the concept “human rights” is relatively recent and found
its way into general usage only after the foundation of the United Nations in 1945.
A third difficulty is that the natural law approach does not sufficiently distinguish
between values and rights (Raz 2010: 323). Basic necessities of life, such as hav-
ing food or being able to live in peace, are essential values or interests whose real-
ization we would support in all cases, and do not do need any reference to human
rights at all. I think all of these criticisms are correct.
The Power of Border Politics: On Migration in and outside Europe
85
of a political community. Hannah Arendt’s often cited phrase – “one needs
to have a right to have rights” –means precisely that nobody should be de-
nied a legitimate claim to be a member of society, to belong to one, and
not just to have a right to claim something against a state or an official or-
ganization, without the more inclusive claim to become a full-fledge mem-
ber of this community. To deny this claim is coercive as it blocks a quali-
fied option for the migrants and migrating European citizens to which they
usually have no or unbearable alternatives. In the case of the Roma peo-
ple, to restrict their free movement within Europe is against European law
anyway.
De-securitization
The second aspect to discuss is related to the notion of power. Let us recall
David Miller’s claim that what is coercive about borders are the means
used to enforce the border exclusion, not the borders themselves.36 Those
means are part of the legitimate state power to exercise its sovereignty.
Obviously, the notion of power used here is a Weberian one: a chance to
impose one’s own will against the reluctance of others within a social rela-
tion.37 Since Weber considered the notion of power to be vague, he pre-
ferred the more precise notion of authority, which means that a certain
group of people has to obey rules ordered by others against their will. In
this sense, borders themselves do not force people to do things and do not
leave other options. Rather, the argument goes, a border just takes away
one option among many others. In contradistinction to these notions of
power and coercion, I argue that a coercive borders occurs when a group
of people narrow down the options of others to the one thing that they
want him or her to do and through this action further block other options
to lead a self-determined life. It is the exclusion through borders them-
selves – be they national borders and borders within a country or region –
that can be a coercive act. It is an act of securitization in which the power
to securitize is exercised, with all the effects on migrants and Roma people
laid out above. That is why the power to securitize and the power of secu-
ritization (the effects of this power) cannot be reduced to a one-sided We-
berian notion of power. A Foucauldian conception of comprehensive sys-
tems of truth (Episteme) and power constellations (dispositives) is more
36 Miller 2016, pp. 73–74.
37 Weber 1980, p. 28.
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adequate here.38 Power appears in all historical periods and in overlapping
scientific, economic, institutional practices which mirror specific forms of
“subjectiviation.” These practices of daily life power normalize, control,
and submit individuals, but, through this, the self-image of the subjects is
created, which remains something that has been imposed. Securitzing
practices do exactly that: they impose policies, images, and techniques
through which a certain identity gets ascribed and fixated.
With this Foucauldian notion of power, we can also see that these pow-
er constellations are never absolute and all-compassing. There are forms
of power that individuals and groups are not just subjected to but also em-
powered by. Power can set off subjectivations. It was only the late Fou-
cault who established that forms of counter-power and freedom played a
role, but he never worked this out systematically. This idea of ‘counter
power’ is of great importance here. What we can observe is that among
migrants, Roma, and ordinary citizens, modes of resistance against
practices of securitization have occurred immediately. Those practices of
de-securitization came up in niches of power, where the subjectivation
turns into a breaking out of the iron discourse. Refugees in Budapest, for
example, demonstrated against the degrading conditions to which they
were subjected: without water, shelter, food in a railway station. Refugees
demonstrated in almost all big but also middle-sized German cities, for ex-
ample, in Augsburg, where they barricaded themselves in the house of the
local union, demanding better treatment and acceptance as residents (“No
human is illegal”) or in Norderstedt, where they claimed (in German)
“refugees are threatened but not a threat.” Roma people too find creative
ways to counteract securitization policies. Roma from Romania, for exam-
ple, applied for asylum in Germany, even though European citizens are not
officially eligible to do this. However, they fulfilled most of the criteria,
such as being subject of permanent and systematic discrimination in their
country of origin, being persecuted, evicted and pushed into a status of
homelessness.39 By claiming asylum in Germany despite holding a Euro-
pean passport, they exceeded the border between European and non-Euro-
pean citizen and made borders within Europe visible at the same time. For
sure, politically seen these are forms of de-securitization that appear to be
marginally confronted with wide-spread practices of border controls exter-
38 Foucault 2008.
39 Caglar/Mehling 2013.
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nally and internally of Europe. Nevertheless, the everydayness of these
protests gives an idea of how counter-power can occur and rebut forms of
securitization, if only on a small scale.
6 Conclusion
To sum up, the “right to exclude” we have seen is not sustainable. States
are not comparable with private clubs, and since they aim – at the liberal
state – to represent some universal values like equality, it is not a moral-
free zone and can be criticized for being exclusive in the wrong way. Trust
is not necessarily based on national identify, and political self-determina-
tion should include everybody affected, also those outside the territory. In
addition, borders, outer and inner borders, visible and digital, inherently
embrace a force that drastically restricts options and this makes them coer-
cive as long as they have been determined asymmetrically, without having
asked those who are forced to accept them. Modern borders establish
practices of securitization, at the ourskirts and within Europe, that make a
border not just a wall but a functioning net of technical, industrial, and ad-
ministraive control and securitizing power. Those practises not only block
the entry of immigrants (more or less successful), but also infiltrate our
daily lives and change modes of governance of all the citizens of Europe.
Whereas Agamben described the refugee as a symptom for a malaise of
the modern state system, the refugee as an expression of human beings re-
duced to their bare lives, the public discourses right now identify in the
bare life a permanent threat to public order. The refugee is no longer the
symbol of the excluded, included through their unfortunate position in the
camps. Rather, s/he has become a symbol of the included “enemy” who is
dangerous like a “ticking bomb” and needs to be radically excluded. Hu-
man rights do not necessarily protect this group of human beings, as there
is no strong commitment to make refugees an accepted member of com-
munity. Instead, we have seen with migrants and Roma people that human
rights can easily be turned against those who are most vulnerable. Further,
the power to securitze as well the power of securitzation may be enfenced
by counterprotests but de-securitization remains marginal, though not im-
possible. Securitization measures, however, and we should be very aware
of this, do not only affect immigrants but all of us. Who is next in being
coined as a threat is an open questions that might be answered quicker
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Introduction
How can we trace power in the study of security and securitization? Par-
ticularly, how can we analyze the power of securitization and the power to
securitize? In a broader sense, how can we analyze how differing political
projects struggle for power in political processes? We propose that the
study of securitization would benefit greatly from integrating insights of
hegemonic discourse theory to include more explicitly the study of the
constitution of power. Further, hegemony theory is able to encompass dy-
namics which go beyond the classical scope of securitization. In this man-
ner, hegemony theory enables us to analyze the aspects of power in dis-
course which lead to (de-)securitization as well as the effects of a momen-
tary discursive formation of securitization which is usually the end-point
of such studies. In our empirical study of the securitization of ‘financial
stability,’ we can observe that while political actors undertook securitizing
moves and did employ extraordinary means in response to it, they were
unable to control the effects of securitization.
Securitization as a concept has greatly enhanced our understanding of
the social construction of issues as relevant to security. The latest wave of
conceptual work on securitization along the lines of the Copenhagen
School (CS) has increasingly argued for the need of securitization to be
understood within a discourse theoretical framework and has engaged with
the implications which the CS approach produces within such a setting.1
However, few works have engaged with the implications of hegemony
discourse analysis for that framework. This is surprising, since the CS
concept is based on strong assumptions of social and political power-cen-
tres, and its proponents have regularly had to engage with criticism there-
of. In this contribution, we propose to combine the Copenhagen concept of
securitization with hegemonic discourse theory as developed by Ernesto
1 See Stritzel 2007.
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Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. This, we hope, will be a starting point for re-
evaluating a number of theoretical inconsistencies within the CS approach,
and for offering tools for a clearer analysis a) of the discursive dynamics
through and in which securitization manifests, b) of the likelihood for at-
tempted securitizations to be successful or not, and c) regarding what hap-
pens after the moment of securitization. We will illustrate the theoretical
link of the two approaches and its advantages through a case study on the
securitization of ‘financial stability’ during and after the financial crisis of
2008.
The concept of securitization has its origins at the threshold between
the domestic sphere and International Relations (IR). It was originally
conceptualized in the context of the immediate post-Cold War era and in-
troduced aspects of the constructivist and linguistic turn of social sciences
into the discipline of International Relations. It has been a fundamental
contribution to the discipline of IR by adding a layer of considerations
based on constructivism and intersubjectivity to the understanding of dy-
namics of security, which had previously been dominated by the realist
tradition of International Relations and its approach of largely blackboxing
domestic affairs. While this heritage of combining the theoretical ap-
proaches of realism and constructivism renders securitization an innova-
tive and enticing analytical concept, it simultaneously introduces theoreti-
cal challenges which so far remain unresolved.
This holds particularly for the 1998 approach (‘Security: A New Frame-
work for Analysis’) but also for many of those works criticizing and
amending the resulting challenges. These challenges find their origin in
the fact that the Copenhagen approach to securitization adapts concepts
and theoretical insights from sociological, linguistic and constructivist
schools but is not always able to do so coherently while maintaining one
foot in the door of a positivist ontology of the realist International Rela-
tions (IR) perspective. While the speech act approach of the CS is helpful
by directing our attention to the performativity of security, it is ultimately
unable to explain the overall success or failure of instances of constructing
securitization. To be able to do so, the approach would have to explain the
socio-political and ultimately discursive dynamics that lead to the (in)ef-
fectiveness of speech acts. The CS approach, in pre-supposing on the one
hand the self-referential grammar of security and on the other hand focus-
ing on a pre-determined end-point of securitization, remains largely de-
scriptive. Lastly, the approach also lacks clarity on whether power both of
securitization, i.e. the effects induced through securitization, and the pow-
Hannah Broecker and Carola Westermeier
92
er to securitize, i.e. the influence to create a momentum of securitization,
are likely to be found in aspects of agency or structure2. In this manner, it
has been argued, that securitization is an agency-centred concept as it de-
pends on the authoring of individual, intentional speech acts by actors.3 At
the same time, the heavy reliance on pre-existing positions of power and
influence such as those embodied in the speaker’s position and the as-
sumption of predictable interests by the political elites relate back to as-
pects of context and structure as the central variable.
In order to be able to gain in explanatory potential, insights generated
by the CS need to be integrated within the framework of a discourse-based
approach. Such an approach would benefit from a more coherent inclusion
of insights from societal constructivism. Specifically, it needs to bring to-
gether a consistently constructivist understanding of power and the dy-
namics constituting it. Further, such an approach needs to explicate the
place and limits of speech act theory within a larger theory of discourse.
The lack of such a coherent theoretical integration causes the approach to
stay rather close to state-centrism and to affirm the very conceptions of
interest and power of the traditional approaches of IR, which it criticizes
and seeks to reform. The latter of these points is particularly clear in the
explicitly normative imperative for de-securitization. It is the key argu-
ment of this article that securitization along the lines of the CS can and
should be understood and conceptualized as a specific form of hegemonic
project, and that such a theoretical tightening can produce deeper insights
into the dynamics of securitization.
This article focuses on the integration of those insights generated by the
line of understanding of the Copenhagen School but also to some degree
those of the Paris School. We propose to use Ernesto Laclau’s and Chantal
Mouffe’s post-structural discourse theory to approach the notion of hege-
mony.
In their work, Laclau and Mouffe argue that power struggles must not
be analysed or reduced according to given or natural(ized) social entities,
such as class. They seek to show how these entities are constituted and so-
cially constructed in the first place and come to be represented by “empty
signifier(s)”.4 The empirical case study in this article analyzes the devel-
opment of ‘financial stability’ as the empty signifier of a securitized hege-
2 See Langenohl's contribution to this volume, pp. 25-66.
3 See Stritzel 2012, p. 552.
4 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 128.
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monic construction. Treading in the footsteps of Gramsci, hegemony has
been described as a multi-faceted category which entails two aspects:
‘First, hegemony is a type of political practice that captures the making
and breaking of political coalitions. Secondly, hegemony can be seen as a
form of rule that can elucidate the way in which a regime, practice or poli-
cy holds sway over a set of subjects by winning their consent or securing
their compliance’.5 These two aspects of hegemony by nature involve the
exclusion of such positions and persons not subsumed under the collective
hegemonic position and thereby the exercise of power. Through this, both
aspects of hegemony help to unravel the broader notion of power, espe-
cially the power to securitize and the power of securitization as logics con-
nected to the constitution of polities and entailing claims to representing
society. Hegemonic analysis can add to our understanding as to how secu-
ritization occurs and why it is ‘successful’ in some cases but not others. In
this, it harbours the potential to go beyond the classical Copenhagen ap-
proach, adding explanatory power regarding the success of securitization
attempts through re-constructing the constitution of hegemonic discourse
formations and simultaneously widening the array of dynamics that can be
analyzed within its scope. It could encompass, for example, a re-thinking
of the role which contestation plays in allowing for the success of securiti-
zation (see also Bloom and Dallyn, 2011). It can also encompass a re-
thinking of the role securitization itself plays in maintaining the stability
of that which it claims to be threatening In the case of ‘financial stability,’
this could relate to the question: how does the securitization of ‘financial
stability’ lead to a (de-)stabilization of the financial system within which
such a crisis could occur in the first place?
In our example, the prevailing pre-crisis discourse could no longer han-
dle the issues that arose with the events of the crisis. It was not able to in-
tegrate different articulations stated by differing subject-positions. Subse-
quently, a discursive formation evolved which temporarily brought togeth-
er differing demands and thereby made a hegemonic claim. It will be
shown that ‘financial stability’ was used as a referent object of securitiza-
tion in the Copenhagen sense. In the following phase of financial policy-
making, it provided an anchor for the discourse on financial regulation
that brought together multiple articulations. However, as differences be-
tween articulations gain importance, it becomes obvious that the initial
5 Howarth 2010. See also Cox 1996, p. 151.
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referent object has to be understood as an ‘empty signifier’ that remains
an abstract code to which multiple articulations can relate. The empirical
analysis – an illustration of discourse, based on statements and reports by
relevant actors within the field of financial regulation – serves as an illus-
tration of the utility of the theoretical approach proposed here.
The first part of the article is dedicated to the theoretical outline of our
proposal. We start out by giving a condensed insight into the central tenets
of the theory of hegemony by Laclau and Mouffe and continue to outline
the manner in which securitization approaches and discourse analysis of
hegemony can be fruitfully combined. It is noteworthy that we focus on
their earlier post-Marxist understanding of hegemony6 and not on the later,
psychoanalytically inspired work. What follows in the second part of the
article is an empirical analysis of the discourse on financial regulation ac-
cording to the proposed model.
Hegemony according to Laclau and Mouffe
Based on the insights of linguistic post-structuralism, Laclau and Mouffe
hold that any understanding is produced through the signification of differ-
ences and interrelations between individual signifiers or subject-positions
in a discourse. No subject matter, symbolic or material, can be represented
as itself but only in relation to other subject matters. Differences and
meaning thusly constituted further rely on the understanding that any sign
consists of a signifier and a signified.
Hegemony in this conceptualisation essentially refers to the nature of
the relationship between different social subject-positions in discourse. As
mentioned previously, the perspective holds that categories according to
which individual issues are analyzed – such as class, gender, and also se-
curity – are not given.7 Laclau and Mouffe argue that the emergence of
such entities can best be understood by an analysis of discourse, more
specifically, the moment of formation of social and political constellations.
They find that a hegemonic construction is essentially a particular discur-
sive formation that brings together several individual positions such as de-
mands, views, hopes, fears and other forms of articulation under one po-
6 Laclau/Mouffe 1985.
7 Id., pp. 123, 124, 127, 129.
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litical umbrella.8 The concept of articulation here refers to “any practice
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified
as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting
from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse”.9 At its core, hege-
mony thus allows for different subject-positions – to relate to one or a
group of hegemonic concepts – such as class or, in our case, a specific
claim to (in)security. Hegemonic formations hence occur when different
subject-positions coalesce around one or several signifiers, which are con-
structed to represent these various positions. Laclau and Mouffe term this
the chain of equivalence.10 “They [signifiers] are the points of identifica-
tion that unite otherwise disparate groups, for instance the flag in a nation-
alist discourse”.11 Through creating what may be called an anchor to the
discursive formation, hegemonies organize the elements they subsume and
make them intelligible in a particular way. While the individual positions
included in a hegemonic construction hence differ and may even contra-
dict each other in some respects, such differences are subordinated to that
which is constructed to unite them and which is expressed through the
empty signifier(s). The empty signifier(s) are hence constructed to stand in
for the entire system of differences, which represents the discourse rather
than any particular position within it.12 In our case study, the signifier ‘fi-
nancial stability’ unites a range of differing positions, such as demands ar-
ticulated by politicians, as well as those of bankers and regulators, without
representing a particular subject position.
The logic of differentiation between a hegemonic discourse and that
which is outside of it, is of a different nature than those differences be-
tween individual positions within a discourse. Within a discourse, differ-
ences are necessary for the creation of meaning. The second logic of dif-
ferentiation is that between a hegemonic construction and its outside. The
outside of a hegemonic construction, which is always constituted by other
discourses, necessarily represents that which has not yet or cannot be sub-
sumed under the hegemonic chain of equivalences. It demarcates that
which curtails the potential for completeness of the hegemonic construc-
8 Id., pp. 128, 152.
9 Laclau/Mouffe 2001, p. 105.
10 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 130.
11 Thomassen 2016, p. 166.
12 See, for example, Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 148.
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tion and, in this manner, threatens its existence – the antagonist divide.13
Instead of the individual differences, these subject-positions enter into an
antagonist relationship with that which is beyond the boundary of this
chain of equivalence. Simultaneously, it is this antagonist outside which
creates the conditions of possibility for the construction of a chain of
equivalence, the subjugation of differences between positions within the
discourse and, hence, the construction of hegemony in the first place.14
Laclau and Mouffe hold that a hegemonic discourse formation is only pos-
sible when, in addition to the presence of antagonist forces, the possibility
is given that elements can be articulated to the constitutively opposite
camps of an antagonist formation. While they utilize the term ‘moments’
to signify those entities which have been articulated as part of a discourse,
they refer to ‘elements’ as those signifiers “incapable of being wholly ar-
ticulated into a discursive chain”.15 Because of the vast field of signifiers
which is not fully articulated, we must distinguish between discourses
(with fixed articulations, i.e. ‘moments’) and the field of discursivity in
which unarticulated ‘elements’ occur and which presents us with a surplus
of meaning. The field of discursivity is hence also always a field of unde-
cidability in which a surplus of meaning exists which cannot be wholly
subsumed into any discursive formation and which therefore constantly
undermines this system of articulation.16 Hegemony then presents a mo-
mentary decision of articulation which is nevertheless placed within a
wider field of undecidability. That is to say, elements might also be articu-
lated as part of the chain of equivalence constructed to oppose the hege-
monic one.17 This also implies that while hegemonic discourse formations
organize discourses and claim to represent decidability (through implying
order and logic), the overall terrain of discursivity remains one of undecid-
ability, and the hegemonic discourse formation remains unstable. In our
case study, this aspect becomes obvious in the fact that the meanings sub-
sumed under ‘financial stability’ are constantly evolving, and finally the
empty signifier becomes unable to subsume their differences.
Inherent in this understanding of hegemony and antagonism – which
are always political projects – is the strive to overcome that which is seen
13 Id., pp. 111, 130.
14 See, for example, Howarth 2015, pp. 67, 68.
15 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 99, see also p. 97.
16 Id., pp. 97, 100.
17 Id., p. 122.
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to restrict the vision of a hegemonic totality.18 This attempt is, however,
necessarily bound to fail as the hegemonic construct, represented in the
chain of equivalence and the empty signifier, depends on the antagonistic
struggle for its own definition and thereby existence.19 To give an exam-
ple, the identity of the discourse in question might be the representation of
‘The Free World.’20 This identity, which represents multiple subject-pos-
itions identified with different and potentially opposing discursive objects,
relies on a definition of that which curtails the totality of that ‘Free World’
– thereby positioned on the other side of the antagonistic line. This could
be terrorism, underdevelopment, militant Islam or, in fact, almost any oth-
er object constructed in radical difference (i.e. constitutional opposition) to
the term ‘Free World.’ The desire for a complete identity thus includes the
striving to eradicate those factors which are seen to curtail it. Were it pos-
sible to eradicate these factors, however, this would not lead to the com-
pletion of the hegemonic construct as ‘The Free World’ but to an impossi-
bility to uphold this identity for lack of an antagonist Other against which
it could be defined. This is what Laclau and Mouffe refer to as antagonism
constituting both the possibility and impossibility of identity.21
The understanding, following from the above, that “a discursive struc-
ture is not a merely ‘cognitive’ or ‘contemplative’ entity; it is an articu-
latory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations” is vital
here.22 It means that hegemonic constructions imply both power and the
social creation of knowledge through establishing a logic according to
which the elements of a discourse are understood and made sense of.
Hegemonic analysis offers us the analytical tools to add such a conceptu-
alisation on the level of the power of securitization and the power to secu-
ritize.
18 See also Nonhoff 2006, pp. 94, 105.
19 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 148.
20 The term ‘identity’ is, in this text, used to refer to the hegemonic construct which
defines an entire discourse and binds together various subject-positions.
21 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 120; Howarth 2015, p. 68.
22 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 82.
Hannah Broecker and Carola Westermeier
98
The signifier ‘security’
A theoretical focus on the dynamics of signification is not uncommon to
Critical Security Studies. Approaching ‘security’ as a thick signifier,
Huysmans articulates such an understanding of security as a logic accord-
ing to which “our relation to nature, other human beings and the self” be-
comes articulated and organized.23 He argues accordingly that the security
studies agenda needs to be concerned above all with the question of the
“meaning of security, that is, the signifying and thus ordering work of security
practices. How does security order social relations? What does a security
problematic imply? What does the signifier do to the discussion of the free
movement of persons in the EU, for example? Rather than being a tool of cla-
rification serving an agenda, the exploration of the meaning of security is the
security studies agenda itself”.24
From the analysis of IR literature, Huysmans identifies security as the log-
ic of an abstract fear of death in modernity. The fear relates to a) abstract
death itself, and b) the uncertainty, the lack of knowledge of where and
when such death is to be expected. Security practices then become those
practices and institutions through which this abstract fear becomes at-
tached to concrete objects, and thus becomes manageable.25 We agree with
much of this analysis. However, we propose to approach security through
the avenue of the ‘empty,’ rather than ‘thick’ signifier for the following
reasons. Firstly, security automatically results in an antagonistic relation-
ship with that which is constructed to represent the lack of security – that
is, insecurity. Secondly, and in line with Huysmans’ analysis, we under-
stand security as operating not on the level of the individual but on the
level of the collective. Claims to security then assume to speak on behalf
of the collectivity, of a vision of society. More concretely than the notion
of ‘abstract death,’ however, security relates to the destruction or destabi-
lization of intelligibility. It is this intelligibility which is theorized in great
depth in Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of discursive hegemony and the
empty signifier. Thirdly, the empty signifier is strongly connected to the
analysis of the constitution of identities and power-relations flowing into
and from such claims of representing ‘society.’ Referencing hegemony
theory can improve our understanding of the nature of the notion of ‘ab-
23 Huysmans 1998, pp. 228, 231.
24 Id., p. 233.
25 Id., p. 235.
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stract death’ as the demise of discursive intelligibility and aid in the analy-
sis of which articulatory practices threaten the stability of the discursive
system which provides such intelligibility. The power of securitization
should then be conceptualized as the effect of securitization as a hegemon-
ic discourse formation. The power of such a hegemonic discourse forma-
tion is to consolidate particular claims to representing ‘society’ and the or-
der of intelligibility. Concretely, this power implies the structuring of the
inclusion and exclusion of subject-positions and (types of) knowledge
which are considered crucial in political struggles.
‘Lack’ in securitization and hegemonic analysis
Lack, in various forms and terminologies, plays a vital role in both the
strand of hegemonic analysis proposed here and in the conceptualization
of securitization along the CS. As outlined above, lack is that which cur-
tails a perfect hegemonic formation. The empty signifier, binding together
the chain of equivalence can, depending on the perspective, be either that
which constitutes the claim to ‘society’ or the wished-for state of affairs
(i.e. security), or that which threatens it.26 To give an example, whether, in
the Cold War context, we conjure up the empty signifier which stands in
for the dimension of threat and insecurity, i.e. ‘communism,’ or whether,
on the contrary, we utilize the signifier representing security and the
wished-for state of affairs, i.e. ‘the West,’ or ‘economy of the free market,’
we always refer to the antagonist divide which constitutes both of its sides.
Security is then always the object which is constituted by lack. In either
case, a negative ontology exists – that is, in either case a version of an ide-
al identity is counter-posed by that which threatens it. In either case, an
antagonist line is drawn between that which is aspired and that which is
perceived to threaten it. In an understanding of securitization as hegemon-
ic discourse formation, we must hence negate the possibility of security
being constructed outside of this logic of negativity, i.e. as pure positivity.
This relationship between lack and an aspired state of affairs essentially
articulates processes that are similarly thought of in securitization ap-
proaches. They are directly described in CS-inspired approaches and indi-
rectly referenced through the praxeological analyses of the Paris School
26 See also Thomassen 2016, p. 166.
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(PS). In this manner, lack, communicated as antagonism in discourse or
communicated through security practices, necessarily has to be present in
order to formulate the endangerment of central components of the polity.
In order for there to be a lack of security, there has to be something that
threatens or restricts security – even if this something finds expression on-
ly through absence – such as the perceived absence of practices or institu-
tions deemed proper to establish the imagined state of things. The articula-
tion that a given referent object is threatened presupposes a perspective fo-
cusing on lack.27 In this manner, both the CS and hegemony discourse
analyses describe a perceived lack.
While not all hegemonic formations are necessarily of a nature per-
ceived as security-relevant, instances of securitization are necessarily at-
tached to such mechanisms due to the combination of two factors: Firstly,
the creation of an issue as security-relevant essentially pre-supposes the
potential for destruction (i.e. abstract death). The drawing of an antagonis-
tic line, dividing the referent object from that which is (understood to be)
threatening its own logic of existence, is a direct consequence of this. Sec-
ondly, when we refer to securitization, we refer to a political practice. In
this manner, issues of individual safety only become issues of security
when framed as relevant aspects of the polity. As Martin Nonhoff argues,
this refers to all political discourses that direct themselves at that which
represents the societal whole, unity or the polity necessarily attempt to
gain the largest possible representative power. In order to do so, they must
attempt to incorporate a range of different positionalities under a common
umbrella, thus aiming to achieve a hegemonic formation.28 It is the shared
signification that emerges as the sum of various positionalities concerning
one referent object. The referent object essentially runs parallel to the con-
cept of the empty signifier, standing in for the chain of equivalence in our
study of hegemonic formations. In this manner, and referring to our exam-
ple below, ‘financial stability’ is both the referent object under threat and
the signifier of a hegemonic discourse formation.
27 The analysis of ‘lack’ is central in Lacan’s psycho-analytical work on identity and
has been appropriated in Laclau’s later work for the further study of (collective)
identity in hegemonic discourse formations. However, we do not want to focus in
this contribution on the wider study of aspects of identity. The term ‘lack’ is here
utilised merely to signify that which curtails the totality of the chain of equiva-
lence.
28 Nonhoff 2006, pp. 105, 106.
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However, this example, to be concretised in the second part of the arti-
cle, also demonstrates that hegemony adds the perspective of the represen-
tation of various subject-positions. In our case, individual narratives of
threat may focus on various referent objects such as shareholder interests,
the security of savings, or democracy. These, however, may be able to co-
alesce around a theme that appears to represent all of these – namely ‘fi-
nancial stability’. In effect, what hegemonic theory can add here is an un-
derstanding that what is generically termed the ‘referent object’ may in
fact be a fragmented coalition of various referent objects. As outlined in
Neo-Gramscian approaches, the basic effect of this hegemonic phe-
nomenon is a gain in power over the overall construction by becoming a
source for the organization of meaning, thus creating and also disciplining
‘knowledge’ in relation to the individual positions it contains.29 The re-
sulting understanding that a referent object may really be a collection of
various and potentially conflicting views on referent objects and/or per-
spectives on how to approach these becomes relevant when considering
the consequences of (attempted) securitizations. While securitization as a
hegemonic formation on the one hand lends power to the positionalities it
includes and shapes, on the other hand it renders the referent object a
fuzzier concept, devoid of any particular meaning. Laclau and Mouffe out-
line this process in the example of individual demands voiced in the “re-
pressive context of the Tsarist state.” Here, they argue that “no movement
for partial demands could remain confined within itself: it was inevitably
transformed into an example and symbol of resistance.” With individual
struggles becoming subsumed under the empty signifier of ‘opposition’ or
‘resistance’ (to the political system), they simultaneously lose some of
their specificity in representation.30
As a result, it is likely that a hegemonic formation loses its ‘binding
force’ when the implementation of concrete measures demands specificity.
As the unifying force of a hegemonic formation depends on the suppres-
sion of differences, the more concrete demands become, the less likely the
unifying hegemonic formation is able to unite them with other specific de-
mands. These dynamics lead to the dissolution of the hegemonic forma-
29 Herschinger 2014, p. 78.
30 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 2, see also p. 4. An in-depth analysis of this matter can be
found in Laclau and Mouffe’s discussion on the seemingly contradictory logics of
hegemony and autonomy (see, for example, id., pp. 126–131).
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tion, as we will also see in the case of the empty signifier ‘financial stabili-
ty.’
The power to securitize and Speech Act Theory in Copenhagen
It is surprising that so very little attention has been paid to a theorization
of power in CS securitization literature. We argue that the reason for this
lies primarily in the aforementioned realist heritage in the original ap-
proach. Power is then assumed to be found with pre-existing positions of
statist power, which are supposed to constitute institutionalized and con-
ventional contexts within which securitizing speech acts take place. While
the application of speech act theory has brought many advantages to the
field of security studies – particularly by placing attention on the linguistic
construction of knowledge and threat – it has stopped short of analyzing
an important missing link between the dynamics explicated by Austin and
Searle and the reasons for and mechanisms of ‘acceptance’ of the securi-
tizing move. The latter is not to be found within the theoretical framework
of the speech act theory, but within a theory of discourse. Because of this,
the role of the speech act within the overall approach of securitization
should be re-evaluated.
We will give a brief overview of our understanding of the speech act
theory as background to this criticism. Based on an instrumentalist under-
standing of the production of meaning in language, the speech act ap-
proach originally developed by Austin and further developed by Searle
aims to analyse the structure internal to language-based action and its pos-
sible effects. While the speech act approach can explain which aspects are
likely to be needed for any intended listener to understand the commu-
nicative intentions of the author of the speech act, there is no explanation
as to the necessary factors for the listener to accept and support the pro-
posed content or claim. That is, the question which factors transfer the
performance of the speech act into an act with political consequences is
not the focus of the theory. Illocution refers to the type and function of the
language-based action which is meant to be undertaken (by the speaker)
and understood to be undertaken (by the listener) in the act of speaking.
Such functions may be to promise, to claim, to demand, etc. The two –
meant and understood illocution – may differ from each other. The per-
locutionary act refers to the consequences of a language-based action
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which do not include the conventionalized effects – by saying A, I do B.31
By claiming something, the listener may be convinced, for example. How-
ever, Austin suggests that in some highly institutionalized procedures,
conventional consequences should be understood as part of the illocution-
ary act – by saying A, I do A.32 This is the case in the oft-cited examples
of naming a ship and marrying a couple (under the correct institutionalized
settings, respectively). In the cited cases, it is a conventionalized action,
which brings that which it declares into being in and through the act of
speaking. It is this understanding which the early CS framework utilized,
reducing securitization to “a conventional procedure in which the ‘felicity
circumstances’ must fully prevail for the act to go through”.33
Few such clear conventional consequences, however, exist in the field
of security (or politics at large). As Huysmans outlines, two contradictory
aspects are contained in the notion of the securitizing speech act, which
demonstrates the tension between an illocutionary and perlocutionary un-
derstanding thereof. The break with normality embodied in the invocation
of a state of exception is, firstly, “connected back to normative and politi-
cal orders that provide the basis for evaluating and contesting the accept-
ability of transgressions in terms of calculable consequences of the act”.34
This includes the calculability of ‘speaking security’ and refers to institu-
tionalized consequences of the speech act. Securitization in this reading is
the orderly transgression of order and, because of this, not beyond order at
all. In a contrarian aspect, “‘security’ is a specific move that entails conse-
quences which involve risking oneself and offering a specific issue as a
test case (Wæver, 1995: 75)”.35 In this respect, we are confronted with the
absence of institutionalized, foreseeable consequences of the speech act.
This perspective is further underlined by the suggestion that “securitisa-
tion can never be only imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case”,36
so that “success depends on perlocutionary effects”.37 An understanding of
securitization as an illocutionary act ultimately only works if assuming
that fully conventionalized patterns and authorized speaker positions do
31 Austin 1962, pp. 102, 106.
32 Id., pp. 102, 103.
33 Balzacq 2005, p. 172.
34 Huysmans 2011, p. 374.
35 Id., p. 373.
36 Buzan et al. 1998, p. 25.
37 Vuori 2011, pp. 160, 161; see also Guzzini 2011, p. 331.
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exist. It displays a fixation on pre-existing, usually state- and elite-centric,
institutionalized positions of power stemming from the realist tradition of
thought.
The analytical category of ‘success’
Two additional analytical categories, demonstrating an underlying unease
with an understanding of security as an illocutionary act, have been intro-
duced to the theoretical framework – the ‘audience’ and the application of
extraordinary means as a measure of success. Success has, from the earlier
writings of the CS, been part of the understanding of securitization. Secu-
ritization is supposed to lead somewhere – that is, the justification of the
application of extraordinary means.38 These extraordinary means then be-
come the de facto proof for ‘success.’ This perspective faces several chal-
lenges. Firstly, securitization does not necessarily lead to the application
of extraordinary means. While securitization may be used to justify the ap-
plication of extraordinary measures, such an application, and the kind of
measure applied, does not automatically arise from securitization. The
utilisation of extraordinary measures as a sign of success, hence, sits un-
easily within a theoretical framework which derives its strength from in-
troducing performativity (understood as illocution) into its framework of
the production of security itself, as the perlocutionary act (which includes
the wished-for response of another person but cannot and indeed does not
try to explain it), is called upon to confirm that the act was illocutionary in
the first place – that it really achieved securitization. This, of course, is
contradictory in terms.
A second challenge introduced to the theoretical framework through the
category of success is the role of practices. While the notion of success
along the lines of the application of extraordinary means places the speech
act at the beginning of a process and the application of extraordinary
means at its end (and as its proof), several authors, particularly those asso-
ciated with the Paris School (PS), have demonstrated that both individual
physical acts which communicate a threat-situation as well as every-day
bureaucratic practices do “not merely follow from securitising speech acts
but are part of the process through which meanings of security are com-
38 Wæver 1995, p. 55; Buzan et al. 1998, p. 24; McDonald 2008, p. 569.
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municated and through which security itself is constructed”.39 In this man-
ner, the “little security nothings,” as Jef Huysmans terms everyday
practices establishing knowledge about security, may indeed be more sig-
nificant and form the basis for grand gestures of political speech acts.40
This ‘knowledge’ about security also includes imaginations on the poten-
tial ways for acting in the face of threat. Further, acts considered “extraor-
dinary” may also be such which lead to, rather than conclude, an initial
communication of threat to a larger social group. A theory of discourse
which understands discourses to be also material, as we suggest in accor-
dance with Laclau and Mouffe, includes such acts and practices as an inte-
gral part of discourse and therefore does not have to draw a line of separa-
tion between everyday practices and dramatizing speech acts. While secu-
ritization may be understood in the perlocutionary sense, the theory of
speech acts does not connect that which it wants to analyze on the level of
individual speech acts to constellations of knowledge or its social con-
struction. It is further not devised to analyse mass communication. It is a
valuable contribution to the study of securitization but does not offer the
analytical tools to explain which conditions govern (un)successful securi-
tization. It is hence – both in its illocutionary as well as perlocutionary as-
pects – misplaced as the centre-piece of a theory which aims to explain the
social construction of security. A further exploration of the possibilities to
integrate insights generated by the PS and the CS may be fruitful in
analysing the contextual conditions within which (speech) acts occur. We
will come back to the related aspects of power in the next section on the
speaker-audience relationship, and focus here on the difficult understand-
ing of performativity within a processual rather than self-referential under-
standing of securitization.
Difficulties surrounding this nexus between performativity and the
meaning of success have in effect played fundamental roles in the creation
of different schools of securitization. In the Copenhagen School reading,
one must ask: how can the act of undertaking extraordinary means some-
times be proof of successful securitization when other acts beforehand
were judged as only attempts at securitization? The central difficulty in
linking securitization to particular actions or performances is a quasi-posi-
tivist claim, leading to theoretical inconsistency and to challenges in em-
39 Id.; Williams 2003; Hansen 2007; Hansen 2000; Weldes 1999.
40 Huysmans 2011, p. 375.
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pirical studies. Success, then, comes to stand in for a vision of “complete”
securitization. This vision of complete securitization does not have to hold
for an entire ‘society’ but can be restricted to a particular audience within
society. A conception of securitization relying on hegemonic constructions
is at an advantage here, as it does not presuppose the totalisation of a
hegemonic identity – and in fact, excludes it as a possibility for two rea-
sons mentioned previously. Firstly, hegemonic formations remain unable
to become totalizations of the discursive space due to the constitutive na-
ture of antagonism. Secondly, articulations always remain only momen-
tary decisions – contingent and embedded in a wider space of undecidabil-
ity, since the possibility remains for elements to distribute over opposing
camps. If applied to the realm of securitization, this means that a “com-
plete” securitization – one that is universally accepted – can also never oc-
cur. This is a crucial insight for securitization approaches, particularly
when considering the role of the definition of success and several chal-
lenging factors that derive from it. Because of this different angle, the con-
ceptual framework suggested here is able to not only understand securiti-
zation despite counter-movements (such as counter- or de-securitizing
movements), but precisely enabled through conflict as part of the process.
This is especially relevant, of course, for conflict that aids to construct the
antagonist line in the first place.
The central questions, then, move away from ones of ‘success’ to those
of where the antagonist line is drawn and, hence, how the hegemonic con-
struction is composed, which discursive elements it incorporates, how
closely they are related, and how broad its basis is. Such an analysis can
show us which logics and ways of producing knowledge are thinkable and
which are not. The view towards the boundaries of the discourse allows us
to differentiate disciplinary power related to the constitution of the dis-
course as basis for intelligibility rather than perceiving only those differ-
ences which render any identities within discourses possible.41 Our ap-
proach maintains, however, that perfect securitization, just as a perfect
identity, can never be reached. Hence, the application of extraordinary
means is firmly situated as part of the performative process which is both
grounded in the preceding discursive context as well as being part of an
ongoing process of any hegemonic project. This includes that each act of
representation may further homogenize the collective, which forms the
41 See also Bloom/Dallyn 2011; Hansen 2011, pp. 362, 363.
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hegemonic construction, or make visible the cracks therein caused by the
variegated moments subsumed within it. Lastly, it may even cause a break
of the entire hegemonic framework through attempting to stretch the
boundaries of the empty signifier too far. In this manner, ‘successful secu-
ritization,’ defined, for example, through the undertaking of a military in-
tervention, might result in a backlash on the legitimacy supposedly at-
tained through the process of securitization in the longer run. Cutting off
the analysis of securitization at this stage, as is inherently supposed by the
CS theoretical setting, is hence likely to leave the analyst with an improper
understanding.
Audience
The category of the audience which was absent in earlier outlines of the
CS found mention in the 1998 framework. In this, it has been outlined that
a “securitizing move becomes securitization only once an audience ac-
cepts it as such”.42 Similar to the category of success, it sits uneasily with
the illocutionary understanding of security expressed in the text.43 While it
holds the potential to transfer the understanding of security onto an inter-
subjective terrain, the use of the category has been criticized for having
been grossly under-theorized to the point that one may deem it inconse-
quential.44 As Lene Hansen argues, the utilization of the category of audi-
ence by Wæver has tended more towards a post-structural understanding
in which the audience is not pre-existing the act of communication but
constituted in it.45 However, this too ultimately neither helps to define the
speech act as illocutionary (since the opinions and positions of the audi-
ence do not follow a fully institutionalized, or conventionalized, script but
have to be studied), nor does it help to understand the nature of factors
aiding or hindering the process of securitization.
In the CS framework, those factors that may explain the acceptance of
the speech act – and thus relations of power – are relegated to a number of
rather vague ‘facilitating conditions’ securing the acceptance of the securi-
ty perspective by an audience. These facilitating conditions point us to: a)
42 Buzan et al. 1998, p. 25; see also McDonald 2008, p. 564.
43 Balzacq 2005, p. 179.
44 McDonald 2008, pp. 564, 571–2; Balzacq 1998, p. 177; Côté 2016, p. 542.
45 Hansen 2011, pp. 360, 161.
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the form of the speech act; b) the power position of the speaker; and c)
contextual factors such as “conditions historically associated with the
threat”.46 These contextual conditions, however, are central to any under-
standing of power exerted – who or what is able to exert power by impos-
ing an interpretation of events on the polity? And not least: is ‘security’
understood as a relevant interpretative framework at all? Stemming from
such criticism, constructive revisions of the framework have suggested
moving to an understanding of securitization as processual, and to increas-
ing the importance allotted to discourse-based understandings thereof.47
Such revisions have emphasized the role of the audience as well as con-
textual factors.
We agree that it is the thorough examination of contextual factors, un-
derstood as discourse, that the speech act approach can be embedded into
an explanatory model of securitization. It is the discursive context within
which such agency occurs, is enabled, and – most importantly – in which
it is heard, understood and judged by others if it is to carry meaning for
the social construction of security. We contend however, that the very cat-
egorization into speaker and audience is not helpful here. Any approach
maintaining such a split between audience and speaker must (implicitly)
refer back to contextual factors, which affect the audience but not the
speaker. The speaker can use contextual circumstances – framed through
discursively created understandings and logics – in a strategic manner,
while not being affected by these contextual factors him/herself. However,
attempts at securitization can only ever occur on a shared basis of intelligi-
bility. As Lene Hansen has pointed out, it is the inter-subjective nature of
security, as defined “among the subjects”48 conceived of in the CS which
renders the approach innovative.49 Inter-subjectivity, however, refers to
different levels of analysis when considering the CS and the hegemonic
analysis proposed in this paper. The Copenhagen understanding of securi-
ty, as taking place among subjects, refers primarily to the process of ac-
ceptance of a securitizing move. In post-structural discourse analysis on
the other hand, it refers to the more structural level of intelligibility – simi-
lar to Foucault’s notion of ‘episteme.’ As Guzzini argues, while “percep-
tions can be subjectively varied, but are not reducible to personal whim,”
46 Buzan et al. 1998, pp. 31–32.
47 Stritzel 2011, p. 2492.
48 Buzan et al. 1998, p. 31.
49 Hansen 2011, p. 358.
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the question is directed toward that which grounds their condition of pos-
sibility.50 In our approach of hegemony analysis, inter-subjectivity does
not relate to the negotiation of pre-existing subject positions. Rather, artic-
ulations are made within a pre-existing discursive field of intelligibility. It
is their re-articulation, however, which partially fixes their meaning. The
form of such articulation again “may have important consequences […],
and contribute decisively to the shaping of common sense of the mass-
es”.51 It is hence vital for this study of processes of authorization and pow-
er to emancipate itself to a good degree from the very analytical figure of
the speaker as well. A more detailed consideration of this analytical figure
of the speaker and its relationship to structure and agency is necessary. If
such an explicit consideration is not present, the understanding of all im-
pulses introduced into the discourse can be expressed and understood only
through this narrow analytic construct of the speaker, while the audience is
understood as rather passive and homogenous with relation to power.
The category of ‘audience,’ on the other hand, implies a rather passive
counterpart, largely responding to clues used by the speaker for the attain-
ment of strategic goals. In this manner, Thierry Balzacq suggests “to think
of security pronouncements … as discursive techniques allowing the secu-
ritising actor to ‘induce or increase the (public) mind to adhere to the the-
sis presented to its assent’ (Perelman and Olbrecht-Tytecka, 1969: 4)”.52
Empirical studies demonstrate, however, that such a straightforward rela-
tionship between the securitization attempt and the audience’s acceptance
should not be presupposed. In this vein, Vuori argues that the intended
perlocutionary effects may differ from the explicit justification. Intentional
aims may for example also be to express a warning or deterrent, to frame
post-hoc justifications for actions or to induce “a controlled silence”.53
Further, the focus on individual moves continues to exclude the possibility
of securitization occurring incrementally without any one decisive, inten-
tional move towards it.54 Beyond this, it also denies the potential that a
speaker’s statement is not intended but utilized by an audience (or individ-
uals therein) to securitize a situation. It further denies the potential that an
actor expressing views of securitization may not do so for strategic pur-
50 Guzzini 2011, p. 330.
51 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 158.
52 Balzacq 2005, p. 72.
53 Vuori 2011, p. 160.
54 McDonald 2008, p. 569.
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poses but as an expression of genuine (and socially conditioned) convic-
tion that security – understood here as a signifier – is the only logic appli-
cable to the perceived circumstances. Consequently, we firstly need to
consider here that members of the ‘audience’ are actors themselves inas-
much as they relay, modify, multiply or counter statements. Adam Côté, in
a meta-analysis of 32 empirical securitization studies, has outlined the
rather variegated and mostly very active role of the audience. Thus, he
finds that in several case studies, the audience “actively challenged, ques-
tioned, and/or supported claims […] undertook independent actions to
modify, bolster, or destabilize security meanings,” were able to actively
act upon and interpret the contextual circumstances so that their agency
cannot be seen as being merely produced by those circumstances.55
Beyond this, we argue that there is no context on which a speaker may
rely which does not affect him or her as well. Such an understanding
would have to be premised on either a) the speaker being completely dis-
joined from the knowledge-base of the listener, or b) a reality outside of
the discursive knowledge-base to exist to which the speaker has access but
not the audience. Such an understanding is mirrored in the assumption that
“language does not construct reality, at best, it shapes our perception of
it,” while some occurrences such as ‘brute threats’ contain an essence
which is not constituted through discourse.56 While we agree that context
is important and its inclusion and theorization is of great value to any the-
ory of securitization, we do not agree with an understanding that some
parts of reality are beyond the discursive construction. As Laclau and
Mouffe outline, a discourse-theoretical approach does not relate to the on-
tological question whether a reality outside of discourse exists. It instead
insists that any perceived reality can only be made sense of within the rela-
tionality of discourse.57 Discourse here is the central category which es-
tablishes the anchor of shared understandings of differing subject pos-
itions, within which the norms, values and preferences are understood and
negotiated. It “delineates the terms of intelligibility whereby a particular
reality can be known and acted upon”.58 Arguably, particularly those is-
sues which are constructed as being outside the discursive framework,
thus attributed an intrinsic essence, are those which form the most stead-
55 Côté 2016, pp. 550, 551.
56 Balzacq 2005, pp. 181, 190.
57 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 94; Holzscheiter 2014, p. 144.
58 Doty 1996, p. 5.
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fast basis of the relational web of construction of meaning. Following this
logic to its end entails that also the fear of (abstract) death – and thus the
logic of security – is such a constructed understanding. The concept of in-
security and threat hence presupposes an actor’s awareness of circum-
stances judged to constitute these.
State-centrism
The CS has largely imagined the speaker-audience relationship to be struc-
tured through the entity and influence of the state as the locus of power
over defining threats and security. We argue that this is neither entirely ac-
curate nor entirely false. Rather, we contend that structures of the state are
part of the more fundamentally institutionalized discursive context within
which securitising acts occur.
While the CS has traditionally assumed power to lie with state elites,
various studies have demonstrated that these are not necessarily the actors
most likely to successfully push for securitization. As a consequence, Hol-
ger Stritzel has argued that “positions of power within discourse to ‘define
security’ should not simply be assumed but should rather be an essential
element of empirical analysis itself: an assumption of authority should be
replaced by the empirical study of processes of authorization”.59 While he
makes an important point here, it remains important not only to re-concep-
tualise the distribution of power to securitize. Such a perspective views
the concept of power too narrowly, since it does not touch upon the power
of security as a logic of social relations, and presupposes a basic accep-
tance of this logic. Here, the study of hegemony again proves helpful and
indeed essential. It is able to analyse the web of intelligibility within
which an acceptance of the logic of security is based and constructed. A
central aspect of this is the understanding of the construction of claims to
representing society and polity through, and in response to, constructions
of threat and security. States have, from the classical tradition founded by
Machiavelli’s writings onwards, dominantly been understood as instru-
ments attempting to create security from the sphere of international anar-
chy, thus enabling the very existence of polities.60 While the state struc-
59 Stritzel 2012, p. 556.
60 Huysmans 1998.
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tures of power to securitize as pointed out by CS certainly exist, these are
not independent factors but created through the relationship of actors of
which they attempt to make sense. Guzzini here adequately outlines that
“the realist reading of security … is not to be understood as the ‘essence’
of security but rather as the effect of a historical development in which
certain actors have come to be authorized to talk and effect war and peace
in a ‘realist’ way”.61 Developing this argument further, one may call
(state) institutions conventionalized or codified positions of power in dis-
course. The central point here is that “any form of power is constructed in
a pragmatic way and internally to the social, through the opposed logics of
equivalence and difference; power is never foundational”.62 In the case of
security, this means that in traditional analyses, as in the CS, we can ob-
serve a merging of the discursive constructs of security and the state.
However, the authority and power with which both are endowed is also in-
ternal to discourse. Two points follow from this analysis. Firstly, states or
state representatives do not necessarily hold power over dynamics of secu-
ritization. Their power depends on the acceptance of the conventionalized
positions of power they attempt to embody. Where the state is discredited
as a legitimate actor, it does not hold such power – the array of possible
positions state representatives can legitimately take are also restricted
based on dominant discursive patterns. Secondly, an analysis of alternative
claims to the power to securitize hence does not radically question the log-
ic of security but merely challenges the (institutional) structures through
which it is channelled. Hegemony analysis holds two advantages here. It
can point us toward the question of which potential claims on the creation
and constitution of ‘society’ and polities are excluded. What is more, it
shows clearly that both the individual securitizing move and the position
of the speaker (as state representative or other) are shaped by, in and
through discursive formations. Hegemony analysis can hence help us to
apply the called-for analysis of the constitution of power, while on the one
hand evading the difficult state-centric heritage of the CS and on the other
hand not neglecting potential positions of power and influence channelled
through (the discursive figure of) the state.
This understanding also carries a wider implication for the relationship
between the CS and PS approaches. The Paris School’s focus on (institu-
61 Guzzini 2011, p. 335.
62 Laclau/Mouffe 1985, p. 129.
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tionalized) and bureaucratic practices that may directly or indirectly en-
able securitization of a given issue can be reinterpreted as an essential
component of an analysis of hegemonic discourses. Such practices are en-
abled through a shared understanding regarding functions which particular
state or other actors are tasked to, and allowed to undertake. Once they are
undertaken in one fashion or another, they discursively impact the subject
issue (as well as on the institutions which authored the act). While some
institutions may have the power to act in ways which individuals or other
institutions cannot (including the creation of statistics, using military and
financial means etc.),63 this is not to be equated with the power to securi-
tize. The power to securitize is always a combination of an articulation
and the way in which this articulation resonates and is taken up within
broader discourse. This perspective, as it locates power in discursive for-
mations, fundamentally calls into question the binary speaker-audience re-
lationship assumed by CS-inspired approaches to securitization. While
there appears to be a binary logic in articulation and resonance, we must
keep in mind that the articulation itself is affected by the discursive system
of intelligibility it attempts to influence. The speaker-audience dichotomy
tends to ignore that those aspects seen as constituting the position of the
speaker, implicitly or explicitly, are of a structural – that is, discursive –
nature. An approach based on the presumption of fixed positions of influ-
ence further underrates the ability of such structures of meaning-making to
change within the process of their attempted fortification. Hegemony theo-
ry adds this aspect through reminding us that “hegemonic discourses al-
ways only imagine themselves as the appropriate order representing a spe-
cific field”64 and are able to exist only through antagonism.
Hegemony theory can go some way in this respect as it is able to con-
sider in more detail the dynamics and structures that lead to power within
discourse. The power to securitize then lies within rules of the social – all
of which are, essentially, discursively constituted. It is the structure of dis-
courses that determines which subject-positions may carry legitimacy as
well as which institutionalized positions carry weight and meaning under
which circumstances. The power to securitize then essentially lies on the
level of differences within discourse, while the power of securitization is
the constitution of an antagonist divide. Both levels, of course, cannot be
63 See, for example, Hansen 2000.
64 Stäheli 2000, p. 55, authors’ translation.
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analyzed independently of each other. Hegemony theory offers a perspec-
tive to combine the analysis of these two levels. It allows us to move be-
yond the speaker-audience dichotomy, and offers a view on the processual
formation of identities through the drawing of antagonist lines. Its ex-
planatory power hence extends to both the question of the boundaries of
the discursive formation and simultaneously allows to account for change
in this formation. The hegemony approach articulates an understanding of
politics as the conflictual negotiation of that which represents the common
space.65 In this understanding, securitization is not the end of normal polit-
ics but part of it.
‘Financial stability’ – The referent object and empty signifier
In the following it will be shown, by way of example, how securitization
approaches may be fruitfully enhanced by a discourse theory of hegemo-
ny. ‘Financial Stability’ will be analysed both as a reference object and as
a hegemonic framework. Thereby different (power) dynamics of and with-
in processes of securitization that offer a more throughout analysis of how
the language of threat and security shape (political) discourses become ap-
parent.
The Financial Crisis of 2008-09 seems to be a ‘classical case’ of securi-
tization in the Copenhagen sense. The near collapse of the financial sys-
tem, most prominently the breakdown of Lehman Brothers, invoked politi-
cal discussions about how similar events may be prevented in the future.
There seems to be a political consensus that financial market practices had
been misguided and abused by greedy ‘banksters.’ Speculation and gam-
bling were deemed to be the causes of the crisis. As a consequence, politi-
cal leaders expressed the need to react in order to ‘calm the markets’ and
to prevent worse from happening. The security of the population in finan-
cial terms and of the financial system as a critical infrastructure were de-
picted as threatened and in need of protection.66 Extraordinary measures
were taken to rescue banks and maintain the financial system. Billions of
euros and dollars of public money were made available overnight. The
causes of the crisis and possible consequences were debated in the broader
65 Nonhoff 2006, p. 109.
66 Langley 2014; Boy/Burgess/Leander 2011, p. 116.
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public and among policy-makers and experts. While within the broader
public debate all sorts of crisis interpretations, such as the end of capital-
ism and the return of the strong state, circulated,67 crisis explanations
within the circle of high-level political decision-makers were narrowed to
a perspective that only focused on ensuring ongoing financial circulations.
This discursive narrowing was based on crisis explanations that rest on
specific epistemologies. These include financialised methods and tech-
niques of economic handling that were all present within the administra-
tion of the crisis. As Paul Langley explains, “crisis management mobilized
a diverse array of calculative devices of economy, not least because they
provided quantitative, material indicators of the extent and nature of the
problems at hand”68. This kind of crisis management can only be under-
stood when considering the hegemony of certain kinds of economic think-
ing, foremost neoclassical convictions, which were in place before the cri-
sis and were reproduced post-crisis. This hegemony is based on a number
of circumstances, such as the prevalence of an “economic style of reason-
ing” among policy-making elites,69 as well as the dominance of financial
capital in (especially United States) politics, and not least “its central place
within the accumulation regime,” meaning the increasing influence of fi-
nance on everyday life.70 In addition, there have been insightful contribu-
tions that trace the historically close connections of finance and the state71
and show the political nature of the distinction between financial specula-
tion and gambling.72
Securitization of finance – The referent object of financial stability
It is essential to consider the market-based-principles of the hegemony to
understanding why high-level politicians such as United States President
George W. Bush as well as European leaders provided an interpretation of
the crisis in which financial practices and the financial industry itself were
conceived as threatening and in need of stricter regulation. At the same
67 Hassel/Lütz 2010, p. 252.
68 Langley 2014, p. 9.
69 Hirschman/Berman 2014, p. 790.
70 Scherrer 2011, p. 227.
71 Boy 2015.
72 De Goede 2005.
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time, financial markets in general and ongoing financial flows were recog-
nised as a common good which needed to be protected. In many of their
speeches and interviews, western politicians used the term ‘financial sta-
bility’ (or German ‘Finanzmarktstabilität’) to describe what needed to be
restored, protected, and maintained for the future. This term evolved to be
the antagonist to a declared status of crisis. While in the time of immediate
crisis management the aim of political action was to overcome crisis, in
the years that followed the crisis the signifier ‘financial stability’ served as
a constant reminder of what had to be avoided by any means.
One remarkable example has been provided by former US President
George W. Bush in one of his first speeches to explain the crisis and the
government’s action to the public. At the peak of financial turmoil, on
September 24, 2008, Bush gave an ‘Address to the Nation on the Financial
Crisis,’ employing the language of threat and security to legitimize the
government’s action of bank-bailouts. He first provided a short explana-
tion of the situation as “an extraordinary period for America’s economy,”
which he describes to be “in danger.” After giving his analysis of the situ-
ation, he explained that he was faced with a choice: “To step in with dra-
matic government action, or to stand back and allow the irresponsible ac-
tions of some to undermine the financial security of all.” He legitimized
his intervention in the financial markets – normally unthinkable for Re-
publicans as the staunchest believers in enabling market forces – with an
apocalyptic outlook on possible consequences if these actions were not
taken:
“More banks could fail, including some in your community. The stock market
would drop even more, which would reduce the value of your retirement ac-
count. The value of your home could plummet. Foreclosures would rise dra-
matically. And if you own a business or a farm, you would find it harder and
more expensive to get credit. More businesses would close their doors, and
millions of Americans could lose their jobs. Even if you have good credit his-
tory, it would be more difficult for you to get the loans you need to buy a car
or send your children to college. And ultimately, our country could experi-
ence a long and painful recession.”73
These concrete and personalized scenarios sustained the abstract threat of
a financial meltdown and help to legitimize the government’s ‘rescue
plan’ that had already been decided upon. At the end of his address, Bush




closely examining “operations of companies across the financial spectrum
and ensure that their practices do not threaten overall financial stability.”
About a month later, on the morning of October 10, 2008, after global
financial markets had experienced their worst weeks for decades, the Pres-
ident gave another short statement in the White House Rose Garden:
“Good morning. Over the past few days, we have witnessed a startling drop in
the stock market — much of it driven by uncertainty and fear. This has been a
deeply unsettling period for the American people. Many of our citizens have
serious concerns about their retirement accounts, their investments, and their
economic wellbeing. Here’s what the American people need to know: that the
United States government is acting; we will continue to act to resolve this cri-
sis and restore stability to our markets.”74
Financial stability was the core term that was used to mark what on the
one hand had to be restored because it was lacking in the state of crisis,
while on the other hand what had to be protected in the future. It was the
referent object of securitizing moves that rendered certain practices within
the financial markets as threatening. Similar to what the Copenhagen
School model has emphasized, the statements helped to legitimize the ex-
traordinary actions of state elites to intervene in financial markets.
Similarly, the German Chancellor invoked ‘Finanzmarktstabilität’ (fi-
nancial stability) to legitimize the passing of a bill that should stabilise fi-
nancial markets (‘Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz’). These laws were de-
cided upon exceptionally quickly, considering the fact that billions of eu-
ros were at stake. The cited passage gives an example of how Merkel
framed the crisis in order to justify these extraordinary policies. First, she
declared financial markets an important public good that needs protection.
Then she explained how this public good, the financial markets, was
threatened. And she renewed the securitizing move by stating that the
“threat to financial stability is not tamed yet.”
“The financial system plays a central role to ensure the working of the broad-
er economy and thereby to ensure growth and employment. (…) Our pro-
posed law serves to protect this system. Even more so it serves everybody, it
serves the public good.” (…)
“Let me say it clearly, the threat to financial stability is not tamed yet. We
must act as quick as possible and pass the law to lay the foundation for the
markets to calm. This is decisive for growth and employment.”75
74 Bush 2008b.
75 Merkel 2008, authors’ translation.
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These examples represent a broader political discourse that dominated the
immediate political crisis management and thereby provided a discursive
frame that foreshadowed post-crisis efforts on financial governance. They
show that political leaders used the language of security to describe the
events and political reaction to the financial crisis. The period of immedi-
ate crisis management, from summer 2007 until the end of 2009, entailed
both intense political pressure to prevent the financial trouble from be-
coming a full-blown economic crisis and a small circle’s crisis-manage-
ment efforts conducted behind closed doors. This opaque form of crisis
politics adjusted its political practices to the requirements of the financial
market, meaning that political actors strove foremost to prevent any fur-
ther financial distress. Decisions were taken on the weekend and presented
before ‘the markets open,’ meaning before the stock markets around the
globe started their daily business. Within political decision makers’ public
statements, ‘financial stability’ was used as the referent object which
needed to be restored and protected. It was the discursive antagonist to the
‘crisis,’ the threatening Other. Similar to what Jef Huysmans outlines for
the ‘thick signifier,’ the empty signifier received meaning through its an-
tagonistic relation to other signifiers (crisis, instability) in a chain of other
signifiers, such as a threat to financial stability that put the qualifier in re-
lation.76 Huysmans also highlights that signifiers like ‘security’ are not a
neutral device of expression. In relation to the language of security, finan-
cial stability implies a certain meaning and a “particular signification of
social relations”77. How these social relations unfolded will be analysed in
the following section.
Following the crisis, ‘financial stability’ became an omnipresent term.
It was used to refer to the desired condition of the financial market – glob-
ally and nationally. An analysis informed by discourse theory of hegemo-
ny leads to the question: What conditions led ‘financial stability’ to be-
come a unifying sign for the post-crisis regulatory discourse? As the con-
struction of hegemonic formations is always relational to the construction
of a radical Other, we have to examine what the radically different entailed
– that is, to analyse those elements to which financial stability necessarily
related in order to become an interpretive framework of financial gover-
nance.




The threatening Other, the undesired in the discourse on financial regu-
lation was the emergence of another financial crisis similar to the one that
had just occurred. This corresponds to the Copenhagen securitization ap-
proach. The threat of another financial crisis served as constant legitima-
tion for the extraordinary measures that were taken as immediate crisis re-
sponse as well as following political efforts to regulate financial markets.
By constantly renewing the threat of a possible financial crisis, political
decisions-makers gained legitimacy and defended their interference in fi-
nancial markets – even if they considered themselves a ‘strong believer in
free enterprise,’ as the former American president did. By analysing the
discourse of financial regulation, we can observe how this threatening
Other was constructed and mobilized in temporally differing dimensions.
The first dimension implies a look backwards to the preceding financial
crisis which had just been overcome, and the second dimension refers to
future imaginaries and the prevention of a similar crisis which was the
central aim of policy-making. ‘Financial stability’ was considered a public
good because it was intended to reduce insecurity for the profoundly fi-
nancialised societies of many western democracies. Personal savings,
stock market exchange, bank loans and the production-based economy re-
lied on a functioning financial system. At the peak of the financial crisis,
some of these market activities nearly came to a standstill. Although it re-
mains unclear when and if a condition of ‘financial stability’ is reached,
the perception of absence of crisis already carried effects. The ‘diagnosis’
of a situation as a crisis or not-crisis situation makes it ‘governable’.78
These effects show that ‘financial stability’ does not refer to an external
reality, but interprets, and in doing so, constructs reality.
‘Financial stability’ related to the threat of crisis as its antagonist, which
made the constitution of (unusual) blocs possible. For political decision-
makers, financial stability entailed the prevention of another large-scale
crisis that would possibly make another government intervention neces-
sary. Several institutions of financial policy-making – the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and
central banks – gained legitimacy to enhance their monitoring and assess-
ment of financial market activities. Central bankers supported this because
it added another pillar to their responsibilities, and was able to embrace
new concepts such as ‘systemic risk.’ Finally, for market participants it
78 Wansleben 2011.
Hannah Broecker and Carola Westermeier
120
promised a comeback to a normalized state of affairs in which they could
conduct their business without considering possible financial turmoil.
Striving and working for financial stability became hegemonic, meaning it
became “widely shared common sense” and common political will.79
These characteristics of an empty signifier were an asset on the level of
policy-making, but they were an obstacle on the level of implementation.
An analysis following the Copenhagen School approach would proba-
bly stop at this point and declare a ‘successful’ securitization. Political
elites performing the securitizing move claimed authority for the use of
extraordinary measures and thereby also strengthened the state’s priority
in dealing with security issues. ‘Financial stability’ was established as ref-
erent object to be protected against future financial crises. However, the
case of the financial crisis shows, crucially, why this kind of analysis
leaves us with an incomplete picture. The following section will demon-
strate why it is important to have a broader framework of analysis, as there
is a discrepancy between the ability to securitize and to control the effec-
tiveness of securitization.
Expert discourses and the hegemony of ‘financial stability’
Following the immediate phase of crisis management, after the public se-
curitisation of finance in the Copenhagen sense, legitimizing the use of ex-
traordinary measures, debates on how to prevent another large-scale crisis
began. The debate about the future policy framework, however, was less
public than the just-cited securitization of the financial system. While fi-
nancial regulation remained for some time central to ‘high politics’80 and a
small circle of experts on financial governance had been in place before
the crisis, discussions about ‘greedy bankers’ did not fill newspaper pages
anymore. Hence, starting from late 2008 and most obvious in 2009 and the
following years, we find different discourses that were concerned with the
consequences of the crisis. During the high times of crisis management,
especially in 2008, we find a vivid public discourse that was dominated by
demands for stricter rules for an out-of-control financial industry. At the
same time, there was an expert discourse among the members of a rela-
79 Mouffe 1993, p. 53.
80 Engelen et al. 2011, p. 165.
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tively small group within the financial-policy elite who had a direct influ-
ence on policy-makers. These two levels of discourse – a crisis-oriented,
politicised public discourse and a deliberative technocratic one – de-
veloped independently.81 The experts who were consulted by policy-mak-
ers did not react or refer on the public discussion, and there was little me-
dia coverage of how their discussions of financial regulation evolved over
time. What unites both discourses and the subject positions involved is the
concern about the avoidance of another crisis which is connected to the
empty signifier ‘financial stability.’ In both discourses an antagonist line is
drawn between the desired ‘financial stability’ and the threat of crisis.
After 2009, the public interest in financial regulation decreased and the
discursive dramatization lost momentum. This was partly due to the fact
that the sovereign debt crisis in Europe – also caused by the financial tur-
moil of the financial crisis event of 2007-08 – received most of the pub-
lic’s attention in late 2009. Public discourses switched to the threatened
failure of currency that was depicted as more pressing than the threat of an
unstable financial system. The possible break-up of the Eurozone ap-
peared potentially devastating as it implied severe consequences that en-
dangered the survival of the European Union.82 The social upheaval that
could result if the currency union failed was considered more dangerous
than the abstract threat of financial market distress. The securitization of
the Euro Crisis thereby led to a de-securitization of the global financial
crisis and the issue of financial regulation; in Lene Hansen’s terms, one
can speak of ‘desecuritization by replacement’.83
By framing the causes of the crises less morally and rather technically,
the discourse of financial regulation was primarily held within rather small
circles of experts and less visible in evening news headlines. These circles
had close relations to those political decision-makers who regularly con-
vene in the G20, a forum established in response to the crisis in order to
strengthen international financial regulation. In their response to the crisis,
the G20 requested the IMF, the BIS and the newly established Financial
Stability Board (FSB)84 to provide reports on the causes and possible
regulatory responses to the crisis. These bodies were a central part of fi-
81 Bieling 2014.
82 Langenohl 2013.
83 Hansen 2012, p. 529.
84 Established by the G20 after the summit in London in April 2009 as the successor
of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).
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nancial market governance before the crisis, and their reports are nodal
points within the wider discourse on financial regulation. In their publica-
tions, these bodies depicted the causes of the crisis in the insufficient regu-
lation of financial market practises and less in questionable practises
themselves.85 The reports of IMF, BIS and FSB provided the basis for dis-
cussion among political leaders who in turn set the framework for further
regulatory work.
The experts of IMF, BIS, and FSB are part of the formations of finan-
cial governance that were already in place before the crisis. Central Banks,
such as the European Central Bank, the New York Fed and the Bank of
England, are also important actors within the discourse on financial gover-
nance that is decisive for the apparatus of financial regulation that includes
national authorities. Although these apparatuses of security obviously did
not prevent the events of the crisis, due to their legitimation through the
various bodies they successfully gained legitimacy to be part of the post-
crisis regulatory discourse that aimed at establishing new policies. Here
we find those “security professionals”86 and routinized practices of securi-
ty, such as regulatory controls of banks or the accumulation of data on fi-
nancial market activities. The aim and promise that the policy proposals
initiated in these bodies to serve financial stability helped the financial
market experts’ position to stake a hegemonic claim. Hence, interventions
and regulations that followed the crisis aimed at improving market gover-
nance, not at dismantling markets.87
In this discourse on how to re-regulate financial markets, ‘financial sta-
bility,’ especially in times of crisis, served as an empty signifier that was
able to relate to the dominant subject positions within the financial policy
discourse. It related to the position of political decision-makers whose pri-
mary aim in the reform process was to avoid another large-scale crisis.
They connected with ‘financial stability’ because, as the discursive antag-
onist to ‘crisis,’ it implied for them the future prevention of crises. Several
international bodies of financial governance, such as the IMF and the BIS,
also related to ‘financial stability’ because it aligned with their convictions
that financial markets monitoring, surveillance and analysis needed to be
widened instead of banning particular financial market practices. Their
position and legitimacy was strengthened and also resulted in widened
85 Kessler 2013.
86 Bigo 2002, p. 74.
87 Preda 2009, p. 2.
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mandates and expansions of their capacity in terms of staff and financial
support.
There are several levels of financial market governance that also con-
nected their action to the empty signifier ‘financial stability.’ On an insti-
tutional level, several high-level bodies and reports were initiated that fo-
cused on the issue of financial stability. In the G20’s ‘Common Principles
for Reform of Financial Markets,’ (2008) financial stability was the cen-
tral concern of future international cooperation. Additionally, the G20 es-
tablished the already-mentioned Financial Stability Board (FSB), whose
primary tasks was to monitor and address risks to the global financial sys-
tem and to develop a new framework for financial regulation (G20, 2009).
Additionally, on the supranational level, several high-level bodies were es-
tablished whose mandates include “safeguarding financial stability,” as in
the case of the European Systemic Risk Board.88 On the German national
level, the ‘Finanzstabilitätsausschuss’ (Financial Stability Committee) was
initiated, bringing together German central bankers and politicians con-
cerned with the financial sector to discuss potential threats to financial sta-
bility. Also, the IMF reinforced its ‘Global Financial Stability Reports.’
These measures were also a signal to the public that action was taken to
avoid another financial crisis. While changes in financial regulation were
less, if at all, visible to the public, the establishment of new financial mar-
ket authorities was a clear signal. By naming these bodies similar to the
empty signifier ‘financial stability,’ the message was even clearer, and it
shows again how the empty signifier connected expert and public dis-
courses. At the same time, economists and analysts working in these bod-
ies substantiated their claim to act and speak as (financial) ‘security pro-
fessionals,’ and thereby closure of the expert discourse continued.
Instability of the empty signifier
After analysing how ‘financial stability’ connected the public and the ex-
pert discourse and how it helped to relate separate subject positions within
a hegemonic formation, this section will address how attempts to substan-
tiate the empty signifier led to instability in the discourse formation that
had evolved around the empty signifier. This analysis will concentrate on
88 EU-Regulation No 1092/2010.
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the experts’ discourse in which economists of several institutions of finan-
cial governance are involved. Concerning the question that touched on the
concrete interpretations of ‘financial stability,’ the instability of relations
between subject positions and empty signifier becomes apparent. By fol-
lowing the discourse on implementation, the fragility and only temporal
fixation is rendered obvious. The more concrete demands to financial sta-
bility are, the more contested they become.
The term ‘financial stability’ is not entirely new to financial gover-
nance. It was also used before the crisis, mostly to refer to the intercon-
nectedness of multiple financial intermediaries. However, during this time,
regulatory principles rested on the conviction that the purpose of regu-
lation is to ensure the ‘soundness’ of individual institutions when they lose
assets, so-called ‘microprudential regulation.’ For example, the G7 in
1997 proposed to “develop a strategy for fostering financial stability
through the analysis of experiences in previous crises and to elucidate ba-
sic standards and principles to guide individual economies in the develop-
ment of stronger financial systems”.89 In order to ensure soundness, the
pre-2008 crisis approach assesses the risk that individual institutions take,
often on the basis of banks’ risk models. It assumes the quintessential mi-
cro-prudential dictum that “financial stability is ensured as long as each
and every institution is sound”.90
Financial stability became open to redefinition, which occurred when it
was combined with other concepts in novel ways.91 Within the above-
mentioned influential publications of IMF, BIS and FSB, we do not find a
shared and consensual definition of financial stability with regard to con-
stantly changing financial markets.92 The following will deliver a closer
discourse analysis within the field of financial governance and the bodies
that are responsible for monitoring, surveillance and ultimately the consid-
eration of interventions in financial markets. Before new security practices
were to be implemented, the broader framework given by political deci-
sion-makers needed to be interpreted and turned into concrete practices or,
in turn, ongoing security practices needed to be related to shifting hege-
monic claims in financial governance.
89 Arner/Buckley 2010, p. 16.
90 Crockett 2000, no pagination.
91 Smith 2003, p. 78, referring to Laclau and Mouffe.
92 Kessler 2009, p. 164.
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As Gabriele Galati and Richhild Moessner describe in their BIS work-
ing paper (2011), there was no commonly shared (working) definition of
‘financial stability’.93 It was often discussed in connection to another buz-
zword of the crisis: ‘systemic risk.’ How to define, identify and measure
systemic risks was contested as well. However, systemic risks were identi-
fied as one of the central causes of the crisis. These risks were not seen as
lying with specific financial entities but in between them. New approaches
to financial regulation that were introduced following the crisis, most im-
portantly the ‘macroprudential’ approach to regulation, sought to tackle
the threats which systemic risks posed to financial stability.94 However,
there were considerable differences in what exactly the aim of post-crisis
regulation should be. The Bank of England stressed in 2009 that the aim
of the macro-approach should be the “stable provision of financial inter-
mediation services”,95 while BIS economists Claudio Borio and Mathias
Drehmann argued that it should limit the risk of episodes of financial dis-
tress that have macroeconomic costs.96 While for the first definition the
aim was to enable ongoing financial market flows, the second claim aimed
at primarily avoiding costs for the wider economy. When considering con-
crete policies, these differing aims matter. They caused the post-crisis dis-
course coalitions to erode as the empty signifier ‘financial stability’ lost its
ability to relate to diverse subject positions within the discourse. It was
agreed that regulatory policies should aim at providing financial stability;
however, there was no commonly shared definition of ‘financial stabili-
ty’.97 It was usually characterized negatively, and circularly, as the ab-
sence of threats to itself, i.e. as “being impaired whenever widespread de-
faults threaten to take place, due to either a banking or a sovereign debt
crisis”.98
The lack of a concrete (positive) definition of financial stability can be
seen as necessary to gain the support of differing subject positions within
the discourse on financial regulation as a whole in order to make a hege-
monic claim. As shown, it remained an abstract code that could be con-
nected to differing meanings, and be formulated by differing subject pos-
93 Galati/Moessner 2011.
94 Baker 2013.
95 Galati/Moessner 2011, p. 6.
96 Galati/Moessner 2011, p. 5; Borio/Drehmann 2009.
97 Galati/Moessner 2011.
98 Borio/Toniolo 2011, p. 19.
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itions. By analyzing how the discourse on financial regulations evolves,
we can see how these formations become unstable and how the partially
fixed meaning erodes. As questions of concrete implementation arose, the
concept was quickly criticized because there were no concrete means to
measure ‘financial stability.’ Quantification is essential within a field that
rests on the positivistic belief of neutral, evidence-based modelling and
objectivity. Subsequently, different market authorities, for example the
ECB or the Bank of England, developed their own understandings of how
financial stability could be understood in regulatory practice. Also, certain
articulations emerged that point to the partly conflicting varieties in the
meaning of ‘financial stability’,99 or which questioned the relevance of fi-
nancial stability as core concept and demanded a shift within the dis-
course.100 The lack of clarity of the empty signifier ‘financial stability’ be-
comes apparent and problematized and leads to new antagonisms within
the discourse of financial regulation while the unifying effect of a hege-
monic formation was lost. Paul Tucker, for example, exposes differing
competing interests that all seek to speak in the name of financial stabili-
ty.101
The powerless securitizer? Controlling the effects of securitization
Analysis of ‘financial stability’ as a reference object and as an empty sig-
nifier permits scrutiny of the claims connected to the hegemonic formation
and subject positions from which these were articulated. The Copenhagen
School claims that securitization gives legitimacy to political and state
elites to leave the realm of ‘normal politics.’ In their understanding, secu-
ritizing speech acts invoke a semantic repertoire by framing a certain
problem in the language of security. In consequence, handling this prob-
lem is the prerogative of a centralized authority, usually the government of
the state.102 In the case of the securitization of finance in 2008, we can see
the limits of this theoretical framework when considering who had the





102 Buzan et al. 1998; see Langenohl’s contribution to this volume.
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Although national political elites decided on the exceptional measures
taken in the course of crisis management through (partly) nationalizing
banks or bank bailouts, these measures were only taken after careful con-
siderations with other political leaders and non-political elites, such as
central bank governors and also leading figures of financial market enti-
ties, such as bank chief executives.103 Nearly every step that was taken to
counter the state of crisis was decided, or at least coordinated, on the
supranational level. The following measures to prevent another large-scale
crisis were initiated, coordinated and largely prepared for implementation
by the mentioned institutions of financial governance. These financial
market governance institutions had supported the pre-2007 hegemonic dis-
course on financial regulation, which was dominated by the conviction
that financial markets would self-correct and strict regulation would harm
economic growth. However, after the crisis events of 2007-08, this dis-
course was not able to relate to articulations that arose with the crisis: a
strong state and stricter regulation. In order to be included in the post-cri-
sis discourse on financial regulation, actors and institutions that had been
able to relate to the pre-crisis hegemonic claim of market efficiency had to
demonstrate their ability to relate to the changed discourse. By responding
to the crisis with “key lessons from the turmoil” and “policy lessons”,104
they performed a discursive shift toward the rising hegemonic formations
that questioned the dogma of financial market efficiency. Already before
the crisis, some questioned the hegemony of market efficiency; however,
they only succeeded in forming a discursive formation after the events of
financial crisis could not be integrated in the discourse of self-correcting
and efficient markets. However, the hegemonic formation around ‘finan-
cial stability’ was able to discursively integrate crisis descriptions and
claims. In turn, political leaders within the G20 followed these discourse
formations in their crisis diagnosis and took up many of their proposed
policy responses.
Already during the high times of crisis management and even more so
during the process of reform, demands articulated by actors connected to
financial markets increasingly gained importance. Their articulations were
readily connected to the signifier ‘financial stability,’ and eventually their
interpretations of the reference object were implemented. The discourse
103 Steinbruck 2011, pp. 200ff.
104 IMF 2008, p. 1.
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on the implementation of financial stability connects the speech act of se-
curitization to the level of security practices. On the latter level of provid-
ing security, certain actors were empowered to ‘create’ security. In the
case of financial governance, these were certain bodies and financial mar-
ket authorities whose mandates are widened in order to provide financial
stability, such as the ECB and the Bank of England. Within these authori-
ties, we find the ‘security professionals’ of financial governance that su-
pervise financial market activities. In taking this position they were able to
make claims about the rightfulness of financial market practices. It is
within these bodies and institutions that the political framework on the
provision of financial stability was transferred into concrete methods and
policies.
Coming back to the initial observations that political decision-makers
made securitizing moves and thereby legitimized their interference in fi-
nancial markets, the outcome of this process is remarkable, when consid-
ered from the Copenhagen School’s perspective. Their approach proposes
the speech-act theoretical model of securitization, according to which po-
litical actors gain legitimacy to act in labelling an economic problem as
existential for the existence of the polity.105 As cited above, political lead-
ers made such securitizing moves and thereby claimed their right to inter-
vene in and regulate financial markets. It is important to note that in the
case of the financial crisis, these interventions were not a straightforward
crackdown by political elites. Instead, actors that were decisive in deter-
mining which policies were to be taken were part of an elite of financial
governance that had already been in place before the crisis. The discourse
analysis of hegemony provides a more nuanced picture of how political
and financial elites interacted. This continuance emphasises the need to
take into consideration the constellations of security practices and tools as
well as ‘security experts’ that are already in place.
The analysis underlines the importance of the different forms of power
discussed in Andreas Langenohl’s contribution to this volume. Only fo-
cusing on the linguistics of the securitizing move does not provide a full
picture of power relations and their dynamics. As stated by Langenohl, the
power of securitization, meaning “consequences that arise from such acts
of securitizing communication,”106 are also part of the securitization pro-
105 Wæver 1995.
106 Langenohl, in this volume, p. 56.
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cess. An analysis restricted to the Copenhagen understanding of securiti-
zation would not consider how the effects of the securitization evolved, al-
though this strongly alters the assessment of the post-crisis developments.
Also, focussing on the speech-act of securitization does not consider
which hegemonies have already been in place and may have been under-
mined by the events of the crisis. Focussing on the speaker and the securi-
tizing speech-act may even narrow the analysis by foregrounding actors
and speech acts as those that would be decisive without considering where
their articulations stem from. In the case of post-crisis financial regulation,
the Copenhagen School’s framework would leave the researcher with the
impression that political elites succeeded in re-claiming their right to gov-
ern financial markets. A discourse analysis of hegemony discloses that po-
litical decision-makers were not in control of the securitization dynamics
in which they were involved. The broader discourse analysis helps to un-
derstand how certain actors belonging to the field of financial governance
profit from the securitizing move at the expense of the securitizing actors.
In the above-cited, securitizing moves political leaders claim to use their
agency to act and control financial markets. The analysis of the reform
process that followed this securitization showed that while the dramatiza-
tion of the discourse put pressure to act on the political elites, the empty
signifier ‘financial stability’ allowed only certain articulations to be in-
cluded into the hegemonic formation. It integrated political demands as
well as articulations stemming from an elite of financial market gover-
nance. Eventually, it was especially this elite whose particular articulations
were linked the empty signifier ‘financial stability’ and which gained au-
thority in the discourse on financial reform. This relation strengthened
their status as experts of financial governance and gave them a prerogative
to propose specific security measures and thereby to occupy the position
to control the power of securitization.
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Legitimacy and Security from a Historical Perspective:
A Case Study in the History of Terrorism*
Carola Dietze
Introduction
Faced with political violence such as terrorism, Western societies have,
since the turn of the millennium, put security issues high up on the agenda
again. In response to the numerous attacks that have taken place since
2001 in New York City, Alexandria, VA, Bali, Moscow, Beslan, Madrid,
London, Mumbai, Sydney, Paris, Brussels, Ankara, Istanbul, Jerusalem,
Nairobi, Berlin, Teheran, St. Petersburg, Barcelona and Turku, among oth-
ers, new security laws have been passed in the United States, as well as in
many European countries, Russia, Australia, and Turkey, especially. With
these laws, parliaments and governments intend to strengthen national and
international security authorities by creating new security agencies or reor-
ganizing and enlarging existing ones, by improving the agencies’ equip-
ment, and by extending their regular and exceptional powers to act against
citizens and non-citizens alike. At the same time, on an international level,
wars and military interventions have been led with the declared aim of
fighting terrorism and (re-)building nation states in the name of global se-
1
* This article was written while I was receiving a Heisenberg-Fellowship of the Ger-
man Science Foundation (DFG), and in my capacity as manager of the sub-project
“Security of the State and Security from the State in Europe, Russia and the United
States in the 19th Century” of the Collective Research Center / Transregio 138 “Dy-
namics of Security: Types of Securitization from a Historical Perspective” at the
Justus-Liebig-University Gießen and the Philipps-University Marburg. The text has
profited in many ways from the fact that – as an alumna of the Institute for Ad-
vanced Study Konstanz – Fred Girod and Svenia Schneider-Wulf kindly gave me
permission to work in the Seeburg for a few weeks, again. For conversations on the
topic of this text, my thanks goes to Kurt Lüscher and Wolfgang Seibel. Moreover, I
am indebted to Ulrich Bröckling, Malte Griesse, Iwan Iwanov, Martial Staub, and
the editors of this volume, who read the text in an earlier stage and gave valuable
comments. Lukas Keller was a great help, again, in providing me with the few titles
I could not find at the Library of the University of Konstanz. If not indicated other-
wise, accentuations are in the texts as cited, and translations are mine.
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curity. As a result, security measures and/or interventions in the name of
security have directly or indirectly affected many people in most countries
of the world in one way or another.
In correspondence with the rising importance of security measures in
political, public and private life, research and discussions regarding securi-
ty issues have gained momentum in academia. Before the turn of the mil-
lennium, debates on security and securitization were mostly confined to
comparatively small and self-contained circles of researchers working in
institutions and think-tanks specifically devoted to security studies and po-
litical consulting. Since 2001, university teachers and scholars in other
disciplines have increasingly taken up the topic of security as well.1 In ad-
dition to this widening of the field, research in specialized security and se-
curitization studies has intensified and gained increasing recognition be-
yond their immediate circles. Hence, the study of security and securitiza-
tion currently is a vibrant and important field of study in many ways.
The cross-fertilization between, on the one hand, security studies and
securitization studies and, on the other hand, the social sciences and the
humanities more generally has enriched discussions in a wide range of dis-
ciplines by opening up new questions, perspectives, and interpretations.
This may be especially true for the discipline of history.2 Conversely, the
engagement of scholars from disciplines other than International Relations
with issues and debates in the field of security and securitization studies
has the potential to open up new perspectives and questions and to mark
certain neglected areas in this field.
One such neglected area in current security and securitization studies is
the significance of legitimacy in a broader sense – that is, the legitimacy
of political, economic or societal orders, as such – for issues of security.
1 On this development, see, for example, C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, pp. 445 and
460-472. The Collective Research Center “Dynamics of Security” is an example of
this development. Initiated in 2014, the Center brings together scholars from the
disciplines of history, art history, law, sociology and the political sciences.
2 As far as the sub-project “Security of the State and Security from the State in Euro-
pe, Russia and the United States in the 19th Century“ is concerned, the fruitfulness
of security theory for the interpretation of history has become clear, for example, in
the discussions of the International Conference Dynamics of Security in Russia in
the Era of Revolution and Restoration (1790-1840) / Dynamiken der Sicherheit in
Russland im Zeitalter von Revolution und Restauration (1790-1840), which took
place in Gießen on March 2-3, 2017. It will also be apparent in the anthology result-
ing from this conference.
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From a historical perspective, it is remarkable that legitimacy in this sense
does not figure prominently in the explanation of stability, safety and
threats to both in much of recent security and securitization studies. Cer-
tainly, in the history of political thought, in current political and sociologi-
cal theory as well as in the general fields of International Relations and
conflict studies, many works deal with questions of legitimacy and the sta-
bility of political order. It might suffice, here, to remind of the classical
works by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and some of the historical
authors mentioned in the main part of this text, the books by Henry
Kissinger, Raymond Aron, Paul Schroeder, and Alexander Wendt,3 or the
contributions of researchers connected to the Hessische Stiftung Friedens-
und Konfliktforschung (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt) and the Wis-
senschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB, Berlin Social Sci-
ence Center).4 Moreover, there are a number of expositions especially on
legitimacy of the state and the law.5 Seen from this perspective, issues of
legitimacy and the stability and security of order belong to the core ques-
tions of political thought and political theory.
Despite this long and impressive tradition, preliminary examinations of
the field of legitimacy, security, and their relationship show that the corre-
lation between legitimacy and security is not easy to grasp. For example,
no agreed upon definitions of the terms ‘legitimacy’ and ‘security’ exist,
and the ways in which the concepts are used in the literature, as well as the
manner in which their correlation is described, vary widely.6 Accordingly,
Christopher K. Ansell states that legitimacy “is a critical but often vexing
concept in politics and political science.”7 Browsing the indices of promi-
nent standard introductions, theories, and compilations in the field of secu-
rity studies, one will find that in many of these works, the terms ‘legitima-
3 See, for example, Kissinger 1974; Aron 1966; Schroeder 1994; and Wendt 1999.
4 See, for example, Geis/Nullmeier/Daase 2012; Daase 2013; Rauh 2015; the project
“Rethinking Legitimacy and International Institutions“ by Michael Zürn and
Matthew Stephen, as well as their article (2010); Kreide 2015 (reprinted in a re-
vised version Kreide 2015a). On Hobbes cf., for example Marciniak 2015, e.g. pp.
158f.
5 For recent works, cf. esp. Barker 1990; Beetham 1991; Stryker 1994; and Gilley
2009.
6 For a good overview of definitions and concepts of legitimacy, cf. Stryber [= Stryk-
er] 2001; Ansell 2001; and esp. Mandt 1995; as well as Kaase 1995; and Sarcinelli
1998.
7 Ansell 2001, p. 8704.
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cy’ or ‘legitimation’ are not indicated. In case one of these terms is men-
tioned, it typically leads to expositions about historical developments or
about ‘weak’ states in the so-called Third World.8 The treatment of legiti-
macy in a broad sense as a factor relevant mainly for history and the so-
called Third World potentially implies, though, that the question of legiti-
macy can be neglected when dealing with current challenges to security in
the so-called First World or on a global level.
In European securitization studies, such as the Copenhagen and Paris
Schools, legitimacy is an important category, yet in a narrower sense. In
works of these two schools, the category is mostly used with respect to the
political or professional legitimacy and authority of specific security
moves and experts.9 This is somewhat surprising, because in their hall-
mark book, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, published in 1998,
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde have given the category of
legitimacy in the broad sense a systematic treatment under the heading
“The Political Security Agenda.”10 Here, the three authors maintain that
“[p]olitical security is about the organizational stability of social order(s).”
They state: “Typically, political threats are about giving or denying recog-
nition, support or legitimacy.” As such, they are “purely political threats”
(as opposed to military ones, for instance), in which “words matter in rela-
tion to recognition and related political demands.”11 Buzan, Wæver and de
Wilde differentiate between threats to the “internal legitimacy” of the po-
litical unit, primarily relating to “ideologies and other constitutive ideas”
and “the external recognition of the state, its external legitimacy.”12 They
observe that “a state consists of three components: idea, physical base, and
8 See, for example, Booth 2007, p. 260; Booth/Wheeler 2008, p. 109; Acharya 2011
and Homer-Dixon 2011; Booth/Erskine 2016, esp. pp. 166-171. In some books,
the term ‘legitimacy’ appears in the text but not in the index. Such absence is sig-
nificant because it indicates that the author(s) or editor(s) do not consider the term
to be a key-concept of the field. On the absence of the term and the concept in
many standard texts in the field of International Relations, cf. also Clark 2005, pp.
2 and 11. On p. 9, Clark poses the question, “why, thus far, has it [legitimacy;
C.D.] never been regarded as one of the discipline’s key concepts?”.
9 Cf. further on this and with extensive references to the literature the chapter by
Andreas Langenohl in this volume.
10 Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998, Chapter 7.
11 Id., p. 141 and p. 142. Cf. also p. 144.
12 Id., p. 144.
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institutions,”13 and they note that any subversion of legitimacy affects the
ideas and ideologies on which political institutions are built, and thereby
the stability of a political order. In their typology of cases, Buzan, Wæver
and de Wilde consider questions of legitimacy in the broad sense under the
heading “Unintentional threats to states on political-ideological grounds.”
As examples, they name the conflict between India and Pakistan and the
one between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.14 Thus, le-
gitimacy in the broader sense is well positioned in the theory of the
Copenhagen School through the termini of “political security” and “politi-
cal threats.”
Yet, even though Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde systematically include
the category of legitimacy into their approach of securitization theory,
their usage of this category still fits the general picture outlined earlier.
Similar to Ansell quoted above, the three authors, at the beginning of their
chapter entitled “The Political Security Agenda,” remark: “the political
sector will turn out to be the one that is the most perplexing.”15 Buzan,
Wæver and de Wilde also regard legitimacy issues in the broad sense as a
security threat predominantly for ‘weak’ states, where “basic institutions
as well as ideologies are often challenged, and political violence is exten-
sive,” whereas in ‘strong’ states, “the framework and thus some basic le-
gitimacy of the government are usually accepted.”16 Concerning ‘strong,’
liberal-democratic states, processes of legitimation mainly come into focus
with regard to security measures – that is, only in the narrow sense. Thus,
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde define a “security criterion,” according to
which an issue “has to be a threat of a dramatic nature, portrayable as
threatening the breakdown or ruin of some principle or some other ir-
reparable effect whereby one can then legitimate extreme steps.”17 Ac-
cording to the Copenhagen School, therefore, legitimacy issues in ‘strong’
states concern less the question whether audiences are prepared to general-
ly accept that “government acts only as the legitimate agent of the nation-
state,”18 in contrast to ‘weak’ states. Rather, the crucial question is if audi-
ences are prepared to accept as legitimate a specific securitizing move and
13 Id., p. 150.
14 Id., p. 157.
15 Id., p. 141.
16 Id., p. 148.
17 Id., p. 148.
18 Id., p. 146.
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the security measures it enables. Finally Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde
themselves marginalize the cases assembled in their typology of cases un-
der the heading “Unintentional threats to states on political-ideological
grounds,” by noting that conflicts of this type are “not common” and that
they are “not the typical form of political security conflict.”19 It is possibly
for reasons such as these that the inclusion of the category of legitimacy in
the broader sense into securitization theory, which the Copenhagen School
offers in principle, has not brought about an effective inclusion of legiti-
macy into the research of this school or into the general field of security
and securitization studies. In the writings of the Paris School, questions of
legitimacy mostly concern the securitizing actors and their audience.20
Hence, there is also a tendency in both schools of European securitization
studies to neglect legitimacy in the broader sense, if it does not pertain to
‘weak states’ in the so-called Third World.
With regard to history, security studies tend to focus on the emergence
of legitimacy in international society. The locus classicus, in this respect,
is Henry Kissinger’s 1957 definition of a legitimate international order in
his remark that the order established at Vienna in 1815 was legitimate be-
cause it established “international agreement about the nature of workable
arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign poli-
cy.” This definition comes in combination with Kissinger’s statement that
a legitimate international order does “not make conflicts impossible, but it
limits their scope,”21 thus stressing the link between legitimacy and securi-
ty: “Stability, then, has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but
from a generally accepted legitimacy.”22 These quotations have been cited
so often in the relevant literature that they have acquired a certain status of
fame in the field of security studies; still, they stand somewhat apart from
the actual research questions and study programs.
In the field of International Relations, Ian Clark is one of the rare
scholars to fully focus on questions of international legitimacy. He works
with historical material, striving to establish legitimacy as a key concept
19 Id., p. 157.
20 See, for example, Balzacq 2011, Chapter 1, p. 3, and the remarks by Langenohl in
his introduction to this volume.
21 Kissinger 1974, p. 1, cited for instance in Booth/Wheeler 2008, p. 109.
22 Kissinger 1974, p. 1.
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of his discipline.23 Under the heading “Why Legitimacy Matters,” Clark
underlines that there is “a possible connection between international legiti-
macy and the greater international stability that results from it,” thus also
stressing a link between legitimacy and security.24 The more direct aim of
his study, however, is to explore the “international practice of legitimacy”
in its “substantive” and “procedural dimension,”25 in order to decide, for
example, if we can “make judgements about the varying degrees to which
international society has succeeded in legitimating its actions,” and if “– in
that sense alone – […] some international orders [have] been more legiti-
mate than others.”26 In order to answer such questions, Clark develops a
distinctive approach to international legitimacy, arguing that the “core
principles of legitimacy express rudimentary social agreement about who
is entitled to participate in international relations, and also about the ap-
propriate forms in their conduct.” In this sense, “legitimacy thus denotes
the existence of international society.”27 Hence, security remains present
as the overall goal of legitimations, but it is not the direct focus of Clark’s
study.
In history, one can indeed find many important indications that legiti-
macy in the broad sense is crucial for security and securitization. In order
to fully appreciate this, it is helpful to take a long historical view. Social
scientists sometimes assert that legitimacy of political rule is mainly a
modern phenomenon. A prominent scholar presenting forceful normative
arguments for such an assertion is Wilhelm Hennis. In a similar sense,
Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn write: “Legitimacy or the acceptance
of political rule came into full bloom with the rise of the democratic nati-
on-state in the nineteenth century.”28 Others assert that pre-modern
concepts of legitimacy existed, but are not relevant for legitimacy issues
today. Ian Clark, for example, states: “No attempt need be made to provide
23 See Clark 2005, p. 9. Cf. also Clark 2007 his International Legitimacy and World
Society. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, as well as Wight
1977, p. 153. The chapter is a revised version of an article first published under the
same title in International Relations 4(1), 1972: 1-28.
24 Clark 2005, p. 15.
25 Id., pp. 1 and 3.
26 Id., p. 9.
27 Id., p. 2.
28 Cf. Hennis 1976 and Leibfried/Zürn 2005a, p. 2 (orig.: Leibfried/Zürn 2006a, pp.
20f. For the emergence of this position in the course of the revolutionary era, see
also further down.
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a comprehensive intellectual history of the term [legitimacy; C.D.],” be-
cause “the concept came into common usage only after the French revolu-
tion,” and: “This post-1789 usage, as we shall see, was to be distinc-
tive.”29 Certainly, with the democratic nation-state, “popular legitimacy”
as a specific understanding of legitimacy was established, and this princi-
ple of legitimacy is still relevant today.30 From a historical perspective,
however, it is important to note that legitimacy – at least in the empirical
sense – also existed in other societies and at other times, even if it was un-
derstood differently.31 This is important not least because observations on
the relationship between legitimacy and security in pre-modern times hold
important lessons on their relationship in general.
Therefore, in the following I will use different historical methods to ap-
proach the relationship of legitimacy and security as well as securitization
from a diachronic perspective. First, I will introduce the term ‘legitimacy,’
as it is commonly used in everyday English, French, and German today.
Then, I will describe the history of the term and of the concept of ‘legiti-
macy’ for Central Europe in its longue durée, with the help of Begriffsge-
schichte, the history of concepts, and the history of ideas. This history is
correlated with events and constellations, taken from European history,
which illustrate the importance of legitimacy for security and indicate the
significance of changes of the term and of the concept of ‘legitimacy’ for
the history of security and securitization and the stability of political or-
ders. Then, in a case study focusing on the 8 years between 1858 and 1866
in Europe, Russia, and the United States, I will show that questions of le-
gitimation and de-legitimation were important preconditions for the emer-
29 Clark 2005, p. 17.
30 For the term ‘popular legitimacy,’ see Wight 1977, p. 153. For the relevance of
this understanding of legitimacy under the conditions of the present transforma-
tions of the democratic nation-state, cf. Leibfried/Zürn 2005a. (Orig.: Leibfried/
Zürn 2006a); Nullmeier et al. 2010; as well as the titles in the series “Transforma-
tions of the State”, edited by Achim Hurrelmann, Stephan Leibfried, Kerstin
Martens and Peter Mayer (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). The differentiation
between legitimacy in a normative as compared with an empirical sense is com-
mon in the literature. See on this differentiation esp. Beetham 1991. Leibfried and
Zürn (2006, p. 28) introduce the differentiation in “Von der nationalen zur post-
nationalen Konstellation”.
31 Cf., for example, the introduction in Würtenberger 1982, pp. 677-679, who takes
an anthropological approach; or (partly on the basis of this same text) Schneider et
al. 2010, p. 5; as well as Gilley 2009, p. xi, who provides examples.
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gence of terrorism as a specific tactic of political violence – a tactic cur-
rently considered as a major security threat. Overall, the combinations of
conceptual history with a praxeological approach show that legitimacy is
decisive for security and securitization in a variety of ways.
This text does not make any claim to deal with the topic at hand in a
comprehensive manner. Instead, this article is supposed to present a first
outline of the argument – an outline, which is to be followed by further
studies dealing with the arising questions in more depth.
Historical Perspectives on Legitimacy and Security
In current usage, the term ‘legitimacy’ has at least a double meaning. On
the one hand, it overlaps with the term ‘legality.’ The Oxford English Dic-
tionary, for example, defines ‘legitimacy’ as “[c]onformity to the law, to
rules, or to some recognized principle; lawfulness,” and in a more directly
political sense as “[t]he legal right to govern or to sovereignty; spec[ifical-
ly] the fact or principle of strict hereditary succession to a throne.”32 Simi-
larly, the Grand Larousse de la langue française defines the French ‘légi-
time’ as “fixé ou établi par la loi, conforme aux règles,” “[c]onforme à la
loi écrite, au droit positif,” “[f]ondé, appuyé sur la loi” and as “conforme à
la raison, au bon droit.”33 On the other hand, the term ‘legitimacy’ can be
directly juxtaposed with the term ‘legality.’ In this sense, the Grand La-
rousse renders the meaning of ‘légitime’ as “[c]onforme à la justice, à
l’équité, au droit naturel, à la loi morale ou divine (par opposition à légal)”
and as “[f]ondé sur le droit divin, par opposition à tout autre pouvoir
réputé usurpé.” Carl Schmitt, in his political essay Legality and Legitima-
2
32 Entry “legitimacy”, in: OED. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press
2017, www.oed.com/view/Entry/107111?redirectedFrom=legitimacy#eid [last ac-
cessed: July 19, 2017]. On the same line, the American Merriam-Webster Dictio-
nary defines the meaning of “the quality or state of being legitimate” as “accor-
dant with law or with established legal forms and requirements,” as “ruling by or
based on the strict principle of hereditary right,” and as “conforming to recognized
principles or accepted rules and standards” (Entries “legitimacy” and “legitimate,”
in: Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
legitimacy [last accessed: July 19, 2017]).
33 Entry “légitime”,in: Grand Larousse de la langue française, in 7 vol., vol. 4: IND-
NY, Paris: Larousse 1975, p. 2992.
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cy on the Weimar Republic, used the terms as opposites in this sense.34
The juxtaposition of the terms ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legality’ is thus more pro-
nounced on the European Continent than in Britain or in the United States,
perhaps for reasons connected with differences between historical experi-
ences and different legal traditions.
Notwithstanding this difference, for the longest time in European histo-
ry the juxtaposition of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legality’ would have been hard to
comprehend on the Continent as well. Both terms are ultimately derived
from classical Latin ‘legitimus.’35 This word also combined the meaning
of the current term ‘legal’ (“of or concerned with the law,” “legally pre-
scribed or recognized,” “permitted by law,” “lawful”), with the additional
meaning of ‘legitimate’ (“prescribed by custom or usage,” “genuine,”
“just,” “proper”).36 Accordingly, it was the term ‘legitimus’ which was
used to refer to the Law of the Twelve Tables, which is considered as the
foundational law of the Roman community.37
In the terminology of the Middle Ages, a principal differentiation be-
tween law, justice and morality cannot be found, either. The term ‘legiti-
mus’ continued to be used in learned Latin discourse,38 and it began to en-
ter the vernaculars.39 Moreover, the neologism ‘legalitas’ (meaning “legal
status,” “law-worthiness”) was coined. This new term was not juxtaposed
34 Schmitt 2004 (orig.: Schmitt 2012). For contemporary German usage, the most
useful points of reference are the entries ‘legitim’ and ‘Legitimität’ in: Wahrig.
Deutsches Wörterbuch, edited by Renate Wahrig-Burfeind, 8., vollständig neu be-
arbeitete und aktualisierte Aufl. Gütersloh/München 2006, p. 932.
35 The term ‘legalis’ can be found, since the first century AD, but it did not play a
significant role. Cf. Würtenberger 1982, p. 680, note 8.
36 Cf. entry “legitime, adj. and n.”, in: OED. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2017, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/107120?redirectedFrom=le-
gitime#eid [last accessed: July 20, 2017]; and the entry “legitimus” in Pocket Ox-
ford Latin Dictionary: Latin-English, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005,
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191739583.001.0001/b-
la-en-00001-0005755?rskey=5ejm9i&result=1 [last accessed: September 15,
2017].
37 Cf. Würtenberger 1982, p. 680, and for more detail Würtenberger 1973, chapter 1.
38 Cf. Würtenberger 1982, pp. 681-684, and Würtenberger 1973, p. 37-45.
39 Words from the family ‘legitim-’ began to enter the French language in the thir-
teenth century and the English language from 1400 onwards. Cf. entry “legitima-
cy”, in: OED. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press 2017,
www.oed.com/view/Entry/107111?redirectedFrom=legitimacy#eid [last accessed:
July 19, 2017] and the entry “légitime”, in: Grand Larousse de la langue françai-
se, in 7 vol., vol. 4: IND-NY, Paris: Larousse 1975, p. 2992.
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with ‘legitimus,’ however. The law was seen to comprise proven and test-
ed rules for society; thus, lawful behavior was regarded as just and moral
– and vice versa.40 In content, the medieval principle of legitimacy was
dynastic. According to Martin Wight’s succinct characterization, the dy-
nastic principle was “concerned with the status and claims of rulers” and
“might be cautiously described as a doctrine that legitimacy rests upon
prescription, tempered by consent.”41 It connected international and do-
mestic politics, because it prevailed (or was proclaimed to prevail) “within
a majority of the states as well as in the relations between them.”42 The
understanding of legitimacy in dynastic terms entailed that conflicts about
legitimacy were typically conflicts about the question, whether an individ-
ual person or body (such as a chapter or a monastic order) had or did not
have the legitimate right to rule specific towns, territories, and subjects.43
Therefore, in the Middle Ages, conflicts about legitimacy were frequent,
but limited in kind, and it may be considered significant that, in the Em-
pire, no assassination of a king took place for political reasons between
754 and the Holy Roman Empire’s demise, in 1806.44
When competing orders of legitimacy emerged, serious controversies
about legitimacy began, and these controversies soon became relevant for
the security of those in power as well as for large parts of society. After
the Reformation, the term ‘legitimus’ took center stage in deliberations
about the right to resist a ‘tyrant.’ In this discourse, the dynastic principle
of legitimacy continued to be recognized, but faith and the way, in which
rule was exercised, gained in importance as additional criteria for legiti-
macy.45 For example, Martin Luther initially declared that no obedience is
40 Cf. Würtenberger 1982, p. 681.
41 Wight 1977, pp. 153 and 157.
42 Id., p. 153.
43 On different types of violence in Medieval Europe, cf. for instance Brown 2014.
44 The two kings, we know to have been assassinated, Philipp von Schwaben, in
1208, and Albrecht I. von Habsburg, in 1308, were murdered for a violation of
honor and because of inheritance matters, respectively. Cf. Bihrer 2005, esp. pp.
118f. and 123. Moreover, there were several attempts to assassinate Friedrich II.
(1212-1250), and one each to assassinate Konrad IV (1250-1254) and Sigismund
(1411-1437), as well as rumors about poisoning, mainly in situations with double-
elections (Doppelwahlen) or counter-kings (Gegenkönige). See Bihrer 2005, p.
123.
45 For the term ‚legitimacy’ in the context of Early-Modern politico-theological lan-
guage, cf. Schorn-Schütte/Tode 2006. On England see esp. Zaller 2007.
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due to ‘ungodly’ rulers, but that one was not allowed to resist them active-
ly, either; after the outbreak of the Peasants’ revolts in 1524, however, he
adopted a strict position of non-resistance.46 By contrast, Roman Catholics
and Calvinists alike revived and elaborated on ancient and medieval ideas
about resistance and tyrannicide.47 Under the impression of the Catholic
monarchy’s fight against the Huguenots in France, especially the attempt
to murder the entire Calvinist leadership in the massacre of St.
Bartholomew’s Eve in 1572, Calvinist monarchomachi (notably François
Hotman, Théodore de Bèze, Calvin’s right-hand man, Philippe du Plessis-
Mornay, George Buchanan, and Johannes Althusius) discussed: (1) if re-
sistance was legitimate against a ruler who overstepped his powers and
acted as a tyrant; (2) which subjects would have the right to resist such a
tyrant; (3) at what stage of misrule resistance was legitimate; and (4) in
what form.48 Fearing social unrest and retribution, most of the Calvinist
monarchomachi gave restrained answers to these questions.
Around the same time, some Catholics began to raise analogous issues
with regard to ‘heretic’ Protestant rulers. Upholding an “extreme or exclu-
sive Catholic principle of legitimacy” (and thus “turning revolutionary”),49
preachers of the Catholic League (such as Rossaeus of Paris, Jean Bouch-
er, Francisco Suarez, and Juan de Mariana) claimed that heretic rulers
were by definition tyrants, and that tyrants could be assassinated. A num-
ber of popes and Catholic monarchs put these ideas into practice and de-
posed Protestant sovereigns. Thus, Pope Pius V in 1570 declared Queen
Elizabeth I of England to be a heretic, and Pope Sixtus V in 1585 issued
the same kind of statement about King Henry IV of France. In the face of
the abovementioned interpretations en vogue in the Catholic League, such
delegitimizing declarations were calls for political murder.50 For instance,
Spanish King Philip II declared William of Orange an outlaw. When
Philip had tried to violently suppress Protestants and Protestantism in the
Low Countries in 1581, the Dutch States-General renounced their alle-
46 For an introduction to the political implications of Luther’s teachings, see Skinner
1978, part 1, esp. pp. 16-19.
47 Ford 1985 underlines the fact that monarchomachi can be found on both sides of
the religious divide. Cf. e.g. p. 150.
48 Cf. Würtenberger 1982, p. 685f.; Würtenberger 1973, pp. 37-45; as well as Ford
1985, pp. 150-155, and Skinner 1978, chapter 8, esp. pp. 242 and 252, and chapter
9.
49 Wight 1977, p. 157.
50 Cf. Ford 1985, p. 156f., and Wight 1977, p. 157.
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giance to the Spanish king, declared him a tyrant, and chose William of
Orange as their leader instead. In this way, William also became an ally of
French Huguenots. Following Philip’s delegitimizing declaration, how-
ever, a French Catholic, Balthasar Gérard, murdered William of Orange in
1584. Gérard was executed, but for his deed the Spanish king generously
paid the assassin’s family.51
Here as in other cases in the era of the Wars of Religion, violence
against the population for religious reasons, the contestation of the
sovereign’s legitimacy, which followed such acts of violence, and the
delegitimation of rulers chosen in their place by the persecuted, overall
generated a sharp increase in assassinations as well as (civil) war, and in
this way significantly affected the security of governments and the public.
Fanklin Ford, for instance, counted 35 “major political murders and exe-
cutions in the Age of the Wars of Religion,” from July 1535 to January
1649.52 But in Early Modern Europe, the focus of attention was still on the
legitimacy of individual rulers – their person, religious beliefs, and actions
– who were judged against principles of godly rule or true Catholicism,
while the principle of dynastic legitimacy itself was not questioned.
This changed in the course of the revolutionary era, when competing
orders of legitimacy emerged for a second time, as adherents to the princi-
ples of popular legitimacy and the nation-state began to challenge the prin-
ciples of dynastic legitimacy and the raison d’être of empires.53 This was
the moment when the term ‘legitimacy’ became a discursive weapon to at-
tack or defend entire systems of rule. Now, ‘legitimacy’ has begun to be
juxtaposed with ‘legality’, and the dualism between ‘legitimacy’ and ‘le-
gality’ began to make sense to a broader public.
Preconditions for the principle of popular legitimacy were the emer-
gence of the sovereign state and the democratization and de-personaliza-
tion of the concept of legitimacy, which took place in French political
thought. Searching for ways out of the religious strife, which had come in
the wake of the reformation in the second half of the sixteenth century, the
51 Cf. Ford 1985, pp. 160-162, and specifically Jardine 2005. For the legitimation of
the Dutch revolt against Spanish rule, see Saage 1981, part I und III.
52 For the table in question, see Ford 1985, pp. 147-150.
53 For global perspectives on this “crisis of the old regimes in Europe”, cf. esp. Bayly
2014, Part I, esp. pp. 86-88 (quote p. 86); and Osterhammel 2009, esp. Chapter 10.
For a relativization of the contrast between the legitimation strategies of empires
and nation-states cf. Leonhard 2012.
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‘Politiques,’ a circle of politicians, jurists and political theorists, contra-
dicted all theories of resistance and tyrannicide, from Calvinist and
Catholic monarchomachi alike. The most important political thinker be-
longing to this circle was Jean Bodin. He conceived a non-denominational
monarchy, whose main-purpose consisted in the maintenance of public
peace and order. To enable the monarchy to take on this role, it was sup-
posed to be the sole institution exercising legitimate power in the state; in
return, it was supposed to be legislative in character and bound by natural
and higher law. Bodin’s political thought proved influential. Politicians,
such as the Cardinal Richelieu, put the idea to consolidate the French
monarchy into practice and in this way strengthened the French state.54
The depersonalization and democratization of the concept of legitimacy
took place towards the end of the eighteenth century. Enlightenment
philosophers (such as Claude Adrien Helvétius, Paul-Henry Thiry Baron
d’Holbach and Jean Jaques Rousseau) first used the adjective ‘legitime’ to
characterize sovereignty and political or state rule, in general. In this way,
they severed the term from the person of the sovereign and his or her rule,
and instead identified the people of the nation as the sole and true source
of legitimacy, for example in the concept of ‘volonté générale.’ According
to Rousseau, this source of legitimacy, was not even bound by natural and
higher law.55 In this way, the scene was set for the battle between those
fighting for the principle of popular legitimacy and those defending the
principle of dynastic legitimacy in the revolutionary era.
From the end of the eighteenth century onwards, the principles of popu-
lar and dynastic legitimacy were used to threaten and overthrow the secu-
rity and integrity of governments, states, and empires, in both directions –
from dynastic to popular rule and back again. First, in 1776, Continental
Congress, referring to the principal of popular legitimacy, seceded from
the British Crown and its Empire. The former colonies defended their se-
cession in the War of Independence. In 1789, the assembly of the French
Third Estate, in its Coup d’État against King Louis XVI, declared to be the
sole legitimate representation of the French nation, as Assemblée Nationa-
le. Civil war and terror followed in France, and more than 20 years of
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars across the whole of Europe. After
1814, in the peace negotiations and at the Congress of Vienna, the French
54 Cf. Würtenberger 1982, pp. 689-691; Würtenberger 1973, Chapter 2.1, esp. pp.
76-80; and Skinner 1978, pp. 284-301.
55 Cf. Würtenberger 1982, pp. 691-694; Würtenberger 1973, Chapter 2.2.
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diplomat Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand introduced the concept of legiti-
macy as an organizing principle for the interior order of each state as well
as for the European international order, and in this way helped to prepare
the preservation of France and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy.
This did not stop conflicts, however. In most parts of Europe, insurrec-
tions, revolutions and restorations were frequent, until the revolutions of
1848/49 had been put down. For these reasons, according to Thomas
Würtenberger, it was during the Era of European Restoration that ‘legiti-
macy’ definitely and irrevocably became a concept used for machtpolitik
as well as a crucial category of state-policy.56
The juxtaposition of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legality’ emerged after the
Congress of Vienna in the political conflicts about the implementation of
the principles of dynastic or popular rule, in France as well as in Germany.
It can first be found in the writings of conservative political theorists dur-
ing the French restoration period. In the eyes of ultramontane politicians
and publicists, such as Louis de Bonald, Hugues-Félicité Robert de
Lamennais, and Fabre d’Olivet, a metaphysical basis was the pivotal re-
quirement for legitimacy. They regarded only those political institutions
which were ordained by God and founded in God’s order, and only those
laws which history had bequeathed upon society, as legitimate. Political
institutions newly constituted by man, only, and the laws they issued,
could, in contrast, merely claim ‘legality.’ In the following years, this du-
alism of legitimacy and legality was adopted in other political and philo-
sophical writings and transferred onto other topics. Most importantly, lib-
eral political theorists began to devise competing definitions of legitimate
authority. According to the Staatslexikon of Karl von Rotteck and Carl-
Theodor Welcker, for instance, legitimacy could only be claimed by
democratic nation-states, whose political and legal systems was endorsed
by its citizens.57 The position taken by Hennis, Leibfried and Zürn, cited
above, can be read in this tradition.
Consequently, in the violent political conflicts of the first half of the
nineteenth century between those who defended the dynastic principle of
legitimacy and those who fought for the popular principle, ‘legitimacy’
was the focal point of an intense academic and widespread popular debate,
a discursive weapon, and an important object of conflict, all at the same
56 Würtenberger 1982, pp. 694-710, esp. p. 697; and Wight 1977, p. 160.
57 Würtenberger 1982, pp. 715-732.
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time. And just like in the decades after the reformation, the contestation of
legitimacy in the Revolutionary Era and in the period of European
Restoration generated an increase in political murder as well as in (civil)
war, weakening the security of political institutions as well as public secu-
rity. Different from the former period, however, in the decades
around 1800, it was the legitimacy of the state and of the entire political
system which was at stake, including the monarchy. The process of the
emergence of terrorism shows how the contestation of legitimacy could
turn into a security issue.
Legitimacy and the emergence of terrorism in nineteenth century
Europe, Russia and the United States. A Case Study
The contestation of legitimacy witnessed in the revolutionary and restora-
tion eras, was an important factor for the emergence of terrorism. In this
emergence process, all three aspects of the contestation of legitimacy
prominent in the first decades of the nineteenth century were indispensible
preconditions: the fundamental critique of political systems and their rep-
resentatives from adherents of a different principle of legitimacy; the
widespread popular, political, and academic debate on the topic; and the
juxtaposition of ‘legitimacy’ with ‘legality.’ Hence, the link between these
preconditions and the emergence of terrorism is another argument for the
thesis that terrorism is a modern phenomenon, which first emerged in the
nineteenth century in Western Europe and in the United States.58
For the first terrorists, questions of legitimacy played a decisive role in
their decision to resort to acts of violence, in a twofold manner: They had
3
58 I first explored this topic with the help of a conference, “Terrorism and Modernity:
Global Perspectives on Nineteenth Century Political Violence,” organized together
with Claudia Verhoeven, and supported by Mareike König and Benedikt Stuchtey
as well as Samuel C. Ramer and Margaret M. Keenan, on October 23-26, 2008, in
Tulane University, New Orleans, LA. Many contributions given on this confer-
ence, were taken up into the Oxford Handbook of the History of Terrorism. See
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199858569.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199858569. On the invention of terror-
ism as a distinctly modern phenomenon, cf. Dietze 2016. For a discussion of the
literature on this topic, see the introduction there. The book is currently being




to de-legitimize the state, its representatives, and their policies, in order to
legitimize the violence they perpetrated against the political order and its
representatives. This is true for all five persons, who can be described as
inventors of terrorism. The first two of them were Felice Orsini, who at-
tempted to assassinate Napoleon III in 1858, and John Brown, who at-
tacked an arsenal of the US Army in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1859.59
They are inventors of terrorism, because they perpetrated acts of political
violence, which: (1) conform to the criteria for terrorism used today; (2)
resulted from independent and idiosyncratic processes of thought and ac-
tion (and not primarily the imitation of some prior action by others); and
(3) can be proven to have served as models for the actions of terrorists to
come. As for the criteria of terrorism used today, the German sociologist
Peter Waldmann defines this specific tactic as “violence against a political
order from below which is well planned and meant to be shocking. Such
acts of violence are supposed to spread feelings of insecurity and intense
fear, but they are also meant to generate sympathy and support.” Wald-
mann stresses that – for a terrorist act to be successful – the symbolic ef-
fect of the violence (its message) is more important than its instrumental
effect (the carnage and destruction it wreaks). “Terrorism […] is primarily
a communication strategy.”60 The first individuals, who verifiably adopt-
ed, copied, and thereby further developed the terrorist acts of Brown and
Orsini were Oskar Wilhelm Becker, who failed in his attempt to assassi-
nate Prussian King Wilhelm I in 1861, John Wilkes Booth, who shot U.S.
President Abraham Lincoln in 1865, and Dmitriĭ Vladimirovich Karako-
zov, who tried to kill Tsar Alexander II in 1866. All five experimented
with older and newer forms of insurgent violence and used the ensuing
media coverage for their purposes with varying degrees of success. By
way of this media coverage, they also learned about and from one another.
In the context of this learning process, they developed patterns of violent
action that must be called terrorism, even though the perpetrators them-
59 Here, and in the following, the current spelling “Harpers Ferry” is used in the text;
in citations, however, the spelling “Harper’s Ferry” is rendered, which was com-
mon in the middle of the nineteenth century.
60 Waldmann 1998, pp. 10 and 12f. Other well-composed social scientific definitions
consist of similar elements. See, for instance, the definition by the American polit-
ical scientist Hoffman 2006, pp. 40f.
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selves and the societies in which they lived (with one exception) did not
use this term.61
Living in diverse political systems and circumstances, the five inventors
of terrorism were proponents of different principles of legitimacy, and act-
ed out of different considerations. Felice Orsini, who, with his assassina-
tion attempt, triggered the transnational, collective process of the inven-
tion of terrorism, was part of the revolutionary movement against the
restoration in the Italian states and a veteran of the Italian revolution of
1848/49.62 He had been an elected member of the national Constituent As-
sembly in Rome and appointed as commissario straordinario dal Comita-
to esecutivo (“extraordinary representative of the executive committee”)
of the Roman Republic.63 In Orsini’s eyes, an independent and unified
Italian republic, which had become some contours during Napoleonic rule
and in the course of the revolution in 1848/49, was the legitimate political
structure and government for the people living on the Apennine peninsula.
The Roman republic was short-lived, however, because – of all rulers! – it
was the president of the Second French Republic and nephew of Napoleon
I (whom Orsini’s father had served as officer), who supported the counter-
revolutionary side. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (later Napoleon III), by
military force, terminated the internationally acclaimed experiment in
democracy which the Roman Republic represented, and reinstated the
Pope in his worldly possessions and sovereignty.64
61 For a discussion of the case-selection, the literature on these cases as well as possi-
ble precursors cf. the introduction and the conclusion of Dietze 2016, esp. pp.
17-19. On the cases themselves and the connections between them, see the indi-
vidual chapters of the book, respectively.
62 For Felice Orsini, cf. esp. the biographies by Luzio 1914; and Packe 1958; on his
assassination attempt, see Dansette 1964; Cappelli 2008; and Dietze 2016, chapter
2.
63 On the Italian revolution and the Roman Republic, see Riall 2009, pp. 23-25; and
Hearder 1975. For Orsini’s role in them, see, for example, Orsini 1857, pp. 72f.,
chapter VIII; Luzio 1914, pp. 65-77; and Packe 1958, pp. 89-111. For the term
commissario straordinario dal Comitato esecutivo, cf. Orsini 1857, documents
35-39.
64 On Louis Napoleon’s decision and his command to the French expeditionary corps
to put down the Roman Republic, see Girard 1986, pp. 105f. and Milza 2004, pp.
169-171. On the legendary defence of the Roman Republic by Giuseppe Garibaldi
and a corps of voluntaries from the whole of Europe, cf. Riall 2009, pp. 23-26;
Macaulay Trevelyan 1907; and Riall 2007, pp. 75-97.
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After the fall of the Roman Republic, Orsini fled Italy and found asy-
lum first in Nice, and later in London. During his exile, he met many other
refugees from the German and Italian states, as well as from France.65 The
French refugees were mostly republicans who had fled their country after
the coup d’état in Paris on December 2, 1851, with which Louis Napoleon
ended the Second French Republic and began to establish, what was to be-
come the Second Empire. This coup d’état was accompanied by “legal ter-
ror.” For example, the French army put down protests by republicans, who
opposed the dissolution of parliament, and tough repressions hit all those,
who gave any signs of discontent with the new political order. 66
For most of the refugees from France and the Italian states in London,
there was little doubt that the restoration order imposed on the Apennine
peninsula as well as Napoleon III’s authoritarian Empire in France were
illegitimate political entities, erected with the help of military might and
police suppression. At least this is what Felice Orsini and his Italian,
French, British (but also American) friends and supporters thought.
George Jacob Holyoake, for example, a radical British publisher who
helped Orsini test prototypes of his bombs, spoke of Napoleon as the
“false President of the Republic” and “French usurper,”67 while Orsini’s
co-conspirator and “inseparable brother”68 in London, the “French Ja-
cobin” Dr. Simon François Bernard,69 wrote:
Voici un seul homme, l’empereur, l’obstacle unique et l’ennemi commun qui
éteint toute idée et rallume toute haine, qui arrête ou entrave tout progrès, qui
dit à la révolution: Tu n’iras pas plus loin, tu reculeras; qui, par ruse et par
force, s’embusque dans un serment, derrière une constitution, avec une bande
de complices à gages, leur criant: vainqueurs, à nous le monde! vaincus, un
65 On Orsini’s exile in Nice, see Orsini 1857, pp. 98-101; Luzio 1914, pp. 77-84; and
Packe 1958, pp. 115-118. On the subversive activities he undertook, until he was
arrested, and on his flight to Great Britain, cf. Orsini 1857, chapters IX-XIV;
Luzio 1914, pp. 85-257; and Packe 1958, chapters 3 and 4. On the refugees from
the Italian states in London, see Verdecchia 2010.
66 The term “legal terror” is used by Willms 2008, p. 104. On Louis Napoleon’s elec-
tion as president of the Second Republic, and his coup d’état cf. Aprile, 2000,
chapters III-IV; and Price 2001, chapter 1. On the repressions, see Aprile 2000, pp.
199-218; and Price 2001, pp. 27-37.
67 Holyoake 1892, p. 27. For a vivid description of the bomb tests, cf. chapter 60.
68 Pyat 1862, p. 7.
69 For the expression “French Jacobin”, see Holyoake 1892, vol 2, p. 31. On Bernard
and his relationship with Orsini, see ibid, chapter 62; Lancet 1858; Pyat 1862 as
well as Packe 1958, 228-230 and Dansette 1964, pp. 59-62.
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exil d’or! en conséquence, exterminant les plus braves citoyens, effrayant les
plus lâches, trompant les plus sots, ami à revolver, allié à cuirasse, menaçant
ou il n’est pas maître, enchaînant France, Italie, Mexique, en attendant plus,
ayant commencé comme l’oncle et devant finir comme lui!70
In this depiction of Napoleon III and his rule, Bernard assembled typical
insignia and signs of a ‘tyrant’ and his or her illegitimate rule, such as the
enmity of the people, the suppression of free speech and the fanning of
hate in society at large, as well as rule by stratagem, deceit, fear, force,
threat, perjury, and with the help of a circle of greedy and vindictive fa-
vorites. Accordingly, after Orsini’s assassination attempt, Bernard de-
clared in a London court: “We want only to crush despotism and tyranny
everywhere,” convinced his English jury, and was acquitted.71 Today,
Napoleon III may be mostly remembered for his role as a patron of the
arts and for the rebuilding of the center of Paris, but those who opposed
his coup d’état on Deux-décembre and experienced the political repression
of the Second Empire had a different perspective.
Importantly, moreover, Felice Orsini and his collaborators thought that
the Second Empire, its Emperor, and some political decisions he had tak-
en, were illegitimate to such an extent that tyrannicide was justified. There
are indications that the decision to attempt an assassination was not taken
lightly. Félix Pyat, a French refugee who, in 1848, had been a member of
the Constituent Assembly and, in 1849, had taken part in an insurrection
in Paris to prevent the crushing of the Roman Republic, explained that
Orsini’s supporter Dr. Bernard saw regicide as a “droit de légitime de-
fense, balance d’extrêmes, réaction adéquate à l’action, remède
homéopathique, contre-poison.”72 Certainly, with these words, Pyat ex-
pressed his own views on this question. After Orsini’s assassination at-
tempt, he was brought before an English court for the glorification of regi-
cide.73 Felice Orsini himself was convinced there were “rightful assassina-
tions”, as Holyoake points out in his autobiography. He renders a story
which Orsini once told him, referring to his life experience in the Italian
states under Austrian restorative rule. The story is about an Italian youth
who inadvertently killed the dog of an Austrian officer. The officer had the
youth arrested and sentenced him to such a severe whipping that the boy
70 Pyat 1862, pp. 6f.
71 Holyoake 1892, vol. 2, p. 33.
72 Pyat 1862, p. 6.
73 On Félix Pyat, see Colombet-Schieferer 2011.
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died during punishment. The next day, the youth’s father stabbed the offi-
cer. Holyoake, in accordance with Orsini, concludes that the father had
done right, just as it was right to assassinate Napoleon III.74 This story, in-
deed, seems to be significant for Orsini’s perspective on tyrannicide, be-
cause in front of the court in Paris he explained: “J’ai fait comme Brutus.
Il [Louis Napoleon; CD] a tué mon pays, j’ai voulu le tuer,”75 and thus –
just like in the story – argued with the reciprocity of death, in real life.
Holyoake also relates, however, that Orsini had long discussions with
Joseph Cowen, a radical English journalist and politician, about the right
to resist Napoleon III and assassinate him.76
With respect to their interpretation of violence, Orsini and his support-
ers stand in the European tradition of debates on legitimacy and the right
to resist tyrants. When justifying the assassination attempt on Napoleon
III, their views take up and renew the ancient ideas revived and discussed
by the monarchomachi of the sixteenth century, and they explicitly refer to
ancient and early modern figures like Cato, Brutus, William Shakespeare
and John Milton. Holyoake, for example, writes: “When Cato visited the
palace of a tyrant and saw the persons he put to death, and the terror of the
citizens who approached him, he asked, ‘Why does not some one [sic] kill
this man?’ Orsini came forward in like case to do it.”77 As cited above,
Orsini referred to Brutus, in court, and Félix Pyat recounts that, just like
“les deux plus grands génies de l’Angleterre”, Shakespeare and Milton,
Bernard thought that Brutus was the best of the Romans and that tyranni-
cide was a right and a duty.78 To the elements originating in the long tradi-
tion of deliberations concerning the right to resist illegitimate rule, Orsini
added a number of strategic considerations, however, which are indicative
of terrorist tactics.79 Thus, notions of tyrannicide and said novel strategic
considerations, together with Napoleon’s political instrumentalization of
the assassination attempt, circumstances of nineteenth century popular and
media-policy as well as popular and media reactions, caused the turn from
tyrannicide into terrorism, in Orsini’s case.80
74 Holyoake 1892, vol. 2, chapter 61, pp. 27 and 223.
75 Dandraut 1858, p. 28.
76 Holyoake 1892, vol. 2, p. 223.
77 Id., p. 27.
78 Pyat 1862, p. 5.
79 For a presentation and discussion of these elements, see Dietze 2016, pp. 135-145.
80 See on this Dietze 2016, pp. 157-185.
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For the other inventors of terrorism, considerations about legitimacy
were similarly crucial, even if their considerations show different degrees
of elaboration. John Brown – the second of the inventors of terrorism –
fought against slavery, which was protected as an institution in the south-
ern states of the United States until 1865.81 As compared with Orsini and
his collaborators, for Brown and his supporters it was more challenging to
justify their act of violence, because it was directed against the political
and social order of a republic based on popular legitimacy, a principle
Brown and his group strongly supported. This is why he and his backers
went to great lengths to legitimize the raid on Harpers Ferry, in content as
well as in form.
Regarding content, the comparatively new juxtaposition of ‘legitimacy’
with ‘legality’ stood at the center of John Brown’s justification. In the in-
terview he gave right after his defeat at Harpers Ferry to politicians like
Henry A. Wise, the Governor of Virginia, James M. Mason, one of Vir-
ginia’s Senators, and a number of military people and journalists, Brown
replied to Senator Mason’s first question, how he justified his acts:
I think, my friend, you are guilty of a great wrong against God and humanity.
I say that without wishing to be offensive. It would be perfectly right for any
one to interfere with you, so far as to free those you willfully and wickedly
hold in bondage. […] I think I did right, and that others will do right who in-
terfere with you at any time, and all times. I hold that the golden rule, do unto
others as you would that others should do unto you applies to all who would
help others to gain their liberty.82
In this explanation given to Senator Mason, Brown referred to the Golden
Rule, a fundamental ethical law expressed for instance in the Gospel ac-
cording to Matthew 7, 12: “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that
men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the
prophets.“83 John Brown, an orthodox Calvinist, was convinced that the
81 Out of the large literature on John Brown and the raid on Harpers Ferry, see esp.
Oates 1970; and McGlone 2009. For Brown’s interpretation of his violence more
generally, see Dietze 2016, chapter 4; and Dietze 2015.
82 “A Conversation with ‘Old Brown’”, in: Baltimore American, and Commercial
Advertiser (Baltimore, MD), October 21, 1859, p. 1.
83 Holy Bible. King James Version [Online: Bibelwissenschaft.de, Das wissenschaft-






positive laws allowing the institution of slavery in the southern states, con-
tradicted God’s Higher Law as expressed, for example, in the Golden
Rule. Therefore, in his eyes, the positive law was illegitimate – a perspec-
tive, reiterating the juxtaposition of legality with legitimacy.
His abolitionist friends and supporters concurred, and they made the
contradiction between legitimacy and legality in the slavery question even
more explicit. For example, the famous orator Wendell Phillips, in a
speech in Brooklyn on November 1, 1859, provocatively pointed out that
it was not John Brown who was an insurgent but the state of Virginia:
I said that the lesson of the hour was insurrection. I ought not to apply that
word to John Brown of Ossawatomie, for there was no insurrection in his
case. It is a great mistake to call him an insurgent. This principle that I have
endeavored so briefly to open to you, of absolute right and wrong, states
what? Just this: ‘Commonwealth of Virginia!’ There is no such thing. […]
Virginia, the Commonwealth of Virginia! She is only a chronic insurrection.84
By identifying John Brown and the insurrectionary violence he had perpe-
trated with absolute right – that is, with legitimacy – and a southern state,
the Commonwealth of Virginia, with permanent insurrection, and absolute
wrong – and thus with illegitimacy – Wendell Phillips reversed the usual
concept of legitimacy concerning insurrectionary violence and the state.
The reason for this reverse of legitimacy, Wendell Phillips declared,
was the fact that the state of Virginia did not fulfill the qualifications of
legitimate statehood. As qualifications, Phillips firstly named the criteria
developed by liberals (and used by some political scientists, until today),85
according to which legitimacy could only be claimed by democratic na-
tion-states, whose political and legal system was endorsed by its citizens:
Lawless, brutal force is not basis of a government, in the true sense of that
word. […] No civil society, no government, can exist except on the basis of
the willing submission of all its citizens, and by the performance of the duty
of rendering equal justice between man and man. Whatever calls itself a gov-
ernment, and refuses that duty, or has not that assent, is no government.86
84 Phillips 1863, pp. 271f. Cf. also the slightly different version of the speech given
in “The Virginia Rebellion... Wendell Phillips on the Outbreak”, in: The New York
Times (New York, NY), November 2, 1859, p. 1.
85 See e.g. the criteria by Karl von Rotteck and Carl-Theodor Welcker in their Staats-
lexikon and the reference to Wilhelm Hennis, Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn
referred to above.
86 Phillips 1863, pp. 271f.
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Secondly, Phillips – an orthodox Calvinist, just like John Brown – referred
to the demands of the Christian faith, the Bible and God’s Higher Law in
order to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the state of Virginia: “The bar-
barous horde [the slave-holding class in the State of Virginia, which was
for a large part identical with the political class of the state; CD] who gag
each other, imprison women for teaching children to read, prohibit the
Bible, sell men on the auction-block, abolish marriage, condemn half their
women to prostitution, and devote themselves to the breeding of human
beings for sale,”87 in Phillips’ eyes, did not qualify for legitimate and civi-
lized statehood: “You see I am talking of that absolute essence of things,
which lives in the sight of the Eternal and the Infinite; not as men judge it
in the rotten morals of the nineteenth century, among a herd of States that
calls itself an empire, because it raises cotton and sells slaves.”88 There-
fore, the Boston abolitionist, with regard to legitimacy, came to the con-
clusion: “What I say is this; Harper’s Ferry was the only government in
that vicinity,” and “John Brown has twice as much right to hang Gov[er-
nor] Wise, as Governor Wise has to hang him.”89 It comes as no surprise,
then, that Wendell Phillips, in his widely perceived speech, placed John
Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry in the tradition of the American Revolu-
tion, and in this way credited Brown’s violence with the highest legitima-
tion possible. Soon, Wendell Phillips was not alone anymore with this in-
terpretation.90
John Brown also saw himself in the tradition of the American Revolu-
tion. This becomes evident, for example, from Brown’s endeavors to legit-
imate his violence, in form. In analogy to the founding documents of the
United States, Brown wrote “A Declaration of Liberty by the Representa-
tives of the Slave Population of the United States of America”91 and a
“Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the People of the United
87 Id., p. 272.
88 Id., pp. 272f.
89 Id, pp. 273 and 272.
90 Transcendentalists like Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson soon pre-
sented similar interpretations in their speeches. Cf. for example Thoreau 2001; and
Emerson 1995. For recent books on this topic, see Reynolds 2005; Stoneham
2009; and Kemper Beck 2009.
91 The document is reprinted in Hinton 1894, pp. 637-643. On this document, cf. Mc-
Glone 2009, pp. 213-216.
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States.”92 In these documents, he presented his idea of an ideal United
States in which the promises of liberty and the pursuit of happiness would
come true for the entire population. Moreover, with the help of his
African-American friend Martin R. Delany, Brown summoned a “Provi-
sional Constitutional Convention.” About fifty people, mostly African-
Americans, took part in this gathering. Together, they discussed and adopt-
ed Brown’s “Provisional Constitution” and elected a government (the elec-
tion of a President was postponed). The Convention also conferred the
command of the armed forces upon Brown, and endorsed his insurrection-
plan (as far as Brown was prepared to give it away).93 In this way, John
Brown consciously tried to gain popular, even state-like, legitimacy for his
enterprise, justifying his violence in accordance with the revolutionary
American tradition and self-perception, and asking for legitimation specif-
ically from African-Americans – the group, for whose liberty and rights he
fought.
For the three individuals who imitated John Brown’s and Felice Orsini’s
terrorist acts, the illegitimacy of current rulers and existing social and po-
litical conditions, as they perceived it, also played an important role. For
Oskar Wilhelm Becker, King Wilhelm of Prussia was “nicht im Stande
[…] die Umstände zu bemeistern, die sich der Lösung der Aufgabe entge-
gensetzen, die er als König von Preußen in Bezug auf die Einigung
92 Pamphlet, John Brown’s “Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the People
of the United States” from records relating to John Brown’s raid at Harper’s Ferry,
Virginia (now West Virginia) in October 1859, 1859–1859, 15 p.; Letters Received
by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series), 1822-1860; Returns of Mili-
tary Organizations, compiled ca. 1800 – 12/1916; (National Archives Microfilm
Publication M567, roll 618, frame 411-420); Records of the Adjutant General's
Office, 1762–1984, Record Group 94; national Archives, Washington D.C. [On-
line: www.archives.gov/research, National Archives and Record Administration,
Online Public Access, John Brown’s “Provisional Constitution”, last accessed
5.7.2012]. The preamble and the first seven articles are re-printed in: Ruchames
1969, pp. 119-121. For the formation of this constitution in Frederick Douglass’s
house, see Douglass 1994, p. 755; and Oates 1970, pp. 224-227.
93 On the Convention, see the minutes “Journal of the Provisional Constitutional
Convention, held on Saturday, May 8, 1858”, in: United States Congress. Report
[of] the Select Committee of the Senate Appointed to Inquire in to the Late Invasi-
on and Seizure of the Public Property at Harper's Ferry. Washington, 1860, pp.
45-47; the reports by Anderson (1980) and Martin R. Delany in Rollin 1868, pp.
85-93; as well as Oates 1970, pp. 242-247; and McGlone 2009, pp. 213-216.
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Deutschlands zu erfüllen hätte.”94 Becker thus thought it was legitimate to
attempt to assassinate the Prussian King, because he deemed him unable
to realize his historic mission and the desire of the German people: the
unification of the nation.95
For John Wilkes Booth the formal justification of his act of violence
was especially important, just as it had been for his example, John Brown,
a few years earlier. Booth, like Brown, was an ardent supporter of the po-
litical and social order of the United States, as he knew them, and of the
principle of popular legitimacy implemented in its constitutions, and just
like many Southerners of his time, he was convinced that Abraham Lin-
coln’s presidency was illegitimate.96 For example, according to the memo-
ries of his sister, Asia Booth Clarke, one night in the last winter of the
Civil War in 1864/65 (presumably in the weeks around Lincoln’s re-elec-
tion) he sang a parody to her, ending with the rhyme “In 1865 when Lin-
coln shall be king,” and told her:
That Sectional Candidate [i.e. of the northern states, only; C.D.] should never
have been President, the votes were doubled to seat him. […] This man’s ap-
pearance, his pedigree, his coarse low jokes and anecdotes, his vulgar similes,
and his policy are a disgrace to the seat he holds. Other brains rule the coun-
try. He is made the tool of the North to crush out, or try to crush out slavery,
by robbery, rapine, slaughter and bought armies. He is walking in the foot-
prints of old John Brown […] He is Bonaparte in one great move, that is, by
overturning this blind Republic and making himself a king. This man’s re-
election which will follow his success, I tell you, will be a reign! […] a false
president, yearning for kingly succession as hotly as ever did Ariston [a tyrant
in ancient Athens; C.D.].97
John Wilkes Booth believed that Abraham Lincoln was an illegitimate
president for many reasons: Lincoln (1) was the candidate exclusively of
the northern states and had come into office by vote rigging; (2) he was
not worthy of the presidency because of his lowly descent and his coarse
94 Oskar Wilhelm Becker, “Notiz über die Motive meiner That”, in: Landesarchiv
Baden-Württemberg, Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, 250: Amtsgericht Baden-Ba-
den: Verfahren 10, Bl. 4.
95 On Oskar Wilhelm Becker and his assassination attempt, see Haehling von
Lanzenauer 1995; on his political thought, and his interpretation of his assassina-
tion attempt, see the respective parts in Dietze 2016, chapter 6.
96 On John Wilkes Booth generally, see the biography by Alford 2015. For an analy-
sis of his political thinking and of his justification of his assassination of president
Abraham Lincoln, see esp. the relevant parts in Dietze 2016, chapter 6.
97 Booth Clarke 1999, pp. 88f.
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manners (most southern presidents before had been from wealthy planter
families); (3) he did not rule independently, but was a marionette con-
trolled by rich abolitionists of the northern states who had violated the
constitution and declared war on slavery, just like the insurrectionist John
Brown; (4) he intended to overthrow the American republic in a coup
d’état, just like Napoleon III had done in France; and (5) he was a tyrant.
None of these rumors are true.98 For instance, there had been no irregulari-
ties in the election of 1860; Lincoln was simply the first president to be
elected with the votes of the northern states, alone, because the United
States had undergone demographic changes.99 Still, Booth believed these
stories circulating among adherents of the Confederacy, and when he
heard that Lincoln intended to give some former slaves the right to vote,
he acted on the basis of these rumors and shot the American president.
In contrast, Dmitriĭ Vladimirovich Karakozov entirely concentrated on
justifying his attempt to assassinate the tsar in content. He gave political as
well as economic reasons. In his written claim of responsibility, he delin-
eated what he saw as the historical guilt of the Russian tsars: the suppres-
sion and expropriation of the Russian people. In his eyes, Alexander II had
renewed this guilt with the emancipation declaration, which the tsar had
issued in 1861, and which acted to the detriment of the former serfs: “Sad
and distressed I became, that my beloved people is so oppressed, and there
I decided to destroy the liar-tsar and to die myself for my beloved peo-
ple.”100 Moreover, Karakozov described what he thought a Russia without
tsars would be like, a Russia with a political system based on popular le-
gitimacy and an economic system providing for a fair allocation of ground
and capital. This would be “true freedom” (nastoiashchaia volia).101
The five cases presented here, prove that – for the emergence of terror-
ism – concepts of legitimacy were of crucial importance. These concepts
of legitimacy differed, however, in connection with the respective social
and political situations in which the inventors of terrorism lived. In the
case of Felice Orsini and his supporters, the conflict of legitimacy follows
the revolutionary pattern common since the late eighteenth century. They
98 See for example the accounts of McPherson 1988 and Donald 1995.
99 See McPherson 1988, p. 232; and Donald 1995, p. 256.
100 “Grustno, tiazhko mne stalo, chto tak pogibaet moĭ liubimyĭ narod, i vot ia reshil
unichtozhit’ tsaria-zlodeia i samomu umeret’ za svoĭ liubeznyĭ narod”.
(Shilov 1918, p. 161).
101 Shilov 1918, p. 161.
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were ardent and active proponents of the principle of popular legitimacy,
and shared a fundamental critique of the political system of the restorative
order in the Italian states, of the Second Empire in France and of Emperor
Napoleon III, whom they saw as responsible for putting down republican
forms of government and for re-/establishing dynastic rule, in France and
in the Apennine peninsula. After the failure of all attempts to implement
the principle of popular legitimacy through collective violence, they took
up ideas of tyrannicide.
John Brown and his group, in contrast, perpetrated violence against a
political order in which the principle of popular legitimacy had been suc-
cessfully implemented through collective violence. The orthodox Calvinist
Brown, therefore, referred to the legitimacy of God’s Higher Law in order
to criticize the positive law supporting the institution of slavery as illegiti-
mate. In structure, his argument thus resembles the reasoning of the ultra-
montane politicians and publicists in the French restoration period, where-
as, in content, Brown’s recourse to God’s Higher Law differed from the
ultramontanes’ views, because it was revolutionary instead of restorative.
John Brown and Wendell Phillips combined the recourse to God’s Higher
Law with the demand for a full implementation of popular legitimacy, a
legitimacy which included all those of the population who had no political
rights on the basis of the color of their skin and/or their legal status as a
slave.
The three imitators represent variations on these basic themes. John
Wilkes Booth regarded John Brown’s demand for the inclusion of the
slave population into the principle of popular legitimacy as illegitimate,
because it threatened the republican principles as he understood them, and
because it contradicted the constitution of the United States at that time.
Dmitriĭ Vladimirovich Karakozov called for the implementation of the
principle of popular legitimacy in Russia. As an additional requirement for
a legitimate political order, he demanded economic participation, however.
Finally, for Oskar Wilhelm Becker’s decision to try to assassinate the king,
the popular demand for unification and the Prussian king’s alleged inabili-
ty to fulfill this demand were the key factors. Taken together, the three
cases stand for a universalization and further differentiation of notions of
popular legitimacy.
In a similar vein, all five cases studied here can be seen as indicators as
well as effects. First, they are indicators for and effects of the debates on
legality, legitimacy, and legitimate rule, in the first half of the nineteenth
century, in Europe, Russia and the United States. Second, all five protago-
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nists are indicators for and effects of the active participation of wider parts
of the population in conflicts about forms of government. Moreover, the
differences and contradictions between their ideas concerning legitimacy
and the political demands resulting from these ideas point to a phe-
nomenon which might well be typical for periods of major political and
social change, in general, as soon as a population is involved with politics
at all. Once the political and social order has begun to change, one per-
son’s legitimacy is another’s illegitimate order – as one could formulate
with Gerald Seymour.102 The sole exception might be a political order
which has wholly and irrevocably discredited itself, in the eyes of an over-
whelming part of the population.
In European history since the middle of the nineteenth century, legiti-
macy continued to be contested. Conspicuously, in Germany in the second
half of the nineteenth century, there are hardly any traces of public and
academic discourses on legitimacy. Thomas Würtenberger explains this
fact with the effects of Bismarckian power-policies, which tended to disre-
gard claims of legitimacy in order to forge the German states into a Ger-
man Empire and nation. Correspondingly, legal positivism and theories on
realpolitik identifying legitimacy with state-power were prominent, in the
public as well as in academia.103 Despite such legitimizing discourse, the
level of political violence remained high, in the ‘Golden Age of Terror-
ism’ or ‘l’ère des attentats’, in Europe, Russia and in the United States.104
After the end of the First World War and the founding of the Weimar Re-
public, in Germany, an intense discussion of legitimacy set in again be-
tween adherents of the Hohenzollern-monarchy and the German Empire,
on the one hand, and the adherents of the Republic, on the other.105 At the
same time, there was a peak in political violence, which entailed different
forms of political violence, from street terror to assassinations of promi-
102 The original quotation by Gerald Seymour is: “One person’s terrorist is another’s
freedom fighter”. (Seymour 1975, p. 61).
103 Würtenberger 1982, pp. 732-34; and Würtenberger 1973, pp. 237-240.
104 For an overview cf. esp. Rapoport 2006; and Jensen 2010. On Germany, see
Gabriel 2014; and Mühlnikel 2014; on France Bouhey 2008; and on Russia
Naimark 1983, as well as Budnickiĭ 2000.
105 The essay by Schmitt Legality and Legitimacy (2004, orig. Legalität und Legiti-
mität, published in 1932), is part of this discussion, Schmitt taking a critical
stance towards the Weimar Republic, arguing for a “total state” based on ethnici-
ty (see esp. the conclusion, e.g. pp. 88 and 90f.). Cf. on this debate Würtenberger
1982, pp. 735f.; Würtenberger 1973, Chapter 6; and esp. Dyzenhaus 1997.
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nent republican statesmen.106 After the end of the ‘Third Reich’ and the
Second World War, legitimacy increasingly became the object of the new-
ly developing social and political sciences.
On the whole, the historical perspective confirms that there is a correla-
tion between legitimacy and security. The consideration of different con-
stellations over the course of European history indicates that the funda-
mental contestation of legitimacy has caused rises in the level of political
violence, for example, in the Era of Religious Wars, the Revolutionary
Era, or the period after the First World War. In case of the emergence of
terrorism, the correlation is not only indicated, but can be shown, firstly, to
be true and, secondly, to be of crucial relevance. Thus, loss of legitimacy
can severely undermine political order and rule as well as rulers them-
selves, while legitimacy helps to secure power as well as social and politi-
cal orders. And indeed, rulers in societies all across the globe in much of
human history have known this and acted accordingly.
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to make a case for a better inclusion of the
category of legitimacy in the broad sense – as referring to political, econo-
mic or societal orders as such – into European security and securitization
studies. The starting point for the argumentation was the observation that
in studies of the Copenhagen and Paris Schools, as well as in other works
in the field of security and securitization studies, the category of legitima-
cy in the broad sense is considered as a relevant category, but rarely for
current security issues in the nations of the West or globally. Instead, legit-
imacy is either used in a narrower sense – that is, with respect to the politi-
cal or professional legitimacy of securitizing moves and security experts,
while legitimacy in the broader sense is mainly regarded as a factor rele-
vant for ‘weak’ states in the so-called Third World and in history. With re-
spect to history, special attention is given to the emergence of legitimacy
in international society. Such a focus implies, however, that legitimacy in
the broad sense can be neglected when dealing with current challenges to
security and constructions of threat in the so-called First World or on a
global level.
4
106 See for example, Sabrow 1994 as well as Reichardt 2002.
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However, a historical perspective – thus, the rationale – can be helpful
to appreciate that legitimacy in the broader sense is a crucial factor for se-
curity, in general. The long historical view combining the history of the
term ‘legitimacy’ with events and constellations taken from European his-
tory helps to identify patterns and constellations concerning the relation-
ship between legitimacy and security, and in this way holds important
lessons on their correlation. When, in the Reformation and in the Revolu-
tionary Era, competing concepts of legitimacy emerged and serious con-
troversies began, large-scale conflict involving “political threats” against
“ideologies,” “other constitutive ideas,” and “political institutions”
(Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde) followed, which meant that the respective
controversies became relevant for the security of those in power as well as
for large parts of society and the political and social order as a whole. In
this respect, both eras are comparable. Large-scale violence against the
population, especially, was a reason to contest a sovereign’s legitimacy
and in the short- or in the long-run brought about an increase in violence,
while the concept of legitimacy itself became a discursive weapon to at-
tack or defend rulers or entire systems of rule.
The emergence of terrorism shows how exactly the contestation of le-
gitimacy turned into a security issue. The contestation of legitimacy wit-
nessed in the revolutionary and restoration eras was an important factor
for the emergence of terrorism, because for the first terrorists, questions of
legitimacy played a decisive role in their decision to resort to acts of vio-
lence. This is another argument for the thesis that terrorism is a modern
phenomenon which first emerged in the nineteenth century in Western Eu-
rope and in the United States. In the process of the emergence of terror-
ism, all three aspects of the contestation of legitimacy prominent in the
first decades of the nineteenth century were indispensable preconditions:
the fundamental critique of political systems and their representatives
from adherents of a different principle of legitimacy; the widespread pop-
ular, political, and academic debate on the topic; and the juxtaposition of
‘legitimacy’ with ‘legality’. Seen in this way, the inventors of terrorism
are indicators for and effects of the debates and conflicts around legality,
legitimacy, and legitimate rule, which intensified during the Revolutionary
Era, as well as indicators for and effects of the active participation of
wider parts of the population in conflicts about forms of government. In
principle, questions of legitimation were important for the inventors of ter-
rorism in a two-fold manner: they had to de-legitimate the political order,
against which the violence was aimed, and they had to legitimate the vio-
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lence they perpetrated with regard to this de-legitimation. Their precise
concepts of legitimacy differed in relation to the social and political situa-
tions in which the inventors of terrorism lived, and the differences be-
tween their concepts point to the fact that consensus about the way and the
direction of change is unlikely, once a violent overthrow of a political or-
der has taken place with some extent of public participation. After such vi-
olent transformations, one person’s legitimacy is another’s illegitimate or-
der – as one could formulate with Gerald Seymour – at least, until the new
order has taken sufficient hold. Until then, political violence is more like-
ly.
For these reasons, a historical perspective on security and securitization
studies suggests that the relationship between legitimacy and security mer-
its more attention and further examination, as does, specifically, the trans-
formation of concepts of legitimacy over space and time as well as specif-
ic constellations of contestation – not only with respect to the role legiti-
macy plays in history and ‘weak’ states of the Third World, but also with
respect to the emergence of current security issues, globally and in the
democracies of the so-called First World. In such a focus, the historical
perspectives open up different insights. For example, Begriffsgeschichte,
conceptual history and the history of ideas underline the importance of the
link between security and legitimacy in European political philosophies
since antiquity. Further investigation in this direction seems worthwhile,
especially if such an investigation would not restrict itself to Europe, but
consider political thought from other regions, such as the Near and Far
East or south-western Asia, and in this way enable globalized perspectives
on concepts of legitimacy and security as well as their role in different
conflicts.107 With regard to the history of violence and security, the link
between the emergence of competing concepts of legitimacy and large-
scale conflict involving “political threats” – such as the reformation era,
the revolutionary era, as well as current times – could encourage compar-
isons between the respective eras concerning forms of violence and securi-
ty issues, as well as concerning the developments and solutions which en-
abled past societies to find ways out of the respective conflicts. Such stud-
ies might inform today’s attempts to deal with competing secular and reli-
gious concepts of legitimacy and with religious as well as political de-le-




gitimations of political orders, inside and outside the West as well as on a
global scale. Moreover, the historical perspective can be read as a warning
to give too much weight to the differentiation between so-called ‘weak’
and ‘strong’ states, because history shows that the legitimacy and security
of political orders have to be constantly fostered, maintained, and renewed
to prevent their demise. This observation, however, opens up questions
about the relationship and interdependency of legitimacy and security in
negative spirals of contestation and decline. In this context, terrorist at-
tacks are not only attempting to de-legitimize a political order by aiming
at constitutive ideas and ideologies, which form the basis of that order, but
have a de-legitimizing effect because they aim at the basic legitimacy and
security of order. And, possibly, some security measures, usually follow-
ing such attacks, involuntarily augment this effect by challenging the legit-
imacy of political order even further.
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Historical and Contemporary Manifestations of the
Power Dynamics in Securitization
Part II –

The Legitimation of Council Rule Through Vedute of the City
and Territory of Nürnberg from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth
Century: Visualizing Insecurity within an Image of Secured
Order
Katharina Krause
As a discipline, art history has often examined the function of the visual
arts and architecture in expressing power and power relationships. Re-
searchers have focused primarily on the question of how works of art were
produced or called upon to represent dominance. This immediately sug-
gests a problem: art history has not dealt deeply with social scientific theo-
ries of “power.” Art historians are likelier to speak about dominance than
power and to examine art as a means of stabilizing or extending domi-
nance in the sense of institutionalized power.1 When they do speak about
power – sometimes from a historical and sometimes from an anthropologi-
cal perspective – they address the specific power influence of visual art
and, less often, of architecture, which they distinguish from the power of
texts.2
Unlike considerations of this kind, whose interest lies in the drawing of
difference between images and texts or in developing a fundamental theo-
ry of the image, our focus in the following study is to analyze the use of
images and architecture in political processes. We begin from the idea that
images and architecture have authors who seek to direct their uses and ef-
fects in different specific situations. We are not denying the immediacy of
the effect of images, as articulated in the suddenness of wonder or horror;
however, we do want to point out that both images and texts transmitted in
written form are received at a distance from their immediate act of expres-
sion, and are thus removed from their authors’ direct control over the time,
1 Warnke 1984; Beyme 1998; Mühleisen 2005, for a cross-epochal, interdisciplinary
overview, Hebel/ Wagner 2011. Münkler’s paper 1995 was reviewed from the histo-
rian’s perspective in Mallinckrodt 2006, among others.
2 Freedberg 1991. Most recently, the discussion on Bredekamp 2010. As an example
of the mistaken reception of the book, see Paul 2013 and its review by Stiegler
2013.
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context, and mode of their reception. Thus, texts and images may have dif-
ferent meanings ascribed to them in different contexts that differ from
their authors’ intentions. Whether pictures or buildings serve to create or
represent security thus depends substantially on the context of their recep-
tion.
The organization and tradition of research in art history have not com-
pletely separated the visual arts from architecture and urban construction,
but these fields have developed quite differently, since the specific materi-
al contingencies of these arts are of vital importance, especially for the
constitution of works. For this reason, we will look at them separately.
In relation to the proximity or distance of visual artworks from domi-
nance, it is important to consider epochal differences in the nature of the
artist’s profession, which can be divided into a long-lasting phase when
works of art were almost exclusively created by specific commission, fol-
lowed by a phase that continues to this day when works of art are pro-
duced for a market.3 In general, art historians have shown great interest in
seeking evidence that works of visual art were and are specifically created
with the intent to destabilize or constrain prevailing circumstances of rule.
Pictures, which could be and can be created and reproduced at relatively
small expense, are especially apt to be used as a medium to visually cri-
tique the conditions of rule and express social grievances. In the premod-
ern era, this function principally related to drawings and prints, that is,
works on paper, but this was conditional upon having ready access to pa-
per or the printing press.4 In the modern era through to the present time,
printed products have been supplemented by audiovisual and so-called
new media. At first glance, due to economic considerations, pictures in-
tended for serial reproduction and broad distribution would tend toward
communicating more exceptional and often threatening events. This is the
case, for example, for the illustrated broadsheets of the early modern peri-
od and, to a similar degree, for modern media products, which have some-
3 Warnke 1996; Haskell 1980; Bätschmann 1997. About the self-deception of the
avant-garde, it is always worth re-reading Bürger 1974. A helpful introduction to
the current state of research: Locher/Markantonatos 2013.
4 For an introduction: Harms/Schilling 2008. As a case example from the perspective
of journalistic studies Bellingradt 2011, Cilleßen/Reichardt 2010. For the interfer-




times been topics of study in the discipline of security studies.5 The full
spectrum of how political imagery was used in the early modern period
also includes techniques for assuring long-term stabilization of one’s own
position and for destabilizing the position of one’s opponents, and these do
not necessarily rely upon depicting or visually highlighting the current sit-
uation.6
In the case of architectural works and urban construction, it is rare to
see any distancing from institutionalized power. Because of the longer
durability of their materials and the greater costs and logistics required for
their construction, buildings are regarded as being in greater proximity to
ruling entities than works of visual art. This assumption has become so
widely accepted as self-evident that researchers have rarely questioned the
evocative power of buildings. For this reason, it is important to recall that
architectural works, as constructions by those in command, not only set
broad frameworks for human behavior but also shape people’s behavior on
a day-to-day basis: “The power of architecture lies […] in its materialisa-
tion of what is normal or taken for granted. Buildings, insofar as they are
arrangements of space designed to ‘facilitate’ a way of living that is ‘taken
for granted’, are material expressions of the way the world is held to work.
As such, buildings are always and immediately ideological: they seek to
give a legitimation and authority to something which is arbitrary.”7
In close alignment with the historical development of architecture as an
artistic and technical profession, architectural historians have primarily fo-
cused on issues such as the ways that building types and the formal lan-
guage of architecture represent the function of the building and the cus-
tomer’s rank within a group of peers or in relation to higher-ranking or
lower-ranking groups. In this respect, architectural historians differentiate
between the intended and actual effect on an audience that is directly and
personally exposed to a building, and the intended effect on an audience to
which the structures will be communicated though media – whether in text
or image.8 The discipline thereby focuses on domestic and foreign policy
effects of construction activities.
5 As a program of research, only in Williams 2003, pp. 524–552 For proposed theory
and empirical application, see Hansen 2011.
6 Cilleßen 1997.
7 Johnson 2006, pp. 285f. referring to Anthony Giddens to justify why “vernacular
architecture” also exercises power.
8 Völkel 2001, especially pp. 237–276.
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Visual works and buildings, including monumental buildings, are rarely
mentioned in political discourse or political theory as objects of securitiza-
tion. This may come as a surprise, given Plato’s insistence on the danger
to the common good of works of art in the tenth book of his Politics.
However, this blind spot – which goes beyond securitization studies – is
less surprising once we recall that since antiquity, along with the low esti-
mation of image producers due to their low social status, there was also
the conviction that only written texts by the educated and the learned, and
not visual artworks by artisans, could be of any relevance to political prac-
tice.9
This stance converges with that of the field of art history; thus, beyond
neglecting theories of power, the field has failed to take up a set of issues
related to how works of visual art may create or represent security at the
level of the community. However, art historians have been interested in
questions of censorship – as directed against the visual media cited
above.10 The themes of censorship and how image producers have re-
sponded to censorship have been discussed primarily in iconographic stud-
ies on the use of censorship as a controlling measure to maintain an exist-
ing political order – but less often in terms of studying the creation or rep-
resentation of security. As measures that accompany and foster attempts to
change the political order, the toppling of memorials and the storming and
destruction of official architecture as well as their reconstruction have re-
ceived some attention. In these cases, security and insecurity are rarely
considered in terms of politically motivated iconoclasm, nor are the re-
sponses of those in power, who first turned monument preservation into a
security issue by promoting their protection.11
Things are no different in the case of buildings. It is beyond question
that some works of architecture are works of security architecture. The list
would encompass fortresses, the fortification of cities and private build-
ings, and special building projects associated with public security, includ-
9 A study on the forms of dissemination of a ban on images or the destruction of
images ordered by those in power would discover further reasons for the absence
of this aspect; thus, images are destroyed in order to help implement a particular
religious tendency – at the same time seeking to have the effect of permanently
destroying the cultural identity of a portion of the population (Bamyan 2001;
Palmyra 2015).
10 See. e.g. Goldstein 2012.
11 See, among others, Bildersturm in Osteuropa (1994); Gamboni 1998. There are a
series of case studies in Fleckner 2011.
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ing prisons and buildings intended to protect the government and popula-
tion in case of war or catastrophe, such as bunkers. However, this field
also lacks systematic presentation. Accordingly, the sole touchpoint that
can be offered is the view that architecture at its root is grounded in man’s
existential fear of the weather and of internal and external enemies.12
In the context of those gaps we have only briefly outlined above, this
essay uses a case study with limited materials to inquire about the poten-
tial functions of images in the typology of security power. In consideration
of the introduction to this volume, we will inquire about the role of images
in processes of securitization. Our assumption is that the function of a
unique image may change depending on the conditions of its reception.
The same image may be differentially deployed and have different effects
on processes of securitization, depending on the type of power to be secu-
ritized and the type of power employed in the securitization.13 This means
that context is of central significance in the uses and impacts of images,
underscoring the relevance of statements on contextual integration in the
securitization model, especially as practiced by representatives of the Paris
School of security studies.14 Because of the interest in the work, the notion
of “context” in the field of art history includes the long-term view beyond
the individual context, as well as prolonged interruptions in the use and re-
ception of works, and thus changeable historical conditions, as well as ma-
terial changes in the works themselves.15 Thus, it also makes sense that
images are not merely deployable in a dramatically staged “securitizing
move,” as would be suggested by the viewpoint of the Copenhagen School
of security studies. Only in rare cases in the early modern period is it con-
ceivable that a situation would be securitized by means of presenting “an
existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actors out-
side the normal bounds of political procedure.”16
Rather, it is generally the case that situations of existential threat to a
community and measures required to deal with them also tend to become
apparent to the actors when they are or at least appear to be unusual and
new, and the actors link them back to familiar processes of legitimiza-
12 Erben 2003/2004.
13 Langenohl, in this volume.
14 Balzacq 2005.
15 See in this regard programmatic proposals in Busch 1985 and Kemp 1993.
16 Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998, pp. 23–24..
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tion.17 Thus, the role of images can repeatedly recall security routines dur-
ing a prolonged process and thus not only to hold in collective memory the
context for extraordinary measures but also to legitimize them in the case
of a similarly relevant state of threat. However, the role of images can also
be to keep latent threats alive in an atmosphere of deepest peace and well-
being, and thereby place the focus on a feeling of insecurity of human ex-
istence, whose mastery generally lies beyond human power. Here as well,
there takes place “a classification of circumstances into a concept of order
that creates meaning” – in this instance, the story of salvation oriented to-
ward the Judgment Day.18
Thus, one could conclude that the interest in security routines, as partic-
ularly advocated in security studies by the Paris School, would be suitable
for analyzing aspects of securitization in the early modern period.19 How-
ever, these approaches also focus on innovations. In 1998, Buzan, Wæver
and de Wilde proposed, without further exploration, that in cases of ex-
treme threat and natural catastrophes, “the need for drama in establishing
securitization falls away, because it is implicitly assumed that when we
talk of this issue we are by definition in the area of emergency.”20
The pool of images of the Free Imperial City of Nürnberg examined in
this chapter shows among other things that the production and reception of
images takes place among a set of actors who have varying claims of in-
terpretive authority about security-related image content. Despite the huge
difference in the pace and scope of image production and dissemination in
the early modern period compared to the present time, we can confirm a
secondary aspect of the conclusions offered by Hansen, who saw images
performing very specific functions. Hansen states that “the possibility of
circulation through modern media technologies challenges securitization
theory’s rather traditional notion of securitizing actors as political elites.”
In fact, this process of circulation had already begun with the production
of images in the artistic centers of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. So
long as we do not limit categorization of images to a specific “securitizing
move” but rather view them as setting the context for such a move through
the creation of a consciousness of permanent threat, we can see an ever-
17 Kampmann/Krems/Krause/Tischer 2012.
18 Schnadenberger 2016, especially p. 74.
19 Bigo 2002, p. 73.
20 Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998, pp. 27–28.
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expanding number of actors from different social groups come into play in
the early modern period.21
Given the state of the research outlined above, this is not the place to
develop a comprehensive typology of images and their use in securitiza-
tion processes. Our aim will be more limited. We will ask: (1) Over the
long run, how does a dominant political and social order with a specific
cast of actors employ images of the city and its surroundings as the basis
for affirming the security of an early modern political system, even while
using signals of latent threats to depict that system as perpetually endan-
gered?; (2) What is the role of contexts of image reception, predicated on
the memory of events as well as transmitted knowledge of aesthetic con-
ventions and modes for presenting image and textual genres – and how do
these elements come together to generate the anticipated efficacy of the
images?; and (3) Can elucidating the role played by images in creating and
depicting security in the securitization process help us understand those
features specific to early modern image production?
Rule over the city and its environs
As a case example, we will use depictions of the Free Imperial City of
Nürnberg and its environs in prints and image series from the Protestant
Reformation to the end of the eighteenth century. The outpouring of Nürn-
berg pictures began in the sixteenth century and stands at the apex of
quantity and quality, even when compared to large European states and
centers of picture production.22 In some cases, these vedute were produced
for large compendia of European cities and countries, or at least integrated
into them. In their surfeit, however, they appear to have been independent
publishing works that were sold by their engravers and publishers. They
were created at the initiative of these producers and were only rarely sub-
sidized by the Nürnberg Council, but, like all printed works of the early
21 Hansen 2011, p. 57, McDonald 2008, p. 573, and Guzzini 2011, p. 335, emphasize
the procedural character of securitizations and the necessity of embedding them in
a specific context.
22 The Nürnberg vedute production has not been researched in its totality. The most
comprehensive work remains that of Müller 1791. For an introduction, see Mende
1999. For an overview of the history of the city, see the essays in Pfeiffer 1971.
Regarding the techniques for managing the potential for religious conflict, see
Riegg 2004.
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modern period, they were subject to censorship. Their economic success is
evidenced by the fact that they continued to be disseminated in multiple
editions through the end of the eighteenth century. Thus, we have included
images for the case study that would not have been associated at first
glance to political events in Nürnberg. To illustrate the specific nature of
the selected images, we should briefly outline the Council’s communica-
tion strategy. It employed an image program that illustrated or constituted
a building or festive program for the city: The Nürnberg Town Hall – en-
larged after 1616 – highlights the city’s connection to the Holy Roman
Empire and adds to the décor from Dürer’s time a series of emblems in-
tended to instruct the viewer in the basic principles of good governance.
The emblems were made accessible through the publication of a book that
reproduced the images with their Latin text translated into vernacular Ger-
man, and explained their meanings.23 The Emperor’s ceremonial entrances
were celebrated with expensive ephemeral installations; for a while, they
were accessible to all interested persons and accompanied by printed ex-
planations that were sometimes preserved permanently.24 Generally, the
Council’s communications of this kind about political circumstances were
triggered by a specific event, but they were usually intended to generate
statements with lasting effects, whether they be more normatively intend-
ed or more with a view toward commemoration. Consequently, on the part
of the Council, events were primarily communicated and memorialized
using the medium of medals, which as a result of the manufacturing pro-
cess involved were not suitable for addressing highly current issues.25
More expeditious media included broadsheets, sometimes illustrated, and
written or printed newspapers. The Council did not actively use these me-
dia but tolerated them, especially when communication of an event was
23 Emblemata Politica. In aula magna Curiae Noribergensis depicta, quae sacra Vir-
tutum suggerunt Monita Prudenter administrandi Fortiterque defendendi Rempub-
licam, Nürnberg 1617, Edition Nürnberg 1640: http://gdz.sub.uni-
goettingen.de/dms/load/img/?PPN=PPN807277312&DM-
DID=&LOGID=LOG_0001&PHYSID=PHYS_0004 The engravings were made
by Peter Isselburg, who dedicated the volume to the Council. About the city hall as
such, see Mende 1979; Schauerte 2013.
24 For example, the Entrance of Emperor Charles V. 1541 (Philipp 2011).
25 See Fischer/ Maué 2014, with numerous examples.
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linked to an overarching ethical message.26 The Council’s communication
practices, unless they were matters of every-day importance to the city,27
were directed more toward commemoration and the ethical interpretation
of events rather than their immediate news value. Regularly recurrent pro-
cesses – such as Council elections – did take place but were not made the
objects of written or pictorial news stories.28 The serene quality of the
Council’s communication behavior was a confirmation of its competency
and was thus a not insignificant contribution to the legitimation of its rule.
The vedute of a well-ordered city and its secured territory also form part
of a long-term discussion on the basic facts of a well-functioning commu-
nity. This theme began brilliantly with the frescos of Ambrogio Lorenzetti
(1338–39) in Siena’s Palazzo Pubblico. In the case of Nürnberg (and other
Imperial cities) it gradually became separated from its connection to the
town hall as the locus of rule and thereby also gained a broader audi-
ence.29 While in Siena, “Securitas” dominated the environs as a messenger
of good and proper government;30 she was not specifically represented as
an allegory in Nürnberg. Seen as a whole, the prints, which were widely
disseminated in large numbers over the next 200 years, present the eye
with the image of a permanently well-ordered city and its territories under
municipal council rule whose inhabitants and visitors can all safely pursue
their various daily activities.
26 For broadsheets, see the edition by Harms 1980; Schilling 1990, especially ch. 2,
pp. 91ff. For the Nürnberg newspaper business, see Sporhan-Krempel 1968 (with
reprints of news stories) and Zimmermann 1930. For a good overview of the re-
search status, see Bellingradt 2011, pp. 17f.
27 For this purpose, the Council employed, among others, written decrees, which
were displayed in the city. An overview of the themes and forms of these man-
dates, which were printed in octavo format, that is, in small format and at low cost,
can be found in the digital holdings of the Austrian National Library, Vienna (over
200 examples).
28 For pre-Reformation Nürnberg, the situation is outlined in Groebner 1994; more
generally, as characteristic of the epoch, see Schlögl 2014, especially the chapter
on Communication, pp. 29–47.
29 For an overview of the research on Siena, see Schmidt 2003, pp. 84–135. Pictures
of the territory are often found in the mansions of the princes. There is a good
overview in Eser 2014. In the Netherlands, vedute were commissioned for city
halls. Worthy of note is the monumental view of The Hague by Jan van Goyen,
around 1650-51, painted on commission by the Mayor for the city hall (Suchtelen/
Whelock 2009, No. 20, pp. 116f.).
30 On the territorial dimension of “Securitas” at the boundary between city and coun-
try, see Skinner 1999, pp. 1–28 and Schenk 2010.
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The Free Imperial City of Nürnberg could boast that within living
memory, until its opening to the troops of Friedrich II of Prussia in 1762,
it had not tolerated any external enemy within its walls. This fact is con-
veyed and acknowledged in the writings of the period. Despite the imple-
mentation of the Protestant Reformation, the city remained custodian of
the imperial insignia of the Holy Roman Empire and insisted on its loyalty
to the Imperial house. Under the ruling monopoly of a small number of
patrician families who made up the leadership of the city and belonged to
the nobility,31 Nürnberg’s oligarchy is an example of the “authoritarian
type of power,” and it was under constant pressure to legitimize itself in-
ternally and externally given the presence in its immediate proximity of
other types of rule.32 We will only briefly outline the conditions under
which the Nürnberg Council ruled.33 Externally, the Council’s rule was
threatened by the competing model of the sovereign princely state (Für-
stenstaat). Near Nürnberg, this form of government was manifested by its
closest neighbor, the Margravate of Ansbach-Bayreuth, which almost
completely encircled the territory of Nürnberg. Eventful instances of real
existential threat to the community and continual reminders of the need for
security routines included the memory of two Margrave wars, during
which the Nürnberg area was ransacked, concerning the country estates of
prominent council-eligible families,34 the damages caused by siege and
military marches through its territory during the Thirty Years’ War and
War of the Spanish Succession, as well as the repeated claims to the envi-
rons of Nürnberg extending right up to the city walls35 filed at the Imperial
Court following the Peace of Westphalia. Within the city there was pres-
sure to legitimize the oligarchy through competent action, especially in
crisis situations, by maintaining rules of procedures such as municipal
elections and through the manifestation of rituals, such as the oath of citi-
zenship.36 For its part, the citizenry was not socially homogeneous, but di-
vided into two major groups, on the one hand, long-distance traders, and
31 Hofmann 1965; Fleischmann 2008.
32 Authoritarian power type according to Popitz 1992, pp. 27–31.
33 When we speak in what follows about the “Council,” we are always referring to
the “Small Council” that constituted the top level of the city government.
34 We are unable to present here the dynastic differentiation of the Margraves or the
events of the wars of 1449–1453 and 1552–1554.
35 Evidence from Willax 1979, pp. 203ff.; see also Rutz 2014.
36 On the “affirmation function” of such acts as symbolic communication with the
example of the Nürnberg Council election, see Rogge 2004, pp. 396ff.
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on the other, craftsmen producing for the local and regional market, and
these groups pursued very different interests. The merchants and traders
experienced the decades of the Thirty Years’ War and the economic conse-
quences of catastrophic municipal indebtedness as a permanent crisis, and
their resentment manifested in attacks on Council rule.37
 
Fig. 1: The three Aldermen of the City of Nürnberg (Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, 
Abteilung Sammlungen) 
 
The Council rulers’ self-understanding was expressed in the form of allegorical representations: 
the eldest and most venerable of the three Aldermen sits on a golden stool with red cushions, 
weighed down by the burdens of the city which rest on his shoulders like a model with the 
imperial castle at its apex – surely not by coincidence, as it is a traditional symbol of dominance. 
Helping to bear the burden is the second Losunger, entrusted along with the eldest with the 
rights and duties of managing municipal finances. This diumvirate of the most powerful 
Nürnberg gentlemen seated under the symbol of “Justice” is attended by a third party 
representing the artisans.38 The leitmotiv of the symbol chosen by the Council to present its self-
affirmation and legitimation before the citizenry is not the exercise of power, but instead the 
bearing of the burden of city government under the dominion of justice. The vedute of the city 
and its environs that we examine more closely in the following confirm this view of shared 
leadership. There are multiple depictions of aspects of rule as well as external and internal 
                                                 
38 Nürnberg, Municipal Library, Collections Department. See Fischer/Maué 2014, p. 25 (color fig.). An eighteenth 
century copy in the Germanic National Museum Nürnberg includes explanatory captions, which contrast the 
destruction of Rome and Troy as a result of vices with good Council rule (Smith 2008, p. 32, also in connection 
with the medals minted on commission of the Council by Valentin Maler, 1586, 1589 and 1590 (Fischer/Maué 
2014, Nos. 28, 29, 32f., pp. 50-54; Tipton 1996, pp. 118–120. 
Fig. 1: The three Ald rmen of the City of Nürnberg (Nürnberg, Stadtbib-
liothek, Abteilung Sammlungen)
The Council rulers’ self-understanding was expressed in the form of alle-
gorical representations: the eldest and most venerable of the three Alder-
men sits on a golden stool with red cushions, weighed down by the bur-
d ns of the city which rest n is shoulders like a model with the imperial
castle at its apex – surely not by coincidence, as it is a traditional sy bol
37 Using the example of Lübeck, Hoffmann-Rehnitz (2016) indicates a similar con-
stellation. Despite the perception of “decline” and the development of narratives to
that effect, in Lübeck as well, one can document the maintenance of continuity and
demand to act according to time-honored rules, rather than postula i g discontinu-
ity in the modern mode of crisis or upheaval.
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of dominance. Helping to bear the burden is the second Losunger, entrust-
ed along with the eldest with the rights and duties of managing municipal
finances. This diumvirate of the most powerful Nürnberg gentlemen seat-
ed under the symbol of “Justice” is attended by a third party representing
the artisans.38 The leitmotiv of the symbol chosen by the Council to
present its self-affirmation and legitimation before the citizenry is not the
exercise of power, but instead the bearing of the burden of city govern-
ment under the dominion of justice. The vedute of the city and its environs
that we examine more closely in the following confirm this view of shared
leadership. There are multiple depictions of aspects of rule as well as ex-
ternal and internal security, but they are somewhat parenthetical. The
Councilors are not pictured among the figures populating the vedute; the
street is not their place. However, the Council families are represented and
kept in mind by the fact that their houses are cited by name in the legends
of the prints. Of course, this is also the case for other major city attrac-
tions, such as hospitals and taverns. The forces of law enforcement under
the Council’s authority are certainly visible,39 but you have to search long
and hard to find any Stadtknechte [policemen] in the pictures. More visi-
ble is the technical equipment for protection in case of crisis, which is
shown as inactive, but well maintained. In addition to defensive chain bar-
riers [Kettenstöcke] for blocking off the most important streets, precau-
tions are taken against the perils of fire and the fortifications themselves.
There are scarcely any vedute that fail to include an image of a tower as
part of the city fortifications – the omnipresence of the towers in the im-
ages shows the high priority of such defenses against external danger for
the order of the community within. The pictures thus constitute a perfect
example of Münkler’s “visualization of the power of the expertocracy”:
the extreme secrecy about the Council’s decision-making processes, the
“utter invisibility of power,” is contrasted with its “visualization as or-
der.”40 What does not match Münkler’s simple typology is that the pic-
38 Nürnberg, Municipal Library, Collections Department. See Fischer/Maué 2014, p.
25 (color fig.). An eighteenth century copy in the Germanic National Museum
Nürnberg includes explanatory captions, which contrast the destruction of Rome
and Troy as a result of vices with good Council rule (Smith 2008, p. 32, also in
connection with the medals minted on commission of the Council by Valentin
Maler, 1586, 1589 and 1590 (Fischer/Maué 2014, Nos. 28, 29, 32f., pp. 50-54;
Tipton 1996, pp. 118–120.
39 See Bendlage 2003 for number, duties and garments.
40 Münkler 1995, p. 214.
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tures were not actually commissioned by the magistracy; rather, engravers
and publishers had developed an appellative structure through a complex
process of production and dissemination, which by the end of the period
we are examining here, became commemorative of past greatness. This
was certainly true for the castle, which had long since lost its military sig-
nificance. As the seat of a distant Emperor who only rarely traveled to
Nürnberg, the castle is the guarantor and symbol for the sovereignty of the
totality of the city, and for this reason, in the late reprints of the engrav-
ings, which become a kind of walking tour of the city, the castle is placed
at the very beginning of the series.
Internal security through external security – The ruling Council’s image of
Nürnberg
In 1577 the Council undertook a comprehensive review of the status of its
Landwehr, a set of surrounding earth walls constructed in front of the city
walls in 1449, which encircled the suburbs and many noble estates. From
the inside to its periphery, the fortification system of the city was com-
prised of a total of five fortified rings. The castle walls represented the
first ring, and the inner and outer city walls were the third and fourth. The
fifth ring included the fortified cities and fortresses in other parts of the
territory – outside of the Landwehr. Its military importance was thought to
have been superseded by the entrenchments from the Thirty Years’ War,
but it was still recorded on all maps as a distinctive boundary until the
city’s transition to Bavaria in 1806.41
To safeguard knowledge about these fortifications, the Council com-
missioned the painter Paulus Reinhart to prepare a “Mappa.”42 By contrast
to what might have been expected, this was not a true-to-scale map intend-
ed to enable the military to detect violations by negligent property owners,
but instead a bird’s eye vista of Nürnberg’s environs. Proceeding out from
the city walls, it presented the land and the people in a circle around the
city within a hilly landscape, where the to and fro of the trenches and
41 Willax 1979.
42 The map, which represents an official map in legal and administrative act by the
authorities, has been preserved in the Nürnberg State Archive. See Timann 1987,
p. 196; Timann 1993, pp. 121–139. Doosry 2014, pp. 113–125; see Schiermeier
2006 for evidence of all known city maps of Nürnberg during this time period.
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walls of the military defenses appeared as only one boundary among oth-
ers, together with the many fences enclosing the meadows and fields. The
map was hung in the war room of the City Hall and kept hidden behind a
curtain. In this way, it was accessible in case of need but kept secret.
Fig. 2: Stephan Gansöder: Nürnberg, birds-eye view of city and surroundings, woodcut 
on four pages (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek) 
 
In 1577, when Stephan Gansöder offered to duplicate the map in woodcuts, the Council did 
accept his offer, but set up the printing press for creating the prints in the Town Hall under its 
direct control. From this one can surmise that the recipients of the first edition of 17 copies of 
this large-scale map printed from four blocks were carefully chosen. The printed “Mappa” thus 
remained exclusive, if not quite as secret, in accordance with the Council’s wishes.43 
                                                 
43 At this point, we do not have statement from Council documents, nor are any traces to be found of the distribution 
of the printed maps. In general, the literature assumes that the prints of the “Mappa” were also intended to be kept 
secret but this is not proven by sources. The Council members may have been the recipients, in this regard, see the 
vedute by Lautensack/Sautter (n. 457). 
Fig. 2: Stepha  Gansöder: Nürnb rg, rds-eye view of city and surround-
ings, woodcut on four pages (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek)
In 1577, when Stephan Gansöder offered to duplicate the map in wood-
cuts, the Council did accept his offer, but set up the pri ting ress for cre-
ating the prints in the Town Hall und r its dir ct control. From this one
can surmise that the recipients of the first edition of 17 copies of this
large-scale map printed from four blocks were carefully chosen. The print-
ed “Mappa” thus remained exclusive, if not quite as secret, in accordance
with the Council’s wishes.43 Ultimately, the map held no secrets concern-
ing military defenses, for although it was based on an exact description of
43 At this point, we do not have statement from Council documents, nor are any
traces to be found of the distribution of the printed maps. In general, the literature
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the Landwehr, the map did not reproduce it using modern surveying tech-
niques. However, as a joint effort by Reinhart (a draftsman) and Gansöder
(a wood engraver), the work did exemplify Nürnberg’s artistic and techni-
cal achievements: ever since Emperor Maximilian’s major commissions to
Dürer and the artists and artisans associated with him, the creation of giant
woodcuts intended for display on a wall – that is, images printed from
multiple wood blocks – had been a tour de force of the Nürnberg arts.44
From 1529–30, the Council sponsored another Nürnberg wood en-
graver and publisher, Nikolaus Meldemann, through loans and privileges
to create and publish an all-around view of the city of Vienna during its
besiegement by the Turks. Therefore, Meldemann dedicated his presenta-
tion of the Turkish siege of Vienna to the Nürnberg Council and explained
his form of presentation not only on the woodcut itself, but also in a sepa-
rately published accompanying text, which – topically – in the service of
praising the city, as a description of Reinhart’s and Gansöder’s later work
suggests: “[…] when one stand in the midst of a city/on a high tower/and
looks around over the entire city/into the landscape (the same into the
city), then one sees villages/castles/waters/forests mountains and valleys
etc./and whatever is in the whole landscape (that is visible) that lie sur-
rounding the same city/and so he can see all around the city/and not much
is going to remain concealed.”45 Moreover, Meldemann stresses that his
presentation format, which refrained from showing the details inside the
ring of walls, was also intended to keep the costs low enough that the
work would remain affordable “for the common man.”
The different occasions and motivations for the two works make clear
why the focus was particularly an internal one. Reinhart and Gansöder
assumes that the prints of the “Mappa” were also intended to be kept secret but
this is not proven by sources. The Council members may have been the recipients,
in this regard, see the vedute by Lautensack/Sautter (n. 57).
44 The “Ehrenpforte” [Triumphal Arch] and the “Triumphzug Kaiser Maximilians”
[Emperor Maximilian’s Triumphal Procession] were, among others, part of the
original décor of the Nürnberg City Hall. See Schauerte 2001; Warncke 2013.
45 Meldemann 1530, as cited in: http://data.onb.ac.at/ABO/%2BZ16901070X. See
Düriegl 1980: „[…] wann einer mitten in einer stat/auff einem hohen thuern stuen-
de/vnd kuende vber die gantz stat/gerings umb/inn ein landschafft hinein sehen
(des geleychen in die stat hinumb) so sihet der Doerffer/Schloesser/wasser/veld
berg und thal etc./und was in der gantzen landschafft (so anderst sichtig ist) umb
dieselb stat herummen ligt/und so er untersich in die stat herab sihet/mag im auch
nicht viel verporgens bleyben/“.
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contrast the image of the event of the (successfully repelled) Turkish at-
tack on the Imperial City of Vienna and the devastation of the surrounding
countryside by siege and troop movements with a depiction of the totally
peaceful and prosperous territory of the fortified, Imperial City of Nürn-
berg, loyal to the Emperor. In 1577, this is clearly an imaginary picture;
the patricians’ country estates amidst the fertile landscape crisscrossed by
well-traveled roadways were yet to be fully restored after the plundering
of the Second Margrave War, and, in general, “vigilance” was still a cen-
tral theme in the political iconography of the city. As Nürnberg’s elite, the
Council had given a prominent place to the environs in the work as a con-
trasting image to recently experienced and always threatening danger.
Pastoral ambivalence – The cultural elite’s image of Nürnberg
Since the waning days of the fifteenth century, Nürnberg had been an ex-
traordinary place for the production and sales of city views. The city’s
self-image was molded by the 1493 world chronicle that was written by
Hartmann Schedel and published by Anton Koberger; it is a city with
many towers, dominated by its two principal parish churches with the im-
perial castle at its apex, further demarcated from the surrounding lands by
multi-turreted walls, with scattered suburbs, where the gallows provide ev-
idence of the city’s claim to legal authority, and thus its dominion over the
environs.46 We can assume that with artists in Nürnberg such as Wolgemut
and his pupil Dürer, their pupils and members of their workshops, there
was a tradition of producing city and landscape images that also aroused
interest in a local audience. Thus, it comes as no surprise that landscape
artists – painters as well as copperplate engravers – earned their livelihood
in this primarily Lutheran imperial city, many of them having come to
Germany from the Netherlands since the late sixteenth century either as
religious refugees or for economic reasons.47 Thus, Nürnberg was able not
only to import new artistic accomplishments but also to produce them in
the city and adapt them to its own needs.
These innovations also include the first print series with views of the
Nürnberg environs. Only 10 years after the first Dutch examples, which
46 See Mende 1999; Meyer 2009, pp. 294f.
47 For an overview, see Pilz 1952.
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elevated the unspectacular surroundings of Haarlem into evidence of its
newly achieved sovereignty as a theme of print series, artists began to
draw motifs from the environs of Nürnberg in the mode of vedute. There
were several existing templates for reproducing the Nürnberg landscape,
and artists drew on Dutch series, such as the “Plaisante Plaetsen” by
Claesz Vischer (1611–12), and his replicas of the Brabant “Small Land-
scapes” by Pieter Brueghel the Elder (1612).48 The original drawings for
the series of engravings were by Jan Brueghel the Younger , who had
spent some days in Nürnberg. From the pool of sheets, the engraver and
publisher Peter Isselburg, originally from Cologne, selected a total of six
images, which he kept in a similar format to form a self-contained series.
The execution of the prints is ascribed to Matthäus Merian the Elder.49
the pool of sheets, the en raver and publisher Peter Isselburg, originally from Cologne, selected 
a total of six images, which he kept in a similar format to form a self-contained series. The 
execution of the prints is ascribed to Matthäus Merian the Elder.49   
 
 
Fig. 3: Jan Brueghel the Younger (draughtsman)/Peter Isselburg (publisher): Das 
Angersche Weiherhaus [The pond house of the Angerer family] (Braunschweig, Herzog 
Anton Ulrich-Museum) 
 
This image features the Weiherhaus [pond house] of the Angerer family, which had been 
previously depicted by Dürer.50 The engraving shows the timbered house on a wooded island 
                                                 
49 Van Camp (2013) has classified 11 drawings as part of the series. Two drawings were most likely etched by Jan 
Brueghel himself. The examples used were from the Herzog Anton Ulrich Museum, in reproductions from the 
Virtuelles Kupferstichkabinett, http://www.virtuelles-
kupferstichkabinett.de/index.php?selTab=3&currentWerk=13422&. See also Schmidt 2000, pp. 132f., still with 
attribution to Jan Brueghel the Elder. 
50 Regarding the building, see Giersch/Schlunk/von Haller 2007 (http://www.herrensitze.com/st-johannis-i.html); 
the unit was owned by the Angerer family, and was presumably destroyed in the course of 1631 work on 
fortifications. Dürer drew the Weiherhaus [pond house] in a watercolor now at the British Museum in London. He 
used the watercolor for his 1498 copperplate of the “Madonna with the Monkey”. (Schröder/Sternath 2003, No. 
30f, pp. 182–185.) 
Fig. 3: Jan Brueghel the Younger (draughtsman)/Peter Isselburg (publish-
er): Das Angersche Weih rhaus [The pond house of the Angerer family]
(Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum)
48 For a good overview of the state of research, see Gib on 2000, pp. 27–49, 85–116.
49 Van Camp (2013) has classified 11 drawings as part of the series. Two drawings
were most likely etched by Jan Brueghel himself. The examples used were from
the Herzog Anton Ulrich Museum, in reproductions from the Virtuelles Kupfer-
stichkabinett, htt ://www.virtuelles-kupferstichkabinett.de/index.php?
selTab=3&currentWerk=13422&. See also Schmidt 2000, pp. 132f., still with attri-
bution to Jan Brueghel the Elder.
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This image features the Weiherhaus [pond house] of the Angerer family,
which had been previously depicted by Dürer.50 The engraving shows the
timbered house on a wooded island next to a pond whose smooth water
surface reflects the buildings and the vegetation. In the distance, we see
one of Nürnberg’s gate towers; the background is formed by a fisherman
with a net, and a barge on its way to the island. The themes are the modest
buildings themselves, the reflections in the water, the ambience of the
cloudy sky, and the people who are going about their work. The caption on
the page emphasizes that this is a depiction of a real place.
The print pays tribute to a work by Dürer, the city’s most famous artist,
whose works were already much sought after in the decades around 1600
– but at the same time, cityscapes such as these reflected a more recent
movement in the European market that focused interest on local environ-
ments. This new mode was also characterized by the accurate reproduction
of the buildings embedded in their surroundings and collections of farm-
steads and rural roadways, which were all identifiable real-world places –
furthermore, the inscriptions reveal they were meant to be identified. The
primary focus of the depictions are the patrician country estates, but they
also typically include fishery, gardening, and agriculture, the leper’s hospi-
tal as a patrician charity, and Mögeldorf with its mansions and inns, a fa-
vored destination for excursions from the city. Very often, one sees one of
Nürnberg’s gate towers in the distance, thereby maintaining the connec-
tion to the imperial city. Moving about in these landscapes are farmers,
fishermen, shepherds, travelers, pilgrims, and idlers, pigs, sheep, cattle,
and horses. A new feature in comparison to Dürer’s famous watercolors is
that these images, as in the Dutch works, were now compiled into series
and sold as separate pictures. As in the 1577 round woodcut, these works
exude a basic aura of well-being – a sense of contentment that is ensured
by the patricians in their country estates and which now extends explicitly
into the pastoral landscape.51
50 Regarding the building, see Giersch/Schlunk/von Haller 2007 (http://www.herren-
sitze.com/st-johannis-i.html); the unit was owned by the Angerer family, and was
presumably destroyed in the course of 1631 work on fortifications. Dürer drew the
Weiherhaus [pond house] in a watercolor now at the British Museum in London.
He used the watercolor for his 1498 copperplate of the “Madonna with the Mon-
key”. (Schröder/Sternath 2003, No. 30f, pp. 182–185).
51 There are parallels to the presentations of the environs of Nürnberg from Schwal-
bach by Anton Mirou and Matthäus Merian the Elder (Diefenbacher 2002) and
from Strasbourg by Wenzel Hollar (Pennington 1982, No. 754–756).
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Nürnberg’s environs also appear as a pastoral landscape in the 1644
“Pegnesischen Schäfergedicht in den Berinorgische Gefilden,” jointly
published by Sigmund von Birken, Philipp Harsdörfer, and Johann Klaj as
the first printed work by the literary society they had founded called the
Pegnesische Blumenorden [Pegnesian Order of Flowers].52
 
Fig. 4: Pegnesisches Schäfergedicht, [Pegnesian Shepherd’s Poem], Title Page 
(Wolfgang Endter, Publisher) (Göttingen, Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek) 
 
The document’s title page presents all the elements familiar from the older vedute: the silhouette 
of the city with its two parish churches and one of the broad towers, the surface of a body of 
water, enclosed pastures and a farmer ploughing his field. Thus, it is a locus amoenus, where 
two shepherds, Strefon (Harsdörfer) and Clajus (Klaj), are grazing their sheep and striking up 
Fig. 4: Pegnesisches Schäfergedicht, [Pegnesian Shepherd’s Poem], Title
Page (Wolfgang Endter, Publisher) (Göttingen, Staats- und Universitätsbi-
bliothek)
52 Harsdörffer/von Birken/Klaj 1644. For the literary devices and standing of Nürn-
berg’s baroque poetry, especially about the meaning of oral and sung speech, see
Garber 2009, pp. 43–58; Garber 1995, pp. 146–154.
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The document’s title page presents all the elements familiar from the older
vedute: the silhouette of the city with its two parish churches and one of
the broad towers, the surface of a body of water, enclosed pastures and a
farmer ploughing his field. Thus, it is a locus amoenus, where two shep-
herds, Strefon (Harsdörfer) and Clajus (Klaj), are grazing their sheep and
striking up their melodies. The scene – the depiction is of the meeting
place of the Order of Flowers west of the city – is thus specifically attuned
to the text but thereby becomes ambiguous. The ruins of a building testify
to the age of the city; a mill wheel evokes Nürnberg’s manufacturing prod-
ucts. However, the main theme of the shepherd’s ode is to present a friend-
ly welcome to the foreign shepherd Clajus, who has been driven out of
Saxony by the fortunes of war and, much to his amazement and relief,
once again finds peace in Nürnberg.53 This story evokes a motif from Vir-
gil’s first eclogue in which not even the rustic landscape is free of outside
disturbances.54 The subject also includes the ambivalent nature of a vener-
able historical age, which ensures stability and dignity, but in utopic depic-
tion of the shepherd’s existence is subject only to the natural cycle of the
seasons; the ruins symbolize the inevitable erosions of time, thereby evok-
ing an elegiac undertone of impermanence. Like the pastorals of the first
half of the seventeenth century that combine the past greatness of the Ro-
man Empire with images of the Roman Campagna as the utopian site of a
secure and simple life in a lovely landscape, the pastorally populated
Nürnberg landscape suggests timelessness, yet its noble manors, fisher-
men’s huts, meadows, gardens and fields are also threatened by sudden de-
struction. However, the pictures only hint at what the text expresses with
great clarity: “the raging sword/revenge for sought-after injury/and the fu-
rious turmoil of the weaponry [have] lately driven out all art and grace/
shepherds and shepherdesses are brought down among their wooly
flock/all the villages/dairy farms/outlying estates and sheep farms are des-
olate/meadows and fields overgrown/the groves burned down by the
watchfires/fruit and vegetable gardens turned into bulwarks. Instead of the
leafy spruce trees, long spears and lances glistened/instead of the village
organ pipes and shepherd’s songs, one heard the wild battlefield cries and
dying screams of the soldiers/instead of the faithful bleating of the
53 For the purposes of evoking connection to Nürnberg realities (in the text, without
reference to the title image) see Althaus 2001, pp. 690–713.
54 On the literary and aesthetic tradition, see Maisak 1981; Böschenstein 2001; on
the passage cited, see Althaus 2001, pp. 699–705.
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sheep/the neighing of the horses/the roll of the drums and the calls of the
trumpets.”55 In the pastoral poem, the war scenario is shifted to a simulta-
neous temporal reality, but kept at a spatial distance, and, thus, made
present in Nürnberg’s pastoral landscape in the form of a latent menace.
One hears and remembers what one cannot see. The war is enclosed as a
prose text within the framework of a pastoral poem, enabling the poets to
make a literary transformation of the vocabulary of war to portray the pas-
toral, “and to turn it into idyllic consolation.”56 This “bleed over” from
prose to poetry, the latter of which is the mode used to represent pastoral
peace, makes even more evident the fictional nature of Nürnberg’s pas-
toral existence.
The audience for pastoral poetry is socially located in the Nürnberg up-
per class, those who pursue an aristocratic lifestyle or have noble status.
The city and land – that is, the income from one’s property – are clearly
interrelated in the pastoral landscape.
In the spectacular large-format etchings by Hans Lautensack, made in
1552, shortly before the Second Margrave War, agricultural activities are
broadly displayed against the backdrop of the city and on the rural roads
there are mostly passersby depicted from the environs. Trade with other
regions, to which the city and the patricians owe their prosperity, is only
represented by two wagons. And this remains a constant feature: vedute of
the areas directly in front of the city walls, which are part of the canon of
views starting from the end of the seventeenth century, depict pedestrians
and riders, but not the transport of goods.57 In this respect, Nürnberg dif-
55 Harsdörffer/Claj 1644, pp. 5f., quoted here from the 1648 edition: „das rasende
Schwert/die Rache der gesuchten Beleidigung/und das wuetende Getuemmel der
Waffen [haben] unlaengst alle Kunst und Gunst verjaget/ Schaefer und Schaeferin-
nen sind ům ihre lieben Wollenheerde gebracht/ alle Doerfer/Mayerhoef/Forwerge
und Schaefereyen sind veroedet/Auen und Wiesen verwildert/das Gehoeltze durch
die Wachfeuere veroesiget / Obst= und Blumgaerten zu Schantzen gemachet wor-
den. Statt der belaubten Fichten schimmern lange Spiese und Lantzen / vor die
Dorffschalmeyen und Hirtenlieder hoerte man das wilde Feld- und Mordgeschrey
der Soldaten/ vor das fromme Bloeken der Schafe / das Wiehern der Pferde/das
Brausen der Paukken und Schrekken der Trompeten.“.
56 Wording from Althaus 2001, p. 700.
57 Views from the east and from the west, each composed of three etchings of ap-
proximately 44 cm x 160 cm. In return for one color copy for the First Losunger
and non-color copies for the members of the Council, Lautensack received 50
gulden (Imhof 1880, p. 165; Mende 1999, pp. 337f.). Since 1531, the standard for
The Legitimation of Council Rule Through Vedute of the City and Territory
197
fered from the Dutch cities, whose vedute made the flow of goods and per-
sons on water and on land one of their principal themes.58
There is a second way that the pastoral world of Nürnberg is a fiction
and, if not utopian, at least a further reinforcement of Council policy seek-
ing to preserve the precarious state of peace and prosperity. At the time
Jan Brueghel’s vedute of the environs was being printed, Nürnberg was
still little affected by the Thirty Years’ War. By the time Harsdörffer and
Klaj took up the pastoral motif again in 1644, the city had defended itself
against the forces of the Holy Roman Empire through an alliance with the
this type of vedute was set by the woodcut by Anton Woesam, which the Council
of Cologne gave as a gift to Charles V and Ferdinand I on the occasion of their
visit to Cologne. In 1594 and 1599, etchings of Ulm and Augsburg by Joanathan
Sautter would follow: In Augsburg, Sautter received 100 gulden in return for the
prints distributed among the Council members (Besing 1999, p. 97). Graff/Kraus,
Boener, and Delsenbach depict the city gates seen from the outside.
58 As an example: Hendrick Vroom: “Views of Delft”, painted in 1615 and presum-
ably given to the Council as a gift in 1635 (Suchtelen/Wheelock 2009, No. 49, pp.
200f.).
 
Fig. 5: Hans Lautensack: View of Nürnberg, left section (Nürnberg, Germanisches 
Nationalmuseum) 
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58 As an example: Hendrick Vroom: “Views of Delft”, painted in 1615 and presumably given to the Council as a 
gift in 1635 (Suchtelen/Wheelock 2009, No. 49, pp. 200f.).  




Swedish king, activation of a citizen’s home guard, the mobilization of all
households for building entrenchments, and the passage and billeting of
large numbers of soldiers. In fact, it was the Council’s tactics and its con-
clusion of an alliance with the Swedish king between 1631–32 that had al-
lowed Nürnberg to be spared conquest by Habsburg forces. However, for
the citizens, the burdens of war were considerable, and took the form of
supplying the approximately 20,000 men in the Swedish forces, epi-
demics, inflated prices, the need for extensive borrowing and, consequent-
ly, an enormous tax burden. In addition, it was apparent that in the short
term, Nürnberg was incapable of autonomously ensuring the defense of
the city and its territory with its own army and militia. The tragic fate that
befell Magdeburg, which had been the victim of plunder and pillage a year
earlier on the command of Tilly,59 was cited in the discussions among the
Nürnberg authorities during these months. With Sweden’s planned depar-
ture in the fall of 1632, the Council also feared that matters could come to
“an uprising and ransacking of the noble houses by the rabble,”60 and, for
this reason, negotiated quartering a garrison of over 4,000 soldiers from
the Swedish army.
Modes of presentation
At first sight, the 12 vedute etched in 1688 by the Augsburg engraver Jo-
hann Ulrich Kraus61 and titled “Abgezeignete schoene Landschäfftlein
umb Nürnberg” [Beautiful small landscapes around Nürnberg] and based
on drawings by Johann Andreas Graff, would suggest that nothing had
happened in and around Nürnberg in the more than 70 years since the se-
ries by Brueghel, Isselburg, and Merian. In the sunshine under a partly
cloudy sky, one again sees the country houses of the Nürnberg gentry, ex-
pressing a no-longer contemporary architectural language dating from the
sixteenth century. However, the ornamental gardens are quite modern and
59 See “ gantz verheeret!” 1998.
60 Cited from Donaubauer 1899, p. 74: “einem Ufflauf und Ausspolirung der fürneh-
men Heuser, bevorab von dem Pöfel”.
61 Abgezeignete schoene Landschäfftlein umb Nürnberg, alda bey Joh. Andr. Graff,
Mahlern zu finden, Nürnberg 1688, Falk 1975, pp. 218-220. Cited by Schmidt
2000, pp. 137; the prints were first sold by von Graff, then by Jeremias Wolff from
Augsburg (with numeration). See Virtuelles Kupferstichkabinett, Braunschweig,
Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum, AB 3.36ff. For a biography: Tacke 2001, pp. 420f.
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magnificent.62 A new feature in the Nürnberg canon of pictures is the de-
pictions of the byways around the city and their similarly unchanging city
walls, which are no longer reflective of the defensive technology of the
times. The images also include some places connected with fishing and
leisure activities.
The ponds and swimmers in the Tulenau in the suburb of Wörth renew
the motif of the Weiherhäuser (pond houses) against the backdrop of the
city.63 The Pegnesian Order of Flowers is acknowledged by way of its
meeting place – the peninsula on the banks of the Pegnitz just west of the
city – and is already familiar from the title of the pastoral ode. If we look
more closely, however, we see traces of Nürnberg’s more recent history
and the unchanging state of conflict with its neighbors: Ziegelstein castle
 
Fig. 6: Johann Andreas Graff (draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (engraver): The 
Tulen-Au (Abgezeignete schoene Landschäfftlein umb Nürnberg) (Braunschweig, 
Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum) 
 
 
Fig. 7: Johann Andreas Graff (draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (engraver): 
Ziegelstein Castle (Abgezeignete schoene Landschäfftlein umb Nürnberg ) 
(Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum) 
Fig. 6: Johann Andreas Graff (draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (en-
graver): The Tul -Au (Abg zeignete schoene Landschäfftlein umb Nü n-
berg) (Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum)
62 It is not possible to further pursue the question of how far the garden art of Nürn-
berg and its representation might also represent an over-compensatory reaction to
the topos of the city description, by which the sole disadvantage of Nürnberg’s to-
pography was the infertility of its soil. On the topos, see Meyer 2009, pp. 250f.
Especially noteworthy is: Johann Christoph Volkamer: Nürnbergische Hesperides
[Hesperides of Nürnberg] Nürnberg 1708. Vol. 2 appeared in 1714. See also Martz
2008; Lauterbach 2011; Wimmer 2001.




Fig. 7: Johann Andreas Graff (draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (engraver): 
Ziegelstein Castle (Abgezeignete schoene Landschäfftlein umb Nürnberg ) 
(Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum) 
 
Fig. 8: Johann Andreas Graff (draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (engraver): The 
Dooser Bridge over the Pegnitz (Abgezeignete schoene Landschäfftlein umb Nürnberg) 
(Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum) 
 
Fig. 7: Johann Andreas Graff (draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (en-
graver): Ziegelstein Castle (Abgezeignete schoene Landschäfftlein umb
Nürnberg) (Braunsch i , Herzog A ton Ulrich-Museum)
Fig. 7: Johann Andreas Graff (draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (engraver): 
Ziegelstein Castle (Abgezeignete schoene Landschäfftlein umb Nürnberg ) 
(Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum) 
 
Fig. 8: Johann Andreas Graff (draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (engraver): The 
Dooser Bridge over the Pegnitz (Abgezeignete schoene Landschäfftlein umb Nürnberg) 
(Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum) 
 
The ponds and swimmers in the Tulenau in the suburb of Wörth renew the motif of the 
Weiherhäuser (pond houses) against the backdrop of the city.63 The Pegnesian Order of Flowers 
is acknowledged by way of its meeting place – the peninsula on the banks of the Pegnitz just 
west of the city – and is already familiar from the title of the pastoral ode. If we look more 
closely, however, we see traces of Nürnberg’s more recent history and the unchanging state of 
conflict with its neighbors: Ziegelstein castle is shown in ruins – the outbuilding with its chicken 
ladder is no longer in use. In fact, the Haller family seat had been restored after the Second 
Margrave War only to be destroyed by Habsburg troops in 1642 and not rebuilt again.64 The 
Pegnitz bridge at Doos reflects a second foreign element in the bucolically populated Nürnberg 
landscape.65 The old wayside shrine dating from pre-Reformation times and the fishing boat 
underneath the wood structure that replaced the stone arch of the bridge is a monument to 
                                                 
63 On the site and history of ownership: http://www.herrensitze.com/tullnau-i.html . 
64 On the site and history of ownership: http://www.herrensitze.com/ziegelstein-i.html . 
65 On the site and history of the mill above the bridge: http://www.herrensitze.com/kernstein.html . 
Fig. 8: Johann Andreas Graff (draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (en-
graver): The Do r Bridge ov r the Pegnitz (Abgezeignete s oene
Landschäfftlein umb Nürnberg) (Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Mu-
seum)
is shown in ruins – the outbuilding with its c icken ladder is no longer in
use. In fact, the Haller family seat had been estored after the Seco d Mar-
The Legitimation of Council Rule Through Vedute of the City and Territory
201
grave War only to be destroyed by Habsburg troops in 1642 and not re-
built again.64 The Pegnitz bridge at Doos reflects a second foreign element
in the bucolically populated Nürnberg landscape.65 The old wayside shrine
dating from pre-Reformation times and the fishing boat underneath the
wood structure that replaced the stone arch of the bridge is a monument to
historical time. Furthermore, for the politically astute viewer, its economic
and military dimensions are evocative – the Margrave Ansbach-Bayreuth,
who pursued his claims to the territory of Nürnberg with judicial and mili-
tary means, regularly conducted his summer maneuvers at the Dooser
bridge.66 The mood is set by the few selected figures populating the scene
of Nürnberg’s profound peace: fishermen, a few peasants in the field, a
few persons walking along the paths, and often an artist sketching, who
bears witness to the authenticity of the presentation. These are almost al-
ways background figures, and – with their emotions undefined – they
draw the beholder into the scenery while leaving him to his own reveries
in relation to the Nürnberg arcadia.
More rarely marked by such ambivalence are the messages that con-
nected to the pictures of the interior of the city, but here as well one finds
different manifestations. Thus, the square beside St. James Church and the
local seat of the Order of Teutonic Knights are presented in identical detail
in the picture series by Graff and Kraus, Johann Alexander Boener, and
Johann Adam Delsenbach. In this way, information about the city’s topog-
raphy and buildings is offered in consistent fashion.67 However, the mode
selected serves different interests and, in each instance, conveys different
conclusions about the city’s situation.
64 On the site and history of ownership: http://www.herrensitze.com/ziegelstein-
i.html.
65 On the site and history of the mill above the bridge: http://www.herrensitze.com/
kernstein.html.
66 Willax 1979, pp. 208–210.
67 On the history of the command and the legal disputes with the city of Nürnberg,
see Fleischmann 1991, pp. 118–137, with Cat. No. 33f.
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St. James church and the local seat of the Order of Teutonic Knights are presented in identical 
detail in the picture series by Graff and Kraus, Johann Alexander Boener, and Johann Adam 
Delsenbach. In this way, information about the city’s topography and buildings is offered in 
consistent fashion.67 However, the mode selected serves different interests and, in each instance, 
conveys different conclusions about the city’s situation.  
 
 
Fig. 9: Johann Andreas Graff (Draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (Engraver): 
Jakobskirche [St. James Church] and Deutsches Haus [House of the Teutonic Order] 
(Nürnberg, Germanisches Nationalmuseum)  
 
One’s gaze is drawn each time toward the interior of the city and the White Tower; it is midday 
and the sun is high. Graff makes use of the incident light so that the massive rusticated gate 
looks like a bulwark in the smooth walls of the House of the Teutonic Order.68 Nothing is 
happening on the streets. A hunter is headed away from the city with his two dogs; women 
                                                 
67 On the history of the command and the legal disputes with the city of Nürnberg, see Fleischmann 1991, pp. 118–
137, with Cat. No. 33f. 
68 Urbis Noribergensis Insigniorum Templorum, Amoenissimorumque quorundam Prospectuum / [The City of 
Nürnberg Different Churches from Inside and Outside] Stadt Nürnberg unterschidlicher Kirchen von innen und 
außen, 1694 (Falk 1975, pp. 218–220.). The set, not originally conceived as a series, included four views of public 
buildings/facilities. The series was first sold in 1694 by Graff himself, and later by Jeremias Wolff in Augsburg. 
The engraver was Johann Ulrich Kraus. See Schmidt 2000, pp. 137f., on the Council’s share: for the depiction of 
the Barfüßerkirche then under construction, Graff received 40 gulden in 1693; in 1696, 50 gulden for prints of 4 
churches; 12 gulden for prints of the Zimmerplatz (Schwemmer 1981, p. 7, n. 13). The Council was thus interested 
in the depictions of “its” buildings, but not in the series as a whole.  
Fig. 9: Johann Andreas Graff (Draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (En-
graver): Jakobskirche [St. James Church] and Deutsches Haus [House of
the Teutonic Order] (Nürnberg, Germanisches Nationalmuseum)
One’s gaze is drawn each time toward the interior of the city and the
White Tower; it is midday and the sun is high. Graff makes use of the inci-
dent light so that the massive rusticated portal looks like a bulwark in the
smooth walls of the House of the Teutonic Order.68 Nothing is happening
on the streets. A hunter is headed away from the city with his two dogs;
women stand near the brook, and two idlers are leaning against the bound-
68 Urbis Noribergensis Insigniorum Templorum, Amoenissimorumque quorundam
Prospectuum / [The City of Nürnberg Different Churches from Inside and Outside]
Stadt Nürnberg unterschidlicher Kirchen von innen und außen, 1694 (Falk 1975,
pp. 218–220.). The set, not originally conceived as a series, included four views of
public buildings/facilities. The series was first sold in 1694 by Graff himself, and
later by Jeremias Wolff in Augsburg. The engraver was Johann Ulrich Kraus. See
Schmidt 2000, pp. 137f., on the Council’s share: for the depiction of the
Barfüßerkirche then under construction, Graff received 40 gulden in 1693; in
1696, 50 gulden for prints of 4 churches; 12 gulden for prints of the Zimmerplatz
(Schwemmer 1981, p. 7, n. 13). The Council was thus interested in the depictions
of “its” buildings, but not in the series as a whole.
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ary wall of the St. James Church, on which the draughtsman and the en-
graver have put their signatures. There are hardly any customers at the
vending stalls, and a dog is lying comfortably in the middle of the street.
A hard shadow falls on the foreground, creating an indeterminate mood,
but by no means suggestive of a prosperous, populous trading city.
 
Fig. 10: Johann Alexander Boener (Engraver): Jakobskirche [St. James Church] and 
Deutsches Haus [House of the Teutonic Order] (Wien, Österreichische 
Nationalbibliothek) 
 
Johann Alexander Boener worked with the same sources or copied the page from Graff and 
Kraus.69 He uses the repoussoir of the shaded black well to sharpen the contrast with the fully 
illuminated White Tower. He also uses this as a means of composition, for a procession of 
“silver shooters” is running directly across the street from right to left. This is a reflection of 
Nürnberg’s artisan tradition that was not merely tolerated by the Council but at times promoted 
by it as an expression of normalcy and its great importance.70 The page was included in 
Boener’s “Trachtenbuch” [Book of Costumes] and is thus located in a double perspective. It 
presents the order of polity, which regulated clothing and the proper course of celebrations so 
as to maintain the existing social order and standardize its symbolic forms. It also transmits 
information about the customs characteristic of the city, and in the era of antiquarian research 
                                                 
69 Boener’s prints have not yet been widely studies. The complete collection, approximately 400 print, is entitled: 
Des heil. Röm. Reichs Zierdte, bestehend in Geist- und Weltlichen Gebäuden, anmuthigen Plätzen und Prospecten 
inner und außer derselben: wie auch Kleider-Trachten, Handwerks-Umzügen, und unter ihrer Bottmäßigkeit 
habenden Landschafften (1702, 1708, 1722, and without date). See Müller 1791, pp. 24-40, and the selection in 
Schwemmer 1981; moreover Schmidt 2000, pp. 138f., 162; Boener copies prints froms his own costume book 
used Nürnbergische Kleider-Trachten der Manns- und Weibspersonen, 1688 (further editions 1689, 1690, 1700, 
Müller 1791, pp. 103f.). Boener was not sponsored by the Council. 
70 On Nürnberg’s Schembart Carnival, see http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/artikel_45244 with 
additional references. 
Fig. 10: Johann Alex der Boe er (Engraver): Jakobskirche [St. James
Church] and Deutsches Haus [House of the Teutonic Order] (Wien, Öster-
reichische Nationalbibliothek)
Johann Alexander Boener worked with the same sources or copied the
page from Graff and Kraus.69 He uses the repoussoir of the shaded black
well to sharpen the contrast with the fully illuminated White Tower. He
69 Boener’s prints have not yet been widely studied. The complete collection, ap-
proximately 400 prints, is entitled: Des heil. Röm. Reichs Zierdte, bestehend in
Geist- und Weltlichen Gebäuden, anmuthigen Plätzen und Prospecten inner und
außer derselben: wie auch Kleider-Trachten, Handwerks-Umzügen, und unter
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also uses this as a means of composition, for a procession of “silver shoot-
ers” is running directly across the street from right to left. This is a reflec-
tion of Nürnberg’s artisan tradition that was not merely tolerated by the
Council but at times promoted by it as an expression of normalcy and its
great importance.70 The page was included in Boener’s “Trachtenbuch”
[Book of Costumes] and is thus located in a double perspective. It presents
the order of polity, which regulated clothing and the proper course of cele-
brations so as to maintain the existing social order and standardize its
symbolic forms. It also transmits information about the customs character-
istic of the city, and in the era of antiquarian research on mores et instituta
this aroused lively interest among experts and collectors of “originals” as
evidence of the city’s venerable and long history.71
Finally, there is the 1726 version by Johann Adam Delsenbach.72 In this
version, the scene is brightly illuminated, such that all the figures cast
shadows. There is no single significant event that enlivens the streets;
rather, we are confronted with a depiction of the typical everyday life of
the neighborhood. The used furniture in the lively shopkeeper’s market is
depicted in detail. Maids are drawing water from the stream, an innkeeper
is unloading freshly delivered barrels, a carriage is stopped in front of the
House of the Teutonic Order, and the gateway is open. A pilgrim, symbol
ihrer Bottmäßigkeit habenden Landschafften (1702, 1708, 1722, and without date).
See Müller 1791, pp. 24-40, and the selection in Schwemmer 1981; moreover
Schmidt 2000, pp. 138f., 162; Boener copies prints froms his own costume book
used Nürnbergische Kleider-Trachten der Manns- und Weibspersonen, 1688 (fur-
ther editions 1689, 1690, 1700, Müller 1791, pp. 103f.). Boener was not sponsored
by the Council.
70 On Nürnberg’s Schembart Carnival, see http://www.historisches-lexikon-bay-
erns.de/artikel/artikel_45244 with additional references.
71 Boener 1689. We are unable to verify as yet whether the first 1688 edition of the
Trachtenbuch already included vedute. We used the edition in the Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek München, Bavar.14552. The same combination of costumes and
vedute is also found in: Samuel Mikoviny: Kleidungsarten und Prospecten zu
Nürnberg, s.l.s.d [Nürnberg, around 1730], Bayerische Staatsbibloithek, Res/
Bavar. 5177q. Instead of an exhaustive integration in the antiquarian cultural his-
torical tradition, there is only reference here to Conrad Celtis’ 1495 Norimberga,
which for the first time in relation to Nürnberg, took up the theme of ‘mores et
instituta.”.
72 Johann Adam Delsenbach: 110 Views in 3 Parts: 1715, 1716, 1725: On Delsen-
bach’s works for the architectural works of Fischer von Erlach in Vienna, see
Prange 1997, pp. 101f.; Schmidt 2000, pp. 162–164, especially highlights the ac-
cessory figures.
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of the Catholic enclave and the patron saint of the church, is walking away
from the town. Delsenbach uses the figures and the weather to turn the
city’s topography into a narrative about the good function of the city-state
and well-ordered collaboration of its inhabitants. There is just enough to
be seen to tell a story of daily routines. For example, if you want to find
out where the pilgrim is going or where the carriage came from that is ar-
riving into the city, then you must turn the page. Whereas Graff also
makes use of the medium of the pastoral in his inner city vedute to
strengthen the ambivalence of the signals of defensive capability in the ar-
chitecture of the city, Boener and Delsenbach concretize these suggestions
through the figures that populate the scene but deepen the overall impres-
sion of prosperity.
The only way to determine the mode considered most appropriate by
the Council for disseminating images of Nürnberg is to examine the fund-
ing or support it provided or withheld. We do not have a record of specific
opinions being voiced in this regard by the Council of Nürnberg or by the
 
Fig. 11: Johann Adam Delsenbach (Engraver): Jakobskirche [St. James Church] and 
Deutsches Haus [House of the Teutonic Order] (Wien, Österreichische 
Nationalbibliothek) 
 
Finally, there is the 1726 version by Johann Adam Delsenbach.72 In this version, the scene is 
brightly illuminated, such that all the figures cast shadows. There is no single significant event 
that enlivens the streets; rather, we are confronted with a depiction of the typical everyday life 
of the neighborhood. The used furniture in the lively shopkeeper’s market is depicted in detail. 
Maids are drawing water from the strea , an innkeeper is unloading freshly delivered barrels, 
a carriage is st pped in front of the House of the Teutonic Order, a d the gateway is open. A 
pilgrim, symbol of the Catholic enclave and the patron saint of the church, is walking away 
from the town. Delsenbach uses the figures and the weather to turn the city’s topography into a 
narrative about the good function of the city-state and well-ordered collaboration of its 
inhabitants. There is just enough to be seen to tell a story of daily routines. For example, if you 
want to fi d out where the pilgrim is going or where the carriage cam  fro  that is arriving into 
                                                 
72 Johann Adam Delsenbach: 110 Views in 3 Parts: 1715, 1716, 1725: On Delsenbach’s works for the architectural 
works of Fischer von Erlach in Vienna, see Prange 1997, pp. 101f.; Schmidt 2000, pp. 162–164, especially 
highlights the accessory figures. 
Fig. 11: Johann Adam Delsenbach (Engraver): Jakobskirche [St. James




councils in other European cities and territories. Both Boener’s mode of
presentation, which emphasized the customs of the city, and Delsenbach’s
mode of presentation, which depicted the city’s social and economic order,
were introduced to Nürnberg in a specific context that was fraught with in-
ternal and external political meanings: the construction of the city hall and
its communication through prints. The medieval town hall was substantial-
ly rebuilt starting in 1616 at the Council’s initiative with plans drawn up
by Jacob Wolff the Younger, and its exterior was modernized.73 Two
views of the emergent city hall were published in 1621. Hans Troschel
etched a frontal view based on drawings by Lorenz Strauch.74 The broad
façade of the city hall can be seen easily from the (fictional) viewing site
the artist has selected, and the forecourt is peopled by passers-by of differ-
ent classes – a theme whose narrative possibilities Delsenbach will later
expand upon. The viewer overlooks the events from a high vantage point.
The overview also serves as a sign of respectful distance from the seat of
the city’s governance and, for this purpose, indicates and sets a norm for
the attitude toward the construction expected of the observer in the reality
of the square. Invoking the name of God, coats of arms and inscriptions
proclaim the city regiment’s pledge to the eternal life of the city and city
hall, by both government and the governed.
73 Mende 1979. There is a contemporary parallel in the construction and publication
of the Augsburg City Hall, which took place a few years earlier. See Jachmann
2008, pp. 92ff., including additional references. For a systematic comparison of
the art policies of the councils in Augsburg and Nürnberg, see Jachmann 2013, pp.
90–109.
74 Berlin, Kupferstichkabinett: Inscriptions: Norimbergensis prae se fert curia talem /
Formam, quae iussu sic renovata patrum. Solis ad occasum dum cochlea serpet ab
ortu / Ebibet et totum musca pusilla mare, Vrbs et Curia stet, patres populusque
supersint, / Hosque regat cunctos, qui regit astra DEUS. (The Nürnberg City Hall
bears such an image /of beauty to behold, as was recreated through the instruction
of the senators. For as long as the snail crawls from sundown to sunrise and the
tiny mouse drinks up the whole ocean, the city and its hall may stay firmly, the
senators and the people may be there, and may all those be ruled by HIM, who
reigns the stars, GOD). Hanc delineationem fecit & Magnifico suo Ma-/gistratui in
florentissima Norimberga test.observ./ergo dedicavit civis humilimus. Laurentius
Strauch Pi: /ctor aetatis suae LXVII. Johann Troschell Norinberg/sculpsit Anno
Christi 1621 (This drawing was made and dedicated to its great magistrates in
magnificently blossoming Nürnberg as witnessed by the humble citizen Laurentius
Strauch, Painter, in his 67th year of life. Johannes Troschel, Nürnberg, etched it in
the year of our lord 1621). See Müller 1791, p. 78.
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The second page shows the city hall in oblique view, as seen from the
sloping terrain beyond the marketplace. In this print, Strauss has also de-
picted the wedding procession of a Kronenbraut [bride wearing a crown].
Because of its ethnographically interesting figures, this page has been
copied on multiple occasions and was re-issued through to 1672.75
The views of the city hall were not commissioned by the Council, but
financed instead by the generally popular mechanism of dedication:
Strauch was given permission “to copy the new city hall and etch it in
copper,” and in exchange for the dedication of the two sheets was reward-
ed with 25 gulden.76 Both modes of presentation were thus acceptable.
75 Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich Museum, Virtuelles Kupferstichkabinett,
http://kk.haum-bs.de/?id=h-troschel-ab3-0021, Inscriptions: Patricia de gente sa-
tam gestare Coronam/Sponsam, miraris, coronam Norica in Urbe? sinas. Expe-
diam paucis: quoniam illa Corona puellas / Inter, ei merito nonne Corona datur?
(Are you wondering how a bride from a Patrician family came to be wearing a
crown in the city of Nürnberg? You should indulge her. I will explain it all to you
in a few words: because this one is the crown among the young women, shouldn’t
she accordingly be given a crown?). Feci, quod, potui, potui, Christe, dedisti, /
Perfida fac melius, Si potes Invidia. Laurentius Strauch pictor et Ex: HTroschell
fe: Norinb. (I have done what I wished, I wished [what] you, Christ have given
me. Make it better, perfidious envy, if you want.) For support in the reading and
for the translation of the inscriptions into German, I am very grateful to Angelika
Fricke. The date 1621 is found here on a tablet on the wall of a house on the left.
See Müller 1791, pp. 78f., with evidence of the altered later prints through 1672.
For the crowned bride as an attraction see Misson 1701, p. 86 with a copperplate.
Misson’s sojourn in Nürnberg dated from 1687.
76 Mahn 1927, p. 27 with n. 2: „das neue rathhaus zu conterfaiten und ins kupfer zu
stechen“. In Augsburg, for the representation of the book by Wolfgang Kilian, the
text has been preserved, in which the engraver asks the Council for authorization
of dedication in 1614 and is thereupon paid 25 guldens as compensation for deliv-
ering 25 reprints of the three engravings. The same procedure can be presumed for
Lukas Kilian’s engraving of the City Hall (Schmidt 2000, p. 67).
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events from a high vantage point. The overview also serves as a sign of respectful distance from 
the seat of the city’s governance and, for this purpose, indicates and sets a norm for the attitude 
toward the construction expected of the observer in the reality of the square. Invoking the name 
of God, coats of arms and inscriptions proclaim the city regiment’s pledge to the eternal life of 
the city and city hall, by both government and the governed.  
The second page shows the city hall in oblique view, as seen from the sloping terrain beyond 
the marketplace. In this print, Strauss has also depicted the wedding procession of a 
Kronenbraut [bride wearing a crown]. Because of its ethnographically interesting figures, this 
page has been copied on multiple occasions and was re-issued through to 1672.75 
 
Fig. 12: Lorenz Strauch (Draughtsman)/Johann Troeschel (Engraver): The City Hall 
(Berlin, Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, 
Kunstbibliothek) 
                                                 
75 Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich Museum, Virtual Print Cabinet, http://kk.haum-bs.de/?id=h-troschel-ab3-
0021, Inscriptions: Patricia de gente satam gestare Coronam/Sponsam, miraris, coronam Norica in Urbe ? sinas. 
Expediam paucis: quoniam illa Corona puellas / Inter, ei merito nonne Corona datur? (Are you wondering how a 
bride from a Patrician family came to be wearing a crown in the city of Nürnberg? You should indulge her. I will 
explain it all to you in a few words: because this one is the crown among the young women, shouldn’t she 
accordingly be given a crown?). Feci, quod, potui, potui, Christe, dedisti, / Perfida fac melius, Si potes Invidia. 
Laurentius Strauch pictor et Ex: HTroschell fe: Norinb. (I have done what I wished, I wished [what] you, Christ 
have given me. Make it better, perfidious envy, if you want.) For support in the reading and for the translation of 
the inscriptions into German, I am very grateful to Angelika Fricke. The date 1621 is found here on a tablet on the 
wall of a house on the left. See Müller 1791, pp. 78f., with evidence of the altered later prints through 1672. For 
the crowned bride as an attraction see Misson 1701, p. 86 with a copperplate. Misson’s sojourn in Nürnberg dated 
from 1687.  
Fig. 12: Lorenz Strauch (D g tsman)/Johann Troeschel (Engrav r):
The City Hall (Berlin, Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Staatliche
Museen zu Berlin, Kunstbibliothek)
From other examples of the Council’s dealings with bids from draughts-
men, letter painters, and engravers, it becomes apparent which images
kept with the Council’s wishes and received its financial support:77 The
Council primarily supported presentations that had the military fitness of
the Nürnberg citizenry as a theme. This included the festive display of
weapons and manpower as well as shooting contents with Falconen [can-
nons], pub ished for the first time by P ter Isselburg in 1614 as an exam-
ple of the Council’s foresight and preparedness.78
77 On the  of visual media by the Augsburg Council in gen ral, s e Jachmann
2008, pp. 70f. There is no verview about the system of dedication in the imperial
cities. There are a few hints in Besing 1999, pp. 96f.
78 Fischer/Maué 2014, No. 75, pp. 84f., on the stamping of medals; Hampe 1904, p.
473, Nr. 2675. Isselburg’s prints became the model for the publication of a maneu-
ver [Stückschießen] by Georg Christoph Eimmart, 1679 (Fischer/Maué (2014),
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Fig. 13: Lorenz Strauch (Draughtsman)/Johann Troeschel (Engraver): The City Hall 
(Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum) 
 
The views of the city hall were not commissioned by the Council, but financed instead by the 
generally popular mechanism of dedication: Strauch was given permission “to copy the new 
city hall and etch it in copper,” and in exchange for the dedication of the two sheets was 
rewarded with 25 gulden.76 Both modes of presentation were thus acceptable.  
From other examples of the Council’s dealings with bids from draughtsmen, letter painters, and 
engravers, it becomes apparent which images kept with the Council’s wishes and received its 
financial support:77 The Council primarily supported presentations that had the military fitness 
of the Nürnberg citizenry as a theme. This included the festive display of weapons and 
                                                 
76 Mahn 1927, p. 27 with n. 2: „das neue rathhaus zu conterfaiten und ins kupfer zu stechen“. In Augsburg, for the 
representation of the book by Wolfgang Kilian, the text has been preserved, in which the engraver asks the Council 
for authorization of dedication in 1614 and is thereupon paid 25 guldens as compensation for delivering 25 reprints 
of the three engravings. The same procedure can be presumed for Lukas Kilian’s engraving of the City Hall 
(Schmidt 2000, p. 67). 
77 On the use of visual media by the Augsburg Council in general, see Jachmann 2008, pp. 70f. There is no 
overview about the system of dedication in the imperial cities. There are a few hints in Besing 1999, pp. 96f. 
Fig. 13: Lorenz Strauch (Draughtsman)/Johann Troeschel (Engraver):
The City Hall (Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum)
The emphasis in all of the illustrations of these shooting contests is on
good military order, as evidenced by added side scenes of smaller, man-
ageable or well-ma aged interruptions, such as child onlookers, passing
horses, d similar motifs. Nürnberg’s military strength, with its own ar-
mory and troops that could be deployed against foreign enemies, is also a
major theme for Kraus, Boener, and Delsenbach. They painstakingly
sketched out the sentry boxes on the towers and chain barriers intended to
aid soldiers and law enforcers in case of internal or external threat.
Delsenbach’s vedute were welcomed by the Council, and it granted him 30
guld n for ach of the first parts in 1714 and 1715, and 24 guld n for the
Nr. 134, pp. 124f., the Council’s remuneration in this case was 36 gulden; see also
the description and presentation of the man uver, 1671 (Dresden, Sächsische Lan-
desbibliothek)). The Stückschießen of 1733 was published in both medals and en-
gravings (Fischer/Maué 2014, Nr. 246-249, pp. 206f., Engravings by an unknown
engraver published by Johann Georg Purschner).
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1725 series.79 The most venerable medium, the minting of medals, was
commissioned by the Council itself. “The vigilance of the fathers of coun-
try / grants security to council and citizens” was the inscription on the
largest of the three medals for the 1733 military review and shoot.80 In
general, the Council paid more attention to texts and medals than to pic-
tures and took special interest in their messages. One would expect noth-
ing else in the prolonged process of transition from orality to literacy, for
this attitude toward texts is grounded in an understanding colored by
Protestantism (Lutheranism) that accepted the need to use images as a
medium of information and education, but sought to keep them under tight
79 Bach-Damaskinos 2006, p. 17.
80 Medal minted by: Peter Paul Werner (Fischer/Maué 2014, No. 246-249, pp. 206f.):
„Der Landes Vaetter Wachsamkeit / Schafft Rath und Bürgern Sicherheit.“.
From other examples of the Council’s dealings with bids from draughtsmen, letter painters, and 
engravers, it becomes apparent which images kept with the Council’s wishes and received its 
financial support:77 The Council primarily supported presentations that had the military fitness 
of the Nürnberg citizenry as a theme. This included the festive display of weapons and 
manpower as well as shooting contents with Falconen [cannons], published for the first time 
by Peter Isselburg in 1614 as an example of the Council’s foresight and preparedness.78   
 
 
Fig. 14: Peter Isselburg (Publisher): Das Wettschießen mit Falconen, [Shooting Contests 
with Cannons] 1614 (Nürnberg, Germanisches Nationalmuseum) 
 
                                                 
77 On the use of visual media by the A gsburg Council in general, see Jachmann 2008, p . 70f. There is no 
overview about the system of dedication in the imperial cities. There are a few hints in Besing 1999, pp. 96f. 
78 Fischer/Maué 2014, No. 75, pp. 84f., on the stamping of medals; Hampe 1904, p. 473, Nr. 2675. Isselburg’s 
prints became the model for the publication of a maneuver [Stückschießen] by Georg Christoph Eimmart, 1679 
(Fischer/Maué (2014), Nr. 134, pp. 124f., the Council’s remuneration in this case was 36 gulden; see also the 
descriptio  and presentation of the maneuver, 1671 (Dresden, Sächsische Landesbibli thek)). The Stückschießen 
of 1733 was published in both medals and engravings (Fischer/Maué 2014, Nr. 246-249, pp. 206f., Engravings by 
an unknown engraver published by Johann Georg Purschner). 
Fig. 14: Peter Isselburg (Publisher): Das Wettschießen mit Falconen,
[Shooting Contests with Cannons] 1614 (Nürnberg, Germanisches Natio-
nalmuseum)
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control, especially in relation to inner imaginings and “internal images.”81
The difficulty of this undertaking may have led to a general desire for un-
ambiguousness in images; pictures in which the information about topog-
raphy was amplified or even obscured by artistic, emotion-inducing means
seemed less opportune and thus failed to pique the Council’s interest. The
ambiguity of these images extends further: by maintaining a focus on the
controlled and controllable conditions of the townscape including its secu-
rity measures, the presentations highlight the possibilities for action on the
part of the city regiment and on the good order for which it is responsible.
The images that overlay this information with an ill-defined atmospheric
element, because their aesthetic mode is part of the pastoral tradition,
might also be understood as evidence for the underlying precariousness of
human existence, which cannot be resolved by a mere human regiment,
but only in keeping with God’s divine plan in the final judgment. Thus, we
might infer that the Council refrained from adopting the pastoral images of
Nürnberg to communicate political realities not only because of their am-
biguity, but also because of their implicit reference to the ultimate futility
of all human regiments.
The reception of these pictures, like the literary productions, thus shift-
ed to the private (familial) or the semi-private sector. Here, again, we
should draw a distinction: for both printed images and printed texts, their
reception may be co-determined by their inherent characteristics, but once
an image or text was “on the market,” neither its audience nor its opportu-
nities for seeing them or reading them are regulated. Prints – especially
small-format prints – were created exclusively for individual consumption,
and in the early modern period this principally meant a community of the
like-minded and connoisseurs. By contrast, the literary productions of the
Pegnesian Order of Flowers also had a semi-public nature at those times
when they were recited at weddings, festivals, and political events, and be-
fore they were disseminated in print similar to works of architecture art,
and thus reached an audience not predetermined by place, time, or social
status.
In broad continuity, there was a predominantly concretizing narrative
mode in the city views ever since the first decades of the sixteenth century
that sets aside specific realities with a great diversity of picture motifs, all
serving to underscore the defensive strength of the city at peace. Once we
81 Here only: Berns 1993, pp. 35–72.
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try to assign precise figures and measure the presentations in detail, this
becomes a mystery. In this respect, the attitude in Nürnberg is distin-
guished from that in other imperial cities by its greater anxiety about deal-
ing with exact information. For a long time, no map of the city was pub-
lished, and Sebastian Münster had to print his “Cosmographia” minus an
image of Nürnberg.82 The Council commissioned Jörg Pencz to create the
first model of the city,83 but similar to other models and maps, it seems
that it was displayed in the war room, a place that was inaccessible to
unauthorized persons. Later independent initiatives on the part of Hans
Baier (1540, model)84 and Hieronymus Braun (1608, map)85 did end with
the Council paying a remuneration but with the strict stipulation that no
further copies be prepared. As diligently as the Council pursued maintain-
ing secrecy about its own city, it made great efforts to develop information
on other cities and on potential enemies within the city: the Commandry
of the Order of Teutonic Knights, subordinate directly to the Emperor,
commissioned the cartographer Hans Bien in 1624 to create precise archi-
tectural surveys of the buildings. The Council made illegal copies of this
document but did not distribute them, since after Sweden’s withdrawal
from Nürnberg the buildings of the Commandry had to be returned to the
Teutonic Order.86 This mode of true-to-scale surveys with perspectival or
orthogonal views of the buildings, which thus combined accuracy with
graphic clarity, was subjected to scholarly reflection after it was intro-
duced in the town book by Braun and Hogenberg and deemed especially
versatile. Not only could one read information of every kind from the im-
ages and avoid dangerous trips, but, much more to the point, architects
could also discern the unique features of the city’s fortifications in this
82 Münster 1550, p. 650: “Picturam urbis libenter exhibuissem, sed obtinere
nequivi.” The sentence is absent in the German edition, as is an image.
83 Schäfer 1898, p. 30.
84 Schäfer 1898, p. 38: Behaim received 40 gulden, “with the provision that he would
not make any more of the same, unless the Mayor had given permission for such.”.
85 Id., p. 83: The Council commissioned Braun to hand over all miniaturizations of
the plan: “we should also find out from him whether he has any model or reduc-
tion of this work, and require of him for these as well; as for all other similar ones
to do the same.”.
86 Fleischmann 1991, p. 119, with reproduction of the drawings. For examples from
other cities, see Timann 1993, pp. 143–147. Generally concerning this practice,
see also Schnellbögl 1966, pp. 21f.
The Legitimation of Council Rule Through Vedute of the City and Territory
213
way.87 It is understandable against the backdrop of such discussions that
while the Council did enable, tolerate, and even promote viewing of the
vedute as a whole, since they served to promote the well-being of the city
state, they did not tolerate views and plans that were orthogonally depicted
and thus provided exact information that could be used, for example, to in-
stall artillery emplacements. The first surveyed city plan that was printed
to be accessible to a wide audience was created without being subject to
the control of the Nürnberg authorities. This was a depiction of Swedish
fortifications that accompanied the related report in Matthäus Merian’s
“Theatrum Europaeum.”88 From this moment on, it became pointless to
try to censor the publication of views of Nürnberg made from a surveyed
map of the city.
Concordia
Over the centuries, the Council appears to have been less fearful of outside
danger than of civil disorder.89 Celtis was the first to document the history
of the instruments of power used by the Nürnberg Council to rule the pop-
ulous city: “With good words and harsh corporal punishment” it was pos-
sible to rule the city without rebellion or insurrection. The understanding
citizens were responsive to argument, but the rabble could only be ruled
by means of the threat and enforcement of such penalties.90 In making this
distinction, Celtis is fully consistent with the direction that the Council
87 Here according to the German edition: Braun/Hogenberg 1582, Preface, not pagi-
nated. Regarding incorporation in contemporary discussions on cosmography and
chorography, see Nuti 1994, pp. 105–128.
88 Abelinus/Merian/Oraeus 1646, on p. 655. See Wüthrich 1993, p. 166, II/Table 52.
89 For examples from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see Meyer 2009, p. 391.
90 Celtis 1921, Cap. 13, pp. 185f.: “Caesar Fridericus dum Romae consecrationem
coronae a pontificem, ut imperatores nostri ex religione solent, accepisset utque
Norimbergam rediit, populi multitudinem effusam ante portas undique videns et,
ut urbem intrasset, civitatem in populum effusam, obsessas undique plateas et tecta
laborantia et velut diluvia quaedam vidisset, seniorem urbis, qui tunc laevae eius
adequitabat, interrogavit, quonam ingenio et arte tantam multitudinem sine sedi-
tione et tumultu regerent et continerent. At ille, ut vir veneranda canitie et summa
animi prudentia erat, „Verbis“, inquit, „imperator invictissime, et gravibus pecu-
niariis corporisque poenis id efficimus“, significans ingenuos cives verbis et piis
adhortationibus monendos esse hisque se emendare, plebem autem ut servile et in-
domitum vulgus nonnisi corporis poena aut pecuniae mulcta a delictis arceri de-
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would follow over the ensuing decades, but despite the extensive editing
of his text in the German translation commissioned by the Council, the
passage was still in place at the start of the sixteenth century.91 The fear of
uprisings was so fundamental to the Council’s policies that through a de-
cree of damnatio memoriae, the 1349 Guild Rebellion was erased from the
city’s memory, and all public assemblies were forbidden.92 They even
went so far as to delete the by then well-known history of the Council’s
exercise of force, including the taboo word “uprising,” from Merian’s later
widely disseminated “Topographia Franconiae.”93 Citing the explicit
threat that it could do harm to this portion of the book, the Council told the
publisher: “For the question of how such a large populace could be gov-
erned, leave out the word “uprising” and instead tell how the Council
ruled such a powerful citizenry, and further, do not mention the breadth or
depth of the trenches, nor the number of citizens, but instead, leave these
things vague and in generalities.”94 Merian’s willingness to yield offers
rare proof for the mechanisms to which the engravers were subjected; one
could only anticipate sales of the goods in Nürnberg, let alone a gratuity
from the Council if the product withstood censorship.
The Council had reason to be concerned. The number of anonymous
expressions of protest in written and more rarely pictorial form – known
as pasquills – seems to have increased, especially during times of crisis.
Typical themes of extreme criticism and grounds for death threats includ-
ed the excessive costs of city expenditures (city hall construction) and to
entertain patricians (pompous wedding celebrations) – themes that were
positively presented in the engravings of 1621 – in disproportion to pover-
bere ad cohibendaque peccata plus timorem quam pudorem apud vulgum valere.
Vox digna et salutaris rei publicae cunctisque civitatum rectoribus et principibus
memoriae tradenda!” German edition: Fink 2000. See also Meyer 2009, pp. 298–
313 and p. 397; Israel 2012; the assessment that it was hard to rule a populous city
can be traced back to Aristotle’s Politics (Book VII, p. 4f.), as already reported by
Johannes Cochlaeus 1960, p. 84.
91 Arnold 2004, pp. 100–116; Meyer 2009, pp. 297–304.
92 Meyer 2009, pp. 391ff., with extensive confirmation from the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries.
93 Merian 1648, p. 64.
94 Sporhan-Krempel/Wohnhaas 1967, pp. 82–88: „Bey der Frag, wie ein solche gross
Meng regiert würde, das Wort ‚Aufruhr‘ auszulassen und dagegen zu setzen, wie
der Rat ein so starke Burgerschaft regiere, ferners die Weite und Tiefe der Gräben
nicht, auch die Zahl der Burger ebenfalls nicht zu benennen, sondern es indefiniti-
ve und generaliter zu setzen.“.
The Legitimation of Council Rule Through Vedute of the City and Territory
215
ty, hunger, disease, and draconic punishment for violations of the dress
code; the continuation of the economic crisis from the burden of extreme
levies as the object of criticism by the merchants and, unpaid wages as the
grievance of the military. “By night we are going to shoot you through
your windows and by day we will throw stones at you, you are responsible
for turning many good people into thieves and robbers, we’ve been patient
for long enough […] before God and the world, we will get our money
that we’ve honestly earned.”95
Beyond recognizing a general danger of unrest, the Council also saw a
threat to its very form of rule. Expert assessment of another pamphlet con-
cluded that the author was a “plebeian who had picked up some hint of
regimental matters, but wasn’t able to put it all together.” For this man, the
contemporary form of the aristocratic regiment was “an abomination, and
he wanted to introduce democracy, and if he and his ilk were just able to
get their money back from the Losungstuben [revenue office], they would
be ready to drive religion and polity one and the other to rack and ruin.”96
The Council always instituted special measures when the criticism was not
merely local and expressed by the “common man,” but instead when it
saw its reputation threatened regionally and in media disseminated among
persons of high rank. The affair triggered by a medal circulated in a print-
ed text at the 1731 Leipzig Fair occupied the Council’s attention for sever-
al years, until it was able to convict the creator. The persiflage regarding
the Nürnberg medallions at the end of the sixteenth century was so suc-
cessful and the mockery so caustic regarding a highly esteemed medium
that the Council felt directly threatened; greed, injustice, arrogance, con-
tempt, hypocrisy, and falsehood replaced the usual catalogue of sovereign
virtues that the Council never tired of claiming on its own behalf.97
95 Pamphlet 1635, as cited by Sporhan/Wohnhaas 1967, p. 87: „Bey der nacht wellen
wir Euch durch die Venster schiesen und bey Dag wellen wir Euch mit steinen zu
dot werffen, ir macht dass mancher Erlicher man zu einem Dieb und Rauber muß
werden, mir haben uns lang genucht gedultet […] unser gelt welen wir haben vor
Gott und der welt haben mirs redlich verdient.“.
96 Müller 1959, pp. 127f.: „plebejus, welcher von Regimentssachen hat etwas läuten,
aber nichts zusammenschlagen hören […] ein Greuel und wollte gern Democrati-
am introduzieren, und wenn er und seinesgleichen nur seine Gelter von der Lo-
sungsstuben hetten, möchte Religion und Polizey eines mit dem anderen zu Grund
und Boden gehen.“.
97 Hampe 1918, pp. 246f.; Müller 1959, pp. 130f. There was special anxiety, because
at first the Council assumed that the medal had actually been minted. In fact, there
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In her study on Nürnberg’s literary legacy, Carla Meyer concluded that
unlike in other imperial cities, the Council did not actively use chronicles
or other literary forms to create a self-image of the city. Instead, like the
princely states, it drew upon the tools of aristocratic secret politics. Keep-
ing secrets and articulating them to those who were not in the know – the
“common man” were not by themselves sufficient to maintain the stability
of the Council’s rule. The group of council-eligible families, which had
proven their worth by tradition, status, and by their unity, were obligated
instead to prove the legality and proper exercise of their rule by means of
their contributions to the common good. Therefore, mistakes, just like the
transgressions of individual council-eligible families or their family mem-
bers, risked shaking the very foundations of rule. Along these lines,
Valentin Groebner has shown that power relationships in Nürnberg in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were not quite as harmoniously balanced
as tradition would have us believe. The Council was not fully homoge-
neous as had been so consistently claimed ever since the sixteenth century;
to maintain order, it was always having to find a balance between old es-
tablished members and office-holders and new arrivals and wealthy par-
venus.98
Over the centuries that followed, this distribution of power had to be
confirmed, especially during crises, and affirmed under oath. In 1632,
when the Council wanted to join the alliance of the Protestant Estates with
the Swedish King Gustav Adolf, and thus to terminate the age-old princi-
ple that the imperial city was forever loyal to the Emperor, it felt obliged
to affirm this decision by polling the Genannten [Chosen] of the Great
Council – a group of approximately 500 persons – and to subject skeptical
members loyal to the emperor to criminal prosecution.99 On the surface,
the Council was able to persuasively demonstrate over a long time period
that the city was “nobly” ruled and that good order prevailed. Thus,
Christoph Scheurl’s 1516 “Epistola” was widely distributed in both Latin
and German, with its claim that newcomers and the “common folk” could
not participate in the government, “which is entrusted solely to all powers
of God and the good rule of those few whom the Creator has endowed
were only printed fictional descriptions; the author, Johann Philipp Andreae, had
been instigated by the merchants. Fischer/Maué 2014, Nos. 333, 267, with illustra-
tions of the print.
98 Groebner 1994, pp. 279–308.
99 Willax 1991, pp. 123–173.
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with all things and nature with superior wisdom.”100 From the Council’s
viewpoint, Nürnberg’s ‘res publica’ had the form of an aristocratic oli-
garchy, according to the Aristotelian classification, comparable to the
Frankish landed nobility, fiefable as well as having been endowed by God
with the necessary competencies – with wisdom – to exercise the powers
of government.101
However, excessive ambition on the part of some members of the group
of council-eligible families also threatened the maintenance of rule, so
long as these groups signaled external stability through homogeneity and
harmony. For this reason, any involvement with representation through ex-
ternal signs – with all that could be regarded as an appropriate signal in
the respective frame of reference – took on a degree of significance only
hinted at by Meyer and Groebner. As was customary in the South German
imperial cities, the Council made use of complex allegorical images for
this purpose, which were at first directed to an educated audience. The
Council itself was part of this audience; self-affirmation was not a in-
significant objective of this allegorical pictorial program. When it seemed
opportune, ruling wisdom was made public: this was especially the case
for the publication of the statutes of 1564, which were modeled on the
governance reforms decreed by Emperor Karl V in other imperial cities.
They were directed – according to the preface – at being accessible to the
“common man,” and to disseminate knowledge about the exemplary, time-
honored city regiment, but only after the Council had initially complied
with the request by neighboring cities to maintain secrecy.102 The statutes
were equipped with an allegorical frontispiece, which in no uncertain
terms summarized the Council’s view about the foundation of the state.
100 Scheurl 1874, p. 791; Meyer 2009, pp. 323f.: „diweil alle gwalt von gott, und das
wolregirn gar wenigen und allein denen vom schöpfer aller ding und der natur
mit sunderlicher weyshait begabet sein, verliehen ist.“ The Latin version: “Ad-
venae et Plebei nihil possunt, neque plebeiorum est regere, quum omne regimen a
Deo sit, et bene regere paucis admodum concessum, his scilicet qui genio singu-
lari a Summo rerum pontifice et natura quoque dotati conspiciuntur.” (Scheurl
1999, p. 29).
101 For a comprehensive presentation, see Gundling 1706, ch. 2, p. 30; further evi-





Fig. 15: Master M.F.: Allegory of the Imperial City of Nürnberg, Der Stat Nürmberg 
verneute Reformation [Renewed Reformation of the City of Nürnberg] 1564, 
Frontispiece (München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek) 
 
Under the protection of God the Father, the Republic (res publica) is seated on her throne, 
calling the attention of her protégées to this source for the splendor of city and territory. Peace 
(pax) sleeps in her lap, visually enhancing the statement of deep, undisturbed tranquility – yet 
justice (justitia) and munificence (liberalitas), the foundations of the state, are providentially 
protected by breastplates. Munificence distributes by merit (pro merito) the revenues generated 
by the harmonious bees (concordia), which swarm from the city – symbolizing an industrious 
and united citizenry.103 
                                                 
103 Der Stat Nürnberg verneute Reformation, Nürnberg [Valentin Geisler], 1564. We have used: facsimile, 
digitalized, Heidelberg, University Library. http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/drwNuernbergRef1564/0006. 
The print was reprised on a broadsheet for the 1635 Peace of Prague: Des H. Römischen Reichs von Gott 
eingesegnete Friedens-Copulation, [The Holy Roman Empire consecrated by God’s Covenant of Peace, among 
Fig. 15: Master M.F.: Allegory of the Imperial City of Nürnberg, Der Stat
Nürmberg verneute Reformation [Renewed Reformation of the City of
Nürnberg] 1564, Frontispiec  (München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek)
Under the protection of God the Father, the Republic (res publica) is seat-
ed on her throne, calling the attention of her protégées to this source for
the splendor of city and territory. Peace (pax) sleeps in her lap, visually
enhancing the statement of deep, undisturbed tranquility – yet justice (jus-
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titia) and munificence (liberalitas), the foundations of the state, are provi-
dentially protected by breastplates. Munificence distributes by merit (pro
merito) the revenues generated by the harmonious bees (concordia), which
swarm from the city – symbolizing an industrious and united citizenry.103
Harmony is a central theme in Nürnberg’s political allegories and con-
sistently marks the self-presentation of the Nürnberg patricians as a group.
It also forms a foundation for the emergence and preservation of an “urban
core identity,”104 which is produced and continuously reaffirmed in fic-
tional texts and image series instead of the texts kept under lock and key
in the town library. Unlike the landed gentry and unlike the ruling dynastic
families, the Nürnberg patricians hardly ever used the fine arts and archi-
tecture to leverage or elevate their standing through representations of
their competitive status within their own group. There was virtually no ri-
valry among the council-eligible families – and given the basically parag-
onal system of artistic representation in the early modern era, this is a re-
markable phenomenon.105 After the Thirty Years’ War, there was virtually
no private construction activity in the city, and in rebuilding the country
estates, they maintained the ancient appearance of their buildings. The
dress code precluded pretensions among low-ranking citizens, and it also
served to keep the council-eligible families in line. The city and its envi-
rons were represented in image series that underscored homogeneity. No-
body stepped out of line. A look was promoted, even if it was seldom
proactively demanded, which generated an identity of the city and its envi-
rons of rare unity and thus recognizability. Nürnberg was characterised by
103 Der Stat Nürnberg verneute Reformation, Nürnberg [Valentin Geisler], 1564. We
have used: facsimile, digitalized, Heidelberg, University Library. http://
digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/drwNuernbergRef1564/0006. The print was
reprised on a broadsheet for the 1635 Peace of Prague: Des H. Römischen Reichs
von Gott eingesegnete Friedens-Copulation [The Holy Roman Empire consecrat-
ed by God’s Covenant of Peace], among others, Nürnberg, Germanisches Na-
tionalmuseum, Veste Coburg Art Collections: See Schilling 1990, pp. 185ff. (for
the Nürnberg provenance); Harms 1983, p. 209; Burckhardt 1998, pp. 95f.
104 A term in Meyer 2009, p. 391.
105 The pre-Reformation patrician class behaved quite differently; in the religious
memorial foundations, one can consistently observe a competition (cf. Schleif
1990). A famous exception for building activities in the post-Reformation period
is the house that the – non-Council eligible – merchant Martin Peller had built by
Jacob Wolff starting in 1602 on the Egidienplatz. The façade was characterized




long rows of narrow houses under steep roofs with roof dormers, windows
with crown glass panes at a time when elsewhere, plots were becoming
larger, and longitudinally terraced buildings windows with large panes
were providing more comfort.
 
Fig. 16: Johann Andreas Graff (Draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (Engraver): Der 
Neue Bau [The New Building] (Braunschweig, Herzog Anton Ulrich-Museum) 
 
Fig. 17: Johann Alexander Boener (Engraver): St John’s Cemetery (Wien, 
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek) 
 
Fig. 16: Johann Andreas Graff (Draughtsman)/Johann Ulrich Kraus (En-
graver): Der Neue Bau [The New Building] (Braunschweig, Herzog Anton
Ulrich-Museum)
There were also long rows of identical graves in the cemeteries, and only
in extremely exceptional cases did this allow any individual personalities
to stand out.106 This meant insistence on regionally typical clothing, from
which social status could be easily read. This uniformity is expressed es-
pecially well in one form of publication – the series – and one pictorial
mode, which tends toward concreteness in its wealth of detail and avoids
ambivalence: the pictures do show small, everyday mishaps and misad-
106 Pilz 1984, pp. 65-69; Trechsel 1735.
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ventures, but even when the weather gets in the way of the stroller, there is
a rainbow arcing above, symbolizing Nürnberg’s harmonious relation to
God. Dominion is shown through its success, in the stable order and in the
prosperity ensured and made visible through artisan handwork and the
movement of goods in regional and transregional trade. Security is gener-
ated by such internal stability; externally, it is demonstrated through unwa-
vering attention to defensive potential; particularly in consideration of the
inadequacy of the town’s defensive equipment and its incapacity to man
them with its own forces, the celebration of periodic military reviews and
exercises was important.
Stability: The power of securitization
Unfortunately, it is impossible to fully explain the mechanisms that led to
such a remarkable spate of image series depicting Nürnberg and its envi-
rons, which is impressive even in European comparison. Despite the broad
preservation of the image series, their addressees and the circumstances of
 
Fig. 17: Johann Alexander Boener (Engraver): St John’s Cemetery (Wien, 
Österreichische Nationalbibliothek) 
 
There were also long rows of identical graves in the cemet ies, a d only in extremely 
exceptional cases did this allow any individual personalities to stand out.106 This meant 
insistence on regionally typical clothing, from which social status could be easily read. This 
uniformity is expressed esp cially well in one form of publication – the series – and one 
pictorial mode, which tends toward concreteness in its wealth of detail and avoids ambivalence: 
the pictures do show small, everyday mishaps and misadventures, but even when the weather 
gets in the way of the stroller, there is a rainbow arcing above, symbolizing Nürnberg’s 
harmonious relation to God. Dominion is shown through its success, in the stable order and in 
the prosperity ensured and made visible through artisan handwork and the movement of goods 
in regional and transregional trade. Security is generated by such internal stability; externally, 
it is demonstrated through unwavering attention to defensive potential; particularly in 
consideration of the in d quacy of the town’  d fensive quipment d its incapacity to man 
them with its own forces, the celebration of periodic military reviews and exercises was 
important.  
 
                                                 
106 Pilz 1984, pp. 65-69; Trechsel 1735.  




their reception are difficult to determine in detail.107 We can presume that
the purchasers of the image series came primarily from the families whose
country estates are depicted and from families of similar status in other
imperial cities. For example, in the case of the Dutch landscape images
and vedute, it is apparent that they served for self-affirmation and outward
representation.108 Moreover, we can assume that city books and image se-
ries about other major European cities created a market that catered to a
widespread interest in “descriptions.” It is important to note that the pic-
tures circulated in the same (augmented) social group that saw itself as the
guardian of order in Nürnberg. This notion is supported by the way the
images deal with the figures that populate them. The streets and environs
of Nürnberg were peopled with the “common man,” who goes about his
business, whether as a handworker, merchant, a farmer going to market or
a domestic, either male or female. People are presented in a broad view, or
“seen from above.” This perspective is especially compelling in one im-
age, when during the 1649 Nürnberg peace festival, the Swedish ambas-
sador arranged for the heraldic animals symbolizing his ruling house to
spew out red and white wine from the first floor of the city hall. In the des-
criptions of the festival, the depiction of responses to this generosity occu-
pies as much space as the heraldic and technical explanations.109 “It was a
pleasure there to see / how the common people were attracted there,”
writes Sigmund von der Birken in 1652, communicating both the impres-
sions of direct observers and the various moral and political interpretations
of the event that had subsequently developed in Nürnberg.110 The images,
published in part as handbills and in part to illustrate descriptions of the
festival differ only in minor ways. They do highlight the distance between
the distinguished observers of the scene – on the square and watching
from the windows of the city hall – and the common people scuffling for
the wine. There is reason to conclude that the illustrated broadsheets
showing this event were intended for purchase by the same prominent
107 Bellingradt (2011) asserts the absence of any overview of journalism in the early
modern era and has attempted to create one for the cities of Cologne, Hamburg,
Leipzig, and Dresden. However, the images we have been exploring here are not
examined in his work.
108 Leeflang 1997, pp. 53–115.
109 Von Birken 1649. The figure comes from this version. Regarding the event itself,
see Laufhütte 1998.
110 Von Birken 1652, pp. 68f.: „Da ware ein Lust zu sehen / wie sich der Poebel hin-
zudraengete.“.
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class as we see depicted in the picture with coats, hats, and lace collars,
keeping a safe distance from the Volk.111
 
Fig. 18: The Swedish Lions spewing forth red and white wine, from: Sigmund von 
Birken (Text): Kurtze Beschreibung Deß Schwedischen Friedensmahls [Brief 
Description of the Swedish Peace Banquet], Nürnberg: Dümler 1649 (Coburg, 
Landesbibliothek).    
 
Ruptures in this fabric of power relationships, the demarcation of a separate self-understanding 
of a social group, and pictorial representation of these ruptures and demarcations began to 
appear and gradually produced signs of breakdown of the representative order, as travelers 
noted the unusual aspects of Nürnberg in European comparison as objects curiosity. Depending 
on the type of publication, they sometimes cloaked their observations in scathing wit and sharp 
criticism. The dress code continued to be binding on council-eligible families, who saw 
themselves as equal to the European aristocracy, even though the dress code made them 
laughable among the European aristocratic society. “These haughty Lords, swoln with Pride 
Fig. 18: The Swedish Lion spewing forth red and white wine, from: Sig-
mund von Birken (Text): Kurtze Beschreibung Deß Schwedischen
Friedensmahls [Brief Description of the Swedish P ace Banquet], Nürn-
berg: Dümler 1649 (Coburg, Landesbibliothek).
Ruptures in this fabric of power relationships, the demarcation of a sepa-
rate s lf-understanding of  social group, and pictorial r presentation of
these ruptures and demarcations began to appear and gradually produced
111 Harms assumes that the flyers for the Peace Meal “represented cheap popular
version(s) of the ambitious book edition (Harms 1980, nos. 323–328). He does
not attempt a more extensive differentiation.
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signs of breakdown of the representative order, as travelers noted the un-
usual aspects of Nürnberg in European comparison as objects curiosity.
Depending on the type of publication, they sometimes cloaked their obser-
vations in scathing wit and sharp criticism. The dress code continued to be
binding on council-eligible families, who saw themselves as equal to the
European aristocracy, even though the dress code made them laughable
among the European aristocratic society. “These haughty Lords, swoln
with Pride and vain of the Title they have assumed to themselves, together
with their pointed Hats and bushy enormous Ruffs, that might serve for
Umbrella’s to two or Three Women, are more arrogant and inaccessible
than the Nobles of Venice” was how Blainville described the Nürnberg
elite in his travelogue, first published in English translation in London.112
Nicolai, for his part, came to the conclusion in 1783 that Nürnbergers
lagged 150 years behind current standards in the design of their houses.113
Helmut Zedelmaier demonstrated gaps between literary presentation
and social and political reality in the large collections of city descriptions
and concluded that these gaps were partly the reflection of stable literary
conventions. Once complete, “an ‘ensemble’ of literary tradition de-
veloped, which sealed up against reality, and followed its own laws. […]
Only Enlightenment concerns about pragmatic access to the present suc-
ceeded in destroying the static nature of the [literary!] images: then, the
order of literary tradition was no longer available to them, but only the or-
der of empirical reality.”114
However, what may be undoubtedly true for the widely read compendia
of city books is not necessarily applicable to the local text and image pro-
duction. It falls short if one describes the inertial tendency expressed in ac-
tuality and in the images as being “sealed up” against reality. What is de-
picted in the images is a wished-for political and social reality, and all vi-
sual means are deployed to make this ideal image seem plausible. Indeed,
it may be surprising that the themes set down since the city hall vedute of
1621 would continue to be disseminated through new editions of the im-
age series by Graff, Boener, and Delsenbach through the end of the eigh-
teenth century. And we can safely assume that these editions were pub-
lished entirely free from any political interventions by the Council and
112 Blainville/Turnbull/Köhler 1764, Vol. 1.1, p. 230. Blainville was in Nürnberg in
1705. English edition 1767, Vol. 1, pp. 198–199.
113 Nicolai 1783-1796, Vol. 1, p. 205.
114 Zedelmaier 1987, p. 308.
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brought to market purely based on the publisher’s good business interests.
However, the fundamental function of these later editions remained the
same as it was at the time of the first edition, perhaps even strengthened
by the fact that the persons and activities shown in the images had become
a part of history, while there had been little change in the architecture or
the political, social and economic processes depicted. The consistent func-
tion was to portray as well as engender the stability of the societal and po-
litical order through the stability of visual appearances.
Thus, it is only possible to differentiate between the tasks of represent-
ing and creating security as aspects of securitization if the specific situa-
tional use of the images can be precisely determined as a means of com-
munication. However, in the case of the broad continuity of the image pro-
duction, this does not make sense. The communicative power of the prints
resulted from their adaptability to different prevailing conventions of pre-
sentation, and, above all, their persistent presentation of variations of a
few basic themes, thus enabling them to help strengthen civic order
through their repeated reception and remembrance. For over 200 years, the
vedute created a picture of Nürnberg where security was manifested in the
day-to-day routines of the people depicted and a stable, unvarying presen-
tation of the architectonic framework of an order undisturbed by small,
day-to-day misadventures; at the same time, this order had to be and could
be protected from latent threat. When the question is one of an external
threat, such protection is articulated in the images; when the issue is po-
tential internal conflict, it remains invisible and is not directly addressed.
For instance, there never seem to be any beggars in the city – but beggars
might be an indicator for the need for better regulation of order. By con-
trast, the security problem – that is, the threat from an external enemy – is
permanently commemorated while the pictures continue to be produced
and received. The vedute remind a wandering gaze everyday realities that
were also experienced on the street; lacking sources, we cannot describe
these realities empirically: the power of the architecture to steer day-to-
day routines. The chain barriers divided the flow of traffic, traces of which
remain in the roadways of the main streets; the old gate towers (White
Tower, fig. 9) narrowed it once more inside the town after passing through
the fortifications. The images consistently cast this feature of the architec-
ture and contrivances in a positive light. The towers and walls, chain barri-
ers and watchtowers are the community’s own means of guaranteeing se-
curity. To this end, each house also has its own defenses to protect it
against an enemy we will not try to specify in further detail here. Not
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quantitatively dominant, although unmistakably present, is the symbol of
penal justice as guarantor of internal security, the gallows hill, which ap-
pears in every full view of the city on the eastern side.115
In conclusion, it makes sense to emphasize this aspect of persistence/
repetition for the presentation and perception of security themes, because
it also makes clear that the mechanisms proposed by the Copenhagen
School of Critical Security Studies are unsuitable for understanding the
consistent communication of a security theme over an extended time. In
Nürnberg, securitization did not take place as an orchestrated staging of
the circumstances surrounding a security problem, nor was desecuritiza-
tion the ultimate message of normal political activity. The subject and
function of the images is not the “abrogation of normally applicable
boundaries and limitations of political action through securitization,”116
but instead security being in force and remaining in force across many
centuries, even while – as the vedute also show – it could be terminated at
any time, to the detriment of the community. To the extent that these mar-
ketable vedute – tolerated and sometimes also sponsored by the Council –
depicted security architectures, arrangements, and routines and preserved
the memory of a latent threat, they helped to create security. In this sense,
they are a means for legitimizing council rule – through the representation
of order as well as through pastoral, peaceful utopias and not through im-
ages of horror, which were exceedingly rare in Nürnberg.117 A condition
for the efficacy of the images is an underlying consensus between the ac-
tors, between the Council, the producers of the pictures who were mostly
in concurrence with it, and the inhabitants of the city. The series of vedute
are thus an example of an image type capable of exercising an effect with-
in a type of security power – the power of securitization.118 Their long per-
sistence, generation of tradition and reinforcing effects to create a collec-
tive Nürnberg identity in the upper class, which is crystallized in their se-
curity routines, provides impressive proof that in long-term securitization
processes, just as in dramatic event-driven securitizing moves, the players
cannot avoid some degree of self-imposed confinement.
115 E.g. Wolgemut, Lautensack. see also the coach with curtained windows and the
Jew (?), who is being taken to the city hall by a council servant in Lorenz
Strauch.
116 Conze 2012, p. 459, characterizing the positions of the Copenhagen School.
117 On this problem area, see Härter 2010.
118 See Langenohl in this volume, section 3.2.
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“A question of power and war:” Social Conflict in Hamburg and
London in the Late Nineteenth Century1
Christine Krüger and Friedrich Lenger
It is stating the obvious if one stresses the intimate relationship between
questions of security and those of power. The problem becomes more in-
teresting, however, if one contrasts different conceptions of both power
and security and their implications for empirical analysis. This is what this
article tries to do, taking the reactions to social unrest in Hamburg and
London at the end of the nineteenth century as the empirical example and
the conceptual work of the Copenhagen School of security studies and the
theoretical offerings of governmentality studies in a Foucauldian tradition
as analytical tools.2 For London, we will concentrate particularly on three
events: the West End Riots in February 1886, “Bloody Sunday” in
November 1887 and the dock labourers’ strike in summer 1889, and for
Hamburg on the riots of May 1890 and the dock workers’ strike of
1896/97.3 And since comparing two cases and two theoretical approaches
at the same time is bound to confuse the reader, the main part of the article
will demonstrate the usefulness of the terms ‘securitization’ and ‘desecuri-
tization’4 for understanding our two metropolitan stories, while the com-
parative reflection of the tradition of governmentality studies will be re-
served for a much briefer epilogue.
1 The contributions of the two co-authors are very unequal: while Christine Krüger
has undertaken all the empirical work and written most of the text, Friedrich Lenger
has concentrated mostly on the epilogue at the end. We are grateful to Sebastian
Haus for his helpful commentary on an earlier version of this article.
2 For a comparative evaluation of both traditions cf. Opitz 2008.
3 Cf. for the Trafalgar Square Demonstrations and for “Bloody Sunday” Keller 2008;
for the London strike McCarthy 1889; Wasp/Davis 1974; for Hamburg Grüttner
1984.
4 We define desecuritization as the process in the course of which issues or develop-
ments that have been securitized before cease to be regarded as a security problem.
See Hansen 2012, pp. 542-544.
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In accordance with Critical Security Studies and particularly the Copen-
hagen School of Securitization,5 we do not understand security in a nor-
mative way but rather ask how contemporaries defined security, how they
securitized specific phenomena (i.e. how they identified and created secu-
rity issues), and how definitions of security have changed over time. How-
ever, even if concepts of security and of how security should be guaran-
teed were liable to historical change, one could say that they were always
inseparably linked with feelings of insecurity (i.e. with the perception of
existential threats).
The aim is to analyze the relationship between security discourses and
security practices on the one hand and power relations on the other: We
ask in what situations security arguments gained or lost persuasive power.
Who had recourse to securitization and what kind of power relations pro-
vided the conditions for it? What other instruments of power competed
with it? And how did securitization either change or stabilize the balance
of power?
Although the perception and discussion of social conflict as a security
problem were very similar in Hamburg and London, security discourses
and practices were much more influential in Hamburg than in London.
This makes the comparison of both cities useful for our analysis. The
causes for the differences provide answers to the question of how securiti-
zation and power were interrelated. Moreover, with different conceptions
of security competing in both cities, the comparison helps us to understand
why some of them prevailed while others failed.
In the first three parts of this article, we will explore three distinct secu-
rity discourses, which can be attributed to three socio-political camps and
can be found in both cities. The first two of these camps are formed by the
middle classes. The camp that could be denominated as the ‘camp of con-
frontation’ and the camp of liberal social reform that could also be defined
as ‘camp of dialogue’, while the third camp is that of organised labour. In
the fourth and last part, we will study the security policies pursued by the
state and especially by the police forces in both cities. Sources include
various newspapers of different political colours, writings of social re-
formers and social scientists, as well as archival material, especially from
the London Metropolitan Police and the Police Department of the city of
Hamburg.
5 For a short introduction cf. C.A.S.E. Collective 2006; Wæver 1995, pp. 46–86.
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The camp of confrontation
Like all over Europe, the middle classes in London and Hamburg dis-
cussed intensively whether and under which circumstances class conflict
could become a danger for the city or for the nation. This question was
closely connected to their perception of an imminent transformation of the
societal distribution of power. Two distinct positions can be clearly dis-
cerned. On the one hand, there were those who could be described as the
‘camp of confrontation’, comprising conservatives as well as some liberals
– on the German side, especially many national liberals. Supporters of this
camp consistently endeavoured to securitize the labour movement. On the
other hand, there was the ‘camp of dialogue’, the adherents of which pro-
moted social reform. This camp particularly included supporters of the
Radical Party in London, the so-called ‘Kathedersozialisten’ in Hamburg.
Contrary to the camp of confrontation, supporters of the ‘camp of dia-
logue’ often tried to rather desecuritize social conflict. It is worthwhile to
have a closer look at both sides. We will start with the adherents of the
camp of confrontation, for whom security was a most prominent issue.
In London as well as in Hamburg, new evidence of social unrest in the
last decades of the nineteenth century gave conservatives occasion to call
for a larger and more powerful police force and for new and more restric-
tive laws. This call for more security generally referred to the threat that
the middle and upper classes perceived in face of the growing power of
the organized working classes. The exact way this menace was defined
differed according to the situation. After the pillage of the luxury bou-
tiques of London’s West End in February 1886, for example, the affected
shopkeepers highlighted the damage to their property and blamed the
Metropolitan Police for not having been able to prevent the rioting.6 Simi-
larly, in October and November 1887, when Trafalgar Square became the
stage for huge protest meetings of unemployed labourers, hotel owners
and traders lamenting the economic loss these demonstrations had caused
requested police protection.7
However, with the aim to stabilize the traditional power structure, calls
for security tended to assume dimensions that surpassed the urban context.
1
6 The National Archives, HO 144/165/A42380; Thomas Goode: To the editor of The
Times, in The Times, 9 February 1886, p. 6.
7 The Unemployed in London, in Illustrated London News, 29 October 1887, p. 504;
The Defence of Trafalgarsquare, in The Times, 14 October 1887, p. 6.
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For instance, anti-socialist journalists did not restrict themselves to portray
the dock strikes as an economic disaster for both cities, but rather de-
scribed them as a danger for the social order (i.e. a danger that concerned
not only the city but also the nation as a whole). In 1889, the London dock
directors stressed that the dock labourers’ strike was not a wage dispute
but a power struggle.8 By this they tried to strengthen their claim for more
police protection of strike breakers. With even more emphasis, the Ham-
burg employers put forward the same argument to justify their refusal of
an offer for an arbitrational settlement of the strike in 1896/97.9
Moreover, in both cities the entrepreneurs and their supporters depicted
the walkouts as declarations of social war by international social democra-
cy. The London dock directors believed that “the strike was finally deter-
mined upon by the Socialistic section of a Labour Congress held in
Switzerland a few weeks previously”.10 And a journalist of The Globe and
Traveller was convinced that there were “persons who would wish nothing
better than, for ulterior ends, to see London in a state of darkness and
famine. Such things have been literally threatened, as incidents in a gener-
al war.” For him, the strike was “but part and parcel of an organized cam-
paign of labour against the capital.”11 With such claims, the dock com-
panies and the employer-oriented press supported their call for a stronger
police intervention in the strike. Similarly in Hamburg, the entrepreneurs
alleged that the International Federation of Ship, Dock and Riverside
Workers, founded a few months earlier in London, had instigated the
strike. Whereas the simpler variant of this theory blamed the English
union leaders to have persuaded the Hamburg workmen to strike, a more
complex variant saw British dock companies as the culprits, who, in order
to damage their German competitors, had bribed the English union leaders
to drive their German comrades into the strike.12 This conspiracy theory
8 The Globe and Traveller, 24 August 1889, p.3.
9 Der Strike, in Hamburger Nachrichten, 28 November 1896, Morgen-Ausgabe, ers-
te Beilage; Zum Streik der Hafenarbeiter. Die Antwort des Arbeitgeberverbandes
an Herrn Senator Dr. Hachmann, in Der Hamburgische Correspondent, 3 Decem-
ber 1896, Morgen-Ausgabe, p. 11.
10 M.C. Norwood: Report on the late labour strike, 3 October 1889, The National
Archives, MEPO 2/226.
11 The Strike, in The Globe and Traveller, 26 August 1889, p. 4.
12 Zum Streik der Hafenarbeiter, in Der Hamburgische Correspondent, 29 November
1896, Mittags-Ausgabe, p. 2; Englische Brandstiftungen, in Hamburger Nachrich-
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made the alleged danger appear more sinister and the call for security
measures more urgent.
Such an interpretation securitized the strikes, claiming that they were
no longer private affairs between entrepreneurs and workers, but existen-
tial threats to society. Whereas the question whether the state had the right
or the duty to intervene into labour conflicts remained controversial
among entrepreneurs, according to their interpretation as existential
threats, strikes turned into public issues to which the state was supposed to
react. And the greater the danger, the more drastic the measures against
strikers could be demanded. Thus, the Hamburg ship owners and their
supporters considered the proposal to convene an arbitration tribunal in or-
der to settle the strike as inappropriate or even dangerous. Instead, periodi-
cals that took side with the entrepreneurs advocated a renewal of Bismar-
ck’s anti-socialist laws. For instance, the conservative Hamburger Nach-
richten claimed, “If our laws are not sufficient to protect us, we need to
create new laws in the greatest hurry, in order to be able to oppose the ene-
my of our welfare.”13
In the camp of confrontation, security was a frequently debated issue
that enjoyed high priority in the discussion of social conflict. All in all, the
line of argument was similar in both cities. However, while security dis-
course prevailed in Hamburg, where it was shared by conservatives and
national liberals alike, it was less dominant in London. For example, the
interpretation of the dock strike as a socialist attempt to overthrow the so-
cial order—i.e. as a security threat—was not able to assert itself in the
British metropolis. The advocates of social reform constituted a much
stronger counterweight to the camp of confrontation than they did in Ham-
burg.
The camp of dialogue
Compared to the camp of confrontation, the social reformers referred rela-
tively seldom to security. Moreover, their security discourses diverged no-
tably. The most obvious difference was that the social reformers preferred
2
ten, 1 December 1896, Morgen-Ausgabe, p. 1; Lokales. Zum Streik der Hafenar-
beiter, in Börsenhalle, 1 December 1896, Nachmittags-Ausgabe.
13 Die Tyrannei einer kleinen Majorität, in Hamburger Nachrichten, 25 December
1896, Morgen-Ausgabe.
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other strategies for handling social conflict. For example, during the Ham-
burg strike, an article in the left-liberal Kieler Neueste Nachrichten
stressed that the period was “so much on the move and in danger socially
and economically that the aim should be to mitigate and reconcile the
clashing interests, instead of aggravating them.”14 The author was con-
vinced that this was the only way to “take the most dangerous and violent-
ly revolutionary edge off the social movement.” Social reformers relied on
dialogue and conciliation rather than on showdown and combat. Even if,
as we could see here, some social reformers warned that fierce suppres-
sion would lead to a radicalization of the working classes, in sum, they did
not so much fear the working class itself as the escalation of social antago-
nism. And the threat of escalation was a distant one; it was not an immedi-
ate one, pressing for securitization.
The British settlement movement best represents the ideals of the camp
of dialogue. Toynbee Hall, as well as other settlements, acted out of the
conviction that one of the reasons for the disruption of social peace was
the increasing urban segregation of rich and poor city districts.15 Inviting
Oxbridge graduates to live for some time in metropolitan slums, the settle-
ment houses pursued the target to promote mutual knowledge and under-
standing between classes. Social scientists shared these convictions. The
social researcher Charles Booth, for example, took the motivation for his
seminal study Life and Labour of the People of London from the desire to
gain deeper knowledge about the London poor.16
In Hamburg, too, social reformers believed that dialogue with and bet-
ter understanding of the working classes could help to overcome social
disruption. For instance, the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies recommended
studying the living conditions of the urban working classes on an impartial
scientific basis in order to avoid an exacerbation of social conflict. As a
sociologist, he felt compelled to interfere with the Hamburg dock strike,
sharply criticizing the dock directors’ intransigent position and their will
to “be and remain the masters.”17 Like many social reformers, he advocat-
ed as a matter of principle the settlement of labour conflicts by arbitration.
The Hamburg dock strike appeared all the more significant to him because
he believed that it had turned into a dispute about “the fundamental
14 Bildung und Arbeit, in Kieler Neueste Nachrichten, 30 January 1897.
15 Briggs/Macarntey 1984; Meacham 1987.
16 Booth 1902f.
17 Tönnies 2010a, p. 224.
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question whether such conflicts should be fought out until the submission
of one party or whether they should be terminated by arbitrational activi-
ty.”18 In his writings and in two speeches at strike assemblies, Tönnies
propagated the building-up of strong trade unions, as these would enable
the labourers to negotiate.19 In January 1897, he and some other professors
and clergymen tried to help the strikers with an appeal for donations. The
aim was, “for the sake of the idea”, to create the conditions that would en-
able “the one side as well as the other to lead the negotiations without the
pressure of imminent misery.”20 With the appeal for donations and for a
peaceful settlement of the labour dispute, the group of professors and cler-
gymen tried to work against the widening of the social power gap, which
they considered as harmful.
Advocating dialogue and negotiations, many adherents of liberal social
reform rejected the securitization of the working classes. Tönnies, for ex-
ample, condemned that the entrepreneurs and their supporters forecasted
doomsday scenarios for political purposes. “The interpretation of social
conflicts is still left to the interested parties, i.e. the political troglodytes,
who produce artificial lightning and thunder, in order to make believe that
a thunderstorm had broken out,” he deplored, convinced that from an “un-
biased viewpoint the issue did not really appear very dangerous.”21 Simi-
lar attempts to desecuritize the urban social conflict are found on the
British side. A famous example is the often-cited appraisal of slum life in
the introductory chapter of Booth’s inquiry: “The hordes of barbarians of
whom we have heard, who, issuing from their slums, will one day over-
whelm modern civilization, do not exist. There are barbarians, but they are
a handful, a small and decreasing percentage: a disgrace but not a dan-
ger.”22
Like Booth, many social reformers preferred to evoke other values,
such as justice, honour, and moral or Christian obligations in order to jus-
tify their call for social reforms. During the London dock strike, for in-
stance, Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper praised the strikers, who had “with
18 Berliner Börsenzeitung, 22 January 1896, p. 3; for the social reformers’ commit-
ment to arbitrational settlement of labour conflicts, cf. Reulecke 1981; vom Bruch
1981.
19 Tönnies 2010b, p. 156; Tönnies 2010a, p. 222.
20 Berliner Börsenzeitung, 22 January 1896, p. 3.
21 Tönnies, 2010b, p. 100, p. 157.
22 Booth 1902, vol. 1.1, p. 39.
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manly dignity asserted the rights of labour to fair remuneration.”23 Liberal
London newspapers also greatly emphasized human rights or, as they put
it, the “right to live.”24 Reynold’s Newspaper maintained: “The question
between capital and labour for the future is to be stated in this way: How
much payment suffices for decent livelihood.”25 And in overt opposition
to the entrepreneurs’ interpretation of the strike, the same paper argued:
“The great strike is not a conspiracy of idealists, but a combination of
earnest men in defence of the simple right to live in a condition that may
make life tolerable.”26
Although such an emphasis on the entitlement to wages allowing a min-
imum standard of living was more prominent on the British side, the view-
points of social reform were quite similar in the two cities. On the whole,
however, the social reform camp was much weaker in Hamburg. The reac-
tion to the appeal for donations by the social reformers clearly illustrates
this. All middle-class Hamburg newspapers harshly criticized this inter-
vention into the labour conflict. Moreover, the conservative and national
liberal press portrayed not only the labour movement but also its middle-
class supporters as a danger to the social order. Securitization is often part
of the construction of the ‘enemy’ and serves as a vehicle for inclusion
and exclusion. Accordingly, the recommendation of the Hamburger Nach-
richten as to sanctions against the authors of the appeal for donations was
as follows: “Although the social question is, as the Hamburg strike proves
once again, a question of power and war, unfortunately martial law cannot
be applied to such actions. But the mildest punishment, which has to be
imposed by the bourgeois society itself, as long as there is no anti-socialist
law, is exclusion.”27 Moreover, the conservative and national liberal press
demanded to implement censorship measures for university lecturers.28
This suggestion was not followed up. Yet the authors of the appeal for do-
nations were sanctioned. They were prosecuted for illegal fundraising, and
the University of Kiel summoned two of its professors who were among
23 The Strike Settled, in Lloyd’s Weekly, 15 September 1889, p. 1.
24 Justice for Dock Workers, in Lloyd’s Weekly, 1 September 1889, p. 1.
25 The Democratic World, in Reynold’s Newspaper, 1 September 1889, p. 3.
26 Special Notes, in Reynold‘s Newspaper, 25 September 1889, p. 8.
27 Hamburg, 26. Januar, in Hamburger Nachrichten, 26 January 1897, Abend-Aus-
gabe.
28 Der Professoren-Socialismus, in Hamburger Nachrichten, 25 January 1897,
Abend-Ausgabe.
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the signatories of the appeal and urged them to justify themselves.29 As for
Tönnies, his support of the strikers brought him into the disrepute of being
a social democrat and affected his scholarly career. For years to come, he
had difficulty getting a full professorship.30 And professor of economics
Heinrich Herkner, feeling politically and professionally ostracized in the
Germen Empire after having signed the appeal of support for the strikers,
moved to Switzerland in 1898.31
In London, by contrast, the advocates of social reform found much
more acceptance and were able to shape social policy to a considerable de-
gree. They were also far from falling into disrepute. For example, during
the London strike, settlement residents helped the strikers to organize the
strike pay.32 After the strike’s end, Samuel Barnett, the founder and War-
den of Toynbee Hall, invited the strike leaders “to celebrate the victory”
with a “supper party.”33 However, taking the working classes’ side did not
tarnish Barnett’s reputation. The high respect shown towards the commit-
ment of the social reformers enabled them to take on an intermediary role
and thus constituted one of the conditions for the successful settlement of
the London strike by arbitration.
In order to explain why the Hamburg entrepreneurs’ efforts to securitize
the labour conflict were successful, two points need to be considered.
First, the Hamburg employers had a very important position in Hamburg
and could use their close personal connections to members of the Senate
for numerous meetings and face-to-face negotiations with leading decision
makers.34 Besides, they definitely had a strong influence over the Ham-
burg middle-class press, although the surviving sources give no evidence
that they exerted any direct pressure on journalists or editors, as the social
democratic newspaper Das Hamburger Echo suspected.35 The second and
probably more important reason was that the Hamburg entrepreneurs and
their supporters were in accord with a wide spread anti-socialist feeling
29 Hamburg, 26. März, in Neue Hamburger Zeitung, 26 March 1897, p. 1; Tages-Ue-
bersicht, in General-Anzeiger für Hamburg-Altona, 12 February 1897, p. 1.
30 Cf. Tönnies/Paulsen 1961, pp. 330–332.
31 Herkner 1924, pp. 97–99.
32 Toynbee Record, vol. 2, no. 1, October 1889, pp. 7–10; vol. 2, no. 2, November
1889, p. 20.
33 Pall Mall Gazette, 23 September 1889.
34 Evans 1987, pp. 1–50; Hamburger Staatsarchiv 111-1 Cl XI Gen No. 2. Vol 74
Fasc 1b.
35 Das Hamburger Echo, 7 January 1897.
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and a strong tradition of securitization of the working classes that had re-
sulted in Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws and exacerbated the class conflict
in the German Empire.
In London, the political field was quite different. Liberal attitudes had
more impact in England generally, while the labour movement was weaker
than in Germany. Contrary to Germany, the middle class did not believe
that a socialist revolution was an imminent danger, and consequently a co-
operation between liberals and working class organisations was not scan-
dalized in the same way as it was in Germany.
The organized working classes
When the middle classes raised the topic of urban security, the potential
dangerousness of the labour movement was at the centre of controversy.
The organized labour classes themselves inevitably had to take a stand on
this issue. Their discourse remained most ambivalent in both cities. On the
one hand, working class and social democratic organisations had an inter-
est in demonstrating their power and threatening revolution. For instance,
agitators regarded it as one of the main purposes of the mass processions
of the unemployed or of socialist ‘monster meetings’ in 1886 and 1887
that the sheer number of protesters should impress and intimidate the Lon-
don middle classes. In this vein, Henry Hyndman addressed himself to the
labourers at a socialist meeting only three weeks after the Trafalgar Square
riots: “It was by combination that they would be able to put such fear into
the hearts of the governing classes that they would no longer refrain from
taking the case of the masses into account.”36 Thus, being securitized gave
power to the labour movement.
On the other hand, the spokespersons of organised labour were eager to
desecuritize the working classes. After the London West End riots as well
as following the Hamburg riots of 1890 or the two days of rioting in the
aftermath of the Hamburg dock strike, socialists and working class organi-
zations emphasized that no honest workman was to blame for violence,
demolition and spoliation, but that “mischievous youths,” “professional
3
36 Monster Socialist Meeting in Hyde Park, in Reynolds Newspaper, 28 February
1886, p. 1.
Christine Krüger and Friedrich Lenger
248
thieves” or “roughs and rowdies”—who “could not claim to call them-
selves labourers”—had committed the offences.37
This ambivalent security discourse is due to the aim of the working-
class organisations to redefine the tasks of the state. Again, this can be ex-
plained by the fact that the guarantee of security was traditionally one of
the state’s reasons for being, while it was not yet a common conviction
that the guarantee of social welfare and social justice belonged to the
scope of state duties. Thus, the menace of revolution could advance social
reform. However, threatening social upheaval was a double-edged strate-
gy, as the state’s security policy tended to be police repression instead of
social reform. To some extent, this might explain why socialist leaders of-
ten stressed the fact that time was not yet ripe for revolution.38 By this
they implied that the dangers of a more distant future might be prevented
by timely reforms.
While the labour movement became an object of securitization, it was
hardly able to use securitization as an instrument of empowerment for its
own purposes. This is clearly demonstrated by the example of the Ham-
burg dock strikes. If the strikers wanted to be victorious, they had to suc-
ceed in two respects. Firstly, they had to impede the employers from re-
cruiting blacklegs on a large scale. This was particularly difficult for the
dock labourers who, being unskilled, could easily be replaced. Therefore,
strikers repeatedly tried to intimidate strike breakers by menacing them or
even by using physical violence.39 However, deterring blacklegs was only
one condition for winning the strike. The second condition was to provide
sufficient funds in order to guarantee the strike pay for an unforeseeable
duration. As union membership had been low before the strikers laid down
work, they depended on affluent sympathizers (i.e. they needed the good-
will at least of parts of the “Bürgertum”). This meant that they had to re-
frain from physical violence as an instrument of power. This explains why,
in the working class press and at the strikers’ assemblies, labour leaders
37 The Rioting in London, in Reynolds Newspaper, 14 February 1886, p. 4; The Riots
in the West-End, in Pall Mall Gazette, 9 February 1886, p. 9; Eine regelrechte Re-
volte, in Das Hamburger Echo, 14 May 1890; cf. Grüttner 1984, p. 145f.; more
generally for this kind of argumentation, cf. Lindenberger 1993.
38 Special Notes, in Reynolds Newspaper, 25 August 1889, p. 8.
39 Hamburger Staatsarchiv, 331-3/7138.
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repeatedly urged their audience, to prove their discipline and not to lapse
into violence.40
The ambivalence inherent in the conditions for settling the labour dis-
pute with the desired outcome permeated the whole walkout. While on the
one hand the strike leaders recommended to renounce violence, on the
other hand they permitted to read out the names of blacklegs, well aware
that this was an invitation for applying sanctions that could easily end in
violence.41 Another illustration of the conflicting strategies of the strikers
may be found in the conversation of some dock labourers that was record-
ed by a police spy, who had shadowed a working class pub.42 In this con-
versation, one of the strikers described his encounter with two blacklegs.
He had tried verbally to convince them to lay down their work, but with-
out success. Thereupon, “[I]t would not have taken much,” he admitted,
“and he had slapped them into the face.” Another striker admonished him
not to resort to violence. Otherwise they would lose “the sympathy of the
public,” and thus harm their own interests. A third interlocutor affirmed,
believing that the employers were only waiting for an escalation of vio-
lence. He preferred to stigmatize the blacklegs, for example, by publishing
their names in the newspaper.
The strikers had few instruments of power in order to deter the strike
breakers. Therefore, violence could serve as a last resort. However, the
lack of financial means also kept them in a dependency that proscribed vi-
olence. Therefore, strikers also tried to make use of securitization as an al-
ternative way to exercise power against blacklegs and entrepreneurs.
Again and again, they blamed the dock directors for endangering the city
by using foreigners as strike-breakers. In fact, already in the very first
days of the walkout, the employers had threatened to hire thousands of
Italian workers.43 Although this particular threat was not carried out, they
were soon able to recruit two or three thousand new labourers, many of
whom came from abroad.44 During the strike assemblies and in the social-
40 E.g. Bericht über Öffentliche Versammlung der am Petersen-Kai beschäftigten Ar-
beiter, 28 November 1896, Hamburger Staatsarchiv, 331-3/7095.
41 Polizei-Offiziant Burow, Bericht über die öffentliche Versammlung der Getreidear-
beiter und Schiffsmaler, 24 January 1897, Hamburger Staatsarchiv, 331-1/7123.
42 Polizei-Offiziant Graumann, Vigilanz-Bericht, 7 December 1896, Hamburger
Staatsarchiv, 331-1/7122.
43 G. H. Blohm: Zum Strike der Schauerleute, in Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 24 No-
vember 1896.
44 Hamburger Staatsarchiv 331-3/7119; 331-3/1723; cf. Bieber p. 125.
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ist press, the alleged great dangers of this immigration were a big issue.
The strikers were convinced that the hygienic, moral and educational stan-
dards—especially of the Polish, Italian, African and Asian immigrants—
were inferior to their own. They believed that the influx of foreign work-
ers into Hamburg would not only exacerbate the problem of unemploy-
ment but also increase the crime rate.45 Yet an even more serious warning
was that the foreigners would introduce disease.46 This threat was particu-
larly alarming because the disastrous cholera epidemic of 1892 that had
claimed the lives of more than 8,000 victims in 1892 was still fresh in
their memory.47
The warning of such imminent danger that threatened the whole city
served three purposes. First, it portrayed the native Hamburg labourers as
‘safer’—i.e. less dangerous than the foreigners—and it contributed to the
aforementioned target of ‘desecuritizing’ the working class. Second, the
warning against immigration had the target of mobilising those parts of the
Hamburg population that were not directly concerned by the strike and
thus rallying them to join their side. This seems to have been successful at
least for a part of the petty bourgeoisie.48 Third, it allowed the strikers to
call upon the Hamburg Senate for intervention. The social democratic
newspaper Das Hamburger Echo, for example, wrote: “Indeed, the mass
immigration of degenerated and ragged foreigners, who pose the greatest
social and sanitary danger for the state of Hamburg, is a crime. It is the
task and the duty of the police to prevent such crimes.”49 Whereas the
question whether the state ought to intervene in labour conflicts was high-
ly controversial among the contemporaries, the defence against epidemics
belonged to the traditional and unquestioned functions of the state. And
45 E.g. Hamburger Neuigkeiten. Der Streik der Hafenarbeiter, in Das Hamburger
Echo, 25 November 1896; Polizei-Offiziant Thomas, Bericht über Versammlung
der Werftarbeiter 27 November 1896, Hamburger Staatsarchiv, 331-3/7095; Poli-
zei-Offiziant Baumann, Bericht über die Mitglieder-Versammlung des Verbandes
der Hafenarbeiter und Speicherarbeiter, 27 November 1896, Hamburger Staatsar-
chiv, 331-3/7095.
46 Die schwarze und gelbe Bemannung, in Das Hamburger Echo, 14 January 1897;
cf. numerous reports about strikers’ assemblies, Hamburger Staatsarchiv,
331-3/7095 and 331-3/7125.
47 Cf. Evans 1987, passim.
48 Zum Streik der Hafenarbeiter, in Hamburgischer Correspondent, 4 December
1896, Abend-Ausgabe, p. 3.
49 Hamburger Neuigkeiten, in Das Hamburger Echo, 29 November 1896.
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indeed the city government reacted to these appeals. The Senate ordered
the inspection of the hygienic standards of the mass accommodation cen-
tres, in which the strike-breakers lived, and it spoke out against the immi-
gration of Italian workers, but it took no further steps to stop the recruit-
ment of foreigners during the strike.50
The alarmist warning of the allegedly dangerous immigrants also had
side effects. The resentments against strike-breakers—Germans and for-
eigners alike—lasted a long time. It strengthened nationalist and xenopho-
bic feelings among the Hamburg working class and among the petty bour-
geoisie. This unintended consequence further illustrates the limited agency
of the labour movement being unable to channel the securitization towards
its actual goals.
Security policies
Although securitization referred to varying objects according to the differ-
ent political camps, its main objective was usually to impel the state to ac-
tion. For many contemporaries, the state’s primary task was to guarantee
security. As it remained highly controversial whether social questions be-
longed to the state’s tasks and duties as well, it seemed a more effective
strategy to define demands regarding social problems in terms of security.
However, conservatives, liberal social reformers and the organized work-
ing classes all placed different expectations upon the state ranging from
intensified policing to far-reaching social reforms.
While social reforms were slow and contested as a matter of principle,
police action was immediate and customary, and the exercise of height-
ened police vigilance was normally the first statutory measure when social
conflict threatened to escalate. As the raison d’être of the police was the
safeguarding of domestic security, the fact that security was a prime value
for the police forces in both cities is self-explanatory. However, the po-
lice’s security policies in Hamburg differed considerably from those in
London. The Hamburg police clearly regarded the labour movement as a
danger to the city and took strong action against it. During the Hamburg
dock strike, they suppressed picketing, blocked the free access to the har-
4
50 Hamburger Staatsarchiv, 331-3/7112; Morandi 2004, pp. 121–125.
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bour, and forbade street collections in favour of the strikers.51 The political
division of the Hamburg police had kept its surveillance routines, which
Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws had established. As indicated, policemen in
plain clothes regularly spied on workers’ pubs and meetings, and they
meticulously recorded the discussions they overheard.52 These actions
helped the police, for instance, to detect the British trade unionist Tom
Mann, who visited Hamburg in September 1896 to promote the Interna-
tional Federation of Ship, Dock and Riverside Workers founded shortly
before. The police arrested him and forced him to travel back to Eng-
land.53 The irritation this security measure provoked amongst the Ham-
burg dock workers was an important trigger for the strike that broke out
only two months later.54 During that strike, Tom Mann secretly travelled
again to Hamburg with the aim of convincing the dock workers to resume
work, because the leaders of the International Federation feared that the
walkout, taking place in the middle of winter, would have little prospect of
success and would therefore weaken international trade unionism. Again,
the Hamburg police detected and expelled Tom Mann. Examining his be-
longings, they found, alongside some moustache wax and toothpicks, a
letter warning “that it would be a serious blow to the Int. Fed. if the Ham-
burg Dockers were defeated […]. Whereas if the men [could] be induced
to return to work, even on a small concession, it would be a victory and
[would] lessen the danger of involving the Int. Fed. in the gulf.”55 Al-
though Senator Georg Hachmann, the head of the police, admitted in a let-
ter to the Hamburg mayor Johannes Versmann that he did not know
whether there was a legal footing for an inspection of Mann’s correspon-
dence, the police confidentially sent a copy of this letter to the dock direc-
51 Bieber 1978, pp. 131–132.
52 Cf. Evans 1989 as well as Owzar 2006.
53 Hamburger Staatsarchiv, 331-1/7753.
54 Cf. Bieber 1978, pp. 111-112; already the strikers themselves were convinced of
this effect of Tom Mann’s arrestation and expulsion, cf. e.g. Polizei-Offiziant
Grimmelshäuser, Bericht über die öffentliche Versammlung der Kohlenarbeiter, 24
November 1896.
55 Letter by Tom Chambers to Tom Mann, November 1896, Staatsarchiv Hamburg,
331-3/7095.
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tors’ association.56 Consequently, the dock directors hardened their intran-
sigent position and decided to outfight the strikers at all costs.
The Hamburg police was able to implement its restrictive security mea-
sures without taking into account the criticism of the working-class orga-
nizations, social democrats or social reformers. The London Metropolitan
Police, by contrast, had a more limited scope for its security policy. The
conflict between the Police Commissioner, Charles Warren, and the Home
Secretary, Henry Matthews, in 1887, shows this clearly. Warren, who was
appointed Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police shortly after
the West End Riots, wanted to show that the police had learnt a lesson
from this failure. He was convinced that the mass demonstrations in 1887
were a “danger to the safety of the Metropolis” bound to end in a “catas-
trophe.” Therefore, he advocated repressive measures against the
protestors and was determined to dispel them from Trafalgar Square.57
Matthews, on the contrary, felt uneasy in this respect and commissioned
various legal opinions to help him decide on the matter. Again and again
he stopped Warren, insisting on the principle: “The Police must at all
events keep within the law.”58 Warren eventually succeeded in convincing
Matthews of the need to ban political manifestations from Trafalgar
Square through legal quibbling.59 However, considerable parts of the Lon-
don press heavily criticized the violent expulsion of protestors on ‘Bloody
Sunday,’ which was exerted under his responsibility. During the London
dock strike, one and a half years later, Warren’s successor,60 James Monro,
was anxious not to give way to the dock companies’ peremptory demands
to combat picketing. Like Matthews, Monro stressed that the police had to
act “in accordance with, and within the limits of law” and to maintain “an
56 Letter by Gustav Roscher to Carl Ferdinand Laeisz, 26 November 1896; letter by
Georg Hachmann to Johannes Versmann, 1 December 1896, Hamburg,
331-3/7095.
57 Letter by Charles Warren to Godfrey Lushington, 8 October 1887, The National
Archives, HO 144/204/A47976/1TO70. Cf. for Warren’s position and the conflicts
between him and the Home Office Bailey 1981.
58 Letter by Henry Matthew to Charles Warren, 2 November 1887, The National
Archives, HO 144/204/A47976/ 1TO70.
59 Letter by Charles Warren to Henry Matthews, 31 October 1887, The National
Archives, HO 144/204/A47976/ 1TO70.
60 Warren resigned from office in November 1888 primarily because of his failure to
catch Jack the Ripper, but also because of his discrepancies with the Home Office.
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attitude of the strictest impartiality.”61 And Monro, quite like Home Secre-
tary Matthews, was not only concerned with law but also with the judg-
ment of the public, as they believed the people would condemn police sup-
pression of protestors or of strikers.62
Police measures in both cities seem to reflect the different degree of
significance that the security issues played in the public discourse of both
cities. However, it would be erroneous to equate the municipal govern-
ment in Hamburg with the camp of confrontation depicted above or to be-
lieve that state action in London was inspired by social reform. Although
in Britain the state was also in the process of slowly changing the defini-
tion of its traditional tasks, the immediate state reaction to the demonstra-
tions of the unemployed and to the dock strike remained restricted to po-
lice and juridical measures. In Hamburg, however, the dock strike directly
prompted the Senate to initiate several social reforms. Just after the end of
the strike, the Hamburg Senate convened a “Commission zur Überprüfung
der Arbeitsverhältnisse im Hafen” (Review Commission of the Working
Conditions in the Harbor).63 Moreover, the city engaged a port inspector.
In an internal report about the strike, the police department, although it
had so decidedly taken side with the employers during the labour conflict,
even proposed to the Senate to introduce permanent boards of conciliation
and arbitration, but this suggestion was not yet carried out in the immedi-
ate future.64 However, all these initiatives aimed at the detection of
grievances and at the prevention of future strikes. Although working-class
leaders doubted the impartiality and effectiveness of the report and the in-
spector alike,65 these measures were important novelties showing that the
61 Letter by James Monro to Godfrey Lushington, 23 September 1889, The National
Archives, H 144/227/A50732; Letter by James Monro to Henry Matthews, The
National Archives, September 1889, MEPO 2/472.
62 Letter by Henry Matthews to Godfrey Lushington, The National Archives, HO
144/204/A47976/1TO70, 15 November 1887; letter by James Monro to C.M. Nor-
wood, 19 September 1889, MEPO 2/226.
63 Cf. Protokolle der Senats-Commission für die Prüfung der Arbeitsverhältnisse im
Hamburger Hafen über die Vernehmung von Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern,
Hamburg 1898; Bericht der Senats-Commission für die Prüfung der Arbeitsver-
hältnisse im Hamburger Hafen, Hamburg 1898.
64 Der Streik der Hamburger Hafenarbeiter 1896/97. Amtliche Darstellung nach den
Akten der Abtheilung 2 (Politische und Criminal-Polizei) der Polizei-Behörde,
Hamburg 1897, p. 115.
65 Hamburger Staatsarchiv, 331-1/7153; Carl Lindow: Die Verkehrs- und Arbeitsver-
hältnisse im Hamburger Hafen, Berlin 1915, pp. 209–210.
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municipal government assumed social responsibility and started to accept
a mediating role in social conflict. This was, in a way, the flip side of the
entrepreneurial success in securitizing working-class unrest. In order to
avoid the Senate’s commission, which—whatever its biases against work-
ing class interests—meant an intrusion into a space claimed as a sphere of
entrepreneurial authority, desecuritization would have been a prerequisite
—an option not available due to the earlier securitization.
However, the changing perception of the state’s tasks cannot be ex-
plained solely by the willingness to resolve social conflict, let alone by the
inclination to reduce power imbalances, but rather has to be seen in a
wider context. There was a range of other factors that made urban poverty
appear threatening and called for social reforms. The growing slums be-
came a source of serious preoccupation as they were believed to be not on-
ly hotbeds of revolution, but also breeding grounds for immorality, crimi-
nality, and disease. In Hamburg, the cholera epidemic of 1892 nourished
such perceptions, quite like in London with the murders committed by
Jack the Ripper in 1888.66 Often, different concerns mingled, as can be
seen, for example, in the development of an increasing state activity to en-
hance the housing conditions for the poor.
Conclusion
It is obvious that security discourses dominated politics and policy much
more in Hamburg, where all political camps tried to use securitization as
an instrument of power. Questioning the reasons for the varying degrees of
effectiveness of securitization or desecuritization and also the different
agency of the police in both cities, we have already mentioned that the po-
litical antagonism was seated more deeply and boundaries between social
democracy and liberalism were much sharper in the German Empire than
in Britain, where the labour movement was weaker but received more
recognition by the middle class. Moreover, it was decisive that the under-
standing of the state fundamentally diverged in both cities. Securitization
usually went along with an appeal to state action, either highlighting the
necessity of police intervention or calling for new laws or for the creation
of new statutory institutions as, for example, boards of arbitration. This
5
66 Cf. Walkowitz 2011; Evans 1987; as well as Lenger 2013, pp. 251-255.
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explains why the conflicting parties tried to use securitization more often
in Hamburg than in London, where traditionally more distrust in state ac-
tion prevailed. It also explains why the police was more reticent in the
British metropolis.
If contemporaries used securitization with the primary aim to provoke
the intervention of the state, i.e. to make statutory power work for their
own goals, the effects were not restricted to this mechanism. Securitiza-
tion also tended to exacerbate antagonism, be it between the working
classes and the middle classes, between the camp of confrontation and the
camp of social reform or between strikers and strike-breakers. Not least,
due to this exacerbation of antagonism, the Hamburg entrepreneurs suc-
ceeded in strengthening their own position of power and in weakening the
camp of social reform. Again, however, neither the Hamburg workers nor
the London dock directors were able to use this mechanism for their own
purposes, despite having tried to make use of it. Therefore, some of the
strikers believed that the only effective instruments of power they had at
hand were threats, intimidation and violence, but these were ambivalent
and contested, as they could easily lead to repressive police reaction. Se-
curitization, however, which as an instrument of power seemed less prob-
lematic in this respect, remained reserved for those groups who were act-
ing from a position of strength and were able to use also “authoritative”
and financial power to influence the public and the authorities.
Epilogue
While the conceptual apparatus of the Copenhagen School—if enlarged by
the attention paid to audiences by Thierry Balzacq and others—has clearly
demonstrated its usefulness in highlighting why a securitization of labour
unrest did not take place in London and why the securitizing move of the
dockworkers in Hamburg in the end proved unsuccessful, a comparative
look at power relations in our two cities suggests the possibility of a dif-
ferent reading.67 However, contrary to authors like Didier Bigo or Jef
Huysmans, we do not turn to security practices and technologies (“banal,
little security nothings”).68 Instead we try to make use of the Foucauldian
6
67 Cf. Balzacq 2011.
68 Huysmans 2011, p. 371; Bigo 2002, esp. p. 73.
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notion of a liberal governmentality, a notion that has not featured promi-
nently in urban history so far.69 In doing so, we are at least methodologi-
cally closer to Foucault’s famous lectures on the history of governmentali-
ty held in 1978/79. As he put it himself, he was investigating “how the
practice of police actually appeared in the texts,” police to be understood
here in the comprehensive early modern meaning of good government and
administration.70 While there are obvious limits to this very specific vari-
ant of a history or genealogy of ideas, the arguments put forward are use-
ful for our comparison if one keeps in mind that the liberalism in Fou-
cault’s concept of liberal governementality is not congruent with liberal
positions in the two political arenas under scrutiny.
There is a certain ambivalence in Foucault’s own use of the terms
sovereignty, disciplinary power and governmental administration. Despite
the author’s explicit denial, they sometimes take on the character of a se-
quence of power techniques or of stages on which one of these power
techniques is prevalent. Risking oversimplification, one could interpret
late nineteenth-century London as a model of liberal governmentality.
While “discipline, by definition, regulates everything,” its liberalist coun-
terpart leaves alone.71 As we will see, this does not imply a strict policy of
non-intervention, but it does presuppose that economy and society are
quasi-natural entities regulating themselves: “the population as a collec-
tion of subjects is replaced by the population as a set of natural phenome-
na.”72 This has at least two implications. The negative one is that the lack
of insight into the mechanisms regulating society and economy on the part
of the state makes state intervention potentially harmful. This risk may be
lessened if the knowledge produced by economists and social scientists is
taken into account whose new importance is, of course, the positive impli-
cation: “The laws and principles of political economy, the collected data
and facts of statistical sciences and the knowledge provided by social sci-
ence are part and parcel of governmentalisation.”73
69 The most important exception being Joyce 2003.
70 Foucault 2007, p. 333.
71 Id., p. 45.
72 Id., p. 352; for a good reconstruction of Foucaults position cf. the first chapter of
Ronge 2015, pp. 33–118, or, more generally, Neocleous 2000, esp. chapters II and
III.
73 Bohlender 2007, p. 253; cf. id., p. 106 (authors‘ translation).
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Now, while a naturalist understanding of population provides ample
justification for a revalorisation of social science, it does not rule out any
intervention in economic or social processes. On the most general level
the liberal laissez-faire attitude produces the need of „the protection of the
collective interest against individual interests.“ Or, as Foucault puts it a lit-
tle later: “The game of freedom and security is at the very heart of this
new governmental reason.”74 Matthias Bohlender has thoroughly investi-
gated English liberal discourse of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
and documents countless utterances rendering Foucault’s assertion more
concrete. Their common denominator is the conviction that the self-regu-
latory mechanisms of society and economics are in constant need of de-
fense. This has occasionally quite surprising implications. The philosopher
and economist Charles Babbage, for example, argued in 1832: “The prin-
ciple, that government ought to interfere as little as possible between
workmen and their employers, is so well established, that it is important to
guard against its misapplication. It is not inconsistent with this principle to
insist on the workmen being paid in money--for this is merely to protect
them from being deceived; and still less is it a deviation from it to limit the
number of hours during which children shall work in factories, or the age
at which they shall commence that species of labour – for they are not free
agents, nor are they capable of judging, if they were; and both policy and
humanity concur in demanding for them some legislative protection. In
both cases it is as right and politic to protect the weaker party from fraud
or force, as it would be impolitic and unjust to interfere with the amount of
the wages of either.”75
Twelve years earlier the economist John R. McCulloch had similarly
defended trade unions and strikes, arguing that employers would never in-
crease wages voluntarily. Therefore, collective pressure would be the only
way to find out whether wage demands would be fair and reasonable—
seemingly just another expression for being in accordance with supply and
demand in the labour market.76 Accordingly, the Morning Post maintained
on September 16, 1889: “We still retain the opinion that all dislocations in
the relations between capital and labour are best left to adjust them-
selves.”77 If documentation were needed that this was by no means a mi-
74 Foucault 2008, p. 65.
75 Babbage 1832, p. 363, paragraph 436 (cited from Bohlender 2007, p. 335).
76 Cited id., pp. 277f.
77 Morning Post, 16th of September 1889, p. 4.
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nority position, it was provided a week later when the Times printed a
speech by Gladstone in which he described the relationship between capi-
tal and labour as “a balance of force, [...] a fair adjustment between them,
which must always determine in what degree the profits of industry ought
to go and are to go to the man who works with his hands, and in what de-
gree they are to go to the capitalist, who is supposed to bring, and general-
ly does bring, as his contribution [...] the use of his brains and the use of
the capital already saved.” Accordingly the former and future premier wel-
comed the result of the strike “as a real social advance; that it tends to a
greater, a more uniform, and a more firm establishment of just relations;
that it tends to a fair principle of division of the fruits of industry.”78
These examples may suffice to bolster the point that at the time of the
events described in the earlier parts of this article, principles of a liberal
governmentality had been firmly established and deeply entrenched in the
English case—a statement different from and completely independent of
any judgement about the relative strength of liberal and conservative
forces in the political arena. This makes it easier to understand why social
reformers like Samuel Barnett, who invited striker leaders to a dinner cele-
brating their success, were not at all ostracized by other middle-class Lon-
doners who might have been less favourably disposed towards the strikers.
It also explains why the statistical material collected with the massive fi-
nancial support of Charles Booth carried much more weight in the English
debate than the ideas of social reformers like Tönnies and Herkner, who
were easily sidelined within the Hamburg debate. Furthermore, it makes
clear that liberal governmentality left little room for the securitization of
labour disputes. Whether that holds true for social policy more generally
seems doubtful, as we have seen with Babbage’s arguments against the in-
famous truck system or in favour of protective regulations of child labour.
These interventions were, however, meant to ensure the smooth and fair
functioning of the self-regulatory mechanisms of economy and society,
while the authoritarian paternalism prevalent in Hamburg showed much
less reluctance to interfere with these mechanisms.79
There are occasional dissenting utterances in Hamburg, for example, a
letter to the editor of the Hamburger Fremdenblatt whose author opined
78 Times, 24th of September 1889, p. 10.
79 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the changes within liberal govern-
mentality needed to enable social policies as demanded by the Fabians and articu-
lated e.g. by the Beveridge plan.
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“that the accomplishment of the demands put forward by the workers
would not have shaken the capitalist order at all,” but this was clearly a
minority position.80 The opposite view was so dominant that the Hambur-
gischer Correspondent could declare it anachronistic to consider “the cur-
rent strike as a merely internal affair of dockworkers and their employ-
ers.”81 In London by contrast, the lesson of the strike widely accepted was
“that the working man of to-day thinks for himself and acts for himself.
He needs instruction – not guardianship and patronage.”82 Such an anti-
paternalist position had little appeal for the middle class in Hamburg. Fur-
thermore, it is hard to imagine a leading politician there or in any other
German city to speak out against any restrictions of anarchist demonstra-
tions by talking of “a handful of insignificant men who used, no doubt,
foolish and violent language on Sunday afternoon in Trafalgar Square, but
who [...] have not committed any offence against the law,” as the later pre-
mier Asquith did in 1893.83
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Power, Security, and Public International Law – an Intricate
Relationship
Thilo Marauhn and Marie-Christin Stenzel
This chapter, taking ius ad bellum and ius in bello as reference areas, fo-
cuses on the triangular relationship between power, security and public in-
ternational law. It addresses the role of international law in processes of
securitization as well as the complementary impact of acts of securitiza-
tion on the development of international law. In this context, the question
is raised to what extent the law legitimizes or constrains power.
Conceptual and terminological framework
Irrespective of whether the origins of public international law are traced
back to antiquity, whether they are linked to the establishment of the mod-
ern nation state, or whether the rise of international law is connected to its
treatment as an academic discipline, war and peace have been at the heart
of early rules. These rules did not only address the beginning and end of
war, including peace treaties (i.e. post-war arrangements), but also the
conduct of hostilities, and related rights and obligations of parties to a con-
flict. Most of these rules, until the early 19th century, were embedded in
natural law, few were treaty-based, and many built upon legal and philo-
sophical writings.
Driven by a search for legal certainty, pertinent international legal rules
have sought to apply a tailor-made approach to the language used in each
respective norm. Their terminology has often been the result of a compro-
mise reached between the parties to an international agreement. Thus, lan-
guage has not necessarily served the purpose to address the apparent ratio-
nale of the legal instrument adopted. It has rather been used to define and
sometimes even limit the scope of obligations undertaken by the parties to
an agreement. This is why war, peace, armed conflict, and other terms
have been preferred to those of the phenomenon of power and the concept
of security by the parties involved.
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With the rise of the modern (sovereign) state, especially after 1648, the
parties to any such agreement have been primarily states. Until today,
states continue to be the primary subjects of public international law; they
are authors, addressees, and guardians of the law. Statehood, even though
many questions are attached thereto, has been defined by reference to a
defined territory, a permanent population and an effective government.
19th century treaty practice has emerged from traditional approaches to
war and peace, governing the beginning and the end of armed conflict, but
has also moved beyond:
• First, as far as sources of international law are concerned, (multilateral)
diplomatic practice has become more and more relevant, and more in-
stitutionalized, thus strengthening treaty practice as well as customary
international law: “The history of international law at the beginning of
the 19th century is not so much the history of principles of law as an
account of the law applied in practice at the time.”1
• Second, and concomitantly to the abovementioned fact, there has been
a notable move from collective, bilateral agreements, such as the First
Peace Treaty of Paris, which was concluded a series of – verbatim –
bilateral treaties but provided momentum to multilateralism, leading to
multilaterally concluded agreements, such as the Final Act of the
Congress of Vienna and the Second Peace Treaty of Paris (both of
1815).
• Third, the concept of ‘humanity’ has become part of international law,
less so because of state practice as embodied in the so-called Lieber
Code,2 but rather in light of the initiation of the Red Cross (and Red
Crescent) Movement by Henry Dunant and the early Geneva Conven-
tions.
• Fourth, international law much more than before has come to address
the future, seeking to implement collective long-term strategies and
promoting stability between states (be it through codification of the
law on diplomatic agents and missions by the Vienna Congress3 or
through the internationalization of rivers to promote commercial ties
1 Scupin 1984, p. 179.
2 The ‘Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Order No. 100’ of April 24, 1863, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/1
9th_century/lieber.asp.
3 Regulation of the Precedence of Diplomatic Agents of 19 March 1815, incorporated
into the Final Act oft he Congress of Vienna of 9 June 1815.
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between states4). Along the same lines, the development of rules for
the peaceful settlement of disputes – building upon arbitration that had
already become quite common in preceding centuries – has come to
enhance the conflict management potential of public international law.
With the advent of administrative unions in the 19th century and the estab-
lishment of the League of Nations after World War I, however, interna-
tional organizations have become a second major player in public interna-
tional law, albeit with limited powers.
Background: Building blocks of collective security
In international relations and in public international law, a three-fold con-
cept of collective security has emerged over time. It is based, first, upon
the obligation of states to settle “international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered” (Article 2 (3) UN Charter) and, second, requires states to “re-
frain in … international relations from the threat or use of force” (Article 2
(4) UN Charter). These two obligations are complemented, third, by mem-
ber state acceptance that “the security of one is the concern of all, and
agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the
peace”.5 While the term ‘collective security’ is not defined in any particu-
lar treaty, the concept has been firmly established in academic literature
and political practice.
At the universal level, the League of Nations and the United Nations
are both considered to be (or have been, respectively) collective security
systems.6 In addition, there is agreement that some regional organizations,
such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU)
can be considered as collective security systems. These are often distin-
guished from systems of collective defence, such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO),7 which, however, in light of post-1989 de-
velopments, has claimed the status of a regional arrangement according to
1.1
4 The Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine was established by Ap-
pendix 16 B to the Final Act of the Vienna Congress of 9 June 1815.
5 Roberts/Zaum 2008, p. 11.
6 Orakhelashvili 2011; de Wet/Wood 2013.
7 De Wet/Wood 2013, p. 2.
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Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and thus may be considered to match the
requirements of both an organization of collective defence and a system of
collective security.8
The debate about the establishment of a collective security system ac-
cording to the criteria outlined above can be traced back to theoretical
schemes for perpetual peace in Europe, most of them going back to the
late 17th or early 18th century.9 In contrast to the impression raised by the
long-time gap between these foundations in the history of ideas and the
emergence of the League of Nations, precedents of a collective security
system or at least of building blocks for such system can be found in the
19th century.
• First, and arguably, the Concert of Europe entails elements of a collec-
tive security system (Thorson 1948), whether or not it can be plausibly
compared to the UN Security Council.10
• Second, treaty practice in the 19th century has contributed to the devel-
opment of the obligation to settle disputes peacefully.11
• Third, and as a pre-requisite that today is often taken for granted, insti-
tutionalized forms of cooperation did not only emerge in the course of
the 19th century but they quickly developed from mere administrative
unions to comprehensive international organizations, with the estab-
lishment of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the
League of Nations being the culmination of this process.
It has rightly been argued that the Concert of Europe “was not based on
any organizational charter or structure but rather on a vague and changing
set of principles, thus leaving open many questions as to its exact na-
ture”.12 In contrast to today’s systems of collective security, it hence can-
not be fully equated to any such normally treaty-based and largely rules-
based system. Nevertheless, “the Concert of Europe proved to be a rela-
tively effective system in avoiding major conflicts and limiting dangers to
the equilibrium” (Hinghofer-Szalkay 2013: 33). One might argue that the
balance of power, diplomatic dialogue and the preservation of legitimacy
were characteristic features of the Concert’s rather successful practice. In
8 Marauhn 2016, pp. 13, 44.
9 Skordas 2016, pp. 8, 9.
10 Orakhelasvili 2011.
11 Pellet 2013.
12 Hinghofer-Szalkay 2013, p. 29.
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any case, it did not entail any overarching legal obligations on the use of
force, on the peaceful settlement of disputes, and on collective sanctions
against an aggressor. Yet, the Concert’s practice was much more impactful
than its legal framework. And as far as power is concerned, it illustrates
the paradox of truly collective security on the one hand and great powers
as ‘administrators’ or ‘guardians’ thereof. While it may thus be argued
that, legally speaking, the Concert stays far behind of what has developed
as a system of collective security, its effects in practice look like an early
image of collective security, based upon power, even hegemonic powers.
One may take this a step further and argue that the Great Powers defined
any threat to their own stability as a security issue, making use of their
own perceptions (heuristics) and adopting their own instruments in re-
sponse.
Until the developments taking place in the 19th century, “the peaceful
settlement of disputes between states appeared as a mere option open to
them as an alternative to war” (Pellet 2013: 6). This has been described by
Emer de Vattel in his “The Law of Nation” as follows: “In doubtful cases
which do not involve essential points, if one of the parties will not accede
either to a conference, an accommodation, a compromise or an arbitration,
the other has only the last resource for the defence of himself and his
rights, – an appeal to this sword”.13 With increasing diplomatic and treaty
practice in the 19th century, mechanisms for the settlement of disputes and
disputes settlement clauses were integrated into such agreements and ar-
rangements. However, it took states until the very end of the 19th century
to enter into an agreement “to use their best efforts to ensure the pacific
settlement of international differences” (Article 1 International Conven-
tion for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes). It may be argued
that the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions were the combination of a de-
velopment which was pursued by states even further into the 20th century,
aimed at reducing recourse to force in the relations between states. The
Covenant of the League of Nations included a similar obligation. Article 2
(3) UN Charter has confirmed the move from a political option to an obli-
gation to settle disputes peacefully. By defining the risk of war and the use
of force between states as issues of security, and by developing the obliga-
tion to settle such disputes peacefully, one may say that states have pur-
sued a process of securitization, i.e. they have deferred their political au-
13 Vattel 1797, p. 455.
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tonomy to an international institutionalized procedure. Securitization thus
understood goes beyond the act of defining a situation as exceptional but
rather focuses on states giving up political discretion in specified areas.
Equally, the formation of administrative unions, and subsequently of in-
ternational organizations, can be described as a process of securitization.
States considered certain challenges, be they related to infrastructure or to
more serious concerns, as relevant for their security and delegated perti-
nent powers to new institutions at the international level, thereby depriv-
ing themselves of parts of their sovereign powers. Thus, they paved the
way for the formation of international organizations as distinct legal enti-
ties with their own powers and competences. The rise of international or-
ganizations as new subjects of public international law can thus be under-
stood as a threefold process of juridification, collectivization and securiti-
zation.
Taking these developments of the 19th century together, diplomatic
practice demonstrated a move towards the concept of collective security in
the modern sense. Whether or not this was a consequence of renewed at-
tention being paid to the history of ideas or whether it was simply due to
the exigencies of political developments is not so important. Even the for-
mation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can be
read as delegating the responsibility for the humanization of warfare to an
entity that can be distinguished from states, in other words, as another pro-
cess of collectivization and securitization. The fact that military alliances
were formed in order to exercise the right of collective defence does not
question these developments, but rather re-enforces the perception of
states that security can better be achieved jointly than individually. On the
whole, the step-by-step development towards collective security has con-
tributed to an increase of predictability of the behavior of states in their
mutual relations.
Old and new narratives about security
The concept of collective security builds on the term ‘security’, which –
from the perspective of international law and international relations – can
be considered to be fairly recent.14 Today, ‘security’ is neither a narrowly
1.2
14 McDonald/Brollowski 2011, p. 5.
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nor a well-defined term. It is manifold, contested, and some even argue
that “the nature of security defies pursuit of an agreed definition”.15 In
modern public international law there are many different approaches to se-
curity, extending from national to international, individual to collective,
narrow to broad, and others. These approaches reflect a variety of narra-
tives from the perspectives of the respective actors in search of security.
Such narratives have changed over time, and it is worthwhile to briefly re-
flect on these changes.
It is not surprising that the notion of security was hardly ever explicit in
public international law instruments preceding the establishment of the
League of Nations. Until then, the notion of ‘security’ – often perceived
by states as ‘national security’ in the 19th century – was rather narrow, and
often limited to military security. This was very much in line with a nar-
row or negative concept of peace, characterized primarily by the absence
of military force. While the League of Nations did not necessarily broaden
the underlying concepts, it is noteworthy that the parallel establishment of
the ILO in 1919 reflects a much broader narrative about security, extend-
ing to the socio-economic sphere and even including human rights ele-
ments such as freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of
association.
In light of the horrors of World War II, it is not surprising that the no-
tion of ‘security’ in the UN Charter moved from the a ‘national’ to an ‘in-
ternational’ frame of reference and is often linked to “international peace”,
e.g. Article 39 UN Charter refers to the maintenance and restoration of
“international peace and security”. Nevertheless, the narrative still largely
builds upon the narrow one of the League of Nations, even though the UN
Economic and Social Council and its mandate reflect the broadening that
had already been envisaged by the ILO.
Not only in light of positive concepts of peace, including elements of
justice and human rights – as academically elaborated by Johan Galtung –
but even more so with the advent of concepts of human security, yet an-
other narrative of security has emerged in recent decades. These new nar-
ratives are not without problems in light of their potential to securitize a
growing number of issues, reducing political discourse thereon, and ex-
panding the scope of security-related government action. Such a trend may
15 Buzan 1991, p. 16.
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also serve to concentrate power rather than diffusing it. The question aris-
es as to the role of (public international) law in such a context.
How does (Public International) Law fit in?
Above all, the law at any level contributes to providing legal certainty,
which must be distinguished from ‘security’. It would be too narrow and
at the same time too broad a perception of the role of law if its raison
d’être was defined as achieving and maintaining security; such a concep-
tion of the law would be too narrow in light of the law’s potential not just
to steer human behavior, to provide positive and negative incentives, but
also to enable and to empower, to justify and to legitimize the actions of
natural and juridical persons. Public international law assigns powers and
competences, distinguishes spheres of action, delineates the jurisdiction of
states, and – above all – provides a framework for the peaceful settlement
of disputes. Conceptualizing the law along the goal of achieving and
maintaining security would be too broad, since the law is only one of the
available means to provide security; there are several other options avail-
able to actors, nationally and internationally. Public international law in
particular is addressed to entities enjoying legal personality at the interna-
tional level; there are, however, many more international actors beyond
the sphere of law, and these in particular impact the maintenance of securi-
ty. Even within the framework of established legal entities, the law focuses
on selected mechanisms and policies only. This can be illustrated by refer-
ence to both the Council of the League of Nations and the UN Security
Council, whose spheres of action are not limited to legal but expands to
political instruments. Indeed, both are essentially political bodies.
As will be illustrated below, public international law is an instrument to
achieve security, and to implement and legitimize security measures; but it
is, again, only one of the available instruments. It enjoys a double func-
tion, thus pointing to the ambivalence of juridification: it is a means to
control power but it also legitimizes the allocation of power to particular
entities.
Thus, in the triangle of power, security and law, public international law
fulfils particular functions but is neither limited to nor fully absorbed by
either of the other two notions addressed in this chapter.
1.3
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The ambivalence of juridification
Commentators have described the recent history of public international
law in terms of its rise and fall16 but have not denied the perception that
juridification seems to be a kind of one-way street. At least since the early
19th century an increasing number of issues have been juridified, few, if
any at all, have been de-juridified. This expansion of public international
law is often perceived as a triumph by law-makers. However, the existing
discrepancy between the number of international rules on the one hand
and their actual concreteness and effectiveness on the other hand is strik-
ing. It may even be argued that some aspects of the growth of (more or
less effective) substantive rules have been at the expense of procedural
rules serving the primary purpose of public international law, namely the
peaceful settlement of disputes between states (and other actors of public
international law).
Notwithstanding the weakness of public international law in terms of its
implementation and enforcement, there have also been perceptions of the
process of juridification as a regretful monopolization of power. The main
argument put forward in support of this contention has typically been and
continues to be the transfer of decision-making to actors that seemingly
enjoy less legitimacy vis-à-vis their constituencies than political actors;
public international law is often perceived as shifting powers to agencies,
expert commissions, and sometimes even arbitral tribunals and courts,
rather than allowing political discourse and keeping decision-making pro-
cesses subject to the public eye.
In the following, we will briefly illustrate that public international law
enjoys a double function – and may in so far be described as ambivalent. It
is an argument of power and serves to legitimize the exercise of power,
but it also limits power and aims at hedging the exercise of power by law,
establishing to some extent boundaries for political action.
Law as an argument of power
Notwithstanding the expansion of public international law since the early
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plete (in contrast to municipal law, which does not allow courts not to de-
cide, and thus excludes non liquet situations). Furthermore, public interna-
tional law is fragmented and thus seemingly lacks the power of a compre-
hensive system, even though debates about the constitutionalization of
public international law, which have been particularly vivid in the 1990s,
not only aim at establishing international law as a system but seek to facil-
itate the filling of perceived gaps.
While public international law’s potential to legitimize the exercise of
power thus is limited, it cannot be disputed that subjects of international
law, and this means states in particular, have the possibility to enhance
their power by deriving legitimacy from legal rules. Indeed, states often
exert themselves to portray their actions as conforming to public interna-
tional law.17 Public international law’s power of legitimacy18 thus has the
potential to strengthen existing power positions, but it is not limited to this
role. In addition, it can empower states (and other actors) that so far have
not enjoyed a powerful position in international relations. This potential of
public international law to empower disadvantaged or weaker states, how-
ever, is a fairly recent development and has largely taken place in the field
of socio-economic relations and of resource-related issues. Examples are
the concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ developed in
international environmental law or the notion of preferential treatment in
international economic law, which has proven to support the economic de-
velopment of countries in the Global South.
One might argue that public international law can also contribute to em-
powerment of militarily weaker states in systems of collective security, as
broad as this may potentially be defined. To this end, reference may be
made to a famous argument by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler
Chayes, referring to “various regimes that regulate and order the interna-
tional system”, which also can be understood as explaining the potential of
public international law for empowerment: “Sovereignty, in the end, is sta-
tus – the vindication of the state's existence as a member of the interna-
tional system”. They continue to argue that “the only way most states can
realize and express their sovereignty is through participation in the various
regimes that regulate and order the international system”.19 Most recently,
the case brought by the Marshall Islands in the International Court of Jus-
17 Berman 2005.
18 Franck 1990.
19 Chayes/Chayes 1995, p. 27.
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tice against nuclear weapons states20 provides an illustration of the poten-
tial and the limitations of international law in this context.
The legitimizing power of public international law becomes even more
obvious when looking at the formation of international organizations.
From the very beginning of their genesis in the 19th century, and across
their unexpected growth in the 20th century, international law has con-
tributed to their formation. Indeed, it may be argued that they were ‘con-
stituted’ by public international law, referring to the labelling of their
founding treaties as constituent instruments. To that extent, the making of
international organizations, apart from being described as a process of se-
curitization, also emerges as an illustration of the law’s potential to assign
power to such entities.
Law as a limitation of power
Public international law and international legal institutions do not only
serve to legitimize the exercise of power, they also limit the exercise of
such power. Even though there is neither compulsory judicial settlement of
disputes in public international law nor a refined enforcement mechanism
available, mechanisms have been developed over time that actually con-
tribute to limiting the exercise of powers by states and international orga-
nizations, and to ensuring that rules agreed upon are largely complied
with.
To begin with, and to remain within the context of collective security
arrangements, Article 24 (2) UN Charter may be taken into account. While
the Security Council has fairly broad powers according to Articles 39, 41
and 42 UN Charter, these powers, according to Article 24 (2) UN Charter
are limited: “In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. Ref-
erence to “the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” has been in-
terpreted by the International Court of Justice as limiting the powers of the
Security Council both in procedure and in substance.21 In more general
2.2
20 Obligations concerning negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race
and to nuclear disarmament, judgment of 5 October 2016 available at http://www.i
cj-cij.org/files/case-related/158/158-20161005-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
21 In the ICJ case of Libya vs the United Kingdom concerning questions of interpreta-
tion and application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the aerial inci-
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terms, the principle of deferral, which ensures that international organiza-
tions cannot exercise powers beyond those assigned to them by their mem-
ber states, limits the powers of international organizations.
The power of individual states, relying upon their right of individual or
collective self-defence, is limited under treaty law and customary interna-
tional law. Article 51 UN Charter and customary international law do not
legitimize disproportionate measures of self-defence. Furthermore, treaty
law requires member states of the United Nations exercising this right to
immediately report to the Security Council and to refrain from any mea-
sures that “in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Securi-
ty Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity”. In addition, and more generally, it may be argued that public inter-
national law, by providing formalized processes, renders the behaviour of
great powers more predictable and aims at limiting their power, but can
only do so to an extent that these powers generally abide by the rules.
This points to the development of implementation and enforcement
mechanisms. Indeed, public international law lacks refined enforcement
mechanisms as they can be found in national law. However, beginning in
the period between the two World Wars, a political and academic debate
emerged which investigated ways and means to enhance compliance by
states with public international law. Reporting mechanisms, complaints
procedures (primarily inter-state based), and even measures to redress a
situation found to be not in compliance with international law were dis-
cussed but hardly ever translated into formal legal rules.22 It was only in
the 1980s when a general debate emerged with new momentum about how
to improve compliance with the increasing body of public international
law that political and academic discourse remembered these early efforts
to make use of cooperative mechanisms (rather than confrontational ones)
to achieve better compliance with public international law than could nor-
mally be expected. Available enforcement strategies are normally only
those vested in the UN Security Council, and they do not primarily serve
to enforce the law but to enforce international peace and security. Taken
together with dispute settlement mechanisms, these threefold approaches
dent at Lockerbie, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/88/088-19980227-JUD-
01-00-EN.pdf.
22 Lang 1994.
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(compliance control, enforcement, dispute settlement) still reflect the cur-
rent state of public international law towards ensuring compliance.23
From national to collective security – from coordination to
cooperation
In addition to the potential of the law to legitimize and to limit power, the
notable change over time has not only been one from national to collective
security but also from coordination to cooperation. Until the mid-20th cen-
tury international law largely focused on the delimitation of power exer-
cised by individual states and their coordination. Even where international
organizations had been established, they hardly went beyond such coordi-
nation.
Only in light of increasing environmental, economic, and other chal-
lenges, states began to move from coordination to cooperation. The estab-
lishment of pertinent international organizations, the building of appropri-
ate regimes, and the agreement on multilateral treaties signal a categorical
shift that has often been analysed and may only be referred to briefly here.
It is, however, noteworthy that the establishment of administrative unions
in the 19th century, of the ILO and of the League of Nations after World
War I, and some of the efforts pursued during the inter-war period, already
mirror the idea to move toward cooperation. Defining security not only
from the national perspective but developing and establishing collective
security systems is one of the most important and lasting efforts to estab-
lish cooperative systems rather than merely focusing on coordination.
Limitations on the use of (military) force
The limitation of the use of armed force is among the most momentous
and central developments of public international law. It is inscribed in
prominent positions of its core provisions. The preamble of the Charter of
the United Nations opens with the clause “We the peoples of the United
Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
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United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to
that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and re-
moval of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace […]”. If not for the principles and obliga-
tions imposed by international law, the use of military force would be an
uncontained element of states’ ultimate and supreme authority on the in-
ternational plane, hallmarks of their sovereignty.24 International law seeks
to contain that power via three different avenues of approach: the regu-
lation of the means and methods of warfare (ius in bello), the legality of
participation in armed conflict (ius ad bellum), and, in operational terms,
the fostering of collectivization of international security.
Ius in bello
The regulation of the means and methods of warfare was the earliest of
those approaches and still is the most highly institutionalized and differen-
tiated of the three. Even though there were rudiments of a ius in bello
regime from antiquity and especially the Middle Ages with its codes of
chivalry,25 the regulation of conduct during armed conflict became sys-
tematically transformed into formal treaty law, owing mostly to the dedi-
cation of Henri Dunant, who published a book on the misery which he
witnessed at the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino in 1859.26
Ius in bello is nowadays referred to as international humanitarian law,
and certainly humanitarian ideals were and are the main incentive for
Dunant and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movements,27 which, in their
beginnings, were mainly concerned with the protection of wounded sol-
diers. Yet, ius in bello does not merely impact humanitarianism and hu-
man security but it also affects the national security of states. Stipulations
such as those regarding lawful targets, the protection of (civilian) infras-
tructure or the protection of cultural heritage affect states’ stability and the
safeguarding of their effective governance after a conflict. Provisions ban-
3.1
24 See Besson 2011, pp. 96, 125.
25 E.g. it was deemed illegitimate to destroy the opponent’s immovable property,
Grewe 2000, p. 106; see also Gasser 2015 at 7.
26 Dunant 1862; Gasser 2015, p. 8; Bugnion 2012.
27 „La Croix-Rouge désigne et symbolise une grande œuvre d’entr’aide et d’amour
qui unit tous les peuples“ (Huber 1928, p. 387).
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ning the use of certain types of weapons and especially the organisations
and mechanisms dedicated to the monitoring of compliance therewith pro-
vide a certain degree of predictability and reliability for states pertaining
to the behaviour of other states in situations of armed conflict. In that re-
gard, ius in bello features a higher degree of sophistication and institution-
alization than its counterpart (regarding the containment of military force),
the ius ad bellum.
Ius ad bellum
The regime on the legality of the use of armed force is regarded as the
manifestation of the effort to prohibit warfare.28 It does, however, go be-
yond the prohibition of the threat or use of force inscribed in Article 2 (4)
of the Charter of the United Nations. It is a regime comprising elements of
ius cogens, customary international law and treaty law,29 seeking to draw
defining lines between lawful and unlawful military action. While the re-
sort to armed force had been subject to certain limitations for many cen-
turies through the Roman doctrine of bellum iustum in its various evolu-
tionary stages, the former continued to be regarded a valid and legitimate
means of dispute resolution until 1928, when the Kellog-Briand Pact30 re-
nounced warfare as an “instrument of national policy”, Art. 1, and when
the prohibition of the use of force was cemented by the United Nations
Charter in 1945.
Yet, ongoing debates pertaining to the Responsibility to Protect, human-
itarian intervention and anticipatory self-defence,31 to name the most no-
table ones, bespeak the immense difficulties of containing the national in-
terests of (military powerful) states through international law. In contrast
to other areas of public international law,32 very little decision-making and
law-making authority has been transferred to subordinate agencies, com-
missions or experts by states, which demonstrates their reluctance to sub-
3.2
28 Gasser 2015, p. 1.
29 Dörr 2015, p. 1.
30 Formally the “General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of Nation-
al Policy” of 27 August 1928, initially signed by fifteen of the world’s major pow-
ers.
31 Greenwood 2011, p. 41.
32 Especially world trade and, albeit to a lesser extent, environmental law.
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mit issues that touch the core of their national security interests to regu-
lation through international law. In the face of numerous armed conflicts
and blatant breaches of the prohibition of the threat or use of armed force
the value and continued significance of ius ad bellum is questioned.
How much does international law actually contribute towards states’
more peaceful behaviour as opposed to diplomacy, fear of (internal) pres-
sure through public opinion, or (military) deterrence? As a case in point, it
arguably was the existence of formidable (nuclear) weapon arsenals on
both sides of the East-West confrontation and the entailing fear of a nucle-
ar war that prevented the escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962
(see Don Munton 2010: 28). And yet, states go to great lengths to portray
themselves as acting in accordance with international law.33 Even if
viewed from a perspective of strict realism,34 this bespeaks the relevance
of the rule of law for states’ perceived security. It is also, however, a
symptom of the stigmatization that is attached to the blatant disregard of
the international public order and its underlying acknowledgement of the
international community.35
Commonalities: the importance of collective approaches
International issues can generally be tackled by the two fundamentally dif-
ferent approaches of unilateralism and multilateralism. The former de-
scribes unilateral state action that is embedded in the conviction that na-
tional interests are to be pursued independently from other states. Con-
versely, multilateralism originates in the idea that states can pursue their
international goals more efficiently in concert and cooperation with others.
That the latter approach is, at first glance, so widespread and generally ac-
cepted, as well as mirrored in international law and its institutions, should
not distract from the fact that multilateralism is a fairly new concept and
less well established than multilateral diplomatic efforts may convey.
Even though numerous treaties of the era were still concluded as bilat-
eral ones (in multiple, verbatim form), as mentioned in Section 1, multilat-
eralism rose to primary relevance in the European Congress System after
3.3
33 See Berman 2005.
34 See Slaughter/Hale 2013, p. 2.
35 Hoffmeister/Kleinlein 2013.
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the Napoleonic Wars from 1814 to 1822.36 In the face of a threat to the
very existence and territorial integrity of European states, embodied by
Napoleon Buonaparte as well as the revolutionary ideas slowly sparking
independence movements especially in Southern Europe, the European
great powers began to see the future as a shared responsibility: “Faced
with the prospect of a violent past repeating itself, and with a lack of re-
sponses to the impalpable threat of civil unrest, the European sovereign
states, until then structurally solitary actors, turned into a risk communi-
ty”.37 Technological advances in transport and communication made inter-
national conferences in short intervals feasible.
Since institutionalized state cooperation has become slowly routinized
with the development of international administrative unions, especially in
the mid-19th century, cooperation was gradually intensified, first through
(near) universal fora like the League of Nations and the United Nations,
but also through regional cooperation as envisioned in Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter. A rising euphoria for the possibilities of global cooperation,
especially since the end of the Cold War, led to the prevailing notion, es-
pecially among academics of international law as well as NGOs and civil
society, that there was no alternative to multilateralism. Environmental
policy and growing threats to the global environment were an influential
driver in that trajectory.38 At the same time, the spectrum of referent ob-
jects of concerns for the relative and fluid notion of ‘security’ was increas-
ingly opened up by states. While up until the 1950s security on the inter-
national level was still mostly understood as the absence of the threat of
armed conflicts, the notion became increasingly inclusive and encom-
passed more and more collective goods, such as an intact environment,
food security, the reduction of poverty, mass migration and others.39 The
term ‘human security’, which was coined in the 1990s, manifests this
change in definition.40
This evolution led to an implied expectation that states would seek col-
lective action and multilateralism above all else. Unilateral action, espe-
cially by a more powerful state, oftentimes sparks suspicion and mistrust.
While it is true that collectivization originated in the conviction that cer-
36 Nollkaemper 2011, p. 14; see Stenzel 2018, pp. 210, 214, 229.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Bailes/Wetter 2013, p. 8.
40 Wählisch 2016, p. 1.
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tain (collective) goods can only effectively be addressed conjointly, the
current, rising wave of isolationism points perhaps less to a diminished
faith in the power and validity of international law, but more so to increas-
ingly diverging threat perceptions. In that context, disputes over facts play
an ever-increasing role in the dynamics of law-making through multilater-
al diplomacy. A case in point is the withdrawal of the United States from
the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015, as announced by President Trump
in June 2017. The denial of the severity of climate change and its looming
impact on human development by the US government, highlighting the
possibility that states may entertain utterly diverging threat perceptions, is
the most recent example of an impending return to a multitude of solitary
actors.41
Peaceful settlement of disputes
The self-imposed obligation to settle international disputes peacefully is
another hallmark of a rules-based international order. While especially ar-
bitration, and to a lesser extent mediation, were practiced regularly in an-
tiquity and especially during the High Middle Ages, arbitration and other
forms of peaceful dispute resolution were only one option, with warfare
being an equally legitimate alternative (so long as the preconditions for a
‘just war’, see section 3.2 above, were met).
Using law to de-construct power
The first treaty-based, quasi-global stipulation of an obligation to settle
disputes peacefully was drafted in the International Convention for the Pa-
cific Settlement of International Disputes, negotiated during the first
Hague Peace conference of 1899. A more concrete, but still not absolute
(insofar as the resort to violence was not yet ruled out completely) obliga-
tion to favour peaceful dispute resolution over other forms, thus making it
4
4.1
41 Further recent examples are the withdrawal from the ICC by Russia, and the pend-
ing withdrawals from several African countries (Burundi, Gambia; Kenya and
Namibia: considering departure; South Africa: decision to leave the ICC was judi-
cially overturned; Gambia: withdrawal initiated but new government halted the
process), as well as Great Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union.
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the rule and armed force the exception, was then introduced in in Article
12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations of 28 June 1919. The Kellog-
Briand-Pact (see section 3.2), consequentially, imposed the first absolute
obligation along with the absolute renunciation of warfare as means of dis-
pute resolution. Chapter VI of the UN Charter stipulates the obligation of
pacific settlement of disputes in its current form. It also forms part of cus-
tomary law, and, contentiously, of ius cogens.42 The development of the
obligation of peaceful dispute settlement thus ran parallel to the gradual
prohibition of the use of armed force.43
The judicialization of disputes directly implements the rule of law and
makes dispute resolution somewhat controllable and – at least formally
and procedurally – predictable. One resulting factor cannot be overesti-
mated: the outcome of a dispute is no longer contingent upon the military
and economic power of the parties involved. Instead of military clout, the
conduct of states measured against international legal norms becomes the
decisive factor. This enormous shift gives a voice and power to weaker
states which they otherwise would not have, thereby reinforcing and in
fact facilitating the principle of the equality of all states. Thus, internation-
al law is not only a ‘gentle civilizer’ of nations,44 but also a gentle ‘equal-
izer’. Furthermore, making peaceful dispute resolution the norm adds an-
other layer to routine verbal exchange among states. Regular cooperation
and conversation, also regarding contentious subjects, builds trust among
states and reduces tensions that would otherwise build up faster.45
That law replaces military conflict with the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes is an ideal. In some instances, it has proven to be successful, yet in
many cases, states abscond this general obligation. The latter gives them
considerable leeway anyway, since neither the concrete form of dispute
settlement (seven of them are listed in Article 33 (1) of the UN Charter) is
prescribed to states, nor is the obligation enforceable. As the principal
body entrusted with the resolution of international disputes in accordance
with the rule of law, the International Court of Justice in the Hague has
jurisdiction only if both parties to the conflict have accepted its jurisdic-
42 Pellet 2013, p. 5.
43 Pellet, p. 7.
44 Koskenniemi 2001.
45 As is unfortunately currently increasingly the case with North Korea vis-à-vis
South Korea and the United States.
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tion for the specific case in question.46 Its decisions are not enforceable
per se. Ultimately, then, the juridification of international disputes de-con-
structs power only insofar as the states give up their sovereignty and sub-
mit to the ICJ’s or another dispute resolution body’s jurisdiction and, in
case of an unfavourable decision, comply with their obligation to accept
and implement it.
Using security to limit war
Security, as a normative term, unfolds concrete meaning only if and when
the threat(s), from which security is to be gained, are communicated clear-
ly.47 This inherent ambiguity of the term is, however, oftentimes employed
deliberately. The use of security as a buzzword in political communica-
tion, of which multilateral legislative efforts are a part, can play out in two
ways. It can act as an enabler in concordance with legal procedures, but it
can also be used with the intention of securitizing certain issues so as to
detach them from the ordinary political processes and legitimize extraordi-
nary measures which would otherwise not have been accepted.48 In the
former sense, highlighting a shared need for security has initiated and fu-
elled processes of collectivization and juridification, limiting unrestrained
use of military force where and when it was used to communicate the exis-
tence of a pending threat and the resulting need for cooperation and inter-
national legislation.
In current public international (treaty) law, the most prominent mention
of security is the repeated reference to it – always in conjunction with the
term ‘peace’ – in the Charter of the United Nations. As cited above, main-
taining “international peace and security” (preamble, Art. 1 (1), Art. 2 (3),
etc.) is the United Nations’ foremost objective. On the flipside however,
security often also serves as a gateway for states to deviate from legal
4.2
46 Such consent can be demonstrated through a pertinent treaty clause and through a
compromis or framework agreement (Art. 36 (1) of the ICJ Statute), in the case of
optional clause jurisdiction (Art. 36 (2)), and in the case of forum prorogatum.
47 Stenzel 2017.
48 Cf. for this view on securitization Wæver 1995, Stritzel 2007, and McDonald
2008.
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norms, either in the form of exception clauses integrated into treaties49 or
by way of unilateral invocation of security concerns. In essence, security
will be used either to promote peace, the peaceful resolution of disputes
and the rule of law, or it will be used to justify (temporary) deviations
from legal norms and procedures; when the security of the community of
states is invoked, the former phenomenon is enabled, when that of a par-
ticular state is invoked, it paves the way for unilateral action. Thus, securi-
ty serves as a catalyst in legislative discourse on the international plane.
Who decides?
This renders the allocation of the authority of interpretation a central fac-
tor for the implementation of the rule of law. Who decides what security
is, how it is to be achieved, and what poses a threat to security, will set the
parameters of the negotiation or argument in question. Pertaining to issues
relevant for international peace and security, international law bestows a
disproportionate amount of interpretative authority on the United Nations’
Security Council.
With regard to dispute settlement, the UN Charter provides that, if a
pending dispute poses a threat to international security, and the parties fail
to settle it on their own accord, they are to refer it to the UN Security
Council, who in turn is called upon to “recommend such terms of settle-
ment as it may consider appropriate” (Art. 37 (2) UN Charter). Even if
these recommendations are not enforceable, the provision bestows a dis-
proportional amount of power and weight to the Security Council’s assess-
ment, thus reinforcing the inequality of economically and militarily
powerful states (the Security Council’s permanent members) vis-à-vis
smaller states. Its authority is increased by the fact that it is again the Se-
curity Council that decides whether the “continuance of the dispute […] is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” in
the first place, according to Article 34 of the UN Charter. If a dispute has
been decided by the ICJ and one party does not comply with the decision
imposed on it, “the other party may have recourse to the Security Council,
which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
4.3
49 See e.g. Art. 15 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (ECHR), ‘derogation in times of emergency’; Art. 27 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, ‘suspension of guarantees’.
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measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment” (Art. 94 (2) UN Char-
ter). The Security Council is also entrusted with the “primary responsibili-
ty for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Art. 24 (1)).
Given that the permanent members of the Security Council effectively
have the power to veto any decision (Art. 27 (3)), their respective percep-
tions of security and the prevalent threats play a crucial role in the effi-
ciency of international law.
These mechanisms also demonstrate that states are ready to defer issues
of lesser importance for their national security to legislating bodies con-
sisting of commissioners and experts that detach the legislative processes
from the states to a certain extent and introduce a measure of professional-
ization, with the ensuing challenges of a lack in transparency and demo-
cratic legitimation. More powerful states are, however, unwilling to sub-
mit some of their sovereignty to bodies and mechanisms of international
law when it comes to issues that are crucial for states’ and international
security, such as intensifying conflicts between states.
The juridification-securitization interface
In summary, what may be taken from the above considerations is not only
that power, security, and public international law are closely interrelated –
but that there is a highly interesting interface between juridification and
securitization. Indeed, juridification can be an instrument that is adopted
in order to address a situation of perceived insecurity (that may or may not
have been defined in legal terms, referring to the hermeneutics of public
international law). Likewise, de-securitization can be understood as re-
transferring issues back into the regular political processes. Public interna-
tional law could then be perceived not only as a securitization but also as a
de-securitizing agent.
Admittedly, our approach is a much broader conception of securitiza-
tion than has been proposed by the Copenhagen School.50 But the Copen-
hagen approach is too narrow for a comprehensive analysis of internation-
al negotiating processes. Looking at public international law through the
lens of securitization helps to better understand the interface between situ-
ational hermeneutics and instruments adopted in response to a situation
5
50 Cf. Wæver 1995.
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defined as relevant in terms of security. Likewise, looking at securitization
through the lens of public international law helps to move beyond a purely
constructivist approach since public international law is not just an aca-
demic discipline or discourse, but also an established pattern of practice
by political actors.
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“Estimons notre devoir attirer l'attention un nations sur préparatifs militaires
mis sur pied par autorités françaises destinées forcer aspirations kamerunaises
lors élections décembre courant. Voitures cellulaires grillagées contingents
militaires provence colonies françaises avec parachutistes engins militaires
modernes sillonnent tout Territoire avec ordre tirer sur population jour élec-
tions. Si présente assemblée ne prend pas mesures adéquates Kamerun orien-
tal risque d'avenir incendié plus que année précédente contre peuple désarmé
demandons conséquence intervention énergique un nations fin conserver paix
sécurité”.1
In the above quoted telegram to the UN, Felix Moumié, leader of the resis-
tance committee ‘Union des populations du Cameroun’ (U.P.C.) in Camer-
oun,2 calls for immediate intervention to preserve peace and security in the
trusteeship territory. Even though the U.P.C. wrote more than 10,000 peti-
1
1 Translation by author: “It is our duty to draw attention of the United Nations to mil-
itary measures developed by French authorities aimed at forcing Kamerunaises as-
pirations during the December elections. Cell cars, barred military contingents, and
Provence French colonies paratroopers engines with modern militaries any territory
with orders to shoot people day elections. If the General assembly does not take ad-
equate measures Kamerun oriental risk of a more violent future than previous year,
against unarmed people accordingly ask an energetic intervention of the United Na-
tions to maintain peace and security.” (Messmer, Note confidential, 22.1.1957,
DPCT // 14). The securizing speech acts were quoted in their original appearance in
the sources. Thus, the spelling stems from the text and reflects the way of produc-
tion, here a telegram.
2 There are many names for the territory of Cameroon which mirror the colonial pres-
ence in the country. In this paper, the following expression will be used by follow-
ing LeVine (1964): for the today’s country, “Cameroun Federal Republic“ and
“République Fédérale du Cameroun“, furthermore “Kamerun” for the German Pro-
tectorate, “Cameroun” for the French administered territory, and “the Cameroons”
for the British zone during the trusteeship period. U.P.C. activists often used the
German labeling in order to refer to the unified territory.
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tions to the UN Trusteeship Council, lobbied on the international and na-
tional level on behalf of the organization’s claims, travelled, networked
and published immensely, the party has not been successful in gaining any
influence through its integration in the formal political decision-making
process in the country’s transition to independence. Instead, the French ad-
ministering authority banned the organization in 1955; afterwards, the par-
ty stayed underground during the transition and was rehabilitated in post-
colonial Cameroon only in 1991.3 In this paper, I focus on the specific dy-
namics between the anti-colonial resistance movement, U.P.C., and the
French administration in Cameroun under the umbrella of the UN trustee-
ship council. Even though Cameroun was placed under a UN trusteeship
mandate in 1946 for the purpose of decolonization, France integrated the
territory in the French Union and treated it as an ‘Associated Territory’,
thus as a regular colony. During the French UN-trusteeship in Cameroun
that lasted from 1946 until 1960, a violent conflict over the terms of the
independence evolved. I argue in the following paper that in this conflict
of decolonization discourses on threats to the public order, the peaceful
transition and economic interests were created by all actors involved. Fur-
thermore, the threat-countering practices introduced caused resistance, vi-
olence and the enactment of harsh measures, but also transformative ca-
pacity and agency. In this regard, the quote above points to this paper’s
historical constellation and the empirical issue of the process of decolo-
nization and state building in Cameroon.
To trace the distinct discourses and practices through which ideas of se-
curity and protection were deployed, the analysis is centered on the disso-
lution of the political party and anti-colonial movement U.P.C. in May
1955, which provides insights into the dynamics of security in the later
trusteeship period. By focusing on the events of May 1955, I aim at
demonstrating the extent to which the French administration securitized
and protected the public order, and its imagination of future statehood for
opposing political actors. Even though the anti-colonial resistance move-
ment had no structural power in terms of institutional power during the de-
colonization—thus no ability to determine the country’s future on the po-
litical level—a distinct form of agency evolved in the hybrid situation of




The most useful framework for this endeavour is a securitization ap-
proach with a specific consideration for the relations of power. I argue that
such investigations should not only focus on who has the power to securi-
tize, but also on the possible reactions of actors to securitization attempts,
thus on the power which actors unfold when they are in the center of secu-
ritization moves. I aim to show that a relational approach to power is es-
sential to investigate mutual dynamics of power, since there is no clearcut
dichotomy of potential aggressor and potential victim. In this regard, a fo-
cus on agency appears useful to investigate the shifting ‘figurations of
power’4 during the conflict, as it is shown in the paper. Specifically, Elias’
conceptualization of a balance of power is relevant here, since there is no
duality between ruler and ruled, yet also a third instance, which bridges
the macro-micro-divide. Elias characterizes the specific dynamic dimen-
sions of relations within social figurations. Power, thus, is an aspect of so-
cial relations between actors in their group affiliations, relationships,
which in turn by the structure of the total figuration—which in this
example includes the state—are embedded and shaped by it.
In the following, it will be argued, firstly, that the international adminis-
tration that consisted of the French administration supported by the UN
trusteeship council initiated securitizing moves to legitimately enact pow-
er. Furthermore, by these securitizing moves, the administration aimed at
creating a transition towards independence according to French and inter-
national imaginations of the state. At the same time that these moves to
secure the external rule were being enacted by the international adminis-
tration, desecuritizing moves simultaneously took place through decolo-
nization by the transfer of power from the external to the local level.
Secondly, I will argue that the conjunction of these discourses and
practices constructed a referent object that induced the violent reaction of
a countersecuritization, thus securitizing moves by the international ad-
ministration were publicly questioned, rejected, and vehemently opposed
by the anti-colonial resistance movement. The French administration had
to acknowledge the resistance movement’s capacity of agency, which
shaped the balance of power. It is not my aim to argue that there was no
agency before colonization, but that securitization language shaped agency
and therewith had an impact on the figuration of power, and the actors’
quest for political influence. I will show to what extent the transition of
4 Elias 1983.
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power and the monopoly of violence became conflictive; thus, despite the
specific situation of external state building, the state, the nation, and the
public order appeared as referent objects. The findings are based on pri-
mary sources from the Archives D'Outre Mer in Aix-en Provence
(France),5 the UN archives, the UN Photo Archives and the Collection of
the League for Human Rights in New York, the National Archives in Buea
and Yaoundé, Cameroon, as well as interviews that complemented exist-
ing information.
The paper is structured into four sections. I will start with a brief survey
on different concepts of security and state building in Africa, security, and
power. I will then explore the different strands of securitization theory and
locate my empirical interest in ongoing theoretical debates. Then, I will
turn to practices of protection by the French administration, while focus-
ing on conflicting themes and power relations in the navigation towards
independence. I will conclude my analysis with a brief reflection on possi-
ble theoretical accounts for the conceptualization of security power.
State building, Power, and Security within Historical Approaches
Since the decolonization processes, the character and capability of states
in Africa have been under academic debate. Within the huge body of his-
torical literature on decolonization, scholars have focused, among others,
on the transition of power,6 administrative instruments,7 dynamics of na-
tion building,8 and negotiating processes between international actors on
the national level.9 Anti-colonial resistance has also been researched ex-
2
5 Within the research process, the following documents have been retrieved: the
weekly security report to the Ministry of Departments D'outre Mer (FM DPCT //
23-50), documents on the administration of the territory (FM DPCT // 3-6), peti-
tions by Cameroonian activists, tracts, press articles, and letters, in order to under-
stand the environment and dynamic of securitization processes (FM DPCT // 26,
17-19). Some of the documents accessed had been confidential until recently. Nev-
ertheless, these documents show the logic behind the external administration, thus
providing the potential background of the public discourse.
6 Bayart 2009.
7 Birmingham 1995.
8 J. Darwin 1999; D. J. G. Darwin 1988; Smith 1978.
9 Torrent 2012; Patil 2008.
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tensively, for instance by Kaiser,10 Clifford,11 and Walraven.12 The aim of
this paper is to bridge contemporary peace and state building discourses,
critical security studies, and historical observations, by specifically focus-
ing on French imperialism and state-building approaches.
Since the end of the Cold War, scholarly attention on sub-Saharan
Africa has accompanied the increase of interventions and peace-building
operations that are often justified by the international community to pre-
vent ‘fragile states’ that are mostly located in the Global South from harm-
ing the global order, peace and security.13 Difficulties marking state-build-
ing processes in Afghanistan and Iraq spurred the interest of both
academia and policy-makers in state building.14 Many critical scholars in
the state-building debate focus on the taxonomic state creation by external
actors in non-OECD contexts.15 Recently, scholars referred to the concept
of state building and observed similarities between historical imperial set-
tings16, while also focusing on hybridity and resistance by local actors.
The new interventionism has been called “Empire-lite”, “Neo-Trustee-
ship”,17 and “postmodern imperialism”.18 It is within these debates that I
locate my research interest in this paper.
The most stringent pattern of intervention appears to be that so-called




13 Duffield 2001; Veit 2010.
14 Although the concept of state building is often confused or merged with other
concepts, such as democratization or nation building (construction of a national
identity), it is mainly understood as being focused on the building of state institu-
tions, such as the bureaucracy, with a view to increasing their integrity and effi-
ciency and shaping them in ways that will have positive effects on the economy,
society, and politics. The concept of state building is thus much more narrowly de-
fined than nation building, which denotes a big, complex, and interlinked project,
a shaping of economy, polity, and society into a condition of positive sovereignty
(Wesley 2008).
15 Booth 1991; Williams 2003; Chandler und Sisk 2013; Bliesemann de Guevara
2009, 2012; Chandler 2006; Richmond 2009; MacGinty 2011.
16 Bellamy and Williams 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Paris 2009. Examples of




19 By ‘Western’, I refer to states in the Global North in contrast to the Global South.
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ly involved with state building in the Global South. That is why in the
center of criticism lies the focus on the domestic situation in peace-build-
ing projects, which is perceived to legitimize externally-driven visions of
the state.20 Recently, academia drew attention to violence as a continuous
feature of state and peace building. Newman claims that state building has
historically been “an inherently violent process,”21 which shows a clear
similarity between policies introduced by state building and colonial in-
stances. Moreover, post-independence wars also show historical patterns
in the last century that resulted from a rapid process of state building in
transition to independence, which thus reflects the legacy of colonialism.
Newman points to several historical cases and draws the connection be-
tween historical state building and contemporary peace building by ques-
tioning the possibility of external actors promoting peace by coercively re-
building former structures. Similarly, Veit focuses on comparable patterns
of power and authority as indirect rule in the post-independence period
and during the UN peace-enforcement project, which began in 2003 in
Congo.22 Furthermore, Sabaratnam proves that a long-term perspective on
state building practices in Mozambique helps to understand specific pat-
terns of foreign intervention, to “make sense of historical experiences and
trajectories of state-society relations”,23 which leads to more reflexive un-
derstanding of current intervention practices. In this context, Charbonneau
remarks that comparisons between imperialism and peace building often
focus on the British Empire, instead of “the context of Francophone Africa
and France-Africa security relations is one that is typically left unex-
plored.”24 In light of the above, the specific features of French imperialism
and state-building approaches appear to be interesting in order to delineate
the construction, negotiation, and transformation which justified imperial
violence, and which are still relevant in contemporary peace and develop-
ment operations.25
20 Bliesemann de Guevara 2012.
21 Newman 2013, p. 146.
22 Veit 2010.
23 Sabaratnam 2013, p. 106.
24 Charbonneau 2014, p. 607.
25 The interrelation between state building, decolonization, and security is empha-
sized furthermore by Buzan et al. in depicting decolonization as transforming the
emergence of regional security systems near the end of the Cold War. Thus, “the
tidal wave of decolonization rolled back imperial power, created dozen new states,
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Theoretical Reflections: Securitization Framework and the
Configuration of Power
The securitization theory framework was introduced by the so-called
Copenhagen School.26 The theoretical framework of securitization studies
assumes, first, that security is a social construction that emerges out of
communication processes and, second, that it is often, but not exclusively,
related to the state. A typical consequence of securitization is the legit-
imization of extraordinary measures, like the use of force and the suspen-
sion of rules that, under normal conditions, are politically or morally bind-
ing. In a successful securitizing move, it is assumed that something or
someone is portrayed as a threat (for instance, the state, a community, or a
group). Thereby, issues, which are normally open for public debate, be-
come part of the security agenda. A successful securitizing move makes it
nearly impossible to oppose certain policies conducted in the name of en-
hancing security.27 The initial approach was complemented by new per-
spectives, such as the relevance of practices,28 and with reference to criti-
cal theory and ethical debates about the 'critical security studies' by the so-
called 'Welsh School'.29 Commonly shared by these theoretical approaches
is the focus on the performative side of securitization.30 Important for this
paper is the historicity of securitization processes on which Buzan and
3
and allowed regional security dynamics to start operating in these newly indepen-
dent actors [...]”(Buzan and Wæver 2003, p. 15).
26 Buzan et al. 1997; Buzan/Hansen 2009.
27 “’Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rule of the game
and frames the issue either as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory,
any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized
(meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an
issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part
of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more
rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the is-
sue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justify-
ing actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Wæver and
de Wilde 1998: 23–24).
28 Balzacq 2005; Bigo 2014, 2002.
29 Browning/McDonald 2011; McDonald 2008; Booth 1991.
30 “Securitization works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power
that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and espe-
cially through institutional competition within the professional security field in
which the most trivial interests are at stake.” (Bigo 2002, p. 73).
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Lawson and Guzzini provide insights.31 Within these works, the paradigm
for security research spans across different historical settings and the au-
thors acknowledge the importance of the historical context for securitiza-
tion research (theoretically and empirically), which is equally as important
for the paper.
According to Wæver, successful securitization processes have three
“felicity conditions”: 1) the grammar or plot of security; 2) the social capi-
tal of the enunciator; and 3) the conditions related to the threat.32 Bigo
added a fourth condition: 4) the audience.33 This last add-on reflects inter-
est in the contextual environment that has to be convinced of the existence
of a potential threat and the necessity of certain security measures against
it. Thus, a focus on power, legitimacy and representation is relevant cate-
gory within these theoretical assumptions. This is essential in non-OECD
contexts for which academic interest developed relatively recently.34
Security is constructed not only by discourse, but also by practices;35
thus, security is a structured field of practices in which some people and
collective actors are more privileged to speak and construct security issues
than others.36 Following these assumptions, the analysis focuses on securi-
tizing moves and their links to power and representation in the constella-
tion of trusteeship as politics of protection.37 In this regard, the concept of
‘protection’ as a marker for the constructed threats and field for empirical
enquiry in the specific constellation of Cameroun will guide the analysis.
Relevant for the following discussion is hence the focus on the figuration
of power, the transformative capacity, and the situated agency of the anti-
colonial movement through which a state-centric focus on security is
avoided. The paper emphasizes that there is a centrality of power positions
in securitization processes, and shows how these produce subjects, rela-
tions, and transformative agency. In this regard, it appears interesting to
31 Lawson (2015), Guzzini (2015).
32 Wæver 2000, pp. 252–253.
33 Vuori 2008, p. 70.
34 For instance Wilkinson 2007; Vuori 2008; Bilgin 2011; Holbraad/Pedersen 2012.
35 Hysmans suggests the following concerning security practices: “One needs to start
from particular practices of both state offices (such as police, government, judicia-
ry) and non-state offices (such as charities, environmental pressure groups and pri-






observe which claims of protection are given priority. For example, that
even though the oppositional party U.P.C., thus not a legitimate state actor,
might have “[…] introduce[d] insecurities that often remain subordinated
to securing the State and its citizenry”,38 their claims were not given prior-
ity. The focus on speech acts is important and involves a dimension of
power and representation since the speech act is not independent from the
societal position of its speaker.39 In this regard, “situated agency”40 points
to the relational nature of power, since the capacity to protect always ex-
ists in relation to other capacities, and is therefore bound to the institution-
al and regulative contexts in which needs for protection are contested.
Foucault conceptualizes agency in different types in his writings, for ex-
ample: “Agency of any who are able to refuse to objectify power as an ob-
ject and instead recognize that relations of power that look fixed or stable
may become at each moment a changeable strategy of confrontation and
‘the free play of antagonism’ by taking a fragmented and consolidated
strategic situation within a long-term confrontation and deciphering it
through different types of intelligibility as a general structure of power at
the level of the social body that can be seen as free play”.41 This notion of
‘transformative agency’ will be taken together with the concept of ‘bal-
ance of power’42 to point to the power dynamics involved.
The shift in the balance of power in this case might stand in close con-
nection to dynamics on the macro level, such as global decolonization pro-
cesses and the Cold War.43 According to Buzan and Wæver, “The ability
to generate a successful macrosecuritisation depends not just on power,
but on the construction of higher level referent objects capable of appeal-
ing to, and mobilising, the identity politics of a range of actors within the
system”.44 In this regard, individual actors, such as the U.P.C., could utter
securitizing speech acts to connect their ideas to global paradigms in that
period. By including this argument, this paper’s case explores the dynam-
ics of securitizing speech acts and power positions on different scales.
38 Huysmans/Dobson/Prokhovnik 2009, pp. 6–8.
39 Id., p. 8.
40 Huysmans 2009.
41 Foucault 1982, p. 795.
42 Elias 1990; Linklater/Mennell 2010; Elias 1987.
43 Buzan/Wæver 2009.
44 Buzan/Wæver 2009, p. 268.
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The marginalized position of the opposing actor, the U.P.C., is impor-
tant here, since through the speech acts of threat, danger and security, the
French administration created an image which conditioned a hierarchical
order of power while regulating the claims for representation, thus who is
legitimate to represent the future state. As the actors used violence, it is
interesting to focus on the turning point at which the oppositional actors
turned from non-violent resistance to fighting in the underground
(maquis). So far, just a few articles reflect processes of resistance, power,
and (counter-) securitization,45 specifically in the situation of foreign inter-
vention.46 Stritzel and Chang regard counter-securitization as part “of an
interactive process of moves and counter-moves that are both linguistical-
ly regulated by the grammar and illocutionary logic of securitization
speech acts and closely tied to processes of legitimization and delegimita-
tion”.47 In the following, I build on these reflections and aim at showing
that an Elias-inspired approach to power in combination with securitiza-
tion speech acts might be useful to understand the dynamic in Cameroun.
By this, I furthermore nuance the discussion and conceptualization of
power concepts within the securitization framework. I will now turn to the
historical account of the case study.
Securitizing State Building in Cameroun
Background
Following the start of Germany’s colonization of ‘Kamerun’ in 1884,48 in
1922 Cameroun was put under a League of Nations Mandate split up be-
tween France and Britain. After World War II, the mandate was transferred
to a Trusteeship Territory administered by France and Britain. The UN
Trusteeship System was designed to facilitate the transition to self-govern-
ment and independent trust territories.49 Within the Trusteeship Council,
the administering body, developments in trusteeship territories were moni-
4
4.1
45 Charrett 2009; Watson 2009; Vuori 2008.
46 Stritzel/Chang 2015.
47 Stritzel/Chang 2009, p. 5.
48 Levine/Nye 1974.
49 Hall 1948; UN Charter 1946. According to Article 76 of the UN Charter, the
Trusteeship Systems aim is “(a), to further international peace and security; (b), to
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tored, visiting missions established, and petitions handled. Thus, the
Trusteeship Council provides the frame for emerging securitizing speech
acts to have repercussions on the ground. Despite this specific internation-
al status, French Cameroun (and French Togo) were incorporated accord-
ing to the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic and treated like
“regular” overseas departments and colonies.50 Due to this incorporation,
Camerounians were represented within the French National Assembly.51
Even though the British Cameroons and French Cameroun shared many
common features, in the former French territory a violent conflict erupt-
ed52 while the development in the British territory saw relative peace.53
A Configuration of Securitizing Actors
Rather than presenting the relevant actors—the French administration and
the anti-colonial resistance movement—in a clear dichotomy, I will ana-
lyze the mediation of power on different scales of action, and focus on the
figuration and dynamics of power without claiming that there is a causal
relationship between each single security speech act.
Aware of being under the official protection of the UN trusteeship
council, a national independence movement emerged. The Union des po-
pulations du Cameroun (U.P.C.) was founded in 1948 as the first radical
nationalist party in Douala. From the beginning, the U.P.C. eneavoured for
independence under the terms of the United Nations and reunification with
4.2
promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the in-
habitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances
of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
[...]“ c) to encourage respect for the human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage
recognition of the interdependence of the people of the world; d) and to ensure
equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of
the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in
administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainments of the foregoing ob-
jectives and subject to the provision of Article 80 (Article 76, UN Charter).
50 Atangana 1997; LeVine 1964.
51 UN Year Book 1952, p. 674.
52 Atangana 2010.
53 Anyangwe 2010; LeVine 1964.
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the British Cameroons; furthermore, they lobbied against French policy
instruments, such as the loi-cadre and the law for amnesty. However, in
contrast to other anti-colonial movements, such as in Indochina or Algeria,
the U.P.C. was not able to transfer their claims into political reality, since
the party was brutally suppressed by the French authority in Cameroun.
The conflict between the French authorities and the U.P.C. presented one
of the major lines of conflict in this period. In this regard, other political
parties or organizations were founded along the demarcation line the
U.P.C. created, thus either pro-U.P.C. or anti-U.P.C., and automatically
orientated towards French political plans.54 During the 1950s, the U.P.C.
was the most popular and most radical political party.55 Scholars, such as
Terretta, Torrent, Atangana, Bayart, Mbembe, and LeVine regard the mea-
sures taken by the French administration to protect the public order as a
major catalyst for the violent resistance against it.56 Whereas some
scholars, such as Terretta, regard them as the main influential party,57 oth-
ers, such as Frederick Cooper, perceive their power, support and influence
as being foremost regional.58 The U.P.C. has also been active outside the
country, for instance in France (Les Activités de l’Union des Populations
du Cameroun en France, November 1958, ANOM) and at the Trusteeship
Council in New York. On a national level, the party was abolished in
1955,59 and was rehabilitated and allowed to participate in elections only
in 1991.60
Within the trusteeship period, France made massive economic invest-
ments to modernize the country, so political and economic shifts occurred,
54 LeVine 1964, p. 153. This can be seen in the first elections for the French National
Assembly (June 1951) and Territorial Assembly (March 1952). In the early 1950s
emerged politicians and parties that shaped the transition period of the country,
such as the Bloc Démocratique Camerounais (BDC), the later Prime Ministers An-
dré Mbida and Ahmadou Ahidjo or Soppo Priso (LeVine 1964, p. 150). The
U.P.C. did not succeed in these elections, despite being the first and, for many
years, the best organized political party in Cameroun.
55 Atangana 2010.
56 Terretta 2013, Torrent 2012, Atangana 2010, Bayart 2013, Mbembe 2014, LeVine
1964.
57 Terretta 2013.
58 Interview, April 30, 2015, New York.
59 After the divide into different wings, one less radical wing led by May Matip was




triggered also by the global decolonization processes.61 In its annual re-
ports and during visiting missions, the French administration emphasized
the social and economic progress facilitated by the French presence in
Cameroun (UN Report 1952, ANOM 1AFFPOL / 930), but also that the
territory was not ready for its full independence. Connected to the French
administration’s interest group are the French colons, who owned busi-
nesses in Cameroun and who formed a group with economic interests in
the country. This group’s growth during the trusteeship enabled it to exer-
cise pressure on the French government in matters of security and public
order.62
Another relevant body in this context appears to be the UN Trusteeship
Council, which performed as an arena that enunciated legitimacy and
needed to be convinced of the legitimation of securitizing moves, and to
which many claims of protection were directed. The council monitored the
diverging interests for Cameroun’s future and sent visiting missions to
both parts of Cameroon. Generally, it can be argued that the body had a
very ambivalent role and ruling, between taking France to task—for in-
stance in the Yearbook of 1953, which mentions complaints over racial
practices and ill-treatment at the hands of police—63and accepting the sta-
tus quo while emphasizing stability.64
For the case of Cameroun, three audiences of securitizing speech acts,
situated on different scales, appear to be relevant: the UN Trusteeship
Council and General Assembly, the French authorities, and the national/
local audience. These audiences are not separated but interlinked, yet in
order to understand attempts to securitize and the upcoming agency, it is
relevant to distinguish between them, since in each audience different
strategies tend to be applied. The case of Cameroon’s decolonization
demonstrates the importance of legitimation, power, and representation in
securitizing moves, since the attempts by the French administration were
61 Atangana 1997, p. 83. For the purpose of overseeing the development in Camer-
oun, a profound and far-reaching territorially structure of administration was set
up, with the High-Commissioner on top and many administrative units (among
which a security service, a policy service, an economic service etc.) in Cameroun.
The work of these units was supported by the administration of the Ministère de
Départements d’outre Mer in France, and overseen by the French special represen-
tative to the UN in New York.
62 Atangana 1997, p. 99.
63 UN Yearbook 1953, p. 626.
64 UN Yearbook 1956.
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successful where they mattered most: the UN Trusteeship Council as the
international community, but also local elites, military and police forces
were convinced of the necessity of securing the public order by the French
Authority. In the following, I will first show the claims advanced by the
authorities, then the denial and mitigation of those, and lastly the agenda-
setting by the U.P.C.
The Creation of the Referent Object – Protection of Cameroun’s
Public Order
As seen in several speeches by High Commissioners, the French adminis-
tration regarded itself as ‘protector’ of the Camerounian security and fu-
ture.65 In public speeches, newspaper articles and reports, the French ad-
ministration aimed at acting for the Camerounian society and protecting it
from rebellious groups such as the U.P.C., thus formally enacting the po-
litical authority and creating a referent object that is typically linked to the
performance of security by states. The French administration saw in the
Trusteeship agreement the scope and limits of their action, thus connecting
the legitimacy of their presence in the country to the treaty. From a struc-
tural perspective, the role of the High Commissioner is defined to protect
the citizens and their properties. For instance, in the decree number 57501,
Article 41 the competences of the High Commisioner are defined as “Le
Haut-Commissaire a la responsabilité de l'ordre public et assure la securité
des personnes et des biens.”66 During the trusteeship, the French adminis-
tration enforced a specific imagination for and representation of Camer-
oun’s political order with different means and force, as can be seen in
4.3
65 High Commissioner Xavier Torré Communiqué 9.7.1958, ANOM DPCT // 43.
Furthermore, “Mon devoir est de tout mettre en oeuvre pour ramener le calme
dans les esprits et pour assurer la sécurité des citoyens [...] la France vous aidera,
comme elle vous a aidés, mais elle ne peut se passer de votre concours, de la colla-
boration active de toutes les populations camerounaises, d'une prise de conscience
par vous-mêmes des intérêts supérieurs du Cameroun.” (“My duty is to do every-
thing in my power to calm down the minds and to ensure the security of citizens
[...] France will help you as it helped you before, but she cannot do this without
your help, the active collaboration of all Cameroonians, your own awareness of
the superior interests of Cameroon.”.)
66 Translation: The High Commisioner has the responsibility to assure the mainte-
nance of the public order and the wellbeing of persons and goods.
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speeches, public presentations and performances. In general, the French
administration’s main goal was the protection of Cameroun’s incorpora-
tion into the French metropolitan system, later the Franco-Camerounian
“interrelation” against the (violent) resistance of different groups in
Cameroun (Terretta 2013). Often, High Commissioners referred to a
‘Franco-Camerounian’ friendship and called for the support of Camer-
oun’s population for the sake of this mutual relationship. In the emerging
political scene, the French discourse on the Franco-Camerounian friend-
ship was adopted by many Camerounian politicians.
The French administration primarily constructed the U.P.C., but also
political opposition, nationalists, and partly unionists as threats to the pub-
lic order, and took means to prevent and pacify the territory. By this the
French administration presented the Camerounian society, public order,
and the peaceful transition to an independent state as threatened, and thus
as referent objects linked to the state’s performance of security. The ad-
ministration described the U.P.C. in many reports, press articles, and
speeches as a terrorist, rebellious, and violent organization. The connec-
tion of the U.P.C. to communist movements, their claims of independence
and reunification contrasting French political and economic interests—
thus, the French administration of the state to be—were perceived as prob-
lematic. After a period of violent homicides and acts of sabotage perpe-
trated by the U.P.C., the French authorities marked the organization ex-
plicitly as a terrorist organization and strengthened their actions against it.
This is also reflected in the press declaration by M. Aujoulat, a former mi-
nister and parliamentarian in Cameroun, briefly after the incidents: “De-
puis la fin avril, l’U.P.C. cherche la bagarre en multipliant les réunions sur
la voie publique et en se livrant à toutes sortes de provocations”.67 What
was most threatening for the French administration was the geographical
network of local committees the U.P.C. created throughout the territory,
which were estimated at 450 committees in 1955.68 The administration re-
acted to this threat with forced relocation and eviction to other areas,
which is also seen as the reason for the widespread support of the U.P.C.
in the territory.69
67 Aujoulat, June 3, 1955, DPCT 28. Translation: “Since late April, U.P.C. has been
looking for a fight by multiplying meetings in the public space and by engaging in
all sorts of provocations.”
68 Joseph 1974, p. 432.
69 Interview Bella, December 7, 2015, Yaoundé.
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After May 1955, the discursive connection between the ‘protection’ of
Cameroun’s public order and France was strengthened in several speeches
by the High Commissioner. Furthermore, the elections of 1956 were
marred by violence, homicides, destruction of property and injuries. Al-
ready before the actual elections, special security reports counting deaths
and injuries were written for every district,70 becoming one of the main
tools for the surveillance of the territory, while keeping the French minis-
ter informed. In analogy to these presentations of threats to the public or-
der, the administration introduced measures of control against the “terror-
ist rebellion”; for instance, the French authorities strengthened their secu-
rity forces.71 Furthermore, they enhanced their measures against suspects,
oppositional and potential members of the U.P.C., and established in the
main areas of rebellion, Sanaga Maritime, a pacifying zone, the “Zone de
maintien de l’ordre de la Sanaga-Maritime” (ZOE).72 Next to sidelining
politicians that were close to U.P.C. and surveillance of U.P.C. suspects,
the French authorities censored the media (radio and press) to gain control
over the contribution of opposing political views; this can be seen as an-
other site of securitization in this case.73
Furthermore, the French administration intensely surveilled the rela-
tions between Camerounian citizens. French colons, mostly business own-
ers, but also French administrative staff, had a distinct role. The French
administration regarded their situation in many security reports as their
specific concern, especially during the elections of 1956, when targeted
killings of European residents cumulated.74 Yet, the French administration
controlled colons that were politically active, who might be threatened by
70 Rapport de Securité, ANOM, FM DPCT // 37.
71 Fiche sur les moyens de maintien de l'ordre, ANOM DPCT // 23.
72 Deltombe/Domergue/Tatsitsa 2010. In this zone, maintained for two months, the
French army carried out military operations against nationalists in the maquis. In
the whole territory of Cameroun, many U.P.C. members were arrested or killed,
and meetings and assemblies of the U.P.C. were banned.
73 For instance, Bebey Eyidi, the editor of the newspaper Presse Du Cameroun,
which was close to the U.P.C., was imprisoned several times and prevented from
publishing. Several other newspapers were shut down because of their writing
against the current prime minister, the French authorities, and support of the
U.P.C. and claims for independence (Le Patriote, Arrêté n. 798/PSS, COAM
DPCT // 38). Surveillance measures also included scrutiny of the post services,
thus many postcards and letters were collected in order to research oppositional
connections.
74 Doustin, December 31, 1956, ANOM FM DPCT // 47.
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the U.P.C. or others, who, on the contrary, might act against the public or-
der themselves. For instance, during 1956, the election year, the secret ser-
vice commented on the campaign “Votez Autochtone!” by the U.P.C.,75
and on the failure of candidate Louis-Paul Aujolat as a threat to peaceful
cohabitation of society. This incident reveals the perception of the public
order and security by French colons.
Even after the dissolution of the U.P.C., High Commissioner Roland
Pré warned the population to stay alert, since the threat of the U.P.C. was
presented as still ongoing.76 In another speech, he declared that the U.P.C
is the only party responsible for the fragile security situation.77 By this, he
emphasized his vision of a stable closeness of France and the future
Cameroonian state, which was claimed to be troubled only by the U.P.C.
By adopting and emphasizing this mode of communication he publicly de-
nied that the U.P.C. might represent a voice in the navigation towards in-
dependence. The high representative ended his speech by saying that more
than ever, the French administration aimed at giving all Camerounians the
possibility to participate in the evolving political life. This stands in con-
trast to the fact that the percentage of Camerounian administrative person-
nel appeared to be rather decreasing than increasing, according to the An-
nual report of 1956 provided by the French administration. Thus, the actu-
al transfer of power and administration in the state-building process was
meant to happen within a very tight frame under control of French admin-
istrators.
75 Translation: “Vote native!”.
76 Pré, Discours de Clôture, 3.6.1955, DPCT // 15: “Oui, le calme revient; mais,
après une pareille secousse ce n'est encore qu'une situation mal assurée, car les
blessures que laisse l'émeute, l'égarement des hommes que leur folie criminelle a
rejetés hors de la légalité, le doute de fausses nouvelles, les ferments de haine que
laissent toujours après eux le mensonge et la violence verbale, c'est l'opinion pu-
blique camerounaise, la conscience du peuple qui ont à en supporter tout le choc.
Translation : "Yes, the calm returns; but after such a shock the situation is still not
safe, because the wounds left by the riot, the aberration of some men whose crimi-
nal folly rejected on the wrong side of the law, the doubt of false news, the fer-
ments of hatred that lie and verbal violence always leave behind. Of all this, it is
the Cameroonian public opinion, the consciousness of the people who have to bear
all the shock.”
77 Speech Roland Pré, New Bell, June 2, 1955, ANOM DPCT 28.
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Camerouns’ Future as Referent Object: Countersecuritization by the
U.P.C.
During the UN Trusteeship period in Cameroun, the French authorities
constructed public order and future statehood as referent objects in close
connection to the French system. In the following section, the dynamics of
securitization moves and countersecuritization attempts by the U.P.C. will
be analyzed, with a focus on matters of representation, the perception of
threats, and the claim to protect.
Representative for the Will of Camerounians?
The main discursive line of conflict appeared around the question of repre-
sentation, since the U.P.C. claimed to represent the Camerounian people’s
will regarding the future. The main claims of the U.P.C. were the reunifi-
cation with the territory under British administration and decolonization at
large, aims expressed at a very early stage of the trusteeship. By empha-
sizing these claims in the decolonization process, the U.P.C. questioned
the state-centric vision of the French authorities, which claimed that the
state is the only legitimate actor to decide over matters of public order. In
that sense, it is relevant whose ‘transformative agency’ is at stake and who
can legitimately represent Camerounian future.
In contrast to the French administration’s narrative, the U.P.C. depicted
Cameroun’s independence and reunification with the British Cameroons
as threatened by French plans. A myriad of petitions, but also statements
and press releases end with the statement ”Vive le Cameroun unifié et
indépendent, […], A Bas les Kolons, A Bas Roland Pré-Aujolat”.78 These
closing sentences build a strong connection between the U.P.C.’s claims of
independence and reunification, and their view that the French administra-
tion, personified in the High Commisioner Roland Pré and the French po-
litician Aujolat, represent a colonial power extending the colonial regime
in the country. The term ‘Kolons’ deliberately starts with a K, pointing to
the unified Kamerun under German colonial rule. The French administra-
tion was perceived not only as a colonial power, but as the enemy of the
4.2
78 Union des Populations Du Cameroun, October 19, 1955, ANOM FM DPCT // 3.
Translation: “Long live united and independent Cameroun, […] down with the
Colons, down with Roland Pré-Aujolat.”
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country, as for instance seen in the speech by Gertrude Onog.79 Similarly,
Tchejltiks Nolac tried to mobilize for the claims of the U.P.C. by deprecia-
ting the French administration, “Tous les hommes et toutes les femmes
doivent adhérer en masse à l’U.P.C. L’heure est venue où chacun doit être
debout pour la lutte générale. La victoire est proche. L’indépendence est
sûre et celui qui ne marchera pas avec nous le regrettera. …Près la vic-
toire, les valets des colonialistes et les agents de la Sûreté paieront de leur
vie leur …”.80 By this, the representation of the U.P.C. as an ultimate orga-
nization to fight for independence is underlined, while constructing a
clear-cut enemy-friend distinction. It also shows the polarization brought
about by securitizing speech acts: Camerounians were supposed to choose
either for the independence of the country by being part of the U.P.C. or to
be part of the colonialists’ camp, possibly regretting the latter choice in the
near future. Given that this is a political flyer with expressive language, it
becomes clear that the U.P.C. envisioned a state without any influence
from France, while basing its claims on the widespread support of all
Camerounians. Yet, even though the U.P.C claimed the representation of
all Camerounian citizens, the Trusteeship Council also received petitions
claiming that the U.P.C. did not represent the will for the Camerounian fu-
ture.81 Similarly, as Pierre Messmer shows in his memoires, certain
Camerounian actors questioned the claim for representation by the
U.P.C.82
Nevertheless, the U.P.C. was able to mobilize support on different lev-
els, nationally but also from the UN Trusteeship Council, in order to dis-
credit the French administration as a legitimate state builder in Cameroon.
On the global level, the UN saw the U.P.C. (at least in the beginning) as a
legitimate party that represents one of the segments of Camerounian soci-
ety. Furthermore, on the national level, the U.P.C. acted as a representative
for all Camerounian citizens, not only by switching between French, Eng-
lish and local languages, but also despite the fact that the French adminis-
79 Laborde, P., Lettre de Renseignement, May 20, 1955, ANOM DPCT 28.
80 Ibid. Translation: “All men and all women should adhere en masse to the U.P.C.
The time has come where everyone must be up for the general struggle. Victory is
near. Independence is certain and those who will not walk with us will regret it....
After the victory, the lackeys of the colonialists and the agents of the Sûreté will
pay with their lives their…”.
81 UNA S-0443-0023.
82 Messmer 1998, p. 121.
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tration tried to create divisions by emphasizing ethnic differences (mainly
from the area Sanaga Maritime and Bamileke).83 During the lobbying pro-
cess, the U.P.C. gained partners such as the International League of the
Rights of Man, in the person of Roger Baldwin, who supported their
claims and provided infrastructure for their members stays in New York.84
Over the years, the U.P.C. proved its organizational coherence, even after
charismatic leaders such as Ruben Um Nyobé were killed in the under-
ground (maquis). It was only in 1991 that the U.P.C. was reinstated from
illegality, when a political opening created new political parties.85 As
pointed out above, the French administration perceived the U.P.C. as a real
threat, also because of the party’s ties to communist and other anti-colo-
nial movements elsewhere, and tried by several means (including vio-
lence) to prevent the party form influencing Camerounians. This empha-
sized the importance the organization had for the authorities, and can also
be seen against the background of the global security constellations in that
period, namely, the Cold War and anti-communism. The French adminis-
tration denied the U.P.C. its legitimacy by dissolving the party.
The French Administration Presented as Threat in Discourses
Since the beginning of the trusteeship, the U.P.C. constructed the French
administration as harming the political will of the Camerounian citizens.
Already in the 1950s, the U.P.C. used the forum of the UN non-violently
to direct their claims and perform in front of the Trusteeship Council. By
emphasizing their claims—reunification and independence—the U.P.C.
also tried to connect their securitizing speech acts with the upcoming uni-
versalist claim of the human rights regime.86 In the course of the 1950s, a
myriad of petitions arrived at the Trusteeship Council to protest against
measures by the French administration and accused the harsh repressions,
aimed at threats to public order and security. For instance, “…depuis la
guerre sanguinaire du mai 1955 déclenchée par les colonialistes Français
nous vivons qu’au maquis”.87 This statement is often repeated in a similar
83 Atangana 1997, p. 90.
84 NYPL, funds of the ILRM, Boxes 1 and 14, Terretta 2012, p. 332.
85 Krieger 1994, p. 610.
86 Terretta 2012.
87 Petition Nyambé Tonga, January 14, 1957, DPCT // 43. Translation: Since the
bloody war in May 1955 triggered by the French colonialists we have been living
only in the maquis.
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vein by other petitioners.88 In this regard, it is interesting to note the use of
‘colonialists’, hinting to the specific situation of the French Camerouns.
While they were not a colony in legal terms, they were treated as one by
the enactment of repressions on the ground. Next to petitions, the U.P.C.
used resistance newspapers, for instance ‘Kamerun mon pays’ or
‘L’Etoile’, to criticize the French authorities and to promote political cam-
paigns such as the ‘Vote Autochtone’ campaign for the elections of 1956.
It is striking how effective the party was in promoting their messages
while being constantly surveilled, censored and prohibited by the authori-
ties.
Many U.P.C. petitions focus on the Trusteeship itself and the wish for
independence by directly opposing the French vision for a future state to
their own vision. The U.P.C. used securitizing speech acts to point to the
destabilization caused by the French authorities that even found entrance
to the UN yearbook: “The representatives of these three organizations re-
quested the immediate unification and independence of the Camerouns.
They claimed that abstention during recent elections, including those for
the Territorial Assembly, showed a lack of support for the policy of the
French Government and complained, in varying degrees, that a state of in-
security had existed in the territory since the events of 1955”.89 Next to
the petitions, U.P.C. members made their appearance in front of the
Trusteeship Council, for instance in 1951, and denounced explicitly the
human rights violations which had taken place. Furthermore, the party cre-
ated networks for their cause, for instance with the ‘League for the Rights
of Man’ in New York (ILRM, NYPL), and travelled extensively, for in-
stance to Ghana, Egypt and even the USSR.
Later, policy instruments introduced by the French administrations were
criticized directly; for instance, in 1957 the U.P.C. published the document
“L’amitié Franco-Kamerunaise en Danger: Alerte à l’opinion kamerunaise
et mondiale”.90 In this text, the U.P.C. directly mocks the idea of a Franco-
Camerounian friendship by using the capital letter K as a provocation. In
press releases, the U.P.C. positioned and explained the party’s need for vi-
88 Note de Renseignement, Période du 16 au 23 avril 1955, ANOM DPCT 27.
89 UN Yearbook 1956, p. 352.
90 L’opinion au Cameroun, No. 32, September 23, 1957. Translation: The Franco-
Kamerun friendship in Danger: Alert to kamerunian and world opinion.
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olent actions,91 since their claims for Cameroun were not given considera-
tion in the slightest.
Challenging the French Politics of Protection
The peaceful means of international diplomacy were quickly expended;
also, the invocation, to no avail, of human rights and abuses in front of the
Trusteeship Council left the U.P.C. disappointed.92 Thus, starting from
1955, the U.P.C. used violent resistance in order to gain attention for its
cause, but also tried to reinstate its legal status (Joseph 1974: 438) and
recognition on the global level. Starting in 1955, the U.P.C. initiated the
destruction of properties that were mainly relevant to French economic in-
terests, such as train rails. Furthermore, after their prohibition in May
1955, the party mobilized a partly successful sabotage and boycott cam-
paign for the elections of 1956. The organization also created a climate of
fear in the territory by kidnapping members of the French administration,
supporters and politicians. By doing so, the U.P.C. tried to destabilize the
economic investments by the French authorities and to boycott the idea of
a Camerounian-French friendship, and thus the French imagination of fu-
ture statehood. Later, the U.P.C. was able to organize demonstrations,
gatherings and secret meetings to counter the public narrative of the
French administration. These acts of boycott and sabotage took place even
though the party and high-ranking members were under constant surveil-
lance. After its prohibition, the network hid many resistance fighters in the
maquis, thus challenging the territorial sovereignty of the French authori-
ties. According to Mongo Beti, the response of the administering authority
to the underground activists was harsh violence.93
The ongoing violence and turmoil in the territory reported in petitions,
but also by the French authorities, prompted the UN Trusteeship Council
to send a visiting mission to the territory. Thereby, the U.P.C. showed its
ability to mobilize interest and support on a global level. Yet, even though
whole districts were not under control by French security forces, such as
Sanaga Maritime, the visiting missions did not have the means to demand
accountability from France, and thus left the country without any attention
91 Déclaration à la presse mondiale, U.P.C., January 30, 1957, DPCT // 3.
92 Joseph 1974, p. 444.
93 Beti 1977, p. 39.
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brought to the cause of the U.P.C., which left the party disappointed.94
Due to the lack of political inclusion, some local U.P.C. groups tried to
take initiative by launching a boycott and sabotage the campaign for the
elections in 1956, which was only regionally successful.95
In 1957, a telegram arrived at the General Assembly calling for interna-
tional attention: “The Authorities put military pressure on Kamerun popu-
lation to vote in election under loi cadre, contrary to Kamerun wishes. We
protest vehemently against this act which infringes dispositions of United
Nations Charter and Universal Declaration Human Rights. We call on una-
tions [sic] to send immediately international forces to quell second envis-
aged attach on Kamerun by French Government”.96 This shows that in the
late 1950s, the U.P.C. started to protest against single policy instruments,
such as the loi cadre, by linking them to the threat of public order and hu-
man rights abuses by the French administration. In this regard, the U.P.C.
tried to present itself as a legitimate actor in the navigation process by us-
ing the register of securitizing speech acts to refer to their volatile security
situation. Furthermore, the telegram displays that the U.P.C. knew the lan-
guage of the international community and was well versed in its systems,
instruments, and discourses, but also how desperately they appealed to the
international community to finally perform as a moral authority and to
show interest in their struggle for independence. Even while living under-
ground, Um Nyobé, the leader of the U.P.C., tried to connect with the in-
ternational community with demands such as amnesty, recognition of the
fact that the term ‘Cameroun State under Trusteeship’ is self-contradicto-
ry, and a declaration by the French Government “regarding the recognition
of the independence and sovereignty of Kamerun”.97 Furthermore, he
promised his party’s cooperation in maintaining public order after the
achievement of a political settlement, and expressed the party’s desire to
participate in the political decision-making process.98 This again shows
the effort the U.P.C. made in order to remain in the political discourse and
points furthermore to the intensified dynamic of the conflict.
Yet, even though the U.P.C. had hardly any chance to express political
ideas in public, resistance against the French administration increased, as
94 Deltombe/Domergue/Tatsitsa 2010.
95 Distler/Ketzmerick 2017.
96 Ngimbus, Vice President, December 21, 1956, ARMS S-0443-0026.
97 Joseph 1974, p. 440.
98 Id., p. 440.
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observed by the French authorities: “Depuis décembre 1956, directement
ou indirectement, l’opposition à la politique française au Cameroun s’est
renforcée.”99 In this regard, the U.P.C. majorly challenged the politics of
protection introduced by the French administration. Yet, this knowledge
did not prevent the French authorities from introducing, without consider-
ing the U.P.C. as a legitimate party, further measures for state building,
such as: “élections générales, nouveau Statut, prochain Gouvernment au-
tochtone, perspective de nouveaux progrès politiques, continuation de
l’aide financière. … un fort courant d’opinion s’est constitué, favorable à
notre politique“.100
Next to using violent means, the U.P.C. still constantly lobbied for their
cause using political and peaceful means. Yet, in the later trusteeship peri-
od, violent actions in connection with the U.P.C. and their links to commu-
nist ideas happened to be the only things international actors (UN trustee-
ship council and French administration) considered in their judgment,
leaving aside other political suggestions proposed by the U.P.C. for
Cameroun’s future. This becomes very clear in the way the French admin-
istration reacted to policy recommendations and how the Trusteeship
Council regarded the organization. It can be said that the moment in which
the organization switched from peaceful resistance to violent actions
changed their reputation and legitimation globally and locally. This can
only be explained by using securitization approaches, since the construc-
tion of threats to public order is essential. Thus, the moment the U.P.C.
gave examples of their dangerousness for the political sphere, the organi-
zation could be legitimately conquered. Before resorting to violence, the
U.P.C. resistance to French administrative plans and its links to commu-
nism apparently functioned as a threat only for the French administration,
since on a global level the U.P.C. enjoyed a good reputation as a local ac-
tor and was invited to the Trusteeship Council. Yet, what is striking is that
even though the U.P.C. lacked support for their political actions by the
French administration and the global community, on the local ground the
99 Bilan des Attentats, L’Union des Populations Du Cameroun, 11.4.1957, ANOM
DPCT 26. Translation: Since December 1956, directly or indirectly, opposition to
the French policy in Cameroon has increased.
100 Id. Translation: “general elections, a new Statute, an indigenous next Govern-
ment, new perspectives for political progress, the continuation of financial aid....




support seemed to increase after its ban. This shows that the agency the
U.P.C. generated was situated in the context of their action, which means
that the organization performed adequately in front of each different audi-
ence and used windows of opportunity for the navigation of political influ-
ence and power. This can not only seen in speech acts (letters, telegrams,
and speeches in front of the Trusteeship Council), but also in actions (mo-
bilization of a support structure for the underground (maquis), mobiliza-
tion across a geographical divide). The UN Trusteeship Council engaged
in a very distinct role in this case, by prioritizing securitizing speech acts
in its reactions.
In Cameroun, the U.P.C. appeared to be able to change the discursive
frame in the beginning, yet through their violent practices their claims be-
came intolerable for the international audience. This stands in contrast to
other resistance movements, such as in Algeria or Ghana. Hence, what is
interesting in this case is that the prohibition of a political party, which
presents in democratic political systems one of the outmost political
means, appeared to be a decisive key situation in which every involved ac-
tor could express security speech acts and define limits of action for the
unfolding political agency.
Discussion and Conclusion
From 1957 onward, the French administration tried to set the stage for the
independence to come. Starting in 1958, they introduced instruments such
as the loi-cadre to smoothly lead the way to independence; yet these de-
velopments could also be linked to internal political problems at the end of
the French Fourth Republic. Finally, in the conflict over national represen-
tation, anti-nationalists and pro-French representatives like Mbida and
Ahidjo came into power; they emphasized the union of Cameroun but also
closeness to the French political system. During the political transition
process, the U.P.C. tried to influence the developments but was sidelined
and fiercely combated; furthermore, the party was not able to mobilize
much support on the international level. The construction of the U.P.C. as
the ultimate threat to the interests of all Camerounians was continued after
5
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independence. The collective memory of the era of independence is still a
topic of huge political debate and contestation.101
It was not the paper’s aim to focus on the causes and dynamics of vio-
lence in this case, but to highlight empirical aspects of situated agency in
the figuration of power that eventually lead to violent responses. Accord-
ing to the analysis, one could argue that the U.P.C. functioned as a repre-
sentative for the Camerounian population. Despite the harsh securitizing
moves by the French administration, the party developed and mobilized
transformative agency in order to counter them, which transformed the
conflict. In this regard, the party showed it was capable of adapting its ac-
tion to different audiences and by taking different means suitable for each
audience, thus transforming its agency. This agency was taken seriously,
as seen in the reaction by the UN Trusteeship Council, but also in the si-
lencing attempts and other securitizing moves by the French, even though
the party’s aims were nationalistic and violent. In this regard, the ban on
the U.P.C. increased its agency as power to act and to securitize, instead of
diminishing it; hence, agency is situated in the balance of power here. In
contrast to that, the power to decide (thus the power of de/securitization)
on the political decision process could not be harnessed by the U.P.C. Yet,
as other active political actors, such as Soppo Priso, Ahidjo and Mbida,
tried to shape the future in a moderate way, an alternative way outside
French political interests was not developed. Instead, after independence,
Ahidjo, a Francophile politician who always emphasized the closeness of
Cameroun and France, gained power.
In the case under study, securitization approaches have been used to an-
alyze a distinct conflict dynamic in the security register. Specifically, in
the unique constellations of external intervention, the focus on the con-
structions of threats and securitizing speech acts encourages a more rela-
tional approach of the dynamics of power. This might also help to under-
stand current phenomena in state- and peace-building debates, such as the
local-global divide102 and resistance against UN led state building at-
tempts.103 Specifically, it is important in current research to point to conti-
nuities of colonial heritage in power configurations and to authority in a
101 Eckert 2000.
102 Björkdahl/Höglund 2013.
103 Chandler 2013; Mac Ginty 2011.
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historically informed analysis in order to understand patterns of external
rule.104
In this regard, it appears necessary to investigate the relationship be-
tween power and securitization and to further elaborate on concepts to de-
fine different power dynamics, as done in this edited volume. These inves-
tigations should not only focus on who has the power to securitize, but
also on the possible reactions of actors to securitization attempts, thus on
the power actors unfold when they are at the center of securitization
moves. In this volume, Langenohl differentiates between the power of se-
curitization and the power to securitize. Clearly, this mirrors well the two
stages of the balance of power in this paper. The French administration
and the U.P.C. both had the opportunity to securitize, thus the power to se-
curitize, which was enabled by this specific figuration. Yet, the effect of
securitization, thus the power of securitization, was mainly faced by the
U.P.C. in terms of being presented as a threat and excluded from political
decision-making. In this regard, it became clear in the analysis that securi-
tization processes tend to reduce complex problem situations to a dichoto-
mous dynamic, as in the case of the camps for or against France. Through
using the balance of power concept (Elias), the circumstances by which
this dichotomization happened were analyzed in a differentiated way. This
shows that a relational approach to power is essential to investigate the dy-
namics of power within securitization processes. Specifically, the focus on
agency appears to be useful to investigate the shifting figuration of power.
In the background emerges a conflict of universalist ideas on the
macro-level, which were combined by political actors with securitizing
speech acts—human rights and decolonization on the one hand, and anti-
communism / Cold War on the other. In this regard, security interests con-
cerning the threat of communism were deemed more important than ap-
peals to human rights causes, as U.P.C. activists emphasized in their nu-
merous petitions. The conjunction between the prioritization of securitiz-
ing speech acts, macro-level conflicts, and power situations should there-
fore be investigated. Equally important is the conjunction between audi-
ence and the legitimacy of securitizing actors in securitization processes.
Each securitization move has a very specific scope for transformative
agency since it might convince the respective audience. In Cameroun, the
U.P.C. initially appeared to be able to change the discursive frame, yet
104 See, for instance, Sabaratnam 2013.
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through their turn to violence and underground actions their claims be-
came intolerable for the UN audience. The prohibition of the U.P.C., thus,
is one key moment in the dynamics of security. By looking at the empiri-
cal research field of security it can be investigated to what extent agency
and transformative capacity, thus the ability to securitize in this constella-
tion, unfolded in context. As shown with regard to the elections of
1956,105 the perception of successful securitization is quite ambivalent. On
the one hand, the U.P.C. was successful with its boycott campaign, thus
representing a real threat for the French administration; on the other hand,
the political campaign lead to the exclusion of the party from the decision-
making process. An analysis of these kinds of constellations helps to un-
derstand the context conditions that must be fulfilled in order for actors to
exercise the power to securitize. To grasp these processes, the focus must
lie in shifts of the balance of power.
Power relations are complex and depend on the context in which they
are situated. Taking a clue from the Foucauldian statement that “[w]here
there is power, there is resistance”,106 one can perspectivize power rela-
tions by looking at resistance against securitization attempts and securitiz-
ing moves. The appearance of revolutionary movements on the political
stage hints to a shift in power relations, pointing to the fact that traditional
power figurations are about to be transformed and the monopoly of vio-
lence of ruling actors is questioned through the use of counter violence. In
this regard, the way in which armed groups and the use of violence can
create, stabilize, question and destroy legitimacy, specifically in the con-
text of securitization moves, emerges as a theme of great theoretical and
empirical interest. Furthermore, it would be relevant to analyze to what
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Reconfigurations of Security: Governing Heroin Users in
Frankfurt am Main, 1975–1995
Sebastian Haus
Introduction
Today, the city of Frankfurt am Main is widely known as one of the first
major cities in Germany having adopted so-called “harm reduction” pol-
icies towards heroin users. Rather than repressing or forcing users towards
abstinence, the city administration primarily focuses on reducing the risks
of drug use and on stabilizing the health of addicts with a multi-faceted
series of measures such as safe injection sites, methadone maintenance
programs, legal advice services, and assisted housing projects. Praising
“Frankfurt’s path in drug politics” as a “role model for many municipali-
ties at home and abroad,” the city administration highlights that its drug
policy has the double effect of not only improving the situation of drug ad-
dicts but also contributing to the “protection of citizens.”1
Considering social and medical assistances for heroin users as measures
to improve citizens’ security resonates in many ways with the long and
complex history of controlling the city’s heroin scene. Since the 1970s,
Frankfurt am Main, as well as many other cities across Europe, have had
to cope with the increasing presence of heroin users in the urban public
space. The consumption of so-called “hard drugs” such as heroin as well
as its spatial manifestations, the public gatherings of drug-consuming
youth in plain sight for passersby, attracted strong media attention and
caused a moral panic about the radical delinquency of teenage heroin
users. The local authorities in Frankfurt considered heroin addicts as both
threats to urban security and ill persons in need of medical and psycholog-
ical care, therefore necessitating not only criminal persecution by the po-
lice, but also social service measures by the city administration. Conse-
quently, the logics of governing the heroin scene oscillated between coer-
1
1 http://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=3007, February 28, 2017. This quota-
tion and all following quotations are translated by the author.
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cive measures such as police raids and compulsory hospitalizations of ad-
dicts on the one hand, and more liberal and communicative approaches
such as street work or health orientated assistances on the other. These dif-
ferent and often very contradicting approaches indicate that the history of
drug policies in Frankfurt am Main is one of shifting governmental ratio-
nalities and power relations evolving around a group of socially marginal-
ized people who did not obey hegemonic ideas of normality.
This article addresses the transformations of drug policies in Frankfurt
am Main between 1975 and 1995. Exploring the different ways in which
the city administration intended to cope with the heroin scene, it will point
out the political dynamics that led to the emergence of today’s approach
towards heroin users in the city. The article focuses on two aspects: on the
one hand, it focuses on the discourses and practices by policy-makers and
city officials, asking how they framed heroin use and which practices they
adopted to regulate the problems associated with heroin use. On the other
hand, the article will address the reactions and political activities of both
heroin users and groups claiming to represent users’ interests in the field
of drug politics, such as AIDS self-help organizations. In taking the per-
spective of those who were the object of the city’s drug policy, the article
endeavours to focus on the power relations in local drug policies, especial-
ly on the power effects of governmental practices as well as on the agency
of heroin users in different policy regimes.
Historical research on drug politics in West Germany has mainly fo-
cused on the 1960s and 1970s so far.2 The 1960s were marked by the so-
called first “drug wave,” which was strongly related to counter-cultural
protests, the events of 1968 and to a larger controversy about democratiza-
tion and social reform. In this context, emerging policies regarding drug-
consuming youth replaced traditional, more stigmatizing framings of drug
use. Local authorities even supported anti-authoritarian self-help projects
for drug addicts anchored in the counter-culture milieu.3 In highlighting
that policies addressing heroin users were mainly orientated towards a
2 Most historians have analyzed drug consumption of youths in the context of the
emerging alternative youth cultures and the history of consumer societies in the
twentieth century. Research on the 1980s and the early 1990s, especially on the im-
pact of HIV/AIDS on West German drug politics, is scarce. See Briesen 2005;
Holzer 2007; Weinhauer 2006; Weinhauer 2010; regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS
on German drug policies, see Schmid 2003.
3 Stephens 2007; Morris 2014.
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spatial logic, transforming the social problem of heroin use into a problem
of the urban space, historian Jan-Henrik Friedrichs has argued that re-
search on the strategies against heroin scenes provides insights into the
crisis of disciplinary societies. Spatial policing of heroin scenes, Friedrichs
argues, was part of a larger historical shift towards what French philoso-
pher Gilles Deleuze has called “societies of control”.4
Rather than distinguishing ideal types of power regimes or arguing for
clear-cut transformations, this article will suggest a different narrative. I
will argue that different logics and practices of governance strongly over-
lapped in the history of drug policies in Frankfurt am Main between 1975
and 1995. The article will point out a series of reconfigurations of the
city’s drug policy, which resulted from shifting political backgrounds,
such as changes of local government, from unexpected events, such as the
outbreak of HIV/AIDS, and the side effects of political interventions, such
as the increase of overdose deaths, but also from criticism of repressive
strategies by social workers, social scientists, and AIDS self-help groups.
The article will argue that “security” – the security of the urban space, of
the public order as well as the security of the citizens and “third parties” –
was a continuous and controversial point of reference in these changing
constellations. This dynamic of (de-)securitizating heroin users was de-
cisive in transforming not only the relations of power between state au-
thorities, non-governmental organizations and heroin users, but also the
logic of governing heroin users in the city.
In the first section, I address the framings of heroin use in the 1970s.
Policy-makers on the state level, on the one hand, constructed heroin ad-
dicts as objects of therapeutic care and took coercive measures against
users “unwilling” to undergo therapy. The city administration, especially
after the election of conservative mayor Walter Wallmann in 1977, on the
other hand, highlighted the issue of “addiction criminality” and securitized
heroin users as a threat to “urban security.” These framings resulted in two
interconnected practices against the city’s heroin scene: spatial policing
and involuntary commitments of heroin addicts into rehab clinics. Both
practices aimed at making heroin users invisible in the urban public space.
These strategies did not solve the problems associated with the heroin
scene, but had strong negative effects on the users’ health conditions (Sec-
tion 3). The city’s drug policy was strongly challenged in the context of
4 Friedrichs 2013.
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the emerging AIDS epidemic. I will show that critics of repressive drug
policies such as gay self-help organizations questioned the rationality of
the administration’s AIDS policy, demanding a strategy against the spread
of HIV/AIDS among heroin addicts based on acceptance and communica-
tion rather than state coercion and exclusion (Section 4). These shifting
power relations resulted in a fundamental change of local drug policies in
general when a new city government began to introduce harm reduction
measures in 1989/90. Rather than expelling junkies from the urban public,
this new approach accepted the existence of drug use in the city and tried
to regulate the most unfavorable phenomena, such as the worsening health
conditions (Section 5). While heroin users had been silenced and strongly
excluded from any kind of participation in drug politics until the late
1980s, I argue that harm reduction policies helped them to get involved in
political activities, and to call for decriminalization and for their right to
the city. Analyzing the dissolution of the heroin scene during summer
1992, I show that the securitization of heroin users continued to play a de-
cisive role in the early 1990s. In the context of trying to improve the city’s
image to the outside, security concerns prevailed again over the far-reach-
ing liberalizing demands of harm reduction proponents and junkie activists
(Section 6).
Securitizing junkies: framings of heroin use in the 1970s and 1980s
In the Federal Republic of Germany, coping with heroin users and addicts
was the task of states and local authorities – in this case the state govern-
ment of Hesse, the Frankfurt police and the city administration. After hav-
ing pointed out the social specifics of heroin use as well as the transforma-
tions in dealing with delinquent youth in postwar Germany, this section
will to address the framings of heroin use which influenced the strategies
of both the state government and the local authorities in the city of Frank-
furt.
While US-American cities such as New York had been dealing with
heroin as a major social problem since the late 1940s,5 heroin did not oc-
cupy West German authorities until the early 1970s. In Germany, heroin





youth in the late 1960s. While youth in this first “drug wave” mainly
turned to so-called “soft drugs” such as marijuana, the number of heroin
users has increased very rapidly since 1971/2. At that time, the supply of
and the demand for heroin rose very quickly, resulting in the emergence of
so-called “hard drug scenes” in many big cities across the country. In
Frankfurt am Main, the police department registered 85 junkies in 1969,
598 in 1975 and 2,295 in 1980. Roughly two-thirds of these registered
users were male. The overall number of users was higher, with an estimat-
ed number of more than 4,000 heroin consumers in 1980, a number which
made Frankfurt’s heroin scene one of the largest in Germany.6 Historians
interested in the self-understanding of Frankfurt heroin users in the early
1970s consider heroin use as an “everyday radicalism,” which expressed
both a strong disapproval of hegemonic values and their belonging to the
counter-culture milieu. Traces of this radical self-understanding were still
present in Frankfurt’s heroin scene in the 1980s, although connections be-
tween heroin users and the counter-culture had already dissolved by the
mid-1970s.7
One of the reasons for this dissolution was the changing social structure
of young people turning to heroin during the 1970s. The social back-
ground of heroin users was much different from that of drug users of the
first drug wave, which mainly consisted of middle-class cannabis-smoking
youth. In 1976, the drug counseling center “Drop-In” in Frankfurt stated
that the city’s users were mainly youth from a lower-class background
with little education, attending lower secondary or special needs schools.8
At the end of the decade, social studies made similar findings in West
Berlin, describing the typical heroin consumer as a male member of the
lower classes, quite often jobless and without a home, who had started his
“drug career” as a young teenager and had been addicted to heroin for
many years.9 These kinds of reports were often strongly biased, for they
usually based their conclusions on data from heroin users in prison or
from addicts in therapy institutions. Information about the background of
users being able to control their consumption habits, preventing addiction
and imprisonment, was not included.10 These reports characterized, how-
6 Thomas 1982, p. 33.
7 Morris 2014; Noller 1987.
8 Berger/Zeitel 1976.
9 Skarabis/Patzak 1981.
10 Scheerer 1983, p. 15.
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ever, the type of user local authorities mainly had to deal with on a day-to-
day basis: addicted youths at the margins of society breaking with hege-
monic rules of behavior.
By the time West German policy-makers began to systematically ad-
dress the growing number of heroin-consuming youth, the ways of coping
with youth delinquency in West Germany had changed considerably. Biol-
ogistic concepts of youth criminality, for example, which were rooted in
the nineteenth century and had played a major role well into the postwar
period, lost their dominance during the 1960s. They were replaced by so-
ciological approaches which focused on the social conditions of deviant
behavior rather than on the delinquent’s supposed abnormity or “inferior”
disposition.11 These transformations in addressing youth delinquency also
influenced the emerging debates about drug-using youth in the late 1960s.
While the field of drug politics in the postwar era had been marked by per-
sonal and ideological continuities from the Nazi past,12 the 1960s brought
a series of fundamental changes in framing and addressing drug users.
Rather than seeing drug use as a moral failure endangering the fabric of
society, the first policies towards drug-using youth refrained from moral
judgements and considered drug consumption as a comprehensible reac-
tion of teenagers against the downsides of modern society. This framing of
drug use tended to normalize the individual drug consumer and replaced
more stigmatizing understandings based on psychiatric notions such as
“abnormality”. Problems emerging from teenage drug use became, in the
medium term, an issue of the aspiring professions of psychotherapy and
social work.13 Historian Robert Stephens has argued that this new “thera-
peutic mind-set” fit well in the era of liberalization of the late 1960s, for it
fostered a liberal culture of governing the problems associated with
teenage drug use for several years. State authorities even supported anti-
authoritarian self-help groups such as “Release,” which aimed at reaching
out to young drug addicts to help them overcome their addiction in self-
organized, non-hierarchical therapeutic communities.14
When the political focus shifted from the “protest consumption” of
middle-class cannabis smokers to the so-called “hard kernel” of “chronic
11 Baumann 2002; see also Ubbelohde 2002.
12 Holzer 2007.
13 See Schmid 2003, pp. 139–168.
14 Stephens 2007, pp. 121–159, 184–218; Schmid 2003, pp. 130–138.
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drug users” with little school education,15 the therapeutic mind-set influ-
enced the making of policies towards heroin addiction, for treatment agen-
das were mainly based by psychotherapeutic rather than medical or psy-
chiatric categories. The general background of these policies, however,
had changed considerably. Besides the changing social structure of users,
policy-makers had to face the rising number of junkies dying from heroin
overdoses. In West Germany, the federal police registered a continuous
rise of deaths by overdose from 67 in 1971 to 195 in 1975, to its first peak
of 623 in 1979.16 These numbers attracted massive public attention. Illus-
trated with pictures of dead junkie bodies in filthy public places, such as
train station toilets, media reports told stories about youth having fallen
victim to the drug who were lost in the disastrous downward spiral of ad-
diction, social exclusion and crime, often ending in death by overdose.17
Against this background, the Hessian state government claimed that the
“fight against drug addiction” would be one of the most important tasks of
the 1980s. This was, the government stated, the “fight for thousands of
youths in danger of drugs and death by the needle.”18
In 1980, the state government of Hesse, a coalition of social-democrats
and liberals, passed the “Hessian Program to Fight Drug Abuse,” which
outlined the general policy frame for coping with heroin users in Frankfurt
am Main.19 While this program generally announced anti-drug prevention
campaigns and the expansion of the drug counselling system, it also pre-
sented the government’s strategy towards drug addicts.20 In accordance
15 Stellungnahmen der Bundesregierung zum Drogen- und Rauschmittelmißbrauch.
Dokumentation zum Drogenproblem, 30.10.1972. In: Bundesministerium für Ju-
gend, Familie und Gesundheit (ed.) (1972): Dokumente zum Drogenproblem.
Bonn, pp. 11–96, here pp. 19, 21–22.
16 Thomas et al. 1982, p. 47.
17 See for example the cover story „Heroin-Welle: ‚Mord auf Raten‘. Der Spiegel,
30.6.1977, pp. 184–195.
18 Hessische Landesregierung (1980): Hessisches Programm zur Bekämpfung des
Drogenmißbrauchs. Wiesbaden.
19 Institut für Stadtgeschichte Frankfurt am Main (ISGF), Fürsorgeamt 4.454, Bericht
des Magistrats auf eine Anfrage der SPD-Fraktion zur Rehabilitation Drogenab-
hängiger, 8.5.1981.
20 Quite typical for these kind of policy documents at that time, the Hessian govern-
ment did not clearly differentiate between different forms of drug use and drug
habits on the one hand, and drug addiction on the other. All kinds of drugs seemed
to lead directly to heroin, heroin was addiction, and addiction in turn was a con-
stant threat to youths.
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with the mainstream of West German drug experts, the program adhered,
firstly, to the normative idea of orientating all political efforts towards the
objective of a drug-free society.21 Heroin addiction was believed to be a
condition of extreme unfreedom from which no one could escape without
the help of professionals. Social studies drawing a more differentiated pic-
ture of heroin use – pointing to non-addicted forms of using heroin or to
so-called “self-healers,” users overcoming their addiction without passing
through the state treatment system – hardly had any influence on policy-
makers.22 Abstinence from drugs was consequently the unquestioned ob-
jective of treatment, including the rejection of methadone maintenance
treatment as being a “capitulation to addiction.”23 Secondly, the Hessian
government argued that the causes for addiction were rooted in a supposed
deviation from a ‘normal’ process of socialization. In order to address
these “maturity deficits” (Reifungsdefizite) of addicts, the government an-
nounced to expand the system of long-term rehab centers. If addicts were,
thirdly, unwilling to undergo voluntary treatment, local authorities were
motivated to consider adopting the “Hessian Law on Forcible Confine-
ment” (Hessisches Freiheitsentziehungsgesetz, HFEG), a state law passed
in 1952 regulating involuntary commitment proceedings in cases where
persons posed a threat to the public order due to mental illness or drug ad-
diction. In situations where addicts “were unable to self-responsibly de-
cide for therapy and rehabilitation,” the Hessian government legitimized
the adoption of coercive actions in order to provide addicts “with an op-
portunity to overcome their inability to exercise their freedom rights.” The
therapeutic aim of these compulsory hospitalizations was to separate users
from the drug milieu and to “make addicts realize their need for treat-
ment.”24
This agenda of the “Hessian program to fight drug abuse” turned ad-
dicts into patients in need of psychotherapeutic care. Rather than address-
ing the social inequalities present in heroin addiction, the Hessian govern-
ment focused on correcting supposed psychological deficits through thera-
21 Schmid 2003, pp. 164–167, 178–185.
22 See Voigt/Scheerer 1989.
23 Hessischer Landtag, Drucksache 9/6365: Antwort der Landesregierung auf eine
Große Anfrage der SPD-Fraktion, betreffend das Hessische Programm zur Be-
kämpfung des Drogenmißbrauchs, 27.4.1982, p. 13.
24 Id. pp. 4-5; Hessische Landesregierung (1980): Hessisches Programm zur Be-
kämpfung des Drogenmißbrauchs. Wiesbaden, pp. 23–24.
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peutic treatment. Presenting coercive measures as a means of liberating
addicts from a condition believed to strongly restrict a person’s freedom
shows that this was not about a backlash of authoritarian traditions. This
approach rather fit quite well into the logic of the West German liberal
welfare state of the 1970s which was generally committed to foster pros-
perity and democracy by extensive state activities in the field of social
welfare.25 According to this logic, addicts were made the objects of strong
state interventions for policy makers who believed that addicts suffered
from a state of mind incompatible with a modern, liberal society. How-
ever, the liberalizing intention was based on a legal framework which ad-
dressed security issues. Referring to HFEG in the case of junkies presum-
ably “unwilling” to undergo therapy constructed addicts as dangers to
themselves and others, allowing local authorities to address heroin users
through coercive measures.
Besides this framing of heroin use on the level of state policy making,
the spatial dimension of heroin use played an important role in addressing
junkies in the city of Frankfurt. In contrast to previous patterns of drug
consumption throughout the twentieth century, junkies appropriated cer-
tain parts of the city public space where they did not only buy, sell or con-
sume heroin, but where they also maintained social connections and reaf-
firmed a specific identity and self-understanding.26 In Frankfurt, this
“scene” spanned over several areas, including the Bahnhofsviertel, the
area around the central train station, and the so-called “Haschischwie-
se“ (Hash Meadow), a public park in Bockenheimer Anlage. Dozens of
heroin users visible in the middle of the city, shooting heroin in plain sight
of passersby instead of using the urban space how it was initially intended,
was a strong and often intended provocation. Historian Jan-Henrik
Friedrichs has argued that the problem with heroin users was not simply
about the violation of laws. It was also about the radical social otherness
of junkies combined with their provocative visibility in the public space,
the fact that they visibly broke with hegemonic expectations regarding de-
cent behavior and basic standards of outer appearance.27
During the 1970s and 1980s, this visible social otherness of heroin
users became deeply entangled in conflicts about the urban space. After
25 Metzler 2005.
26 See Noller 1987; Scheerer 1989.
27 Friedrichs 2013, pp. 66–67.
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the era of reconstruction, economic growth and rational city planning,28
the city of Frankfurt faced a series of social and economic problems, in-
cluding rising unemployment rates, growing financial debts, housing
shortages and environmental damages. Against this background, political
tensions in local politics increased considerably. While a strong leftist mi-
lieu made Frankfurt a center of the squatter movement, the postwar con-
sensus between the local Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and the conser-
vative Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) broke apart.29 In June 1977, af-
ter the CDU had won the local elections by a landslide, the city parliament
elected Walter Wallmann, the former manager of the CDU parliament
group in the Bundestag, mayor of Frankfurt am Main. Wallmann was the
first CDU mayor since the end of the Second World War, ending a long
era of social democratic reign over the city. His election therefore drew
much national attention, as many conservatives considered this election to
be another sign for a general turn (“Tendenzwende”) against the politics of
democratic social reform promoted by social-democrats and liberals who
were forming the government on the national level and in many states at
that time, including the state of Hesse.30
Wallmann’s tenure marked a considerable shift in politically addressing
the heroin scene in Frankfurt. In being concerned about the bad image of
the city, he promoted a series of political projects that came down to a re-
arrangement of the urban space. While supporting cultural initiatives such
as the (re-)construction of the Römerberg and the Museumsufer, he also
made “urban security” a major issue in local politics for the first time
since the integration of the municipal police into the state police in the
1960s.31 In 1980, Wallmann stated that it would be impossible “that a big
city can keep its world-wide flair” when “aggressive and antisocial ele-
ments” occupied the urban space at “the expense of the citizens and their
claims for security.”32 In this context, he did not only securitize leftist
protesters, “tramps,” “social misfits,” and sex workers, but also “drug
criminals” and “drug addicts,” whom he considered a threat to “the inner
28 Bendix 2002.
29 Tüffers 2011.
30 See Balser 1995, pp. 378–404; Kittel 2011, pp. 1–6, 411–440; Tüffers 2011, pp.
182–197.
31 Schipper 2013, pp. 160–161; Beste 2000.
32 Quoted in Schipper 2013, p. 160.
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peace” of the city.33 Regarding the Bahnhofsviertel, Wallmann made clear
that he regarded these different dangerous phenomena to be spatially en-
tangled, constructing whole city areas as dangerous spaces where the po-
lice severely struggled to uphold a minimum of security: “The entangle-
ment of prostitution, drug dealing and other forms of criminality”, he
wrote in 1984, “gets stronger and more and more intolerable. The so-
called ‘entertainment district’ has become a district of criminality.” This
situation near the central train station, “at the ‘entrance gate’ of the city,”
he continued, “cannot be tolerated anymore.”34
Relating drug dealers and users to spatial concentrations of criminality
indicates that Wallmann did not just consider violations against the Fed-
eral Narcotics Law. Wallmann also politicized the growing number of
criminal activities committed by junkies, an issue both criminologists and
the Frankfurt police department had been worrying about since the
mid-1970s. Crimes committed by addicts to finance drugs, the so-called
“Beschaffungskriminalität,” became a new field of crime control focusing
on individual junkies whose dangerousness, according to the criminologist
Arthur Kreuzer, “could hardly be underestimated.”35 In a comprehensive
study about police strategies against the city’s heroin scene, three Frank-
furt police officers calculated that the typical heroin addict needed 3.000
DM per month to finance his addiction, whereby a large part of that sum
was organized by crimes such as burglaries, shoplifting or pickpocketing.
Without making any comparisons to the average number of crimes com-
mitted by other social groups, the authors assumed that an average addict,
who is not in prison or therapy, commits five offenses per day, so that “the
isolation of only one addict for one year may prevent 1800 offenses.”36
The issue of Beschaffungskriminalität shifted attention at the end of the
1970s. While the police had mainly directed criminal persecution against
dealers in the early 1970s, the notion of Beschaffungskriminalität con-
33 Eine Stadt mit menschlichem Gesicht. Kommunalpolitischer Situationsbericht von
Oberbürgermeister Dr. Walter Wallmann. Mitteilungen der Stadt Frankfurt am
Main 2: 11–20, here pp. 16–17; see also Schipper 2013, p. 160.
34 ISGF, Hauptamt 6, Schreiben des Oberbürgermeisters der Stadt Frankfurt an den
Regierungspräsidenten in Darmstadt, Vorordnung zum Schutze der Jugend und des
öffentlichen Anstandes für das Gebiet der Stadt Frankfurt am Main, 5.4.1984. Re-
garding the regulation of prostitution in Frankfurt am Main see Koch 2012,p p.
270–281 and Molloy 1992.
35 Kreuzer 1980, p. 147.
36 Thomas 1982, pp. 52–53.
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strued heroin users as highly active criminals beyond violating the Federal
Narcotics Law, resulting in stronger controls of users.
In late 1970s and early 1980s, the discourse surrounding heroin use
made heroin users the object of two different kinds of power. On the one
hand, local drug policy was about the control of the urban space, for the
heroin scene was regarded as a threat to the public order. This discourse
focused on the presence and movements of the heroin scene in the city and
made junkies part of spatially entangled areas of crime and insecurity. On
the other hand, the framing of heroin use by the state government focused
on individual addicts and was driven by a more biopolitical concern, for it
focused on saving individual lives and enabling users to reintegrate into
the hegemonic social order. As security arguments played a decisive role
in both discourses, extraordinary measures such as involuntary commit-
ment into psychiatric clinics appeared to be legitimate to solve the prob-
lems associated with heroin use. In Frankfurt am Main, both discourses re-
sulted in two interconnected security practices.
Spatial control and involuntary commitment: practices against heroin
users around 1980
In the 1970s and 1980s, keeping control over the urban space became a
central concern of state authorities facing a series of urban phenomena
which seemed to undermine the public order.37 From the perspective of lo-
cal authorities in Frankfurt am Main, these spatial challenges included
such different phenomena as the squatter movement, the strong and vio-
lent protests against the expansion of Frankfurt International Airport
(Startbahn West) and the “massive disturbance of public security” in the
Bahnhofsviertel.38 In this context, both the Frankfurt police and the Wall-
mann administration intensified their efforts to dissolve the city’s heroin
scene by intensifying spatial policing and trying to obtain involuntary
commitments of junkies in rehab clinics.
The Frankfurt police began to increase pressure on the city’s heroin
users by reinforcing surveillance and control measures as part of an “im-
mediate action program to intensify police operations against drug crimi-
3
37 Friedrichs 2013; Weinhauer 2013.
38 ISGF, Hauptamt 6, Bericht des Polizeipräsidenten Frankfurt am Main über das
Bahnhofsviertel an den Regierungspräsidenten in Darmstadt, 27.8.84.
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nality” by the Hessian minister of the interior.39 In trying to address the
insecurities associated with the presence of heroin users in the urban
space, these measures culminated in the attempt to banish the local heroin
scene, the Haschischwiese in the Bockenheimer Anlage, from the urban
public. In February 1980, the police commissioner ordered a series of con-
certed actions by the city’s police forces in order to fully dissolve the Ha-
schischwiese.40 Starting on February 11, 1980, about 30 officers perma-
nently controlled heroin users over a period of several months, carrying
out more than 30,000 controls and hundreds of arrests and criminal
charges in 1980 alone. These measures resulted in a sharp rise of convic-
tions. In 1977, seven percent of the prison population in the state of Hesse
had been sentenced based on the Federal Narcotics Law. This proportion
increased to 22 percent four years later.41 The police forces considered this
operation to be a success, for they associated, for example, a decline in
shoplifting in spring 1980 with the dissolution of the scene.42
Against the background of intensified spatial policing, the Hessian state
expanded drug counselling and addiction treatment. Following the domi-
nating therapeutic treatment paradigm, the so-called “therapeutic chain,”43
the state government and the city administration tried to establish a
consistent treatment system ranging from drug counseling centers and
withdrawal clinics to long-term therapies and aftercare assistances.44 This
expansion was accompanied by the city administration’s support of the in-
tensified police controls. The head of the office for social welfare (Fürsor-
geamt), who was in charge of coping with drug addicts in Frankfurt, initi-
ated a coordinating committee between the police department and several
municipal offices. The city administration was committed to improving
the administrative proceedings regarding addicts taken into custody by po-
lice controls. As supported by the Hessian state government, the city offi-
cials intended to adopt the Hessisches Freiheitsentziehnugsgesetz (HFEG),
39 Regarding this program see „In Hessen mehr schlagartige Razzien gegen Rausch-
gifthändler.“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20.9.1979, p. 7, and Hessischer
Landtag, Drucksache 9/6365, pp. 28–30.
40 Thomas et al. 1982, pp. 74–79.
41 Hessischer Landtag, Drucksache 9/6365, Anlage 1.
42 Thomas et al. 1982, p. 53; „Seit zwei Wochen ist die Haschischwiese überall“,
FAZ, 27.2.1980, p. 33.
43 Schmid, Drogenhilfe, p. 169.
44 ISGF, Fürsorgeamt 4.454, Bericht des Magistrats auf eine Anfrage der SPD-Frak-
tion zur Rehabilitation Drogenabhängiger, 8.5.1981.
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allowing compulsory actions against heroin users who “pose a danger for
public security and order.” The health office believed the requirements of
HFEG to be fulfilled when a physician had diagnosed a person to be hero-
in addicted. Thus, HFEG should be adopted without giving other reasons
for the supposed danger of the addict.45 This procedure was agreed upon
by the police, the offices for health and order and the district court. The
aim of these measures was to isolate addicts from the scene for a longer
period of time. The police calculated that the situation in the Bahnhofs-
viertel would improve if the involved authorities removed two to three ad-
dicts from the scene per day. Reservations towards coercion should there-
fore be overcome, as argued by the head of the Fürsorgeamt: “The aim is
to set aside existing timidities concerning coercive measures and to recog-
nize that in lots of cases the compulsory removal from the milieu means
the first step towards a successful treatment.”46
In practice, the cooperation between the different local authorities did
not run very smoothly. The Frankfurt police repeatedly complained about
finding junkies back on the scene who had just been removed a few days
earlier. The office for welfare criticized district judges for too often refus-
ing to order compulsory commitments, and social workers generally pre-
ferred voluntary treatment over compulsion. However, these activities
show the strong commitment of local authorities to solve the problem with
the heroin scene by coordinating police controls and involuntary commit-
ments of heroin users into withdrawal clinics based on HFEG. Practices of
criminal persecution and spatial policing on the one hand, and disciplining
drug addicts by involuntary commitments on the other, were therefore
strongly interconnected. Both practices aimed at making heroin users in-
visible by dissolving the scene and committing addicts to the closed wards
of psychiatric clinics.
In the early 1980s, the strategy of connecting coercion and treatment re-
garding drug addicts was not restricted to Frankfurt am Main. There was a
45 ISGF, Fürsorgeamt 4.454, Ergebnisprotokoll über eine Besprechung zwischen Ver-
tretern des Ordnungs-, Sozial- und Gesundheitsamtes, sowie des Amtsgerichts
vom 25.1.1982, betr. Lösungsmöglichkeiten für eine bessere Zusammenarbeit bei
der Bekämpfung der Rauschgiftkriminalität, 26.1.1982.
46 ISGF Fürsorgeamt, 4.454, Ergebnisprotokoll über ein Gespräch zwischen Vertre-
tern des Ordnungs-, Sozial- und Gesundheitsamtes, der Polizei, der Kriminalpoli-
zei und des Unterausschusses Sucht des Psychosozialen Ausschusses der Stadtver-




general tendency in West German drug politics towards the idea of “hel-
fender Zwang” (helping by coercion), that is combining criminal persecu-
tion and social welfare measures such as addiction treatment. In 1982, the
Bundestag passed a reform of the Federal Narcotics Law under the label
“Therapie statt Strafe.” Judges were now able to order therapy instead of
imprisonment.47 Because of this legal reform, the percentage of users at-
tending a treatment program on a voluntary basis declined from circa 75
percent in 1977 to under 50 percent in 1980. In some institutions, only one
out of 10 addicts were treated voluntarily, that is without any judicial obli-
gations.48
The results of the drug policy in Frankfurt did not improve the situation
of heroin users, nor did it reduce the number of users in the public space.
Due to heightened pressure, heroin users were forced to spread into other
areas of the city. At the end of the 1980s, a new meeting place emerged in
the Taunusanlage, a public park between Opera Square and Kaiserstraße.
At constant risk of being arrested, heroin users were always on the move,
paid higher prices for dope of less quality, were forced to shoot up in high-
ly stressful situations and compensated withdrawal symptoms by taking
other sedative drugs in times of low heroin supply. This situation height-
ened the risk of abscesses, infections and overdose emergencies. Even be-
fore the appearance of AIDS, the annual mortality rate of German heroin
addicts was two to three times higher than that of the rest of the popula-
tion. Drug policies based on spatial policing and helfender Zwang there-
fore did not only reinforce the social marginalization and deprive heroin
addicts of basic rights, critics argued; strong police pressure also con-
tributed to worsening their health conditions.49
While some proponents of repressive strategies in drug politics might
have seen these devastating effects as a success, because they separated
the heroin scene from other subcultures and deterred youths of turning to
heroin,50 drug policies such as those adopted by the city of Frankfurt hard-
ly complied with the needs of addicts on the scene. At the beginning of the
1980s, social research found that both drug counselling centers and treat-
ment institutions only reached a very small number of heroin users, indi-
47 Schmid 2003, pp. 175–178.
48 These numbers refer to different local treatment institutions in Hamburg and Bre-
men. See Bossong 1983, p. 33.
49 See Bossong et al. 1983; Scheerer 1989, pp. 292–298.
50 Id., p. 290.
Reconfigurations of Security. Governing Heroin Users in Frankfurt am Main
339
cating that the whole system of drug counselling and addiction treatment
was out of contact with their potential clients.51 Around 1980, local au-
thorities in West Germany therefore tried to change this situation by fi-
nancing street workers who tried to build contacts with heroin addicts on
the streets. In 1983, the city of Frankfurt began to finance a street worker
program in the Bahnhofsviertel, the so-called “M41,”52 which aimed at
restoring the trust of addicts in state sponsored treatment institutions.
Compared to drug policies in other German and European cities, the
strategy adopted by the authorities in Frankfurt am Main appears to be
very repressive. According to Klaus Weinhauer, the West Berlin senate
had adjusted its confrontational strategy towards the city’s junkies in the
late 1970s, paving the way for a more liberal culture in coping with heroin
addicts. Weinhauer argues that this culture resembled policies in cities
such as London, which were generally more orientated towards communi-
cation, trust and mutual acceptance.53 Drug policy in Frankfurt am Main
demonstrates that local politicians and city officials had chosen a different
route. Although the city administration also expanded the number of drug
counselling centers, the strategies against the heroin scene were mainly
based on practices aiming at regaining control over the spaces of heroin
use and forcing addicts into treatment. During the 1970s, the way the
marginalized group of heroin users were governed therefore hardened con-
siderably, for they were subject to state-centered policies, increased coer-
cion and social exclusion. These policies did not only have strong negative
effects on the junkies’ health. It also restricted their political agency. Ef-
forts by some Frankfurt activists to found and run a “junkie union” based
on the model of Dutch junkie activism failed due to strong exclusion and
lacking support from more powerful political actors.54
In the city of Frankfurt, this situation did not change until the emer-
gence of the AIDS epidemic, when the debates about HIV/AIDS preven-
tion resulted in more liberal and inclusive approaches towards drug ad-
dicts. These reconfigurations, however, were not simply introduced by
state officials, as we will see. They rather had to be fought for by self-help
groups and critics of the city’s drug policy.
51 Bossong 1983, pp. 29–32.
52 ISGF, Fürsorgeamt 4.464, M41 – Aufsuchende Drogenhilfe in Frankfurt, Tätig-
keits- und Erfahrungsbericht 1983, 5.1.1984.
53 Weinhauer 2010, p. 287; see also Weinhauer 2006.
54 Scheerer 1984; for the more successful Dutch junkie unions see Blok 2011.
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Challenging ‘security’: shifting power relations in the context of the
emerging HIV/AIDS epidemic
Starting in 1985/6, controversies over HIV/AIDS prevention fundamental-
ly challenged the way of coping with heroin users in Frankfurt am Main.
While the city administration identified heroin addicts as “high risk
groups” and transferred the security logic of its drug policy to AIDS pre-
vention practices, self-help organizations founded by gay men, the largest
group affected by HIV/AIDS, organized strong protest against these pro-
cedures. In questioning the rationality of the city government’s AIDS poli-
cy, these grass-roots initiatives not only promoted new drug policies but
also provided a new political environment for heroin users by engaging in
a politics of antidiscrimination for people directly affected by the epidem-
ic.
Besides gay men, heroin users were the group most affected by HIV/
AIDS. After having detected a human retro virus as the causal agent of
AIDS, the sharing of syringes was believed to be the main vector of virus
transmission for heroin users. When AIDS emerged as an issue of public
health in West Germany around 1982/83, however, it mainly appeared to
be a disease spread by sexual practices of gay men. The West German
mass media reported about a so-called “gay plague” reaching Europe from
the United States, depicting AIDS as a dangerous disease of gay men that
seemed to necessitate harsh interventions into gay communities. In order
to oppose both the spread of HIV and AIDS-related discrimination, West
German gay activists engaged in AIDS discourses, founded self-help orga-
nizations and promoted individual preventive behavior such as “safer
sex”. These strategies proved to be quite successful as gay AIDS activists
and organizations started to play an influential role in the emerging AIDS
expert networks.55 In the mid-1980s, at the time when the health adminis-
tration in Frankfurt began to systematically address HIV/AIDS, the city’s
gay scene therefore did not appear as a field of intervention. In contrast,
the local public health authority experienced homosexuals as reliable,
health-conscious men who were eager to take responsibility for them-
selves by raising awareness for AIDS prevention within the city’s gay
community.56 In this context, the city’s health department began to cooper-
4
55 Haus 2016.
56 ISGF, Stadtgesundheitsamt (StGA) Sachakten 632, Bericht Deutscher, Überwa-
chung von AIDS-Risikogruppen, 13.8.86.
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ate with AIDS‑Hilfe Frankfurt (AHF) and agreed to cover part of its ex-
penses.57 On August, 23 1985, the mayor, several city offices, regional
medical associations, the university hospital and the AHF founded a so-
called “AIDS-coalition,” thereby integrating gay AIDS activists into the
local public health system.58
At about the same time, the municipal health office began to direct its
attention towards male and female sex workers. In the mid-1980s, prosti-
tution attracted much attention when the media began to speculate about
the spread of AIDS into parts of the society that had not been believed to
be at risk so far. Prostitutes were believed to be a “reservoir for Aids,”59
spreading the virus from risk groups into the general population, as the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung claimed in September 1985. In this con-
text, the health office organized a survey to gain knowledge about the
spread of HIV, then called LAV/HTLV-III, among the city’s more than
1,000 registered male and female sex workers.60 This survey resulted in
the identification of a specific group of people in Frankfurt whom the ad-
ministration considered to pose a severe threat. It found that the general
prevalence of LAV/HTLV-III among the tested population was very low,
while 60 percent of the positively tested persons were female street prosti-
tutes with intravenous drug addiction.61 Interpreting these results in Febru-
ary 1986, the head of the health office wrote that “the risk groups, which
were considered to be exceptionally endangered a year ago, have now to
be reevaluated.” From then on, rather than solely addressing gay men, the
authorities were intended to focus on “persons with intravenous drug ad-
diction” in general and heroin-addicted persons financing drugs by prosti-
tution, or so-called “Beschaffungsprostituierte,” in particular. The latter
“pose an imminent threat for third parties” because they were “practically
57 See ISGF, StGA Sachakten 635, Vermerk Hartwig, Beurteilung der AIDS‑Hilfe
Frankfurt, 25.10.85; Vermerk über ein Gespräch zwischen dem Gesundheitsdezer-
nenten Rhein, dem Leiter des STGA Schildwächter und der AIDS‑Hilfe Frankfurt,
26.2.86.
58 See „Beratungsstelle soll Fragen über Aids auffangen.“ Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 24.8.1985; ISGF, StGA Sachakten 635, Zusammenarbeit des Stadtge-
sundheitsamtes mit der AIDS‑Hilfe Frankfurt, Vorbereitung der Sitzung am 9.3.87.
59 „Die Prostitution – ein Reservoir für Aids“. FAZ, 25.9.85.
60 ISGF, StGA Sachakten 633, Rundbrief Schildwächters betr. geplante Untersu-
chung von Prävalenz des HTLV III Virus unter Prostituierten, o.D. [August 1985].
61 ISGF, STGA Sachakten 633, Schreiben Schildwächters an Dr. Rapprich und Dr.
Staszewski, betr. Untersuchung auf HTLV-III-Antikörper, 4.12.85.
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inaccessible” for any kind of education regarding infection risks and pre-
ventive behavior.62
In the following months, this knowledge about high infection rates
among “inaccessible” heroin-addicted sex workers strongly influenced the
making of the city administration’s HIV/AIDS policy. While HIV-positive
prostitutes without a drug addiction did not have to fear coercion for they
were believed to comply with safer sex rules, using condoms was not an
option for Beschaffungsprostituierte. Concerning this group, city officials
had to “acknowledge the behavioral unreliability due to drug addiction,”
as mayor Wolfram Brück wrote in August 1986 to the Hessian Minister
for Social Affairs, explaining the city’s HIV/AIDS strategy.63 The city ad-
ministration therefore planned to convince heroin-addicted persons to en-
tirely abandon prostitution. In a second step, the city officials intended to
carry out coercive actions based on the Federal Contagion Law, such as
compulsory blood testing, against those “undiscerning and reckless” per-
sons who did not comply with the instructions given by the health office.64
In extreme cases, this explicitly included “lifelong quarantine,” as the
head of the health department, Peter Rhein, stated in a press conference,
without stating exactly what this would mean for infected persons consid-
ering the lack of medical treatment.65
Planning coercive measures against so-called “risk groups” and HIV-
positive persons believed to be unreliable or inaccessible for education
messages was a highly controversial issue in political debates about AIDS
prevention throughout the 1980s.66 On the level of national politics, the
Bavarian state government was the most powerful proponent of adopting
the Federal Contagion Law in the case of HIV/AIDS. In deciding to focus
on identifying and intensely controlling “high risk groups” believed to en-
danger the general population, the city administration in Frankfurt decided
62 ISGF, StGA Sachakten 636, Schreiben Schildwächters an das Ordnungsamt, betr.
Zusammenhänge zwischen Drogenabhängigkeit und Prostitution, 21.2.86
und 12.3.86.
63 ISGF, StGA Sachakten 629, Brief des Oberbürgermeisters Brück an den Hessi-
schen Sozialminister, Maßnahmen gegen die Verbreitung von Aids – Zusammen-
hänge zwischen Drogenabhängigkeit und Prostitution, 29.8.86.
64 ISGF, StGA Sachakten 632, Schreiben Stadtrat Rhein an Stadtrat Brück, betr.
Maßnahmen gegen Angehörige von besonderen Risikogruppen, 16.6.1986.
65 „Ärzte und Behörden schlagen wegen rasanter Aids-Ausbreitung Alarm“. Frank-
futer Allgemeine Zeitung, 3.10.86.
66 For a general overview see Geene 2000; Reutter 1992; Tümmers 2012.
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to follow a similar HIV/AIDS policy. The image of the “undiscerning”
heroin addicted prostitute, unable to act responsibly, strongly correspond-
ed with the idea of the junkie “unwilling” to undergo voluntary treatment.
From the perspective of city officials, “unwilling” or “undiscerning”
junkies posed a threat to others and justified coercive interventions in or-
der to protect others.
In contrast to the strategy against the heroin scene around 1980, though,
strong actions against heroin addicts faced resistances in the context of
HIV/AIDS. In September 1986, city officials brought certain heroin-ad-
dicted sex workers to the health office in order to detect their HIV blood
status.67 In this context, measures by health officials and the railway po-
lice against 10 male sex workers at the main station, conducted on
September 17, 1986, attracted much media attention and lead to a local
and national wave of protest against the city administration’s practices in
AIDS prevention.68 The social-democratic and green opposition in the city
parliament strongly criticized the health office for implementing a sense-
less, counterproductive AIDS policy.69 The AIDS‑Hilfe Frankfurt, after
having unsuccessfully protested in writing, declared the “AIDS-coalition”
to be broken, because state coercion, as the AIDS‑Hilfe publicly stated, un-
dermined its efforts in AIDS prevention based on trust and cooperation.70
In protest writings to the Frankfurt health office, a series of different ac-
tors, ranging from local health authorities to many local AIDS‑Hilfe orga-
nizations, demanded the halt of these compulsory measures. Coercion was
highly ineffective, as the health authority of Bremen criticized, for it un-
dermined AIDS education based on anonymity and trust, leading only to
67 ISGF, StGA Sachakten 632, Stadtrat Prof. Dr. Rhein, Maßnahmen gegen die Ver-
breitung von AIDS, Ergebnis einer Besprechung vom 17.9.86, 18.9.86; Vermerk
Forßbohm, GK-Abteilung, Maßnahmen gegen die Verbreitung von AIDS, 19.9.86.
68 See „Blutprobe wegen AIDS-Verdacht im Bahnhof.“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung, 19.9.1986; “Razzia am Hauptbahnhof: Strichjungen auf AIDS untersucht.“
Frankfurter Rundschau, 19.9.1986; “‘Strichjungen‘ mußten Blut für AIDS-Kon-
trolle lassen.“ Frankfurter Neue Presse, 19.9.1986; „Am Ende des Vertrauens.
Frankfurts Prostituierte müssen zum Aids-Test“. Die Zeit, 24.10.86.
69 ‚Strichjungen sind für Aufklärung unzugänglich‘, Frankfurter Rundschau,
20.9.1986; ISGF, StGA Sachakten 632, Anfrage der Grünen im Römer, betr. Raz-
zia des Gesundheitsamtes am Südeingang des Hbf, 23.9.86.
70 Proteste gegen AIDS-Razzia im Bahnhof, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,




the “retreat of affected persons into invisibility,” with the dangerous effect
of making any form of prevention in these groups impossible.71
Being quite representative for the AIDS debate in the 1980s, this criti-
cism expresses how a broad political coalition questioned the effectivity of
coercive measures against people with HIV/AIDS. Arguing that coercion
weakened state control for it pushed affected people into “invisibility” in-
dicates a general shift in addressing heroin addicts. Firstly, visibility was
made an important precondition of effective AIDS prevention. While up
until the early 1980s, drug policies in Frankfurt had aimed at banning
heroin use from the public space, heroin users now ought to stay visible
and accessible for prevention campaigns and education work. This ap-
proach implicitly accepted the presence of heroin users at public meeting
places. Secondly, concrete measures recommended by actors such as the
AIDS‑Hilfen practically undermined the idea of heroin addicts being “un-
willing” or “undiscerning,” the city’s legitimation of coercive measures in
both drug policy and AIDS prevention. Backed by successes of safer sex
campaigns in gay communities, the Deutsche AIDS‑Hilfe (DAH), the na-
tional umbrella organization of the local AIDS‑Hilfen, for example, began
to recommend so-called “safer use” programs, which could provide heroin
consumers with sterile needles in order to stop HIV transmission via nee-
dle sharing.72 The DAH believed this measure to be quite effective, for it
assumed, in contrast to city officials and mainstream drug experts, that
heroin users were indeed “accessible for assessing and evaluating infec-
tion risks.”73 By reframing heroin users as rational subjects, the DAH pro-
moted a fundamentally different idea of drug addiction than embodied in
policy documents by both the Hessian state government and the Frankfurt
city administration, which considered addiction as a strong restriction of
the junkies’ capacity for reasonable decision-making. In 1988, after AIDS
expert commissions had recommended the provision of sterile needles,
71 ISGF, StGA Sachakten 636, Brief der AIDS-Beratungsstelle des Hauptgesund-
heitsamtes der Stadt Bremen an den Gesundheitsdezernenten Rhein, 6.10.86. The
other protest writings can be found in ISGF, STGA Sachakten 635.
72 Deutsche AIDS‑Hilfe 1987, pp. 15–17.
73 Ahrens/Michels 1988, p. 19.
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too,74 the city officials began to fund the Verein für Arbeits- und Erzie-
hungshilfe in order to start a corresponding program.75
As the wave of criticism against the administration’s measures regard-
ing male sex workers indicate, self-help networks, especially the
AIDS‑Hilfen, played a decisive role in organizing protest against coercive
measures. The AIDS‑Hilfen thereby did not only challenge the security
framing of heroin addicts by questioning its efficiency. They also claimed
to articulate political demands of those groups mostly under pressure from
both the disease and state authorities. This partisanship did not only in-
clude gay men, but also sex workers and heroin users. Thus, heroin users
for the first time gained a strong political representation in political con-
troversies about AIDS prevention and drug politics in general. As a direct
reaction to state and city administrations planning to adopt the Federal
Contagion Law against people they believed to be “undiscerning”, the
DAH organized a political action day called the “solidarity of the undis-
cerning” in Frankfurt am Main on July 9, 1988, bringing together not only
gay and prostitution activists and social workers, but also national politi-
cians in support of the DAH’s concerns, such as the social democrat, and
later mayor of Frankfurt, Volker Hauff. Speakers expressed their strong
disapproval of labeling and excluding people as undiscerning and unteach-
able and tried to motivate sex workers, gay men and heroin users for a
common “politics of encouragement and anti-discrimination.”76 In the fol-
lowing years, such claims resulted in the emergence of distinct identity
politics for HIV-positive people, institutionalized in so-called “national as-
semblies of positives.” These assemblies tried to participate in national
health politics by formulating political claims in the name of people with
HIV and AIDS. These AIDS‑Hilfe activities created a new political envi-
ronment for heroin users because they also gave junkie initiatives such as
“JES – Junkies, Ex-Users, Substitutes” the opportunity to publicly demand
treatment innovations and the decriminalization of heroin use.77
Until the introduction of methadone programs, the willingness and po-
tential of heroin users to participate in self-help initiatives was much less
74 Deutscher Bundestag 1988, p. 12.
75 ISGF, StGA Sachakten 632, Rhein an Sozialdezernat, Spritzenaustauschprogram-
me für i.v. Drogenabhängige zur Aids-Prophylaxe, 15.4.88.
76 These were the words of the DAH’s expert for drugs, Helmut Ahrens, see:
Deutsche AIDS‑Hilfe, Solidarität, p. 13.
77 See the documentation Deutsche AIDS‑Hilfe 1990; see also Hermann 1990, p. 34.
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profound than that of gay men due to their strong social exclusion, crimi-
nalization and the effects of addiction. However, the activities of AIDS
self-help groups claiming to represent heroin users discriminated as
“undiscerning” show how power relations in drug politics have changed in
the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Heroin users gained an influential
(and well-financed) political advocate. The model of AIDS prevention
promoted by the AIDS‑Hilfe networks undermined stigmatizing images of
heroin addiction by considering heroin users as subjects capable of taking
reasonable action, such as using sterile needles. Rather than considering
addicts as threats to the urban space, HIV/AIDS prevention was based on
strategies of acceptance, trust and communication. In this context, both the
AIDS‑Hilfen and junkie initiatives formulated claims to liberalize West
German drug politics in general. As we will see, this new political situa-
tion eventually resulted in reconfiguring drug policies in Frankfurt, for
critics of the city administration’s AIDS policy also became the most ar-
dent proponents of harm reduction.
Making the case for survival: the establishment of harm reduction
policies, 1988-1991
Around 1990, the political controversies about HIV/AIDS and heroin ad-
dicts underwent a profound transformation. Discourses on heroin use,
which had strongly overlapped with discourses on HIV/AIDS for some
years, now shifted to problematizing the worsening living conditions of
heroin users in general. In this context, “harm reduction,” a drug policy
paradigm mainly focusing on improving the health of heroin users, gained
much influence. In 1989, Frankfurt am Main became one of the first cities
in Germany to systematically adopt harm reduction policies. This ap-
proach reconfigured the ways of governing heroin users because it ques-
tioned well-established framings and practices.
In March 1989, the social democrats and the greens won the local elec-
tion in Frankfurt am Main and agreed upon creating a new city govern-
ment under the leadership of social-democratic mayor Volker Hauff. Al-
ready in the years before the election, Volker Hauff and the new head of
the department for health, the green politician Margarethe Nimsch, had
been promoting alternative approaches in drug politics. It was no surprise,
therefore, that the new mayor declared that his administration wanted “to
go new ways in drug politics,” because he considered existing approaches
5
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to have failed and to be ineffective in achieving sustainable solutions for
the city’s heroin scene.78 One of the first drug-related decisions of the new
government concerned the reorganization of responsibilities in drug is-
sues. By creating the “Drogenreferat,” a new division in Nimsch’s depart-
ment which ought to coordinate the city’s drug policies, the city govern-
ment transferred responsibilities from the department of social affairs to
the health department. This institutional rearrangement indicated that the
new administration wanted to address drug issues from a more health re-
lated perspective.79
In 1989, highlighting health aspects in drug politics referred to the
worsening living conditions in the city’s heroin scene. Although the bad
health conditions of junkies had been known to Frankfurt drug experts
since the mid-1970s,80 improving the heroin user’s health had always been
subordinated to the aim of abstinence. Measures that did not contribute to
drug abstinence were strongly rejected for not aiming at the supposed
cause of the junkies’ miserable condition: addiction to heroin. At the time
when Hauff and Nimsch took office, reports about the heroin scene
showed strong tendencies of physical deterioration of junkies, especially
of those long-time addicts who had no home and frequented the scene dai-
ly.81 Even more disturbing was the dramatic and unforeseen rise in death
cases related to so-called “accidental overdoses.”82 The Federal Police
counted 1,000 drug-related deaths in Germany in 1989, which rose to
1,491 in 1990. Within the next year, this number further increased by more
than 42 percent to its all-time peak of 2,125 deaths. In the city of Frank-
furt, the police counted 62 such deaths in 1988, 108 in 1990, and 147 in
1991, which meant that the police found two to three dead bodies related
to the consumption of heroin on average per week during that year.83 Such
developments shifted attention in debates about drug policies. While the
78 „Frankfurt braucht das soziale, ökonomische und ökologische Gleichgewicht.
Kommunalpolitischer Situationsbericht des Oberbürgermeisters Volker Hauff.“
Amtsblatt für Frankfurt am Main 25/1990: 481-497, quote p. 491.
79 See ISGF, Hauptamt 38, Mit Drogenabhängigen leben! Rahmenplan zur Gestal-
tung der Drogenpolitik in Frankfurt am Main, 29.4.1991.
80 Berger/Zeitel 1976, pp. 163–164.
81 See ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 4, Irmgard Voigt, Abschlussbericht der Studie ‚Offe-
ne Drogenszene in Frankfurt am Main‘, Mai 1992.
82 See Schmid 2003, pp. 197–198.




question of how to prevent HIV/AIDS from spreading in the group of
heroin users had dominated discussions in previous years, HIV/AIDS now
became part of a much larger concern: heroin users’ chances of survival.
The rising mortality rate in the group of heroin users stimulated funda-
mental criticism of existing drug policies among drug experts, social
workers and local politicians across the country. Critics of existing drug
policies claimed both criminalization and the aim of abstinence institution-
alized in the addiction treatment system were responsible for the worsen-
ing health conditions of users. Until the appearance of HIV/AIDS, a ma-
jority of the addiction treatment experts had considered a “consciously ex-
perienced level of suffering” (Leidensdruck) as a necessary motivational
precondition for withdrawal treatment and psychological therapy. Thus, a
certain degree of personal misery was considered the precondition of kind
of assistance.84 Having to face high HIV infection rates and thousands of
drug-related deaths made many actors rethink this kind of approach. One
of the most radical criticisms was formulated by the Deutsche AIDS‑Hilfe.
Its “drug strategy paper” of 1988 made “conventional drug policies,” re-
pression and an “absolutized need for security” responsible for the severe
“health crisis” of heroin users. Formulating “a claim to survive” in the
name of junkies, the paper demanded a general paradigm shift away from
securitization and criminalization towards a drug policy that focused on
stabilizing the users’ health rather than penalizing them or forcing them
into abstinence. Concretely, the DAH asked for a broad portfolio of harm
reduction measures, or in terms more common in West German discus-
sions, “low-threshold” assistances for heroin users, including methadone
maintenance programs, “crisis intervention centers,” legal counselling,
self-help projects and meeting places such as junkie cafés.85
As these demands indicate, proponents of harm reduction tried to estab-
lish a new way of governing drug addiction. In contrast to drug policies
based on security, criminalization and abstinence, harm reduction fol-
lowed, in Foucauldian terms, the logic of governmentality.86 While the
former intervened into heroin scenes in order to alter the reality of drug
consumption and addiction according to a strict normative idea of the so-
cial, the idea of a drug-free society, harm reduction proponents intended to
set these ideals aside. In April 1991, the red-green government in Frank-
84 Berger/Zeitel 1976, p. 167.
85 Ahrens/Michels 1988, quotes on pp. 15, 16, 19, 24.
86 Foucault 2006.
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furt stated that “the attempt to eliminate drugs and drug consumption from
our culture has failed … Instead of denying this fact, we should create
conditions that enable us to diminish risks, limit harm and reduce suffer-
ing.”87 Thus, harm reduction approaches accepted the reality of drug use
in order to be able to influence certain unfavorable phenomena, such as
the worsening health conditions of addicts.
This reorientation also implied a new framing of heroin use. In 1990,
social scientist Heino Stöver, a strong proponent of harm reduction at that
time, argued that addiction did not necessarily mean a heteronomous con-
dition of unfreedom rooted in a disorder of the user’s personality. Stöver
preferred a less dramatic idea of addiction. Rather than seeing addiction as
a life-long enslavement to drugs, Stöver highlighted that there were ele-
ments of autonomy and responsibility in the drug addict’s behavior despite
addiction-related constraints. He considered addiction as a “form of hu-
man expression,” a way of life characterizing certain biographical phases.
For professionals, “acceptance-driven drug work” (akzeptierende Drogen-
arbeit) was therefore about accompanying addicts in this biographical
phase, about overcoming the “object status” of addicts and promoting their
individual capacities and “self-healing powers.” Stöver believed that this
new approach had a better chance of being accepted by drug consumers
than therapies strictly aiming at abstinence. He argued that harm reduction
“is about accepting drug consumption of those people who cannot or do
not want to stop consuming. It is about creating low-threshold offers in or-
der to make contact with these kinds of users.”88
Initiated by the controversies about HIV/AIDS prevention, this new
paradigm strongly broke with concepts of West Germany drug politics in
general and Frankfurt am Main in particular. Rather than legitimizing co-
ercive state intervention by pathologizing heroin users or depicting them
as threats to public security, the paradigm of harm reduction desecuritized
heroin use in terms of dedramatizing and normalizing heroin use and ad-
diction, arguing that heroin addicts were able to make their own responsi-
ble decisions – including the decision to continue using heroin. Propo-
nents of harm reduction such as Heino Stöver and the DAH therefore de-
manded a more liberal and tolerant culture in treating heroin addicts by re-
specting their decisions, their way of life and their “right to humane,
87 ISGF, Hauptamt 38, Mit Drogenabhängigen leben! Rahmenplan zur Gestaltung
der Drogenpolitik in Frankfurt am Main, 29.4.1991.
88 Stöver 1990, quotes on pp. 14–15, 21.
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healthy and social living conditions.”89 By liberalizing the way of coping
with heroin addicts, however, harm reduction proponents also hoped to in-
crease the outreach and efficiency of drug assistances compared to pol-
icies based on the logics of security and abstinence. In this regard, harm
reduction was about expanding rather than limiting state control of heroin
addiction by adapting drug policies to the potentials and capacities of
heroin users.
Although the new city government in Frankfurt did not follow these ar-
guments in every respect, Volker Hauff and Margarethe Nimsch were gen-
erally in favor of de-dramatizing heroin users and therefore tried to orien-
tate the city’s drug policy towards harm reduction. On the one hand, they
established four “crisis centers” run by various non-governmental organi-
zations such as the local AIDS‑Hilfe. Each of these centers provided users
with stress-free places near the scene where they should feel accepted and
where they found overnight accommodation and hygiene facilities (but
where they were not allowed to deal or consume drugs).90 With regard to
methadone, the red-green city government had to face the strong opposi-
tion of federal and regional medical associations, which had reservations
towards maintenance therapies.91 The health department therefore made
strong efforts to thoroughly coordinate its plan with the Hessian medical
association, the health insurances and the Hessian state government. After
long discussions, the involved institutions agreed upon introducing a med-
ically controlled “methadone-based drug assistance” (methadonbasierte
Drogenhilfe) in 1991.92 In contrast to a previous “high-threshold” pro-
gram, the methadone-based drug assistance was not restricted to prosti-
tutes with HIV-drug addiction.93 As an “aid for survival” (Überlebenshil-
89 Id., p. 15.
90 See ISGF, Hauptamt 40, Drogenreferat der Stadt Frankfurt, Tätigkeitsbericht
1.10.92 bis 31.12.93, 22.4.94.
91 See „Ersatzdrogen. Stellungnahme des gemeinsamen Arbeitskreises des Wissen-
schaftlichen Beirates und des Ausschusses für ‚Psychiatrie, Psychotherapie und
Psychohygiene‘ der Bundesärztekammer.“ Deutsches Ärzteblatt 5, 4.2.1988; ISGF,
Stadtverordnetenversammlung 4.401, Presseerklärung der Landesärztekammer
Hessen, betr. Methadonsubstitution, 28.11.1987.
92 ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 2, Rahmenvertrag über die Verordnung, Vergabe und
Verabreichung von Methadon (L-Polamidon) zum Zweck der Substitution Heroin-
abhängiger in Hessen, 27.6.1991.
93 See ISGF, StGA Sachakten 631, StGA AIDS Arbeitsgruppe – Ambulanz für medi-
kamentengestützte Hilfe zum Ausstieg aus der Beschaffungsprostitution, 12.9.88.
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fe), the program was run at the four crisis centers and principally ad-
dressed all heroin addicts.
The city’s new drug policy based on harm reduction principles achieved
imminent success when measured by the number of drug-related deaths,
the number which had given local drug politics its strong dynamic in
1989/90. In 1992, the Frankfurt police counted 127 death cases, a decrease
by 13 percent compared to 1991. This reduction was even higher in 1993,
when there were 68 deaths by overdose, a decrease by 46 percent com-
pared to the previous year.94 At the same time, the number of ambulance
calls due to drug-related emergencies also decreased drastically. Regard-
ing social assistances, the Drogenreferat reported that “addiction accept-
ing and pragmatic assistances” had sustainably broken the “deep social
isolation especially of long-term intravenous drug addicts.”95
As these numbers indicate, harm reduction measures introduced by the
red-green city government strongly improved the health situation of the
city’s junkies. In late 1991 and early 1992, however, reports about the
heroin scene showed that parts of the city’s users were still not responding
to the existing assistances because they were neither willing to substitute
heroin for methadone nor to be socially reintegrated. Social researchers es-
pecially highlighted the miserable situation of homeless addicts who suf-
fered from high HIV infection rates. In order to reach out to these persons,
they recommended the expansion of harm reduction measures, for exam-
ple, by providing addicts with clean heroin and safe consumption sites un-
der medically controlled conditions.96 Other actors in the field of local
drug politics reminded the city administration, though, that the effects of
expanding medical assistances were limited. In a letter to the city adminis-
tration, the director of the Verein für Arbeits- und Erziehungshilfe (VAE),
which ran one of two crisis centers in the Bahnhofsviertel, stated that “the
bad general health of junkies results not least from the illegality of their
activities. Therefore, the improvement of medical care cannot replace ef-
forts to reform the Narcotics Law.”97
94 ISGF, Hauptamt 38, Kurzanalyse Rauschgifttote in Frankfurt 1993, 27.1.94.
95 ISGF, Hauptamt 40, Drogenreferat der Stadt Frankfurt, Tätigkeitsbericht 1.10.92
bis 31.12.93, 22.4.94.
96 ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 4, Irmgard Voigt, Abschlussbericht der Studie ‚Offene
Drogenszene in Frankfurt am Main‘, Mai 1992, p. 2–3.
97 ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 4, Schreiben des Vorsitzenden des VAE an das Büro des
Oberbürgermeisters, betr. Ausbau der Drogenhilfe in Frankfurt am Main, 20.1.92.
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In the course of 1992, these demands for decriminalizing junkies, how-
ever, did not resonate with the city’s political leaders. In contrast, making
junkies an issue of urban security continued to play an important role in
local controversies about the heroin scene. It was especially the recipient
of the VAE’s letter, new mayor Andreas von Schoeler (SPD), who decided
to highlight security issues in drug politics rather than promoting the re-
form of the Narcotics Law. Similar to Walter Wallmann’s stance towards
drug users back in the early 1980s, Schoeler’s security policy culminated
in the shutdown of the heroin scene in the Taunusanlage during summer
1992, thereby not only provoking a conflict with the local green party and
the city’s drug help associations, but also with the city’s junkies, who be-
gan to articulate protest towards their securitization.
“All of Frankfurt will be a drug scene”: politicized junkies, urban
security and the dissolution of the heroin scene in 1992
Desecuritizing heroin use was one of the major political demands by pro-
ponents of harm reduction, for they related the miserable situation of
many long-term addicts to the stigmatization and criminalization of the
heroin scene. When in 1989 the red-green government began to introduce
the harm reduction measures, it also supported efforts to reduce criminal
persecution of heroin users. In the so-called “Frankfurt Resolution” of
November 1990, Margarethe Nimsch, along with city officials from
Zurich, Hamburg and Amsterdam, demanded that punishing the posses-
sion and use of small amounts of illegal drugs including heroin be
ceased.98 However, while having no influence on federal law making, the
city government depended on the pragmatic cooperation of the police and
public prosecutors. The Frankfurt police, recognizing the junkies’ growing
impoverishment due to their daily contact with the scene, generally sup-
ported the expansion of social and medical assistances.99 It could not
6
98 ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 5, Frankfurter Resolution, unterzeichnet anlässlich der 1.
Konferenz: Europäische Städte im Zentrum des illegalen Drogenhandels in Frank-
furt am Main, 22.11.90.
99 See the protocols of the so called “Monday Circle”, a weekly coordination meet-
ing by the state prosecution office, several city authorities and the directors of the
local drug help associations, chaired by the health department. In ISGF, StGA
Sachakten 472.
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agree, though, on completely tolerating junkies in the Taunusanlage, espe-
cially due to the issue of Beschaffungskriminalität. In press releases, the
police continued to show its strong commitment to take consequent ac-
tions against the criminal activities of the city’s junkies.100
These kinds of statements both reflected and intensified the general
concern about the insecurity of the urban space, which preoccupied the
police, the public and local politics to an increasing extent in the early
1990s.101 These discourses were pretty similar to those in the Wallmann
era ten years earlier. Firstly, insecurities were related to a vague unease
about the Bahnhofsviertel, “the horror scenario of a big city,” where for-
eign gangs, prostitution and drug trafficking seemed to create an imperme-
able network of crime, as the FAZ wrote in July 1991.102 Urban insecuri-
ties, secondly, were connected to an economic concern, the bad image of
the city. As an effect of neoliberal transformations since the 1980s, cities
such as Frankfurt more and more began to consider themselves as being in
competition with other cities for capital and human resources. As shown
by human geographer Sebastian Schipper, this idea of the “entrepreneurial
city” prevailed in local political discourses in the early 1990s and was as-
sociated with worries about the supposedly bad image of the city due to
the insecurity of the urban space.103 Petra Roth (CDU), for example, then
the opposition leader in the city parliament, criticized that the city would
not profit from its presence in the media, because the image of the city
was mainly formed by the Bahnhofsviertel, criminal dealers, and the
junkies on the streets.104 These argumentations became more and more
important in the early 1990s and involved drug policies into the marketing
logic of the “entrepreneurial city.”
The city administration under Volker Hauff, while principally in favor
of decriminalization, had to adjust to both worries about the junkies’ role
in drug criminality and the feelings of insecurity in the local public. The
Hauff administration did so in trying to show understanding for the con-
100 ISGF, Hauptamt 38, Pressemitteilung des Polizeipräsidiums Frankfurt – operative
Maßnahmen gegen die Straßen- und Raubkriminalität sowie Auswüchse der offe-
nen Drogenszene, 3.8.92; see also Polizeipressestelle Frankfurt, Straßenraub im
ersten Halbjahr 1992, 25.6.92.
101 See Schipper 2013, pp. 194-198; Beste 2000.
102 „Schreckensbild einer Großstadt. Organisiertes Verbrechen im Bahnhofsviertel“.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28.7.1991.
103 Schipper 2013, pp. 191–212.
104 Quoted id., p. 196.
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cerns and anxieties of many citizens towards the drug scene.105 It tried to
raise support for its drug policy in arguing that harm reduction measures
and low pressure on users made it possible to disentangle criminals from
sick addicts in need of help, thereby enabling the police to be more effect-
ive in prosecuting dealers and large-scale drug trafficking.106
This argumentation changed when Hauff’s successor, Andreas von
Schoeler (SPD), took office in May 1991. Against the background of local
electoral successes by extreme right-wing parties, Andreas von Schoeler
made “urban security” one of its major political issues. The mayor was
well aware that his security policy was not about an empirical rise in crime
rates, but rather about feelings of unsafety rooted in social and economic
transformations. Schoeler therefore planned to combine a “preventive so-
cial policy” with a security policy “that takes the fears of the citizens seri-
ously.”107 Regarding the city’s drug policy, Schoeler argued that security,
on the one hand, and the expansion of harm reduction measures, on the
other, belonged together.108 But before expanding harm reduction assis-
tances, such as safe injection sites, Schoeler focused on security issues. In
September 1991, Schoeler ordered to create an administrative working
group on “security” in September 1991, charged with “improving security
and enhancing the public image especially in the city center and the Bahn-
hofsviertel.”109 In March 1992, the Deutsche Bahn started the cam-
paign “Bahnhof als Visitenkarte” due to Schoeler’s initiative. The cam-
paign engaged private security services instructed to assist the railroad po-
lice in expelling homeless people and heroin addicts from the train station
area.110 This campaign was quite paradigmatic of the city’s security policy
under Schoeler, for it linked the concern of improving the city’s image
with taking security measures against underprivileged groups.
105 ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 2, Memorandum Margarethe Nimschs an OB Volker
Hauff, betr. Lage der Drogenszene in Frankfurt, 10.7.1989.
106 See ISGF, Hauptamt 38, Mit Drogenabhängigen leben! Rahmenplan zur Gestal-
tung der Drogenpolitik in Frankfurt am Main, 29.4.1991.
107 Schoeler as quoted in Schipper 2013, p. 195.
108 „Wir bleiben bei unserem Kurs“. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1.8.92.
109 ISGF, OB Schoeler 4, Verfügung des Oberbürgermeisters, Sicherheit und Er-
scheinungsbild der Stadt, hier: Bildung einer dezernats- und ämterübergreifenden
Arbeitsgruppe, 27.9.91.
110 “Nicht länger Wohnsitz und Treffpunkt für Süchtige.“ Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 18.3.1992.
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In mid-1992, Schoeler’s security policy culminated in an event which
did not only cause conflicts between the ruling parties, but also provoked
the protest of junkies. On June 6, 1992, the mayor and the vice president
of the Frankfurt police publicly announced to gradually dissolve the hero-
in scene in the Taunusanlage until the end of the year. Schoeler argued
that these measures were part of “concrete actions to improve the security
situation in the city,” aiming especially at both reducing the crimes com-
mitted by addicts and lowering the attractiveness of the heroin scene for
users coming from areas around Frankfurt.111 During the summer of 1992,
the police forced hundreds of long-term junkies to leave the Taunusanla-
ge. At different times each day, the police conducted raid-like controls in
order to “keep the scene in movement,” as a police spokesman stated in
the local press.112 By late-summer, the police had reduced the number of
users to about 100 to 150, most of those being “impoverished and in an
endangered health condition,” as a police officer remarked in a meeting
with the city administration.113 After the Taunusanlage had been dissolved
completely at the end of 1992, the police did not tolerate any gatherings of
junkies in the public space anymore.
The dissolution of the heroin scene in the Taunusanlage provoked
strong criticism. Both the Hessian drug aid associations and Schoeler’s
coalition partner, the greens, criticized plans to shut down the Taunusanla-
ge as a “de-facto expulsion.” Prior to expanding social and medical assis-
tances to include the junkies, expelling junkies from the scene would only
worsen the situation and therefore endanger the city’s successes in caring
for drug addicts.114 On a special party conference summoned to discuss
the issue of closing the scene, the local greens, especially their leaders,
were not willing, however, to put the coalition in question. Some criticized
that the greens too often avoided the issue of security. They vaguely de-
111 ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 4, Pressekonferenz „Vorgehen gegen die offene Drogen-
szene“, OB Schoeler, stellv. Polizeipräsident Frerichs, 5.6.1992; „Taunusanlage:
Polizei löst die Drogenszene auf.“ Frankfurter Neue Presse, 6.6.1992.
112 “Stadt kann süchtigen noch nicht helfen-„ Frankfurter Neue Presse, 2.7.1992.
113 ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 3, Protokoll der Sitzung des Arbeitsstabes „Auflösung
offene Drogenszene“ am 18.8.1992.
114 , Brief von Akzept Hessen e.V., Landesverband für akzeptierende Drogenarbeit
und Drogenpolitik, an den Oberbürgermeister A. von Schoeler, btr. Vertreibung
der offenen Szene i.d. Taunusanlage, 27.5.1992; see also „‘Schwerwiegende Dif-
ferenz‘ mit Schoeler.“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.8.1992.
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manded an “alternative concept of security” which should not repeat the
mistakes made by the Wallmann administration around 1980.115
On July 1, a flyer appeared on the scene in the Taunusanlage addressed
to “all shop keepers and restaurant owners, to customers, buyers, and win-
dow shoppers in Frankfurt.” Signed by “we, the drug users from the
Taunusanlage,” the flyer stated that “mayor Schoeler expels the junkies
from the scene into the inner city. While in the past, the drug scene was
only in the Taunusanlage, all of Frankfurt will soon be a drug scene, only
the Taunusanlage will be clean then. We feel sorry that we, the junkies,
will be forced to use your salesroom as drug bunkers and your toilets to
shoot heroin. The mayor can crush the scene, [...] but he cannot make
magically disappear the users [wegzaubern].” After exposing the shut-
down of the scene as a “short-sighted election strategy to catch votes,” the
flyer listed a series of demands, documenting the radical difference be-
tween social workers, politicians and the police on the one hand, and the
perspective of junkies on scene on the other: “we, the junkies want only
one thing, to be left alone. Using our stuff in peace. If we got our opiates
in pharmacies, you would barely realize that we exist [...]. Please support,
also in your interest [...] massive expansion of methadone under human
conditions, [...] safe injection sites, morphine and heroin supply, Taunu-
sanlage instead of department stores!”116 In articulating their wish to “be
left alone,” to use their drugs “in peace” and in demanding to keep the
Taunusanlage open for junkies, this flyer expresses the strong opposition
of heroin users against any attempt to dissolve or remove the heroin scene
from the public space. In contrast to the dissolution of the Haschischwiese
in 1980, the flyer indicates that there were junkie activists ready to oppose
actions taken to get rid of heroin users in the city center.
This flyer resulted from the increasing political energy of junkies in the
early 1990s. Junkies became more and more politicized, not only trying to
engage in drug politics on the level of national self-help networks, such as
the Deutsche AIDS‑Hilfe, but also in local conflicts. The effects of harm
reduction measures provided the background for this dynamic. These did
not only improve the junkie’s health, but also created less stressful living
115 „‘Energisch gegen Räumung zur Wehr setzen‘”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
20.8.1992; „Die Grünen entdecken ihr Verhältnis zur Polizei“, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, 20.8.1992; see also ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 4, Brief der Grünen
im Römer und der Dezernentin M. Nimsch an den Oberbürgermeister, 27.5.92.
116 The flyer is filed in ISGF, Büro OB Schoeler 3.
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conditions. This was especially the case for participants of the local
methadone program. Already in November 1990, an anonymous ex-user
from Frankfurt stated that “I see a big chance since I have met participants
of the [methadone] program, showing an incredible activity and an incred-
ible self-confidence [...] They make it possible that persons from the drug
milieu speak about their situation and actively intervene into drug politics.
Their power illustrates that the muzzling of drug consumers is based on
the narcotics law and criminalization, while one can use the potential of
language as soon as you are not occupied with hiding and getting the es-
sential things illegally anymore.”117
Criticizing the “muzzling” of drug users problematized the discursive
position generally assigned to junkies in the field of drug politics. Within
this discursive formation, junkies usually appeared as criminals, victims,
sick people, patients or research objects, all positions that strongly subject-
ed junkies to different forms of power. Both the statement by the ex-user,
hopeful about junkies making use of the “potential of language,” as well
as the medium in which his letter was published, indicate that junkies tried
to be subjects and not only the objects of discourses about heroin use. In
November, the integrative drogenhilfe, an association in favor of harm re-
duction ideas founded in 1986,118 published the first edition of the “Junk-
furter. Die Ballergazette” (JuBaz), a small magazine brought into being to
provide junkies with their own media of information and articulation. In
the second edition, the editorial board, mainly consisting of HIV-infected,
substituted addicts, invited all junkies on the scene, in prisons and therapy
institutions, to engage in the making of the JuBaz in order to make the
magazine to the “voice for those who are never heard.”119 In the following
months and years, the JuBaz served as a platform of political articulation
in Frankfurt. In 1991, reacting to the campaign “Bahnhof als Visitenkarte,”
JuBaz authors also helped to start an initiative which tried to document
and report the rising violence of railway policemen and private security
agents against junkies in the central train station.120
During the dissolution of the heroin scene in the Taunusanlage, the ac-
tivism of junkies in Frankfurt am Main peaked. Junkie activists organized
demonstrations in cooperation with self-help groups by gay men and pros-
117 Junkfurter 1990(1), p. 4.
118 Integrative Drogenhilfe 2011.
119 Editorial. Junkfurter 1990(2), p. 3.
120 Junkfurter 1991(3), p. 7.
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titutes in order to achieve an end of the police practices in the Taunusanla-
ge. On September 19, about 50 protesters spontaneously assembled at the
Taunusanlage for a demonstration under the slogan “Räume statt Räu-
mung.” The protesters marched to city hall, where they presented a letter
to mayor Schoeler, demanding to stop “smashing the scene” and to respect
the human rights of junkies: “Junkies do not have a lobby in the city; they
are left alone in their social, medical and humane misery; even drug aid
institutions cannot change that due to their restricted possibilities. Al-
though the city government is about to expand public health measures, the
ongoing […] smashing of the drug scene hast to be exposed as an attack
on the elementary right to human dignity, which also has to apply to drug
users.”121 In trying to make the “smashing of the scene” a question of hu-
man rights, claiming to get “spaces/rooms” instead of being expelled from
the urban public, the protesters tried to claim their right to be a legitimate
part of the city.
The results of these junkie protests were very ambivalent. On the one
hand, junkies were able to express their own political agency, which had
been impossible in local drug politics since the 1970s. Furthermore, parts
of their health-related demands were realized by the city administration.
At the beginning of December 1994, after much effort by the health de-
partment, the first so-called “health room” of Frankfurt, a safe injection
site, was opened in the crisis center in Schielestraße, located in an indus-
trial park in the east of the city.122 On the other hand, though, both crimi-
nalization and the aim of preventing public gatherings of junkies contin-
ued to play a decisive role in drug politics under the red-green city govern-
ment. After the conflicts between Schoeler and the greens had settled, the
city government officially began to argue that both harm reduction and se-
curity measures were interconnected elements of the city’s drug policy.
Regarding the first safe injection site, a measure principally aiming at low-
ering health risks for heroin consumers, mayor Schoeler stated that health
121 The letter to mayor Schoeler is printed in Junkfurter 1992(5), p. 8; see also “Dro-
gendemonstration: ‘Räume statt Räumung’”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 19.9.1992;
a second demonstration took place in Oktober: „‘Fixer sind nicht unzurechnungs-
fähig‘“,Frankfurter Rundschau, 23.10.1992.
122 „Druckraum für Drogenabhängige wird diese Woche eröffnet“, Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, 1.12.1994.
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rooms also contributed to the establishment of security in the city.123 The
junkies’ most radical political claims – decriminalization, legal heroin
supply in pharmacies, and the right to be part of the city public – therefore
hardly resonated with the city’s decision-makers.124
Conclusion
This article has analyzed the transformations of drug policies in Frankfurt
am Main between 1975 and 1995. It has pointed out several configurations
of governing heroin users which were generally marked by two very dif-
ferent, often overlapping but also contradicting concerns about heroin
users. On the one hand, junkies and the heroin scene were the object of
discourses about “urban security,” an issue which emerged as an important
field of local politics at the end of the 1970s and continued to occupy po-
liticians well into the 1990s. This security framing of heroin use was not
only promoted by the police, but also by political leaders such as the may-
ors Walter Wallmann (CDU) and Andreas von Schoeler (SPD), who were
concerned about certain dangerous urban areas and the bad image of the
city, which they associated with quarters such as the Bahnhofsviertel. On
the other hand, heroin users were also the object of concerns about the
mental and physical health of addicts. Actors highlighting these aspects of
heroin use strongly disagreed, though, on how to arrange social and medi-
cal assistances. Until the mid-1980s, policies were mainly determined by
the paradigm of abstinence in this respect. Against the background of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, however, the urgency to the address the poor health
conditions of heroin addicts induced a paradigm shift towards harm reduc-
tion measures which prioritized health related assistances over the norma-
tive objective of a drug free society.
Focusing on the relation between (de-)securitization and power, the
transition towards harm reduction policies in the context of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic marked a decisive shift regarding the power relations in the field
of local drug politics on the one hand, and regarding the logic of power
determining the ways of governing heroin users since the mid-1970s on
7
123 „Frankfurt richtet ‚Druckräume‘ für Drogenabhängige ein“, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, 12.11.1994.
124 See ISGF, Hauptamt 40, Drogenreferat der Stadt Frankfurt, Tätigkeitsbericht
1.10.92 bis 31.12.93, 22.4.94.
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the other. Proponents of harm reduction challenged securitizing discourses
and practices, such as the shutdown of the heroin scene in the Bockenhei-
mer Anlage in 1980. They not only demanded to decriminalize the indi-
vidual consumer but also put forward normalizing framings of heroin use
which regarded addicts capable of acting responsibly making reasonable
decisions. This framing strongly undermined the image of the irresponsi-
ble, undiscerning junkie which had dominated the city officials’ view on
heroin addicts and legitimated extraordinary coercive interventions such
as involuntary commitments. Rather than govern heroin users by exerting
strong control over the spaces of heroin consumption, harm reduction pol-
icies were based on creating addiction-accepting environments and pro-
moting self-regulating capacities of users in order to influence the most
unfavorable phenomena of heroin consumption such as high mortality
rates. Furthermore, rather than making users invisible, the accessibility of
users for social workers was an integral part of harm reduction policies.
Desecuritizing discourses were therefore decisive in transforming the
power logic of local drug policies towards, in Foucauldian terms, the logic
of governmentality.
Between the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the mid-1980s and the shut-
down of the Taunusanlage in 1992, the power relations in local drug polit-
ics also changed. Until the mid-1980s, self-help groups such as “junkie
unions” hardly had a chance of making themselves heard due to the strong
criminalization and the lack of political supporters. In the late 1980s,
junkie activists made political use of the new freedoms accompanying the
introduction of harm reduction measures. On the one hand, by organizing
protest such as the “solidary of the undiscerning,” gay activists aimed at
including junkies in their politics of anti-discrimination and encourage-
ment against AIDS-related discriminations, thereby giving junkie self-help
groups such as JES the opportunity to get involved in drug political de-
bates. On the other hand, methadone maintenance treatment helped
junkies to escape stressful and illegalized living conditions and get in-
volved into a series of political activities on the local level. By protesting
against the dissolution of the Taunusanlage, junkie activists demonstrated
that their political demands for legalizing heroin consumption did not only
differ from the police and leading local politicians, but also from the sup-
portive network of social workers. The desecuritizing and normalizing as-
pects of both HIV/AIDS prevention and harm reduction policies were
therefore the basis for this kind of political activism.
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The renewed shutdown of the heroin scene in 1992, legitimated by se-
curity concerns, demonstrates the limits of the desecuritizing dimensions
of harm reduction policies. Harm reduction was based on framings of
heroin use which de-dramatized heroin users by acknowledging their
lifestyle, decisions and basic rights. This liberal approach not only made
drug policies more efficient in terms of improving contacts to the scene
and lowering health risks of addicts but also created the preconditions for
demanding more fundamental liberalizations, such as the general decrimi-
nalization of drug use. While these demands found the support of some so-
cial scientists and social workers, they did not resonate with the crucial
political actors on both the local and the national level. At a time when
Frankfurt was about to transform into a neoliberal, “entrepreneurial city,”
Mayor Andreas von Schoeler rather considered harm reduction assistances
as part of the city’s security policy, which was orientated towards the man-
agement of vague feelings of insecurity in the local public and the im-
provement of city’s supposed bad image, ignoring the political demands of
a small group of marginalized people demanding to have a right to the
city.
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Reassembling Insecurity: The Power of Materiality
Ana Ivasiuc
Between 160.000 and 180.000 Roma and Sinti live in Italy, amounting to
less than 0.3% of the population.1 Notwithstanding this insignificant per-
centage, in the spring of 2008, following an episode of moral panic around
a murder perpetrated by a Romanian citizen of Roma background in
Rome, the Italian government declared a state of emergency spurred by
the presence of numerous “nomad settlements” in the regions of Latium,
Lombardy and Campania. The ruling was motivated by the “massive inva-
sion” of what in popular parlance, but also administrative labels, are com-
monly called “nomads”: a heterogeneous group made of various Roma
from ex-Yugoslavian countries, as well as from new EU member states (in
particular Romania and Bulgaria), but also Italian Roma (including Sinti
and Caminanti2). The declaration of a state of emergency provided pre-
fects with exceptional powers and resources to combat “nomad criminali-
ty”. This episode, referred to as emergenza nomadi, was neither a real
emergency—the declaration of a state of emergency being limited to natu-
ral catastrophes3—nor about “nomads”: most of the Roma and Sinti in
Italy, like in most European countries, have been sedentary for at least
three generations. A “fictitious state of emergency”4 declared by decree,
the emergenza nomadi was ruled unconstitutional in November 2011.5
Yet, 10 years after the declaration, some of the structures and dynamics
brought about by the emergency decree pursue unimpeded their insecuriti-
zation work in Rome’s peripheries. The “Public and Emergency Security”
1 Piasere 2012. – I am thankful for their constructive comments to Maria Ketzmerick,
Regina Kreide, Andreas Langenohl, and the participants of the concept group on
power within the project SFB–Transregio 138 ‘Dynamics of Security. Types of Se-
curitization in Historical Perspective’, funded by the German Research Foundation.
An earlier version was presented at the 14th EASA Biennial Conference “Anthro-
pological legacies and human futures”, 20-23 July 2016, Milan, Italy.
2 Travelers, in Sicilian.
3 Picker et al. 2015.
4 Agamben 2005, p. 3.
5 La Repubblica 2011.
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unit of the local police, set up in 2010 to control “nomad camps”, is still
operative, and the authorities are perpetuating the politics of eviction in-
tensified with the emergency decree.
The declaration of the emergenza nomadi could be read as a paradig-
matic case of what the Copenhagen School theorizes as “securitization”:
the performative speech act through which actors construct an existential
threat dictating measures which take a particular issue from the circuit of
politics into the realm of exceptionality. However, the Roma have long
been subjected to securitarian measures in Italy,6 before the moment of the
declaration of the emergenza nomadi, and the juxtaposition of the terms
“emergency” and “Roma” is not a new speech act (see, for instance,
L’Unità 1996). Hence, “securitizing moves”7 have been articulated before
in local politics in Rome, and even though they did not amount to excep-
tional measures within a political-legal framework, the Roma have been
placed, through “politics as usual”, in exceptional spaces: camps. Institut-
ed through a series of regional laws in the nineties, the camps are in many
ways exceptional. Reserved to groups conceived as Roma, Gypsies (“zin-
gari”), or “nomads”, the camp originates in a logic of exception revealed
by the very contradictions it inhabits.8 What the pre-existence of the
camps means for the analysis of the emergenza nomadi as a successful se-
curitization move is that its roots lie elsewhere than in its speech act:
camps have acted as objects of (in)security since their beginning as spaces
of exceptionality, already silently “doing” (in)security prior to the declara-
tion.9
By bringing back together what are often conceived as different aspects
of securitization—the speech act and the materiality of (in)security—I in-
tend, in line with previous criticisms addressing the exclusive focus of the
Copenhagen School on speech acts, to underline and illustrate the perti-
nence of thinking through materiality as constitutive of securitization. On
the one hand, I wish to enter in a dialogue with critical security scholar-
ship which has theoretically and methodologically engaged with the mate-
riality of security,10 making use of the analytical tools of actor-network
6 Piasere 2009 and 2012; Coccia 2012.
7 Buzan et al. 1998.
8 These terms are largely interchangeable in popular use.
9 I choose to use the term (in)security as in Bigo’s model of the Möbius ribbon in
which security and insecurity are part of the same continuum (Bigo 2001).
10 Bourne 2012; Walters 2014; Aradau et al. 2015.
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theory. On the other hand, I attempt at enriching the debate by incorporat-
ing insights from a strand of anthropology which seeks to conceptually
and methodologically destabilize the distinction between object and repre-
sentation. This body of scholarship challenges the Cartesian dualism be-
tween mind and matter, between signifier and signified, between object
and representation. Thus, instead of superimposing a supplementary, dis-
tinct focus on materiality in securitization, thereby reproducing the dual-
ism between object and representation, I aim at collapsing this distinction,
thinking through “things as meanings”11 rather than “seeing” meanings
behind things. This move obliges us to put securitization grounded in the
speech act on its head, and contemplate not how words do things,12 but
rather how things do words.13 Put differently, I am interested in exploring
how a particular constellation of things—the camp and the objects around
it—“does”, through human-non-human associations, (in)security, in a
manner disconnected from the speech act which declares it a dangerous
object to be moved to a politics of exceptionality. This question transcends
the division between discourse and materiality, which has recently been
the focus of methodological reflection on critical security studies.14 It pro-
poses to analytically and methodologically move past the distinction be-
tween things and the meanings of insecurity attached to them in various
contexts, and explore how people and objects quietly fabricate insecurity
in complex and unpredictable chains of associations.
This move opens up new terrain, both analytically and methodological-
ly, and solves a considerable tension in the constructivist approach of criti-
cal security studies. It has been argued that this strand of scholarship con-
ceptually ignores the affective dimension of insecurity grounded in fear,
positing it as a dimension of irrationality affecting people manifestly inca-
pable of understanding the very constructedness of their fears, and unable
to brush them aside as mere mental creations.15 Thus, the constructivist in-
terpretation of insecurity does not only posit that people have different
“views” on the same reality—making security an issue of interpretation—
but, underlined by implicit and often unexplored normativities, in the
same move it orders those views in hierarchies of adequacy to the world
11 Henare et al. 2006.
12 Austin 1962.
13 Latour 2000.
14 Aradau et al. 2015.
15 Schwell 2015.
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“out there”. Obviously, then, the analyst’s construction of the world—its
interpretation—is posited as superior to the “worldviews” of the people
whose beliefs are relegated to mere irrationality and false consciousness.
This, in turn, links to Latour’s critique of critique itself:16 the analyst will
always be right by the power she has to assign false consciousness to those
whose views are in disagreement with her own. This analytical conundrum
has become most obvious in the so-called Welsh School of critical security
studies, which applies the constructivist approach only when deconstruct-
ing the insecurities claimed by some, while taking the security of others,
in contrast, very seriously. For this strand of research, security is a very
real matter, but of crucial importance is whose security is at stake. In this
move, the insecurities of some are deemed morally justified and thus more
“real” than the insecurities of others, taken to be prejudiced, generally
powerful actors, using security instrumentally to oppress the dominated.
Thus, the Welsh School distinguishes between “real-real” threats and “al-
legedly real” ones.17 The normative distinction between those entitled to
speak of real insecurities and those whose insecurity is a mere construc-
tion seems to lie precisely in the dimension of power. Put differently, one
could assess the truthfulness of their insecurities by considering whether
actors have the power to shape the political security agenda, or whether
they are powerless when facing the insecurities imposed, at their expense,
by the powerful—and thus implicitly in need of emancipation.18 This pos-
ition, however enticing it might be from the perspective of engaged schol-
arship, is simplistic and analytically untenable, for it applies the construc-
tivist lens to some discourses, and the realist one to others; it can do so
precisely because it maintains the distinction between reality and plural,
yet normatively hierarchized representations of it. In turn, when this dis-
tinction is collapsed, following instead the chains of associations which
produce particular worlds, one can avoid the apportioning of false con-
sciousness to some, in a constructivist vein, while simultaneously taking
the insecurity of others seriously, according to realist conceptions.
Methodologically, it opens up the possibility of using world-making
concepts closer and more adequate to the ones our interlocutors utilize to
shape their own world.19
16 Latour 2004a.
17 Wæver 2004, p. 6.
18 Booth 1991, p. 319.
19 Henare et al. 2006, p. 16.
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When considering how the Roma in Rome are managed as threats, it
would be facile to claim that their securitization is a social construction—
albeit with very concrete material consequences—and to attribute this dy-
namic to the workings of “power”, on the one hand, and to racism, dis-
crimination, and exclusion, on the other hand. But, although these are
doubtlessly facets of what the Roma go through in their daily lives, such
theorizing seems to quickly exhaust the possibilities of explanation and
produce a circular account in which racism, discrimination and exclusion
are the explanans, instead of the explanandum. Instead, I want to propose
a much more complicated and blurred—but also conceptually richer—pic-
ture, in which objects play a paramount role in the story of how—and thus
why—the Roma are managed through security technologies, measures,
and policies. By resisting the division between things and their interpreta-
tion, I intend to show how insecurity is reassembled through chains of hu-
man and non-human actors; instead of separating insecurity from its own
materiality and speaking of “perceptions” of insecurity, the theoretical and
at once methodological parti pris is to use “conception” to refer to con-
ceiving—bringing into being—insecurity in its materiality: “[c]onception
is a mode of disclosure (of—metaphorical—‘vision’) that creates its own
objects, just because it is one and the same with them, so to ‘see’ these
objects is to create them”.20 Following the chains of associations in which
different human and non-human agents act is aimed at retracing how these
objects are created, from the perspective of those involved in thinking
through things.
In the process, Roma camps become, from matters of fact—materiality
requesting interpretation away from itself—complex matters of concern
holding at once the materiality and its representations in one single
“thing” around which a constellation of objects mediates complex negotia-
tions between various actors, perpetually fabricating the camp and its in-
habitants as ontologically dangerous. For Latour, matters of concern “have
no clear boundaries, no well-defined essences, no sharp separation be-
tween their own hard kernel and their environment. It is because of this
feature that they take on the aspect of tangled beings, forming rhizomes
and networks. (...) Finally, and this may be the strangest thing of all, they
can no longer be detached from the unexpected consequences that they
20 Henare et al. 2006, pp. 14-15.
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may trigger”.21 In this resides, according to Latour, the proclivity of mat-
ters of concern to produce “crises”; no wonder, thus, that the crisis of the
emergenza nomadi had to do with the proliferation of informal camps:
they are matters of concern. Thus, in the Latourian move of “merging...
matters of fact into highly complex, historically situated, richly diverse
matters of concern”,22 I divert attention from the conditions of possibility
of Roma camps—in disconnection from their materiality—onto how this
materiality is productive by entering into chains of associations. My argu-
ment is thus an exercise in an anthropology of security inspired by a La-
tourian sociology of associations, past its hitherto preoccupation of under-
standing the “local slippages” of “security” in its contexts (Goldstein
2016).
I will focus on two camps located in the Eastern periphery of Rome, in-
troducing them as things ontologically fabricated as dangerous, around
which several discursive and material practices of (in)securitization occur.
I will mobilize the ethnographic material to explore the ways in which
power works ambiguously through the materiality of the camp to (re)pro-
duce ontologically dangerous objects commanding security practices in-
crementally.23 In the process, I take the anthropological endeavour to be
aimed at elucidating the (in)security logics of various actors on their own
21 Latour 2004b, p. 24.
22 Latour 2004a, p. 237.
23 The ethnographic material in which I ground my analysis has been gathered since
2014 from multiple sources, in a multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995) spanning
not only different geographical places – two Roma camps and a police precinct in
the Eastern periphery of Rome, as well as the two neighborhoods in which the
camps are situated – but also the virtual space, as outside of traditional on-site
fieldwork I conduct digital ethnography (Pink et al. 2015) on social media content
produced and circulated by the two neighbourhood committees and by a neigh-
bourhood patrol group. While such an approach has the disadvantage of dispersing
my observation (Hannerz 2003), it has the incommensurable benefit of seeing the
space of the camp from the multiple perspectives and layers which construct it
both discursively and materially as a space of insecurity. My analysis draws upon
participant observation carried out during police patrols around the two camps and
during night patrols with the patrol group, upon police reports and correspondence
between the local police and various institutions between 2010 and 2015 on mat-
ters regarding the two camps, as well as upon material (complaints, photographs,
reports, e-mail communications) sent by the neighbourhood committees to the lo-
cal administration (including the police). The digital ethnography is carried out on
material posted on the Facebook page of the neighbourhood patrol group from
2013 onwards and by members of the neighbourhood committees. Additionally, I
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terms24 by retracing the associations through which they conceive the
camp, as well as focusing on the lived experiences of (in)security25 in their
materiality. The collapse of the Cartesian dualism will enable a different
type of analytical intake on the locus of power in securitization; in the pro-
cess, the camp materiality becomes at once power to securitize and power
of securitization.26
The chapter is articulated in three moves. First, I will shortly expose the
history and ambiguities of the camp as technology of governing the Roma
in Italy, and argue that the idea of nomadism as the essentialization of Ro-
mani culture acts as a mediator reconfiguring and reassembling Roma—
non-Roma sociality as a function of insecurity. Then, I will proceed to re-
trace the chains of various human and non-human actors fabricating the
camp as a space of insecurity, demanding ever-escalating security mea-
sures. Finally, I will chart the ethnographic material’s affordance to theo-
rize power in reassembling (in)security.
Roots of insecurity: The fixity of nomadism
Initially part of a narrative of recognition and protection of cultural rights,
the camps were intended as policy instruments granting temporary stop-
ping places (campi sosta) to Roma, copied after the British and French
legislation of the sixties aimed at Travellers and Gens du voyage.27 It is
from this logic that campi sosta were advocated for by Opera Nomadi
(Nomad Works), a Catholic church-based organization founded in the six-
ties and co-opted by the state in an expert role regarding “nomad” issues.
The idea was highly ambiguous, pendulating between the logic of protect-
ing Roma culture, whose hard and immutable kernel was considered to be
nomadism,28 and the desire to restrict mobility by encouraging sedenta-
rization through assistential projects aiming at building permanent ties
have carried out interviews with police officers and members of the neighbour-
hood committees, as well as with Roma from the two camps; I complement my
material with newspaper articles from the local press from 1987 onwards.
24 Holbraad and Pedersen 2012: 166.
25 Maguire et al. 2014; Goldstein 2016.
26 See Langenohl, this volume.
27 Piasere 2006.
28 Sigona 2003 and 2005; Brazzoduro 2015; Tosi Cambini 2015.
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with the territory through schooling and incorporation in wage labour.29
Mobility was—and continues to be—seen as sign of inferiority30 and ab-
jection,31 as well as danger,32 including in judicial proceedings, when ar-
guments regarding the social dangerousness of Roma have been derived
from their “condition of being nomadic”.33 At the heart of these concep-
tions of mobility and the subsequent attempts of containment lies the po-
tential of disruption stemming from an ethnocentric view of sedentary at-
tachment to place, and the othering of Roma as “matter” perpetually out of
place, hence dangerous.34
Scholars have analyzed the camps as technologies of (bio)politics
through which the separation of the undesirables is effected in the urban
space, with a large array of consequences: segregation, discrimination and
the breakdown of social ties between camp insiders and the surrounding
population. A result of an ambiguously romantic-cum-repressive projec-
tion of Italians,35 the camp is seen as the government technology to domi-
nate the Roma through their bodies, a privileged contemporary instrument
of power.36 The creation of camps as management instruments for the Ro-
ma is contemporaneous to the transition from an intellectual and political
model of inclusive community, inspired by ideals of the social state, to a
model of exclusive state, underscored by ideas of criminality control and
repression.37 The emergence and multiplication of sizeable camps has
been placed in the context of the global expansion of the state of excep-
tion38 and, in the Italian case, as a development marking the convergence
of policies aimed at managing the Roma and the repressive policies to-
wards migrants.39 The camp has been understood as the instrument
through which the socio-economic problem of the discrimination of the
Roma is reduced to a spatial problem,40 which is defined predominantly as
29 Daniele 2011, pp. 114–116; Picker et al. 2015, p. 747.
30 Piasere 2009.
31 Sigona 2003; Hepworth 2012.
32 Coccia 2012, p. 37.
33 Tosi Cambini 2011.
34 Douglas 1991.
35 Sigona 2005, p. 746.
36 Clough Marinaro 2009, p. 270; Tosi Cambini 2015.
37 Piasere 2006, p. 11.
38 Agamben 2005.




a security and public order problem.41 Once the ethnographic magnifying
glass is used, the ambiguous nature of the camp is revealed in the fact that
it simultaneously offers protection, recognition and anonymity, rendering
its inhabitants invisible while projecting them as a dangerous collective in-
to public imagination.42 However, the agentic dimension of the materiality
of the camp has largely been left out in these theorizations, leaving unad-
dressed the question as to how precisely the idea of nomadism has been so
persistently and powerfully productive in fabricating the Roma as ontolog-
ically criminal subjects. The answer, I think, lies in the materiality of the
camp.
Building on a Latourian sociology of associations43 in which mediators
“transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they
are supposed to carry”,44 I argue that the idée fixe of nomadism became
the main mediator in assembling the relations between Roma and non-Ro-
ma, altering the course of events in how the former were managed by the
latter, both through material technologies (camps and the objects around
them) and through policies (of surveillance, control, and repression). No-
madism is therefore more than a projected, reified mental representation—
or, as it has been argued, a powerful transcultural cognitive scheme,45 and
a perennial institutional reference.46 It is a mediator with its own agency in
the reassembling of Roma—non-Roma sociality as a function of (in)secu-
rity. In practice, nomadism is at the root of the adoption, between 1984
and 1995, of a series of regional laws regarding the establishment of
camps for “nomads”, effecting the material technology of the camp, which
subsequently gives way to a constellation of objects governing Roma—
non-Roma relations in the security key. Nomadism, embedded in the ma-
teriality of the camp, fabricates an ontologically criminal subject; as a po-
lice officer argued: “why would they want to be nomadic if they didn’t
want to run away from the state? A nomad doesn’t have a residence place,
an address, because he (sic) wants to escape. It must be that he has some-
thing to hide”.47
41 Tosi Cambini 2015.
42 Sigona 2015.
43 Latour 1996 and 2005.
44 Latour 2005, p. 39.
45 Piasere 2009, p. 10.
46 Tosi Cambini 2015, p. 164.
47 Interview police officer, April 2016.
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Hosting about a quarter of the Roma and Sinti population in Italy,48 the
camp is a label for a heterogeneous variety of settlements ranging from
“equipped” or “authorized” camps—established by municipalities starting
the 1980s, endowed with minimal (and often faulty) infrastructure—to
“abusive” camps—informal settlements of recent Roma migrants from the
new Eastern EU member states, made of autonomously built shacks. In
between these two categories, a third ambiguous and volatile one refers to
“tolerated” camps: generally established by groups of Roma in the mar-
gins of urban areas, but on land pertaining to municipalities, these camps
are deemed to have been performatively recognized by the authorities by
means of the introduction of basic material infrastructure—revealing yet
again that one can do words (adding the label “tolerated” to a camp) with
things (infrastructural improvements), and thus the agency of materiality
in the politics of camp governance. In practice, the boundaries between
these categories are porous. For instance, the camp of Tor de Cenci in the
Southern periphery of Rome was downgraded from “authorized” to “toler-
ated”,49 in order to facilitate and justify its dismantlement in September
2012.
Following the declaration of the emergenza nomadi, the Alemanno ad-
ministration in Rome issued the “Plan for Nomads” (Piano Nomadi), de-
tailing the steps to be undertaken under the emergency. Supported by the
allocation of a substantial amount of financial resources in the name of
emergency, the plan had a markedly spatial dimension, revolving emphati-
cally around camps; the measures aimed at reducing the maximum num-
ber of “nomads” in Rome to 6,000 (whereas the estimates indicated their
number at over 7,000), the displacement of people from “abusive” camps,
the dismantlement of all informal settlements and of some of the “tolerat-
ed” camps, the restructuration of the existing “equipped” camps to receive
new residents and the establishment of two new “villages” in which the
administration would concentrate the remaining Roma. The administration
initiated a spatial politics of evictions and displacements, in a movement
of “degypsification of the Roman urbs” from inside the once symbolic and
material border of the city—the city ring road—towards the peripheries.50
Through repeated evictions, some authors contend that the Roma were
48 Associazione 21 Luglio 2013.
49 Amnesty International 2010, p. 10.
50 Bermann and Clough Marinaro 2011. – Non-governmental sources indicate, for
instance, that between 2013 and 2014, 88 evictions (involving approximately
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thus effectively “nomadized”,51 thus “regypsified” to fit the Gadjé (non-
Roma) stereotype of mobility,52 suggesting that the camp does more than
merely reflect a representation; it ontologically fabricates “gypsiness”
and, with the criminalization of the Roma, insecurity.
Through the imaginary of nomadism and danger, and the subsequent
stigma it produces, the camp has been analyzed as an apparatus, becoming
agential in a “broken down” relationship; it would “[break] down direct
social connections by reducing the ability of one individual to make a per-
sonal decision about another; to fathom what others experience; and to
craft one’s own representation of others”.53 Thus, it precludes moral and
political choices through the power it has to define its inhabitants prior to
any real encounter.54 However, the actor-network theoretical lens on the
materiality of the camp will illustrate how the relationship is not “broken
down” as if it was pre-existent, but is mediated and continuously reassem-
bled through particular deployments of associations, reassembling the Ro-
ma as producers of insecurity. The materiality of the camp is a particularly
effective mediator in this work of reassembling.
Reassembling (in)security: Networks of mediators
Rather than purporting that the camp “reflects” or “incarnates” the rela-
tionship between Roma and various other actors, the approach I adopt in
my argument underlines how the camp and the objects pertaining to it
form chains of mediators,55 reassembling the management of the Roma in
the securitarian register because they produce ontologically dangerous ob-
jects and people. This approach follows the more recent attention of criti-
cal security studies to materiality56 and aims at tracing the networks in
which objects have agency in the co-production of (in)security. I will thus
2,400 persons) have been performed in Rome (Associazione 21 Luglio 2015). In
these statistics, the same person may have been counted several times, as evictions
led to the creation of other informal settlements which were subsequently evicted
again.
51 Sigona 2003 and 2005.
52 Piasere 2009.
53 Feldman 2011, p. 390.
54 Diken and Laustsen 2005, p. 17.
55 Latour 1996, 2000 and 2005.
56 Walters 2014; Aradau et al. 2015; Green and Zurawski 2015; Meiches 2015.
Reassembling Insecurity: The Power of Materiality
377
analyze the chains in which various human actors and diverse things—
camp fences and surveillance cameras in one of the camps, and waste and
smoke in both—participate to perpetually reassemble the Roma—non-Ro-
ma interactions around the theme of (in)security.
Both camps are situated in the eastern periphery of Rome, with Salviati,
unlike most other camps, ingrained in the urban tissue of the neighbour-
hood of Tor Sapienza, and Salone beyond the city ring road, in a scarcely
inhabited area. Both camps are heavily overpopulated. Salviati hosts ap-
proximately 400 Roma descending from families that migrated in the sev-
enties from Serbia and Bosnia; Salone, initially designed for 600 people,
saw its numbers nearly double as a result of the transfer of Romanian,
Bosnian, Montenegrin and Kosovar Roma from the Casilino 900 camp in
2010, which was effected by the politics of eviction initiated during the
emergenza nomadi. Salone is now home to about 900 people; as with oth-
er camps, the fact that various already opposing groups of Roma were
placed together only accrued the internal conflicts, which had material
repercussions on the camp: instances of vandalism—like the destruction of
containers, mostly by arson—took place as acts of revenge between
groups. Currently, Salone hosts around 900 Roma but the number is di-
minishing. The politics of the administration—as explained by a police of-
ficer—is to curb its expansion by removing containers of families who
leave the camp rather than assigning them to families evicted from else-
where.
The materiality of camps and the agency of human actors intertwine in
chains of mediators reassembling the camp, and with it, their Roma inhab-
itants as ontologically dangerous and ultimately ungovernable. I will trace
the associations producing the ungovernability of the Roma in two of the
human—non-human chains which I was able to observe during my field-
work.
Good fences make good neighbours
The metal, human height fence surrounding the camp of Salone is a recur-
rent theme in the reports of the SPE police unit—a special “public and
emergency security” unit set up in 2010, with the stated aim of controlling
authorized Roma camps, and executing the evictions of informal camps
ordered by the local authorities. Set up during the controversial and subse-
quently repelled legislation of the emergenza nomadi, the SPE could be
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seen as an ethnic police unit.57 The reports detailing patrolling operations
around the camps show a continuous concern to restore the borders of the
camp, purportedly for security reasons. Officers report that the fence is
continuously punctured by the Roma for the purpose of creating alterna-
tive ways into the camp through which the control at the gate could be
avoided.58 As Piasere asserts,59 the Roma camp has the sole logic of
“putting a border between who inhabits it and the surrounding society”, a
logic translated in the security idiom traceable in police reports: “The iron
fence which delimits the equipped Village of Salone is broken and missing
in numerous parts of the camp, which allows anyone to enter into and exit
from the Village, thus compromising the security of the camp itself”.60
For the police, the holes in the fence are proof that the camp inhabitants
wish to escape control; yet, they ignore the logic ruling camp comings and
goings. As many Roma explain, these acts are an effect of the inhabitants’
search for facility, but also for privacy in their comings and goings: in-
stead of longing the internal alley towards the end of the camp, they can
use the makeshift entrances next to their containers to shorten their paths,
while simultaneoulsy keeping their movements away from the intruding
gaze of other inhabitants, thus bending the material space to create autono-
my against the containment effects of the camp enclosure. For the police,
the broken fence is simultaneously a crime and proof of criminality: if
57 The declaration of the emergenza nomadi decree as unconstitutional in 2011 did
nothing to remove from its job description the task of dealing with the “nomads”,
in particular during operations of eviction mandated by the authorities. However,
after 2011 it received the supplementary task of handling minor refugees in Rome,
extending thus the “ethnic” specialization beyond the “nomads”.
58 In 2011, the Alemanno administration has introduced in most of the authorised and
tolerated camps an armed security guard service performed by a public utility
company. The guards were present 24 hours a day and were hosted in a container
placed at the entrance of camps. They were tasked with controlling the access to
the camp and reporting to the police or other relevant institutions on events oc-
curred inside the camp. In 2013, following the depletion of funding allocated
through the emergenza nomadi, the service has been removed. The guards mediat-
ed the policing of the Roma: they were in permanent contact with the SPE police
unit, sharing office space in Ponte di Nona and communicating on a daily basis
reports on events occurred during their shifts. Following the removal of the ser-
vice, the container used for the purpose was entirely vandalised and the structure
has since been removed.
59 Piasere 2006, p. 12.
60 Police report, September 26, 2014.
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breaking the fence is an act of vandalism on public property, hence a
crime, the holes punctured by camp inhabitants as an attempt to forge a
more comfortable space of autonomy inside the camp are mediators in re-
assembling the Roma as delinquent. The materiality of the holes is thus
experienced conceptually as criminality.61 The attention the fence receives
in police reports reveals the ambiguity of its protection/containment func-
tion: instead of ensuring security for the insiders/outsiders of the camp, it
fabricates camp inhabitants as producers of insecurity, creating a mecha-
nism for “securing mobility and mobilizing security”.62
At first sight, the thirty-two cameras placed on high poles all along the
fence of the Salone camp embody the panopticon, suggesting that the
moves of Roma inside the camp perimeter are under strict surveillance.
However, police reports and their correspondence with the company re-
sponsible for the management of the recordings reveal that the images
were almost never usable to identify perpetrators of vandalism inside the
camps, either because of their low quality (blurred or too distant from the
place of action), or because the cameras did not function at all, for months
at a time.63 Yet, the images taken by the cameras, when functioning, were
limited to a narrow space along the fence of the camp, testifying to the
agency of the camp enclosure in the decision of emplacement of the cam-
eras. This deeper scrutiny of how these cameras (do not) function rein-
forces the warning that “surveillance” should not be defined a priori as
such.64 Although intended to function, the primary mode of the cameras’
agency became performative rather than effective. The cameras speak a
language meaning different things to different actors: outside observers
will deduce that the Roma are legitimately and justifiably under control,
attesting to the ontological fusion65 between Roma and criminality, dan-
ger, and insecurity. On the contrary, for activists and pro-Roma advocates,
the cameras enter into a different chain of associations: they suggest the
illegitimate and abusive treatment to which the Roma are subjected. The
61 Holbraad 2006.
62 Meiches 2015, p. 477.
63 Police correspondence to local administration September 15, 2011; Police report
on problematic situations at the Salone camp, October-December 2012; Corre-
spondence from Roma Universal Services to police October 1, 2011 and February
6, 2012.
64 Green/Zurawski 2015.
65 Holbraad/Pedersen 2012, p. 189.
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recurrent failure of the cameras, in turn, functions as a mediator in produc-
ing the “failure” of controlling the Roma, manufacturing among police of-
ficers a generalized feeling of impotence pervading all levels of the hierar-
chy of the SPE: the Roma cannot be contained and controlled, even by
means of pervasive surveillance or by the materiality of the fence. Thus,
the fences, the holes in them, and the cameras are incorporated by various
actors to build the frames of their explanations, surrounding themselves
with new resources66 which reassemble the Roma as dangerous and un-
governable.
Smokescreens
In the immediate outskirts of most of the large camps lie heaps of waste in
various quantities. Discarded or broken furniture, domestic appliances, old
clothes, broken toys and household objects, car carcasses and any of the
smaller parts of all these objects, as well as debris from construction sites
can be found surrounding the camp past the fences or walls. How waste is
amassed in large quantities around camps is a matter of contention, and of
arduous negotiations: for some, it is the sign of a cultural propensity of the
Roma to produce rubbish and live amidst it, incarnating what Piasere
called the “peoples of landfills”.67 Rubbish reproduces social hierarchies,
becoming the mediator of the reification of the Roma as abject; the dispos-
ability of waste is extended to the Roma, often referred to as “the scum of
society” (la feccia della società). However, a recent journalistic investiga-
tion68 has revealed an entire chain of shady, often mafia-related practices
of refuse management in which bulky detritus from construction sites is
dumped near camps or given to the Roma instead of being transported to
special sites. Domestic debris is given to Roma by private individuals or
small firms, for considerably less money and effort than what is requested
by special facilities to process them— the so-called “ecologic islands”,
where bureaucratic regulations make the process complicated, tiresome
and expensive.69
66 Latour 1996, p. 12.
67 Piasere 2005, p. 160.
68 Belli et al. 2015.
69 I have described more in detail elsewhere (Ivasiuc 2019) how waste is used in vi-
sualisations circulated on social media by the neighbourhood patrol of Ponte di
Nona, leading to the fabrication of the Roma as producers of insecurity in a pro-
Reassembling Insecurity: The Power of Materiality
381
Waste is recurrent in Facebook posts of the neighbourhood committees
of inhabitants in the camps’ surroundings, as well as on the social media
page of a group of citizens from Ponte di Nona, who carry out night pa-
trols in order to protect their neighbourhood of crime against property. The
latter also share large quantities of visual material on social media.70 In
their accounts, waste is a powerful agent: it has the power to transform a
neighbourhood from a middle-class habitat worthy of investment into a
decayed urban periphery. Waste abounds also in police reports signaling
“a severe situation of socio-environmental decay” in camps.71 The accu-
mulation of waste becomes a cultural marker for the Roma: “Such ethnic
groups persist in the traffic of abusively collected waste from construction
sites, companies and private individuals, discharging the refuse either in-
side the camp or on the neighbouring streets” (my emphasis).72 The public
sanitation services rarely collect waste accumulated near camps, and only
on demand and using extraordinary means, generally through subcontracts
to other firms.73 This, in turn, leads to the practice around which most an-
ti-Roma discourse is structured nowadays in Rome: the combustion of
remnants of waste around the camps.
The causes of the fires are ambivalent and multiple, and their initiators
are almost never caught. One of the reasons for the arson of certain types
of material is their treatment for the separation of metals: typically, the
copper and other rare metals inside electric cables are obtained by burning
the plastic insulation around. When the police investigates the origin of
fires, inhabitants remain silent and profess their ignorance as to who is re-
sponsible for them. Their silence facilitates the articulation of hypotheses
on low-intensity conflict between the Roma and the police: “It is hypothe-
cess of naturalization of social hierarchies, based on “social sorting” (Lyon 2003)
between providers of security and producers of insecurity.
70 Ivasiuc 2015 and 2019.
71 Police reports September 15, 2011 (Salone); March 28, 2012 (Salviati); January
10, 2013 (Salone); November 30, 2013 (Salviati).
72 Police report, March 8, 2012 (Salviati).
73 Subcontracting services by the direct attribution of contracts and the use of public
funds are the mechanisms used in profit-making schemes which have recently
amounted to the scandal of Mafia Capitale. Irrupted in November 2014, the scan-
dal revealed a network of corrupted public servants and their clients (either private
firms or non-governmental entities) involved in service provision towards refugee
and immigrant centres, as well as Roma camps.
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sized that the fire may have been caused by the village74 guests as retalia-
tion to the previously performed police activity” (institution of the parking
prohibition for vans, n.a.).75 Another police report states that the fire was
“presumably a form of protest against the dispositions of the municipal au-
thorities”.76 In another instance, a camp inhabitant suggests that a recent
fire may have been started by the families who had been evicted from the
camp on grounds of their generous bank accounts.77 These instances com-
mend a political reading of the phenomenon of fires, similar to Kerry
Ryan Chance’s approach in the case of a shack settlement in Durban
where the inhabitants systematically provoke fire, coming to “inhabit po-
litical roles”;78 using fire as a means to redirect power, the Roma become
legible to state agents as ungovernable.
The smoke resulting from the combustion of waste has come to lie at
the centre of securitarian discourses on the campi nomadi in Rome, taking
precedence over concerns of petty criminality. The discourses woven
around this practice refer predominantly to health-related concerns about
the inhalation of dioxin from the pyres, or to environmental concerns
about soil and water pollution following the infiltration of burnt sub-
stances into the ground. Dioxin, in the Italian imaginary, is a powerful me-
diator ingrained in the collective memory of the 1976 industrial accident
of Seveso, and is invested in negotiations around the danger produced by
smoke around the camps with new force. Occasionally, the neighbourhood
committees appear in the local press, requesting the intervention of the
army: “It is difficult to say this, because it’s a measure that goes against
the logic of democratic life, but the only solution possible at this point is
the intervention of the army to guard the area”.79 In May 2015, one of the
neighbourhood committees posts on social media a request to the Prefect
of Rome requesting “to militarise the TERRITORY or it won’t go well
(...), intervene immediately or the citizens will take things in their own
74 The authorized camps are ironically called “villages of solidarity”.
75 Police report July 4, 2014 (Salone).
76 Police report February 18, 2015.
77 Interview E., Salone, November 2014.
78 Chance 2015, p. 396.
79 ‘Roghi tossici nel campo rom Salviati, il Cdq Tor Sapienza chiede invio dell’Es-
ercito’ [Toxic fires in the Roma camp Salviati, the neighbourhood committee re-
quests the intervention of the Army]. May 26, 2015, http://www.municipioroma.it/
roghi-tossici-nel-campo-rom-salviati-il-cdq-tor-sapienza-chiede-invio-delleserci-
to/, retrieved May 26, 2015.
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hands. (...) This is not BLACKMAIL, but legitimate DEFENSE!”80 The
leitmotif of the exasperation of citizens which will soon push them to
“take things in their own hands” is recurrent also in the discourse of the
neighbourhood patrol, who yearly organizes protests as “ultimatums” ad-
dressed to authorities requesting the closure of the camps.
The neighbourhood committees and the patrol from Ponte di Nona of-
ten post images of smoke, with comments often referring to the neigh-
bourhood as “under siege”: “It is appropriate to use the army, because this
is a zone of war. These are the chemical weapons used”.81 These messages
provide the context for their digital audiences to post comments contain-
ing hate speech or inciting violence towards the Roma, typically revolving
around the leitmotif of “burn[ing] the camps with everyone inside”. These
photographs and the comments around them create acceptance towards
suggestions to burn the camps down, as such comments systematically re-
ceive “likes” (Ivasiuc 2019). In the process, security is implicitly con-
ceived of as the annihilation of the ones producing insecurity by means of
smoke. Smoke produces identities on both sides: whereas the Roma are
further criminalized, the politics of the neighbourhood committees pro-
duce a common victimhood identity mobilized in claims for military pro-
tection.
The smoke, its visualizations posted on social media, and the discus-
sions around the risks associated with inhaling dioxin create social alarm
and discontent to the point that the authorities, following the lobby of
neighbourhood committees, started organizing, at the suggestion of the
SPE, police patrols around some of the camps, precisely to control the
fires.82 The intent of the police to prevent fires precludes a judgment re-
garding their different types and functions. For instance, during one of the
patrols in December 2015, I witnessed the police requesting a family at
Salone to put off a fire they had lit to cook dinner outside their container;
on a different patrol at Salviati, on a winter evening after nightfall, police-
men asked a group of men to put off a wood fire they had lit in a metal
barrel to warm themselves up while socializing around it. Pro-Roma ac-
80 Facebook post, May 27, 2015, author’s translation, capital letters in original.
81 Facebook comment by SV, May 27, 2015.
82 Police correspondence to local administration, October 30, 2014: the commander
of the SPE requests the local police to institute a fixed surveillance service (servi-
zio di vigilanza fissa), “given the protests of citizens regarding the toxic smoke de-
rived from waste burning”.
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tivists report that some of the smoke comes from the heaters inside the
containers, which produce the same amount of alarm among neighbours as
the pyres of waste.
Policing different fires is not a practice performed in undifferentiated
ways. Because of the high demand of staff and resources that the continu-
ous surveillance service around the camps requires, the SPE has requested
the participation of all local police units in the process. This has lead to
internal conflicts and struggles between various police units and between
agents and their superiors; in these struggles, the labour conditions around
the camps are securitized, as police agents contest the decision: “at the site
in which the surveillance was carried out there is presumably toxic smoke
due to the combustion of braziers inside the shacks and containers of the
camp. Moreover there is a substantial quantity of garbage on the side of
the street, which makes the environment insalubrious”.83 Many agents are
reluctant to spend hours on end in a service that is deemed difficult and
dangerous, but also worthless and stigmatized: there is something like a
social division of police labour in which the SPE, considered the “Gyp-
sies’ police”, is seen as carrying out labour inferior to other police work.
In practice, various patrol teams carry out the surveillance service with
varying degrees of involvement: whereas some teams jump at the sight of
any quantity of smoke, demanding that any fire be put off, some other
teams do not intervene at all, even when smoke is visible inside the camp.
When the police alert the firemen regarding an incipient waste fire, they
are sometimes met with their refusal to intervene until the fire becomes
more powerful, or with delays which sometimes lead to the extension of
the fire. The neighbourhood committees have picked up on the inefficien-
cy of the surveillance service. For example, on Facebook, on a photograph
of smoke rising from the camp of Salviati, a member of the neighbour-
hood committee from Tor Sapienza highlights the police car parked out-
side, at a considerable distance from the camp entrance, to suggest the in-
ability of the police to control the fires. Members of both neighbourhood
committees often engage in accusations that the police are not efficient in
protecting them from smoke, reproducing narratives of citizens soon
“pushed to take things in their own hands”. The inefficiency of the contin-
uous surveillance service strengthens a discourse articulating the impo-
83 The text was repeated in several police reports, accusing current regulations for
the lack of conformity of these particular labour conditions.
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tence of the police to tackle the problem with a pre-existing narrative of
abandonment by the institutions;84 all the while, the inhabitants of periph-
eral neighborhoods produce self-victimized identities while criminalizing
the Roma.
The power of materiality and the materiality of power
Within critical security studies, power has been studied in rather unsys-
tematic ways, and, first and foremost, the power of the securitizing elites
and the impact of securitization on power relations have constituted points
of scholarly interest;85 at the same time, attention to the materiality of se-
curitization is relatively recent. This gap invites reflection on the power of
materiality, and the materiality of power in securitization.
Tapping into the potential of the actor-network perspective, I have
showed how objects are mobilized by various actors to make certain secu-
ritizing moves, in a maze of discursive and material practices spanning a
field of negotiations; the space of the camp has become associations86
which render the Roma as producers of insecurity. As we have seen, the
camp plays a consequential, highly ambiguous role. Conceived as a tech-
nology of threat containment, the camp, together with its materiality, si-
multaneously fabricates and perpetuates the very danger it purports to con-
tain, by entering into powerful associations which produce an ever grow-
ing demand for more security, and more policing. If the fence is there to
contain—and, although ambiguously, also to protect—the camp inhabi-
tants, the holes they puncture in the fence associate with police in chains
which cast the Roma as ontologically criminal, uncontainable and un-
governable. The objects making up the waste around the camps associate
in complex networks with the regulations of “ecological islands”, compa-
ny staff and individuals seeking to minimize the costs of discarding bulky
refuse, the money given to the Roma in exchange for disposing of these
objects, the public sanitation company not serving the areas around the
camp, the fear for falling real estate prices in “decaying” neighborhoods,
and the material posted by the patrol and the neighbourhood committees
on social media. Smoke from the pyres of rubbish, in turn, associates with
84 Quassoli 2004.
85 Balzacq 2011; Balzacq et al. 2015; see also Langenohl, this volume.
86 Latour 1996.
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neighbourhood committees and their securitizing moves, the visual and
textual material posted on social media, the technology of the Facebook
interface allowing for the co-production of speeches and images, the au-
thorities ordering police patrols, the SPE, safety labour regulations, other
police units and so on, producing every time anew the camp and its inhab-
itants as dangers demanding security measures.
The incorporation of the materiality of the camp and the ways in which
objects are used in the production of insecurity allowed for the increased
focus on forms of agency which often remain invisible in accounts on Ro-
ma camps which do not take the power of the camp materiality fully into
account. Often, more shallow perspectives adopt dichotomies between the
dominant and the subordinate, whose agencies seem confined to the prede-
termined roles of the “powerful” against the “powerless”. However, the
material elasticity of the camp87 allows for the Roma to exert some forms
of (what is commonly assumed to be) “power” on the concrete ways in
which they are contained by the enclosure of the camp and the attempts to
enact surveillance: breaking the fences in what seems to be a continuous
“guerrilla” with the police, acts of vandalism on containers and cameras
exerted in response to surveillance measures, and the continuous practice
of manifestly uncontrollable fires. On the other hand, all too often police
control, surveillance, and repression are conceptualized as totalizing re-
pressive power. My argument allows nuance in this debate, as the police
often prove “powerless” in front of the phenomena with whose contain-
ment they are entrusted. This account helps revisit familiar assumptions
about power, and allows for the conceptualization of its locus in securiti-
zation.
The concept of power is, for Latour, “a pliable and empty term” used
uncritically to “explain (away) hierarchy, obedience or hegemony”, which,
he argues, social scientists would do better to do away with; it allows a
shortcut precluding the actual work of explaining. He subsequently pro-
poses a model of translation to account for the circulation of “claims, or-
ders, artefacts, goods” through chains made of multiple agents acting on
the “token” that is to be transmitted—in our case, insecurity. In such a
transmission, there is no inertia attributable to an abstract concept of pow-
er; rather, the translation is the consequence of the “energy” with which




is immediately reinvested in the chain. The transmission finds new impe-
tus as the actors find new sources of energy. In the process, actors mold
the token to suit their interests, transforming it and passing it along to oth-
ers, who in turn change it and shape it anew.
Conceptually, the chains of camp inhabitants, the objects they manipu-
late, and the conceptions they engender among residents, the neighbour-
hood patrol, and the police, are new, hybrid objects, reassembling insecu-
rity through their complex associations. In the process, they become the
power to securitize. Power is not possessed, but exerted, requiring its con-
ceptual treatment as a consequence, rather than a cause of action (Latour
1984). Thus, power is not the cause of securitization moves, as securitiza-
tion scholarship would have it, but its consequence. A long chain of medi-
ators work together towards ever greater securitizing moves, and an ever
more impending threat of violence on Roma camps. To claim that the
neighbourhood committees or the patrol group have the power to securi-
tize would ignore the work of smoke, the SPE, and the multitude of other
associations which produced the institution of camp patrols to police fires.
And even when this particular securitizing move has succeeded in enact-
ing exceptional measures, can it really be said that the neighbourhood
committees have power, given the inefficient policing of the pyres? The
power to securitize, rather than being held by powerful actors, is contained
in the entire chain of associations resting on the materiality of the camp.
Power, then, becomes material.
The conceptual exercise I have proposed is to apply Latour’s model of
translation to the theorization of securitization in a model in which materi-
ality plays at least as important a role as the agency of the humans forming
the chains along which passes the ever-transforming insecurity with which
the Roma are endowed. Thus, the Roma are perpetually produced as dan-
gerous, thus in need of security measures and policies, through the agency
of the complex and shifting chains of human and non-human actants trans-
lating “insecurity” with the fresh resources provided at each step in the
chain: the camp, the holes in the fence, the surveillance cameras, the acts
of vandalism perpetrated in retaliation within the camp, the waste, the
smoke—and the dioxin in it—the photographs of smoke on social media,
the police patrols, the neighbourhood committees, the SPE, labour safety
regulations, and onwards and sideways to a multitude of other actants. In
the process, power is not something either possessed, or exerted by
“powerful” actors, but collectively exerted through chains of associations
linked to the materiality of the camp itself.
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Some will perhaps argue that the argument is attempting to dissolve
racism, diffusing—and defusing—it through objects devoid of intentional-
ity. The discussion about this particular politics of explanation is intricate
and beyond the scope of this chapter; however, the analytical choice of
positing the racism and discrimination with which Roma deal in their con-
crete lives not as explanans, but as explanandum, also means that to refer
to it in the explanation would render the argument circular.
There is, perhaps, a promising escape from securitization: the chain of
translation may be interrupted at any point, should the token be dropped.
A politics of altering the materiality of the camp would probably open up
a path out of the incremental securitization of the Roma in Rome. And this
had better happen before the humans entering the securitization chains ac-
quire new resources to enact the promise of burning down the camp.
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